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HARVARD STUDIES IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 69

HARVARD STUDIES
IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

VOLUME 69



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PREFATORY NOTE

The *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* are published by the authority of the President and Fellows of Harvard College on behalf of the Department of the Classics. Publication is assisted by the generosity of the Class of 1856, as well as by other gifts and bequests.

By reason of the abundance of contributions, the present volume represents only one half of what was originally planned for volume 69. The other half will appear as volume 70 shortly hereafter. One other important change has taken place: the Carl Newell Jackson lectures, formerly printed in this series, will normally appear in future as separate volumes under the imprint of the Harvard University Press.

Although the chief purpose of the *Harvard Studies* is to publish articles by instructors and graduate students at Harvard, scholars in other institutions are invited to submit articles. Manuscripts should be sent to The Editorial Committee, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 320 Boylston Hall, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

The editors wish to express their thanks as always to colleagues who have helped in preparing this volume.

W. V. Clausen

J. P. Elder

J. H. Finley, Jr.

C. H. Whitman

Editorial Committee

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ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE

1881-1964

A Minute presented to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences on May 19, 1964, by the following committee: Professor J. P. Elder, Professor emeritus, W. C. Greene, Dr. R. M. Gummere, Dr. D. T. W. McCord, and Professor Mason Hammond (chairman).

*Felix qui potuit doctos componere libros
Fortunatus et ipse deos qui novit agrestis.*

So might Virgil be altered for Arthur Stanley Pease. Scholar, botanist, administrator, indefatigable pedestrian, and New Englander to the core, he thus described himself in his Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Class Report:

I will confess that I am by nature a collector, that I began with marbles and horse-chestnuts, advanced to postage stamps, continued with botany and books, and at all times have gathered facts and occasionally ideas.

These two latter items, in lack of sufficient cranial space for dead storage, I enter methodically on 3 × 5 slips of paper. When enough of a kind are amassed, they are outspread, classified, digested, written down, dehydrated, and lo! an article, or more rarely a book, to be perused by some lone watcher in Czechoslovakia or beside the Bay of Biscay. Still onward, however, boiling down, like Aristotle and the maple-syrup makers, a thousand gallons of facts to a half-pint of principles; or, to change the figure, bringing order into a few of life's storage closets, discovering there some garments which still have good wear in them, and persuading my students to wrap this raiment about their intellectual nakedness. All of which, as Augustine says, is "a great task and a difficult, but God is our helper."

Pease was born on September twenty-second, 1881, in his grandfather's parsonage in Somers, Connecticut. His father, Theodore Claudius Pease, after taking several parishes, accepted a professorship at the Andover Theological Seminary but died almost immediately upon arrival there. His mother, Abbey Francis Cutler Pease, lived on in Andover so that her son could attend Phillips Academy. On his graduation in 1898, he showed his talent for collecting by winning numerous prizes; he well remembered the embarrassment which a squeaky new pair of shoes caused him on his many trips to and from the platform. At Harvard, he received the A.B. in 1902 *summa cum laude* and with Highest Honors in Classics, and he delivered the Latin Commencement

Arthur Stanley Pease

Part on the benefits of the scholarly life, benefits which he himself was amply to exemplify. An A.M. in 1903 was followed by the Ph.D. in 1905, with a thesis on some problems concerning Saint Jerome's commentaries and tracts on the Psalms. After a year at the American School of Classical Studies in Rome, he returned to Harvard for three years as Instructor in the Classics and then went to the University of Illinois. In 1924 he left a chair of Classics there to accept one at Amherst. He served that college as President from 1927 to 1932. He was a quiet, able, and well-liked administrator, and it is symptomatic of his diversity of interest that on his retirement he was said to have strengthened the Departments of Philosophy, Fine Arts, Hygiene, and Physical Education. The Amherst Library still reflects his concern for building up its classical collections. He received Honorary Doctorates of Law from Williams College in 1931 and from Amherst in 1933.

Though he accepted a professorship of the Classics at Harvard in 1932 because he preferred teaching and scholarship to administration, he served as Chairman of the Department of the Classics from 1942 to 1946. Also from 1942 until his retirement in 1950, he held the Pope Professorship of the Latin Language and Literature. He belonged to a number of societies, classical, botanical, literary, and mountaineering, in many of which he held office, notably the presidency of the American Philological Association from 1939 to 1940. He was a Trustee of the Loeb Classical Library from 1933 until his death on January seven, 1964, in the eighty-third year of his age.

These bare bones of an academic career were fleshed with effective teaching, distinguished scholarship in Latin, and an equal reputation as a botanist. Pease's students found in him an old-fashioned thoroughness, precision of bibliographical and illustrative information, a succinct but penetrating and dryly humorous criticism, and a warm friendship whether in Sever Hall or on country walks. The sixtieth volume of the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, dedicated to him in 1951, contains his bibliography of one hundred and seventy-eight reviews, articles, and books—a list surely by no means complete. His chief scholarly publications were an *Index* to the plays of Seneca with W. A. Oldfather in 1919, and exegetical editions of Cicero's *de Divinatione* in two volumes in 1920 and 1923, of the fourth book of the *Aeneid* in 1935, and of Cicero's *de Natura Deorum* in two volumes in 1955 and 1958. Soundness of judgment, breadth of appreciation, and a wealth of information render these commentaries in Thucydides' words: κτήματα ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγωνίσματα ἐς τὸ παραχρήμα ἀκούειν. Indeed many of the notes, such as that on the ill-omened *bubo* in *Aeneid* IV, line 462,

Arthur Stanley Pease

are authoritative treatises, rich in parallels from ancient and modern literature.

Characteristic of his "double life" is the fact that his first article, in 1901, was on "Some Wild-Flowers of Andover." His *Vascular Flora of Coös County, New Hampshire*, published in 1924, remains so standard that his revision was in press when he died. Likewise just published at that time was a study with Richard E. Schultes of *Generic Names of Orchids: Their Origin and Meaning*. In Coös County lies Randolph, where Pease spent almost every summer of his life and which served as a base for the thorough exploration of every notch and peak of the White Mountains and neighboring ranges. His travels also took him far afield; in this hemisphere, from the Gaspé Peninsula to Central America and from Maine to the Canadian Rockies; in Europe, from Norway to Greece and from France to Turkey; and in 1927 around the world. Five plants were named for him, and the first article of his volume of the *Harvard Studies*, by his friend and mentor Professor Merritt L. Fernald, is entitled "Arthur Stanley Pease, the Botanical Explorer." Indeed, to walk anywhere with Stanley Pease was continual discovery of plants and flowers in their secret stations. In 1946, he collected several of his many charming essays on plants, people, and places in *Sequestered Vales of Life*.

Pease married in 1909 Henrietta Faxon of Boston, Radcliffe 1901, who balanced his New England reserve with an outgoing warmth and wit. Their daughter Henrietta (Mrs. Sherwood Washburn) and her family brought great delight to their summers in Randolph. From his youth on, Pease was a meticulous and punctual diarist, and in his later years a faithful and beloved member of the distinguished Cambridge dining group called "The Club." In retirement, he maintained his enthusiasm for Latin, walking, friendship, and botanizing. He bore his isolating deafness with humor and self-sufficiency and thus remained happy until his final illness: *iam senior, sed cruda illi viridisque senectus*. In his Fiftieth Anniversary Class Report he summed up his philosophy of old age:

At three score years and ten, I trust that our sympathy for others has become somewhat mellowed, but experience has given me a critical distrust of many popular panaceas and nostrums, educational, social, political, and economic, and a reluctance to expect the immediate arrival either of the millennium or of human annihilation.

Pease was one of whom it might be said, borrowing from Ennius:

Moribus antiquis res stat Harvarda virisque.

AMATORIA CRITICA

BY G. P. GOOLD

THE textual criticism* of Ovid's *Amores*, *Medicamina Faciei Femineae*, *Ars Amatoria*, and *Remedia Amoris* has now been established on a firm foundation by Mr. E. J. Kenney's Oxford Classical Text: thanks to his great skill as an editor it is now possible to discern a picture of the manuscript tradition as clear as it could ever have been drawn, certainly much clearer than that which emerged from Munari's edition of the *Amores* (this, too, be it said, an excellent work); and in the final task of criticism, the determination of the author's exact words and meaning, the new edition contains several notable advances on what had been achieved before, fresh conjectures and interpretations, the rehabilitation of neglected or incorrectly abandoned manuscript readings, and better spelling and punctuation.

Nevertheless, the textual criticism of these poems is so difficult that it would indeed be cause for wonder if the new edition were totally devoid of those imperfections *quas aut incuria fudit aut humana parum cavit natura*. It is the purpose of this study to suggest ways in which a still closer proximity to a perfect text might be effected, by detecting and repairing blemishes in the Oxford text, the best so far produced. "Finding faults, if they are real and not imaginary, is the most useful sort of criticism." But let it never be forgotten that for every crux which I mention there are ten whereon I am silent: my approval of the editor's decision may be for these inferred, and I trust that this accumulated approval may weigh the more heavily in view of the fullness of the disagreement expressed.

* I have debated most of this article with Mrs. Anna Maria Dabrowski, whose fine feeling for Latin and Latin literature has reversed our roles of teacher and student on numerous occasions: I thank her for her kind permission to publish her conjectures at *Am.* 3.3.17f and *Ars* 2.669ff, and I record (with some misgivings) that she dissents from several of my judgments. In correspondence I have profited considerably from discussion with Professor Otto Skutsch and Mr. Kenney himself. I should also like to refer the reader to my review of the new edition, which appeared in *AJP* 86 (1965) 89-92.

I make no apology for the diffuseness of these notes: in this field, at least, *brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio*; the emendator who corrected the error at *Rem.* 221, for example, stated his conjecture briefly and without argument, and it has been ignored: I have done my best, with a longish note, to ensure that every future editor places it in the text. To facilitate comprehension by the reader, I often append to a text a résumé of it in English: these résumés are *not* designed to be model translations; they often leave out Latin words or add others from the context or give the inner meaning or even emphasize by willful exaggeration the point at issue. In order to conserve space I often treat several passages under one head; and for the same reason I refer to Kenney's important articles thus: "Notes on Ovid," *CQ* n.s.8 (1958) 54-66 and "Notes on Ovid: II," *CQ* n.s.9 (1959) 240-260 simply as *Notes* with the page-number; and "The Manuscript Tradition of Ovid's *Amores*, *Ars Amatoria*, and *Remedia Amoris*," *CQ* n.s.12 (1962) 1-31 simply as *Man. Trad.* with the page-number.

To three great men, whose scholarship is my light and inspiration, some special deference is warranted. The primacy of Nicolaus Heinsius in Ovidian criticism is even in this study conspicuous: from no other scholar have editors taken so much truth and still left so much behind. Bentley never edited Ovid, but the margins of his texts are so full of readings and opinions (known to me from Hedicke's *Studia Bentleiana V*) as almost to invest them with the status of an edition: some of these readings are obviously no more than "the mere guesses which we all jot down in our margins simply to help us take up the thread of thought tomorrow where we drop it today," and it would be foolish and unjust to represent them as judgments sanctioned with the Master's *imprimatur*. However, others are expressions of opinion which may be taken as final: Bentley does not give reasons, unfortunately; else I should, I know, have followed him more and not less; even his attempts to alter a sound text, as at *Ars* 2.506, somehow shed illumination upon the author. Housman's contributions, most of which appear without argument in the apparatus to Postgate's *Corpus*, are less numerous, and I venture on occasion to cross swords with him; but he was a giant of a scholar, and frequently exerts decisive influence in settling this point or that. It may be mentioned that Gow records (*A. E. Housman: A Sketch* 41) that "some preoccupation with Ovid is apparent in 1914 and the following years, and I have a recollection of his saying that, if more evidence were available as to the manuscripts, he would construct a text of the amatory poems." Not I, but these judges, attended by lesser though still imposing dignitaries, are the real authors of the following critique.

THE MANUSCRIPTS

Our texts of the Amatory Poems of Ovid are derived from a medieval archetype which contained in order the *Ars Amatoria*, the *Remedia Amoris*, the *Amores*, and the *Heroides*. I will call it Ω . If Tafel is right in his theory that it entered the Frankish kingdom from Spain, then it is tempting to indulge the fancy — it can be no more — that it was brought in the latter half of the eighth century by Theodulf, the Spanish bishop of Orleans, who not only shows himself acquainted with peculiar readings which our tradition contains, not only informs us of a copy of Ovid in his library, but has already by others been credited with introducing Martial and Cyprian to the scholars of the Carolingian revival. In that case, the Amatory Poems may even have journeyed to us from the school of Isidore.

Errors infecting the whole tradition testify to the existence of this archetypal manuscript; and we are obliged to postulate that it was much used and liberally glossed. It is possible that two leaves (2×52 verses) containing *Her.* 16.39–144 (not reckoning 97f) eventually fell out; and that so also, though the next twenty-three leaves (*Her.* 16.145–21.14 plus 10 lines for titles = 23×52) were unaffected, did the pages at the end, which fortunately, but mysteriously, made their way by some sequestered and as yet completely unknown path to emerge for a brief moment in the 15th century before disappearing for ever.

No doubt Ω was several times copied, and in turn Ω 's copies several times copied, too. Not some, but most, of these are now lost without trace. We cannot hope to find, a thousand years later, complete monastery records of even every authorized copy of a book which instructed the lover's progress from handshake to boudoir. Our extant manuscripts can only be a fraction of what once existed. They may conveniently be divided into two groups.

The first group derives from a manuscript which I shall call α : it may have been a direct copy of the archetype. Its value, however, was a trifle impaired by the omission of occasional words and even verses. These enable the investigator to identify the group. The chief omissions are *Am.* 1.13.11–14; 2.2.18–27; *Ars* 1.466–471 (conceivably homoeomeson in the fifth foot... *clamatam*... / ... *claratram*...); *Rem.* 9–10; and 189–90. I wonder if we should add to the list *Ars* 1.395f (homoeoteleuton... *abi* / ... *tibi*), though I agree that the verses are not Ovid's.

The principal manuscript of the group is R (9th century), which once

contained as much as the archetype in its mutilated condition, i.e., *Ars*, *Rem.*, *Am.*, and *Her.* in part. All we have now is half of it. The following is a hypothesis to account for the facts. Years after it was written, the manuscript was broken in half, so that the *Amores* and *Heroides* might be removed. Unfortunately, the *Amores* commenced on a leaf which contained the concluding verses of the *Remedia*; and these the owner of the manuscript was unwilling to part with. Accordingly, the prospective recipient of the latter portion, being anxious to oblige the vendor, agreed to forego the first poem in the *Amores*. Now R happens to join the first two poems together without advertising the fact, and since the apparent second poem began near the bottom of the verso of a leaf, the purchaser—*uix mihi credetis, sed credite*—deliberately tore off the horizontal strip of paper containing the first few verses of *Am.* 1.3; he tore the page a little higher than the beginning of the poem (so as to be on the safe side); and, as a result, he took a couple of verses at the end of *Am.* 1.2 as well. Consequently R, in which the tear described is plainly to be seen, finishes at *Am.* 1.2.50; and P (which is an apograph of the abstracted portion of R) begins its text of the *Amores* at *Am.* 1.2.51. It will be convenient to defer for a moment the other manuscripts of the α group.

The second group of manuscripts may be dubbed the β group. This does not mean that they necessarily derive from a single hyparchetype, β , but for the sake of clarity I shall proceed upon that assumption. In the case of α we can reconstruct its contents with fair accuracy, and may even infer from certain dislocations in R that it contained 25 verses to the page. But in the case of β we are completely in the dark. The earliest extant manuscripts of this group are already several stages removed from the source; and the later manuscripts are so much cross-bred with themselves, mongrelized with the α group, and inseminated with conjecture, that to reconstruct the pedigree of any individual manuscript is impossible. What is worse, we are often unable to reconstruct the pedigree of a particular reading: of scores of readings in the text we cannot tell whether they derive from Ω through β or whether they are pure divination, to be imputed to the genius of medieval scholars. A case in point is the end of the hexameter *Am.* 2.1.17: *fulmen amisi* α , *fulmina misi* ω , that is most β type manuscripts. Now Ea, one of the β type manuscripts, has *fulmen abiuit*, a manifest attempt to emend the unmetrical *fulmen amisi*. It rather looks as if ω 's reading is the vulgate attempt to emend *fulmen amisi*, which would then go back through β to the archetype. However, the correct reading, *fulmen omisi*, is found in ς (Kenney's symbol for a(ny) minority of the β type manuscripts).

Kenney regards the authenticity of this reading as certain, arguing that "no medieval corrector would have dared to write *ōmisi*" (*Gnomon* 33 [1961] 480, note 1). Why not? Was he afraid to brave comment in the learned journals? Was he afraid to write *solus* for *turpis* at *Am.* 2.10.4? Why does it require more daring to write *fulmen omisi* than *fulmen āmisi* (the latter of course metrically faulty)? It is much more probable that the scribes of *ς* realized that *fulmen amisi* was wrong and thought that *omisi* (they doubtless knew the verb in the vernacular) might be right. The copyists of the middle ages were seldom deaf to meter: however corrupt a verse might be, it never remained unmetrical for long (see Housman, *Manilius*, vol. 1, pp. lix ff).

Whoever asserts that the middle ages had no part in textual scholarship is contraverted by the 13th-century *Versus Bursarii Ouidii* (my knowledge is, unhappily, limited to what has been published by Alton, *Hermathena* 95 [1961] 67 ff), which provided comment on especially difficult passages: the note on the lemma *uotum . . . lire* at *Am.* 2.18.26 includes mention of the true reading *uotam . . . lyram* (-i-), and that on the lemma *certantibus . . . ephebis* at *Ars* 1.147 includes mention of the true reading *c(a)lestibus . . . eburnis*. Here, then, we find what is virtually an apparatus criticus existing at a date anterior to that of some of the manuscripts which constitute our earliest authority for many correct readings; and hence it is that an authentic tradition was preserved along with texts which displayed, themselves, an adulterated version of it; hence, also, we may surmise, the truth was occasionally restored by critical skill. Nor were the merits of variant readings first debated then. Disagreement over the finer points of scholarship surely played some part in the bitter professorial feud between Matthew of Vendôme and Arnulf of St. Euvert which had raged in the previous century — with nothing barred, to judge from the former's references to the latter's wife. Arnulf's commentary on the *Remedia Amoris* ended, we learn, with the amusing explicit "... hoc opus de remediis quod Arnulfus glosavit ad sanandos illos qui a Fulcone erant decepti" (cf. *Rem.* 814). We cannot follow Ovidian criticism back to the Theodulfian period of the schools of Orleans, but there can be little doubt that it existed. The archetype may have dwelt in this area, and from the archetype sprang the 9th-century Oxford manuscript, O, which has been traced to Glastonbury, aye, even to St. Dunstan's study, and was certainly used in Wales for teaching purposes.

The preceding will serve to introduce a few modifications of Kenney's *stemmata codicum* (edition, page vi).

Amores. For this work we have P (9/10th-century), S (11th-century), and some twenty manuscripts (ω), mostly of the 13th century. P, it is agreed, is descended from α ; and, since they contain the passages which α omits, the ω manuscripts may as a whole be considered descended from β . Kenney, following Tafel and Munari, derives S from α independently of P (and R). Herein is illustrated a danger which often menaces stemmatological studies. A simple stemma depends for its validity on two conditions, (1) that manuscripts are mechanically copied, each from a single exemplar, and (2) that they are not enriched with variant readings or corrected. If the readings of a manuscript are deliberately chosen from sources other than a single exemplar, that is, if its text is subjected to an editorial process, then the foundation of stemmatology is destroyed, and its purpose nullified. S is just such a manuscript. Kenney's stemma suggests that it derives its text from the archetype independently of R and of ω . If this were the case, we should expect it to offer several improvements on R (where R's scribe has made an original error) and we should expect it to be immune from the multitudinous errors which characterize ω . This is not what we find: in fact S's text produces hardly a reading which is not shared with either P or ω , and the readings which are not so shared are all suspect. In particular, we should expect S to exhibit the title which stood in the archetype: ANIMORVM LIBER PRIMVS. This title was preserved by α , but (as making no sense) it was omitted by β . Owing to the maladroit dimidiation of R, even R(2) lacked the title. As a result the middle ages knew the *Amores* as "*Ovidius sine titulo*."

Should we imagine a manuscript copied from R(2), with the missing first poem(s) added from some β source, and with liberal interpolations then inserted from that same β source, then we should be imagining the kind of exemplar from which S was copied. Where P is extant, S is a manuscript with little or nothing to contribute to the text; its chief interest is the remarkable example it affords of the interpolation of β variants upon an α text; and its chief value is the negative one of confirming the R origin of P's evidence. Where P is not extant, S occasionally enables the critic to divine the lost reading of P: at *Am.* 3.6.23 it is clear that P read *debebant* ("should," not "should have"), an idiomatic imperfect often found with modal verbs, expressing a hypothetical present or future as a possibility beyond fulfillment. Among our manuscripts of the Amatory Poems there are pretty certainly others like S which, though strictly speaking descended from α , are so interpolated with β readings as to conceal altogether their ancestry as copies. They are no more to be fitted into a *stemma codicum* than the Oxford Text itself.

Ars Amatoria. In his recension of the *Ars* Kenney (after Tafel) recognizes four representatives of the α group: R, Sa (11th-century), b (10th-century), all derived from a common source, ρ , an apograph of α ; and O, derived from η , another apograph of α . There is no warrant for such detail, which can only lead to a prejudiced evaluation of the variants where these authorities are divided (at 1.211, for example). It is best to treat them as independently descended from α (b seems, like S in the *Amores*, to have been compiled from both α and β). We should probably have been able to attain a much surer state of knowledge, had these authorities attested the text of the whole work; but O bears witness to the first book only, Sa to a mere 230 lines, and b to less than a hundred. The four authorities overlap for forty lines only; and even here a difficulty occurs to undermine confidence in the proposed stemma, at *Ars* 1.37 *placitam* RO (right), *placidam* Sa, b (wrong).

Of course, this and other difficulties can be spirited away by invoking the theory that the archetype contained variants. Certainly, if O gives a fair picture of the archetype, this must be the case: Chatelain (*Pal. des Cl. Lat.*, vol. 2, pl. 93) presents us with a facsimile of one of its pages; it is covered with interlinear glosses and explanations. Possibly its exemplar was, too. But a suspicion lurks in my mind that some of O's original readings did not exist in the archetype at all. At 1.341 *libidine* R ω (right), *cupidine* O, the latter reading is a palpable interpolation. So also at 1.244 *uinis* R ω (right), *ueneri* O. Possibly 1.592 *uerba* R ς (and Theodulf, *Carm.* 28.640) was the reading of the archetype rather than *bella* O ω (clearly right, but not a difficult conjecture for anyone who remembered just one of the other fourteen Ovidian instances of *fera bella*). At 1.328 *carere* O may be a conjecture based on any of nine Ovidian instances of *posse carere*, for *placere* R ω was almost certainly the linear reading of the archetype. At 1.684, *uenus* RO ω , interpolated from 1.248, must have been the reading of the archetype, and *duas* O (variant) may be no more than the happy conjecture of one who had read *Her.* 16.70.

We are fortunate in having for the whole of the *Ars Amatoria* A, an 11th or 12th-century manuscript of the β group. Like all its brethren it is marred by interpolation, but it enjoys the credit of preserving the β text better than any other extant source, and it occasionally corrects the strong combination of RO β , e.g., at 1.269. If its reading here is a conjecture, its maker showed himself once at any rate the superior of Heinsius and Housman. But this is not a likely explanation, and at 1.466 the authenticity of A's tradition is certain. At 1.499 *mirere* R ς , *mirare* OA ς and 1.557 *caelo* R ω , *caeli* OA ς , we see that A is not untouched by

interpolation from an α source; so we should be prepared for the rarity of A siding with RO in an incorrect reading, where ω preserves the truth, and not judge the issue at 1.503 or 1.747, for example, simply by plumping for ROA against ω on the strength of this combination being usually right.

Remedia Amoris. Here Kenney's stemma is to be criticized in one small but significant point: whereas he used the symbol α in the *Amores* and *Ars Amatoria* to denote the hyparchetype from which R was descended, in the *Remedia* he has unwittingly used it to denote the archetype Ω by deriving from it E and K, two early representatives of the β group. Small wonder that he finds (*Man. Trad.* 22) "no evidence which guarantees the independence of the *recc.* [ω] from REK." It may be remarked that E also contains the *Achilleid* of Statius and a portion of the *Heroides*, in both of which works its interpolated character is clear. That R is the only survivor of the α group, and that EK ω are representatives of the β group is revealed by entries like the following:

<i>Rem.</i> 9f:	<i>habent EKω, omittit R</i>
<i>Rem.</i> 189f:	<i>habent EKω, omittit R</i>
<i>Rem.</i> 207:	<i>studium studium EKω, studium R</i>
<i>Rem.</i> 376:	<i>usibus R, uersibus EKω</i>
<i>Rem.</i> 399:	<i>iuuenale R, iuuenile EKω</i>
<i>Rem.</i> 476:	<i>syllaba R, littera EKω</i>
<i>Rem.</i> 611:	<i>reccidit R, decidit EKω</i>
<i>Rem.</i> 677:	<i>amanti R, amicae EKω</i>

E and K are the Cox and Box of the β manuscripts: when one fails to preserve the reading of the group, the other is sure to take its place. Indeed, between them they provide such good coverage for the β group that rarely is a true reading preserved in ω but not in EK (as at 357 and 361, for example). The *Remedia* was used in the post-Carolingian period (no doubt in a β type recension) as a prescribed educational text; and to this is to be attributed the high degree of standardization of the β manuscripts.

No exact positions in a stemma can be fixed for E and K: no fixed positions exist. The character of the manuscripts, however, may be briefly sketched. E is much addicted to conjecture, and when with a few cronies it shares a reading opposed to K ω , we shall be well advised to suspect that such a reading (right or wrong) was not the reading of β . K does not indulge in the hariolations practiced by E, but it has snobbish tendencies and often seeks to disguise its common origin by

passing off as its own the superior heritage of R, so that it, too, no less than E, may not be presumed to testify to β , when it differs from $E\omega$. For example: 644 querenda $RK\omega(=\alpha, \beta)$, dolenda E (a conjecture to avoid a deponent gerundive); 438 mos $E\omega(=\beta, \text{right})$, mox $RK(=\alpha, \text{borrowed from } R \text{ by } K)$. Fortunately, there is no spiritual affinity between the two manuscripts; the fabrications of E have nothing in common with the affectations of K: when they tell the same story, there is a strong presumption that it is devoid of duplicity.

ORTHOGRAPHY

In the days of Heinsius and Bentley, Latin texts were edited by Latinists whose healthy disregard for orthographical trifles, augmented by a full awareness of the antics of medieval scribes, banned all fancy spellings from the pages of the classics. No doubt in shutting some monstrosities out they kept others in, but with the passage of time most of these have been denounced and deported. Today, however, there is a grave danger that addiction to pseudo-scientific principles may cause editors to disfigure their authors' works with what one can only describe as a caricature of their spelling. That Housman should print in his text of Manilius *sequuntur*, *secuntur*, and *sequuntur* is too absurd for words when it is probable that the poet wrote *sequuntur* in all three places: orthographical acceptance of the change of -uo- to -uu- in inflections is at least as old as 17 B.C., for a denarius then minted bears the legend DIVVS IVLIVS; and we are able in the case of the Propertian manuscripts to dismiss spellings like *equs* and *quoi* as false archaisms, knowing that the archetype read *equus* and *cui*.

Ovid spelled the penultimate vowel of the superlative with an *i*, according to the testimony of the manuscripts in several hundred places: but at *Am.* 3.2.70 the editors of the 20th century, presumably in deference to the manuscripts, offer us *proxumus*. Is it really likely that Ovid here abandoned *proximus*, the spelling of his age, which he employed ninety times elsewhere?

The most difficult orthographical problem confronting the editor of the Amatory Poems concerns the assimilation or non-assimilation of compounds: shall he print *impono* or *inpono*, and the like? Kenney conforms to the current practice of following the authority of the oldest manuscript. The verb generally spelled *impleo* occurs seven times, in six of which Kenney prints *impl(eo)*, but at *Am.* 3.14.18 *inple*: I recommend standardizing this to *imple*. At *Am.* 3.1.30 all manuscripts but

one have *implebit*, which was the reading of the archetype: but S has *impleuit* (the perfect tense is wrong): it has altered the assimilated to the non-assimilated form.

This practice, which goes back to republican times, was occasioned by a desire to show in spelling the component parts of the word, and was chiefly affected by the ignorant and the pedantic. Not only was a word like *impositis* exposed to the danger of being copied as *inpositis* but, as Ovid's manuscripts attest, *aptus* might be copied as *ab-tus*, and *optimus* as *ob-timus*. Similarly, the archetype of Manilius read *In-lyricum* at 4.611, an illiterate artificiality paralleled in the imperial period. We are fortunate in having two manuscripts of Livy which we know to be exemplar and copy: at 28.2 the 5th-century Parisinus has *supplicatio* and *absuntis*; the 9th-century Vaticanus, a direct copy, has altered these to *subplicatio* and *apsuntis*.

In detail of this kind we cannot be sure that even the copyists who reproduced Ovid's autographs adhered faithfully to his spelling; certainly we cannot allow an overriding authority to our 9th-century manuscripts. When *ante* and *circum* are firmly welded to words beginning with a vowel, they sometimes lose their final letters, i.e., *antea*, *circuitus*: in elegiac verse, where they form transitive verbs without synzeesis in the one case or elision in the other, they probably always did so. I recommend returning to the old editors who printed the dactyl *anteat* at *Ars* 2.726 and the adonean *circueunda* at *Ars* 3.396. The verb "to swim across" occurs in Kenney's text five times, four times as *transnare*, once as *tranare*. On *a priori* grounds, namely the euphony of *tranare* as opposed to *transnare* with its awkward consonantal cluster — cf. *Ars* 2.41 *Stygius tra(ns)nabimus undas* — and the attestation of *tranare* by the commentators of Virgil, it is probable that Ovid so spelled the word everywhere; so Heinsius gave it, and on this point I judge his edition, printed three hundred years ago, to be superior to the latest. But the matter goes far beyond Ovid. Take the most authoritative edition of Horace, Klingner's. At *Serm.* 1.7.20 we find *conpositum*, though the inscription recording the Acta Sacrorum Saecularium of 17 B.C. is still partially extant, and thereon stands as plain as anything: CARMEN · COMPOSITVM · Q · HOR IVS · FLACCVS.

The same considerations apply to accusative plurals in *-is* (see Bömer's edition of the *Fasti*, vol. 1, pages 55f: there is something to be said for writing *-es* everywhere) and to vowel-change in compound verbs (e.g., *capio*, *in-cipio*: see Quint. 1.4.11). Since Ovid composed his verses by a mental metrical manipulation of words, it is reasonable to suppose that his spelling, like his scansion, attained a much higher

degree of consistency than any stone-mason's. If he wrote, as Kenney prints, *elige* three times, then he must have written *eligis* at *Am.* 2.7.4 and *eligat* at *Ars* 3.136; *elegis* may have been a slip of someone confronted with the words *eligis e multis* in elegiacs; it may be significant that *elegat* is a possible form from *elegare*.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is clear and simple: before disturbing the regular spelling of the vulgate text of Augustan authors with chaotic and irrational novelties an editor should be absolutely sure that he is getting nearer the text of his author. My own counsel, for what it is worth, is to present a uniform standardized spelling, departing from it only when we can prove (what I think will be possible in some cases, though impossible in others) that we are indeed discarding a spelling which the author did not use in favor of one which he did. Where proof is impossible, the author's intentions are better served by writing *componere* everywhere and not giving *componere* on one page and *conponere* on another for no better reason than because some 9th-century scribe inconsistently expanded the contraction for the prefix. Learning, too, is better served by a recognition that forms like *subplicatio* are not necessarily older or more authentic than conventional forms like *supplicatio*; and that other Roman poets might have felt exactly as Lucilius, when he remarked:

atque, *accurrere* scribas
dne an c, non est quod quaeras atque labores.

The spelling of Greek words in the Augustan poets is determined by the obvious method of transferring the Greek spelling into Roman letters. Greek words which originally began with *σμ-* were in Caesarian times mostly pronounced and spelled ζ*μ-*; hence *Zmyrna* is the usual Latin spelling. But, though I should tremble to side with Forbiger against Lachmann at *Lucr.* 2.805, I think it likely that the Roman elegiac poets took their spelling of *σμάραγδος* from the Greek classics: the spelling *smaragdus*, supported by the manuscripts at *Prop.* 2.16.43, *Tib.* 1.1.51, 2.4.27, and *Ovid Met.* 2.24 (but *zm-* N), is probably to be restored at *Am.* 2.6.21 (*zm-* codd.). Moreover, the retention of a short open syllable before *sm-* was a permissible license: its retention before *zm-* meant taking a prosodical liberty. The spelling of these poets is not to be fixed by the spelling found in inscriptions and prose-writers: Housman's note on *Lucan* 5.59 should serve as a warning. At *Am.* 1.5.11 the conjectural *Sameramis* is probably wrong: Greek sources, and the manuscripts at *Ovid Met.* 4.58 and *Prop.* 3.11.21, favor the *Semiramis* of β; and we shall soon see that P (which reads

Samiramis) has been tampering with the spelling of Jason's name, as did R with Laodamia's at *Ars* 2.356 and *Rem.* 724 (*Laud-* R, *Laod-* β). The spelling of the hundred-handed giant *Gyes* (so Hesiod *Theog.* 149) is corrupted everywhere in our manuscripts of Horace, Ovid, and Priscian, but Kenney rightly follows Scaliger at *Am.* 2.1.12 in assuming that Ovid had access to Greek manuscripts as good as ours. At *Rem.* 456 (*Callirhoe* Kenney) Ovid probably transliterated *Καλλιρόη* as *Calliroe*, a spelling amply attested (see the apparatuses at *Met.* 9.414, 432; *Pers.* 1.134; *Calp. Buc.* 3.25; *Serv. Verg. Aen.* 4.250); medially it is -pp-, not -p-, that acquires an *h*.

The spelling of the Muse of Elegy *Ἑλεγεῖα* (*Elegia* Kenney) raises difficulties. The archetype gave *Elegeia* (*Am.* 3.1.7; 3.9.3; *Rem.* 379), and the scribe of S, followed by all scholars up to Lachmann, scanned the word as metrically equivalent to *elephantina*, for S's *elegegia* is an attempt to mark diastole, like the *bagoge* of some manuscripts at *Am.* 2.2.1 (*Bagoe*: Kenney's conjectural *Bagoa* must remain uncertain, to say the least, in view of Strabo's *Βαγῶος*, *Notes* 59, note 9). However, the fact that the word occurs on each occasion in the third and fourth feet of the hexameter (the diastolic form being ideally suited to the fourth and fifth) is decisive in favor of the scansion as an Ionicus a minore. Now the general rule of transliteration of the diphthong *ει* is that it becomes *i* before a consonant and *e* before a vowel: Servius knew of the rule and criticized Virgil for writing *Thalia* at *Buc.* 6.2, "*nam Thalea debuit dicere*." Ovid breaks the rule for feminine Greek compounds in -δέμεια, for I disregard the spelling *Hippodamea* reported by Merkel at *Am.* 3.2.16 as possibly due to the influence of the collateral *Hippodame*. But since Ovid writes not only *Thaleä* (*Ars* 1.264) but also *Amaltheä* (nominative, *Fasti* 5.115); as his manuscripts indicate a spelling with -e-; and as the spelling with -e- is found in the manuscripts of Quintilian at 1.8.6 and 10.1.93: we had best write *Elegea* in Ovid. The *Epistle of Sappho* (= *Her.* 15), which reaches us by a tradition separate from that of the Amatory Poems, contains the name in verse 7, unfortunately beneath a corruption: if Palmer's convincing conjecture *elegiae* were spelled *Elegeae*, a comfortable descent into the pit of archetypal error would be provided, *elegeae* or rather *elegee* becoming *elege* and then *elegi* (it was a similar haplography, *praeueR<R>unt*, which set the apparatus buzzing at *Am.* 3.13.24, leaving what looked like a perfect tense).

The accusative of Greek proper nouns in -ω (e.g., *Argo*, *Calypso*, *Sappho*) ended in -ω in Greek. Roman inclination was to Latinize these nouns, e.g., *Calypso*, *Calypsonis*: so *Pacuvius*, *Caesar*, *Livy*,

and prose writers generally. But the Augustan poets kept the Greek accusative in *-ō*: it is *never* found before a vowel, and it is endorsed by the overwhelming explicit testimony of the ancient grammarians. Servius, for example, says on *Aen.* 7.324: *ALLECTO: huius autem declinationis tres casus usurpamus, genetivum ut Allectus, nominativum et accusativum ut Allecto*. When Martianus Capella mentions forms in *-us* (gen.), *-un* (acc.), “*et ceteris casibus similiter*” (3.292), he is referring to a mock-Greek fourth declension (i.e., *-ui* dat., *-u* abl.), modeled upon the genitive by such philological wizards as Ateius (Charisius *GL* 1.127.17); his next words “*quamquam consuetudo hanc Io dicat*” show him to be at one with Quintilian, Priscian, and the others. Far be it from me to advise the inquisitive student against disturbing the dust on such monuments of knowledge as Ald., *Thes. Cornucop.* (1496), but the statement there given at 268B, that the Aeolic accusative of *Ἀητώ* is *Ἀητών*, possesses no relevance for the Latin poets, who show no interest in forms other than Attic. The incorrect spellings to be found in our editions hint at a spurious and irregularly followed principle (which I will presently account for) that Greek proper names in *-o* are to be given an *-n* wherever they occur before a vowel, and (to anticipate my next paragraph) that Greek proper names in *-on* are to lose the *-n* before a consonant: hence Kenney reads *Io / facta* at *Am.* 2.19.29, but *Ion / altera* at *Ars* 1.323. To observe that synaphea is unknown in Latin elegy is to deprive the principle of its only possible *raison d'être*: it is a complete sham. Kenney's text is involved at *Am.* 2.2.45 (read *Io* with manuscript support), 2.16.31 (read *Hero*), and *Ars* 1.323 (read *Io* with all the manuscripts). Similar corrections are to be made at Prop. 1.20.17, Ovid *Her.* 6.65, 7.7, 12.9, *Trist.* 2.439, Stat. *Silv.* 4.3.63, Juv. 2.92, *Priap.* 68.23, and in many editions elsewhere, too. In the years when Rome was declining and falling, western knowledge of Greek went from bad to worse: the copyists of Latin poetry knew that the accusative singular of the Greek first and second declensions ended in *-n*, but the complications of the Greek third declension were quite beyond them (as Dorothy Sayers so truly remarks, the rot always seems to set in with the third anything); they were familiar with *Naso* and *Maro* and *Plato* and *Zeno*; understandably, therefore, they were puzzled by the morphology of forms like *Iason* and *Orion*, which impinged upon their ears with the sound of an accusative; and when the idea struck them that *Iason* was really a Greek accusative, being improperly used as a Latin nominative, they gleefully took to altering the nominative *Iason* to *Iaso* wherever the thought occurred to them and meter permitted. When this step occurred, accusatives like *Argo*

and *Io* were doomed: obviously (the reasoning went) these names should have an *-n*; and meter never obstructed the corruption.

To proceed to the nominatives: the Augustan poets always preserve the nominative singular of Greek proper names in *-ων*, provided these nouns have not been naturalized, as *Apollo*, *Apollinis*: "In Ovid there are forty examples certified by metre of Greek nominatives in *-ōn*, and not one of the Latin form" (Housman, *JP* 35 [1920] 303, note 1). At *Met.* 3.230 the correct *Actaeon* is demanded by the meter and consequently preserved; but at 3.721 it is followed by a consonant and is altered in M to *acteo*. Write therefore *Iason* at *Am.* 2.14.33, 2.18.23, and *Ars* 3.33. It is very significant indeed that in each case *Iaso* reposes on the authority of the "best" manuscript, and reflects editorial activity in α ; the β manuscripts proffer the correct form.

Hence we conclude that the professorial attention bestowed during the Frankish renaissance on the α family of the Amatory Poems has in the sphere of orthography caused a good deal of error from which the β class is free. Where, then, as at *Rem.* 364 the β manuscripts with a single voice give *imp-* and the α representative gives *inp-*, we are justified in suspecting the latter of being the result of applying Carolingian spelling rules.

PUNCTUATION

To establish a Roman author's orthography is to determine a matter of fact. The punctuation of his work is a matter of opinion. There is a regrettable tendency in modern editors of Latin texts to throw out a vast multitude of the punctuation marks which earlier editors put in. Possibly Madvig went too far in peppering Livy with commas, for in perusing a copious periodic style the eye and the ear are best assisted by being compelled to take in as much as possible at once. But the Latin of the Latin poets is compressed and contorted; a reader or reciter must proceed with deliberation. Wherever, therefore, an obstacle can be removed, a difficulty clarified, or an ambiguity circumvented by inserting a mark of punctuation, let it be inserted.

Of the three hundred or so marks of punctuation I should insert or rather restore in Kenney's text, the majority merely facilitate comprehension and recitation. For example, Burman presents *Ars* 3.567ff as follows:

Nec frangat postes, nec saevis ignibus uret;
Nec dominae teneras adpetet ungue genas.

Nec scindet tunicasve suas, tunicasve puellae:
 570 Nec raptus flendi caussa capillus erit.

The text is easy to recite and easy to understand. Kenney has only the full-stop at the end: we are gasping for breath when we get there. A comma after *puellae* to indicate the change of subject is highly desirable, and two more at the end of the first two lines hardly less so.

Punctuation, however, is far more than an expression of taste: it enables the editor to express his interpretation of a passage; conversely, it often commits him to one. At *Am.* 2.14.43 the punctuation *di, faciles . . . concedite* tells us that the editor takes *faciles* with the verb (*faciles ὄντες*): I wonder whether this was Ovid's construction in view of *Met.* 13.518 *di crudeles*, *Ars* 3.376 *inuocat iratos . . . deos*, and the juxtaposition of the two words. In many passages the insertion of a stop carries with it appreciable advantages: I confine myself to six examples.

Am. 1.4.9 nec mihi silua domus nec equo mea membra cohaerent.

Separate sentences with different subjects and different verbs are best separated: a comma after *domus* will enable the reader to supply *est* and not *cohaeret*.

Am. 3.2.53 ruricolae Cereri teneroque adsurgite Baccho.

Vocatives are generally enclosed in commas: here a comma after *ruricolae* will enable the reader to construe it so, and avoid the error of Lewis and Short, who mistook it for a dative.

Am. 3.12.41f exit in immensum fecunda licentia uatum
 obligat historica nec sua uerba fide.

The way can be prepared for postponed conjunctions by placing a comma at the end of the previous clause: the ordinary reader, I am prepared to wager, would prefer a comma after *uatum* to advise him that *nec* is postponed than its being omitted to advise him that the two verbs share the same subject.

Am. 3.14.29f da populo, da uerba mihi: sine nescius errem
 et liceat stulta credulitate frui.

That *liceat* is a main verb and not dependent on *sine* can be simply shown by a comma or even semi-colon: *sine nescius errem* is not my message to the editor of a Latin text.

Ars 1.288ff forte sub umbrosis nemorosae uallibus Idae
 candidus, armenti gloria, taurus erat
 290 signatus tenui media inter cornua nigro.

A comma after *erat* will prevent the reader taking *erat signatus* as a pluperfect indicative: leaving it out is as good as an invitation to go wrong.

Ars 3.545 scilicet ingenium placida mollitur ab arte
et studio . . .

I omit the next words because it is not until a reader reaches them that he realizes he is in the middle of a new sentence. Help him; put a comma after *arte*.

Though Kenney is so sparing with commas, he occasionally puts them in where a Roman would not have felt the disruptive effect they carry with them:

Am. 1.7.17f sic, nisi uittatis quod erat, Cassandra, capillis,
procubuit templo, casta Minerua, tuo.

The commas surrounding *Cassandra* suggest that the word is formally the grammatical subject of *procubuit*: it is the subject of *erat*, just as at *Am.* 2.16.25 *Charybdis* takes its case from its relationship to the subordinate verb *fundit*, not the main verb *timeam*. At *Am.* 2.5.38 the note in the apparatus removes any justification for the technically incorrect commas surrounding *Luna*. At *Ars* 3.658 *saepe dabit, dederit quas semel, ille manus* no Roman would have felt a comma after *semel*: the sentence is similar in rhythm and structure to *Mart.* 3.50.8 *putidus est, totiens si mihi ponis aprum* (Alan Ker was justly rebuked by Hudson-Williams, *CQ* 2 [1952] 27, for conjecturing *aper*).

The hyperbaton in two passages is worth discussion.

Medic. 26 et uix ad cultus nupta, quod addat, habet.

That is: *et uix nupta ad-cultus-quod-addat habet*. Kenney follows Housman in punctuating such sentences fully, and has only by oversight omitted commas after *uix* and *cultus*. The intention of this is to emphasize that *ad cultus* is to be isolated from the words immediately preceding and following, and transferred to *quod addat*. Similarly

Ars 1.430 et, quotiens opus est, nascitur illa sibi.

Consistency demands a comma after *illa*, to show that *sibi* is to be taken with the subordinate clause ("She says it is her birthday, whenever *she* has need of one").

In favor of this full punctuation is the advertisement of hyperbaton it gives the reader; and since it often enables him to arrive at a correct construe, I am all for it. But it carries with it the suggestion that the

Latin is much more contorted than it really is; it disguises the fact that not only could the Romans take in such sentences at one go but we can, too. Hyperbaton involves nothing more than the inversion of two units of utterance; that is, one unit is for metrical or stylistic reasons shifted out of its natural order. In addition to the sense of the words, a feeling for meter will help in its detection: a verse like "et-penitus-toto *diuisos* orbe *Britannos*" is the metrical key to *Her.* 3.19 "si-progressa-forem *caperer-ne* nocte *timebam*." This A-B-A-B word-order will be found characteristic of much of Latin dactylic verse.

No commas are needed in the following:

Cynthia-prima *suis* miserum-me-cepit *ocellis*.

Ars 3.96 is essentially the same:

quid *nisi-quam-sumes* dic-mihi-perdis *aquam*?

Two commas are reasonably employed to parenthesize *dic mihi*, but since *nisi quam sumes* could be replaced by and would certainly be felt as *praeter sumptam*, I wonder whether the other two which Kenney gives are not beginning to interfere with the verse, much as if in the first line of Propertius we enclosed *suis* in commas and put another one after *cepit*. A good illustration is provided by *Ars* 2.675f:

adde quod est illis operum prudentia maior,
solus et artifices qui facit usus adest.

That *et* is here postponed, a comma at the end of the hexameter sufficiently indicates. A Roman, then, would have felt the sentence as ... *et solus-artifices-qui-facit usus adest*: "...and alone-craftsmen-which-makes experience is theirs." Simple. The Oxford text follows Housman (*CR* 11 [1897] 429), who is named *honoris causa*, and gives:

solus, et, artifices qui facit, usus adest.

This punctuation is as impeccable (well, perhaps two commas after *maior* are needed to be quite perfect) as leaving all the commas out; and to readers who need help it is just about as unhelpful. Bentley, who understood the passage correctly, preferred an unscientific clarity to a brain-baffling exactitude, and placed a single comma after *facit*.

Occasionally an editor is confronted with an impossible task:

Ars 3.51f si bene te noui, cultas ne laede puellas:
 gratia, dum uiues, ista petenda tibi est.

Venus's last words to Ovid: the construction is *si bene te noui, gratia*

puellarum cultarum tibi, dum uiues, petenda est: ne laede eas. If an editor punctuates as above (so Kenney: I approve), he is inviting readers to misconstrue *ne laede puellas* as the apodosis of the *si*-clause; if he brackets the imperative, he is inviting them to misconstrue it as an aside. *Si bene te noui* was a cliché (see Fraenkel, *Horace* 316, note 5), and perhaps in a context like this acquired a quasi-independent flavor: "Take my word for it! Don't annoy smart girls! You will be seeking . . ." Similar complexities of idiom should dissuade us from laying down the law with Kenney (*Notes* 57f) over the punctuation of the following pentameters:

<i>Am.</i> 1.14.4	contigerant / imum // qua patet usque / latus.
<i>Ars</i> 1.140	iunge tuum / lateri // qua potes usque / latus.
<i>Ars</i> 3.310	oscula ferre / umero // qua patet usque / libet.
<i>Her.</i> 18.118	respiciens / dominam // dum licet usque / meam.
<i>Trist.</i> 3.7.54	effuge / uenturos // qua potes usque / rogos.

Shall we place commas round *qua patet* or *qua patet usque*? Did Ovid feel *usque* as the antecedent of *qua*, or did he regard it as welded to the subordinate clause ("wherever," "however," "whilever")? Even allowing that it is grammatically an antecedent will not necessarily determine the answer: in our own language we use idioms like "with one another" meaning "one with another," where it would certainly be wrong to punctuate "with, one, another." The verse *Met.* 3.302 *qua tamen usque potest, uires sibi demere temptat* suggests that, if we insist on separating *usque*, we may be in danger of misconceiving the spirit of the language. Moreover, Ovid never places *usque* earlier in the sentence than the subordinating conjunction it generalizes.

AMORES

Am. 1.2.11f uidi ego iactatas mota face crescere flammās
et uidi nullo concutiente mori.

Vidi, the reading of the medieval archetype, has been generally preferred to *rursus*, the reading of the quotation in Seneca (*Contr.* 2.2.8), presumably on the grounds that misquotation by Seneca is more likely than corruption in Ovid's manuscripts (a glance at the apparatus to *Am.* 2.11.10=Sen. *Contr.* 2.2.12 hardly bears this out).

However, if the issue is considered in the light of the context, the superiority of *rursus* (preferred by Bentley) is overwhelming. The poet

is personally testifying, not to two incidents observed separately ("I have seen A, and I have seen B"), but rather to a single phenomenon: "I have seen flames flare up, when a torch is waved, and die down *again*, when the waving stops." Repetition of the main verb obscures the thought. A similar kind of imagery with a similar use of *rursus* occurs at *Am.* 2.19.15f:

sic ubi uexarat tepidosque refouerat ignis,
rursus erat uotis comis et apta meis.

Rursus, then, is more appropriate to the context; and its claims to authenticity are supported by a plausible reason for its alteration. Strictly speaking, the flames do not die down *again*; the act of dying down occurs but once; it is the former state which exists *again*. The pleonasm (just the sort of thing which medieval scholasticism might jump upon) is found, however, in most languages; for examples in Latin, see Henry, *Aeneidea* (on 4.531), Owen on *Trist.* 2.16, Getty on *Luc.* 1.391. And *Met.* 12.557 *rursusque reponere sumptas* has in some manuscripts been corrupted to *sumptasque reponere posse* (*posse* from the preceding line), an identical suppression of this identical idiom in an identical way.

Am. 1.4.7ff *desine* mirari, posito quod candida uino
 Atracis ambiguos traxit in arma uiros;
 nec mihi silua domus, nec equo mea membra cohaerent:
 uix a te uideor posse tenere manus.

Ovid is indignant that his innamorata, without turning a hair, has invited him to dine with her and her husband. "No longer wonder that Hippodamia drove the Centaurs to fight over her: though I am no Centaur, I can hardly keep my hands off you."

With Douza and Bentley, I think that Ovid wrote *desino* (cf. *Cic. De Or.* 2.14.59 *illud iam mirari desino*, etc.). That the prohibition "no longer wonder," addressed to the girl, is illogical is not in itself decisive: utterances may even gain a great deal of vigor by being phrased in a way which contravenes strict logic. "Fancy seeing you!" one often says, when the real thought is "I am surprised to see you:" emphasis is secured by suggesting that the surprise is universal. In the Ovidian context, however, the relevance of the "wonder" is practically destroyed by being removed from the real subject, especially as the reason for the real subject's wonder is immediately argued. We are given no grounds

for supposing that the young lady did wonder at the Centaurs' excitability (which she probably understood very well). It is clear that the ceasing to wonder is the poet's own experience. For the first time he feels the emotions which once fired the Centaurs: though he is no Centaur, he can hardly control his desire to fight for possession of the woman. Hence he says: "I no longer wonder . . ." The woman cannot share this sudden realization: it is for men only.

Exactly the same experience is voiced by Propertius over Cynthia's attraction for him, 2.2.4 *Iuppiter, ignosco pristina furta tua* ("I no longer wonder at Jove's amours," not *Cynthia, ignosce*, etc.). Significantly, Propertius refers to the Centaurs in the same poem (9f):

qualis et Ischomache Lapithae genus heroine,
Centaureis medio grata rapina mero.

There is a fairly obvious reason why an original *desino* should appear in our manuscripts as *desine*: *desine* is clearly a dactyl, whereas *desino* looks like a cretic. The Augustan elegists, however, scan it as dactylic, see Tib. 2.6.41 and *Her.* 18.203, where the word, certified by the context beyond any possible shadow of doubt, has been corrupted in some manuscripts to — does the reader require to be told? — *desine*.

I am aware that in his review of Munari's first edition (*Athenaeum* 29 [1951] 349ff) Eduard Fraenkel issued an imperious veto against the resurrection from Orcus (even only as far as the apparatus criticus) of Douza's *desino*. For obeying an injunction of the foremost of living classical scholars Munari, who suppressed the conjecture in his second edition, can hardly be blamed. But let us not cheapen our regard for Fraenkel by failing to challenge this decree. He has not mentioned the other occurrences of *desinō*, nor discussed the context. Touching the prosody of the first person singular in -o, his reference to Hartenberger's dissertation may be countered by one to Housman's masterly note at Man. 3.423, in particular where he states that cretics were more readily weakened to dactyls than spondees were to trochees "prius enim *nesciō diligō desinō* quam *findō credō tollō*, prius *Polliō* quam *Nasō* a poetis enuntiari coeptum est." *Tollō* (*Am.* 3.2.26), like *findō* (*Prop.* 3.9.35) and *credō* (*Pont.* 1.7.56) — the only attested examples to be found in the Augustans of a first person spondee shortened to a trochee —, is much more of an innovation than *desinō*. Camps' conjecture at *Am.* 2.10.9 *errō uelut*, which Kenney prints and rightly states is certain, is much more audacious prosodically and much more difficult palaeographically than Douza's *desino*, which Kenney does not mention at all. Virgil, who never elides cretics (Austin at *Aen.* 4.387 should not have

called *audiam* a cretic: it is a dactyl like *audiat*), shows by his elision of *nuntio* (*Aen.* 1.391) and *audeo* (*Aen.* 11.503) that he already regards these words as permissible dactyls; but he nowhere sanctions *tollō*. Furthermore, neither Housman nor Lucian Müller (*De Re Metr.*² 414f) notices a very significant feature of the trisyllabic verbs in question: they are all compounds, *con-ferō* (*Pont.* 1.1.25), *de-sinō*, *ne-sciō*, even Maecenas's *di-ligō* in hendecasyllables. There is something, then, to be said for regarding these, not as true shortenings of cretics, but as extensions of pyrrhicized iambs, of which Ovid has in the *Amores* alone *amō* (3.14.39), *negō* (1.10.64), *putō* (1.2.5, etc.), *uolō* (2.5.54).

Am. 1.6.19ff certe ego, cum posita stares ad uerbera ueste,
 20 ad dominam pro te uerba tremante tuli . . .
 23 redde uicem meritis: grato licet esse quod optas.
 tempora noctis eunt; excute poste seram.
 25 excute: sic *umquam* longa releuere catena,
 nec tibi perpetuo serua bibatur aqua.

"I it was who saved you from a flogging . . . Now return the service. By showing your gratitude, you can secure the freedom you desire. The night is slipping by. Away with the bolt from the door! Away with it! Then, *at any time* you will lose the chain you have worn so long, and have the cup of slavery taken from your lips."

I omit the editor's comma after *esse* in verse 23: *grato* means *si gratus mihi fueris* (schol. Ob); *esse quod optas* means *liber fieri* (Bentley). His own interpretation (that of Marius) "You have a chance of showing your gratitude, as you desire" comes to grief on *quod optas*: nothing in the poem suggests that the janitor had any desire to accommodate Ovid; indeed, everything points in the other direction.

Of the here meaningless *umquam*, which correct usage confines to negative or quasi-negative sentences, the editor remarks "*uarie sed frustra temptauerunt editores.*" Vain, to be sure, the attempts of editors, but not vain or untrue the simple and salutary change of *u* into *i* made by Alton: *sic, inquam, longa*, etc., "then, *I repeat*, you will, etc.," (*Hermathena* 19 [1922] 276). Compare *Met.* 13.284 *his umeris, his inquam umeris*. The conjecture greatly mitigates the cryptic conciseness of verse 23, which it serves to explain and by which it is itself recommended. Having mentioned the name of Alton, I cannot refrain from extolling his beautifully certain correction (yet to find an editor) at Prop. 4.2.37 *sub petaso* "wearing a sun-hat:" see Smyth, *CR* 62 (1948) 14.

Am. 1.8.49f labitur occulte fallitque uolatilis aetas,
 et celer admissis labitur annus equis.

Apparatus: "ut . . . amnis aquis *Pc*¹, *prob. Heinsius*." Yes, and *prob. Burmannus*, *Bentleius*, *Merkelius*, and almost everybody until the epiphany in 1888 of the Ehwaldian Teubner. Since that annus mirabilis only Némethy has protested against the depravity of the archetypal reading.

The Loeb translation will serve as a point of departure: "The stream of a lifetime glides smoothly on and is past before we know, and swift the year glides by with horses at full speed." Does none of the recent editors see that it is absurd to say that time (that is, *years*) glides by unperceived and then that *a year* or *the year* glides past? Do they not know that what is *a fortiori* argumentation for a philosopher is mere bathos in a poet? Then what and how many are these unbridled horses that accompany the year (or transport the mysterious coachman Annus, about whom Ehwald and Munari should tell us more)? And does it strike no one as odd that unbridled, that is galloping or stampeding, horses are described as "gliding"? Such questions are not answered by referring to *Fast.* 6.772 *et fugiunt freno non remorante dies*, where the metaphor is vague "the days flee without a curb to restrain them."

Between the Heinsian and Ehwaldian readings there is a remarkable palaeographical affinity: *ut* becoming *et* is illustrated in Kenney's apparatus at *Am.* 1.15.8; *amnis* and *annus* are identical for thousands of penmen ancient and modern; *aquis* and *equis* are also basement bedfellows at Prop. 4.11.102. The imperceptible celerity of time is much better exemplified by the imperceptible celerity of a swift current than by the eye-riveting spectacle of a stampede. Ovid's assent is secured by *Ars* 3.62 *eunt anni more fluentis aquae*; *Met.* 15.179f . . . *labuntur tempora . . . non secus ac flumen*. The word *admissus*, properly "unreined," "headlong," is often metaphorically extended to mean "precipitate:" cf. *Am.* 3.6.86 *admissas . . . aquas*, *Ars* 3.312 *admissas . . . rates*, *Her.* 2.114 *admissas . . . aquas*.

Am. 1.9.5f quos petiere duces annos in milite forti,
 hos petit in socio bella puella uiro.

"The . . . which a general expects of a valiant soldier, the maiden expects of her man." "animos *Rautenberg*, *BVb*, *fortasse recte*," which

all other modern editors save Munari print, is certainly correct. The suggestion that generals expected valiant soldiers to comply with an age qualification is refuted by the whole of Roman history. Moreover, the phrasing of the couplet leads one to infer that what is *petitum* is something which may be given or withheld. That the preceding verses mention *aetas* and *senex* is irrelevant: the point is that both *duces* and *puellae* expect the performance of the duties outlined in the long passage immediately following the couplet. Proof of the correctness of *animos*, "spirit" (Showerman), "l'ardeur" (Bornecque), is given in the poet's application of his thesis to himself, namely in verses 41ff:

ipse ego segnis eram discinctaque in otia natus;
 mollierant *animos* lectus et umbra meos;
 impulit ignauum formosae cura puellae,
 iussit et in castris aera merere suis.
 45 inde uides agilem . . .

Am. 1.10.5f qualis Amymone siccis errauit in *Argis*,
 cum premeret summi uerticis urna comas,
 talis eras.

"As attractive as was Amymone, roaming thirsty Argos with pitcher upon her head, even so were you." *Argis* Burman, editors; *agris* manuscripts, Bentley.

Since Amymone was in fact Argive, the correction is likely to cause editors who could never otherwise be reproached with a concupiscent frenzy for conjecture to yield to temptation without a flicker of resistance. What could be more probable than the change from *Argis* to *agris*? The geographical fit seems too much of a coincidence. Nevertheless, although the geography is perfect, geography — even accurate geography — is quite out of place in this context. Ovid is not picturing Amymone as she wandered in Argos as opposed to Mycenae; he is not picturing an urban scene at all. He has in mind Prop. 2.26.47 (from which probably comes the *aruis* of *s*):

testis Amymone, latices cum ferret, in *aruis*
 compressa, et Lerna pulsa tridente palus.

However, Enk, the latest editor, has embraced the here likewise specious *Argis* (as if Propertius were a police-officer reporting the scene

of the crime!), and it may be worth while adding a more general argument.

Just as Homer's versification is characterized by an elaborate art of impromptu composition, so too the fluent versification of Ovid relies upon a similar, even if less easily analyzed, technique: the poet has instinctively evolved a large repertoire of formulaic epithets and tags, together with numerous devices to admit them, which enables him to versify rapidly. This naturally leads to a high degree of metrical virtuosity, but a corresponding absence of profundity; it perhaps explains why Ovid is at his best when playing with language. The present case demonstrates his tendency to link "roaming" and "fields:" compare

<i>Am.</i> 2.16.5	<i>arua pererrantur;</i>
<i>Ars</i> 2.473	<i>solis errabat in agris;</i>
<i>Fast.</i> 3.655	<i>erratis laeti uescuntur in agris;</i>
<i>Met.</i> 2.490	<i>suis errauit in agris;</i>
<i>Met.</i> 3.714	<i>errat qui maximus agris;</i>
<i>Met.</i> 4.87	<i>errandum lato spatiantibus aruo;</i>
<i>Met.</i> 7.534f	<i>per agros / errasse;</i>
<i>Met.</i> 10.477	<i>latosque uagata per agros;</i>
<i>Met.</i> 12.209	<i>arua pererrat;</i>
<i>Met.</i> 14.422	<i>Latios errat uesana per agros;</i>
<i>Met.</i> 15.100	<i>mediis errauit in aruīs.</i>

Of course, the formulaic nature of this collocation is not to be regarded as mechanical in anything like the way that Homer's repeated phrases and lines are mechanical. But it can hardly have been created anew on every occasion. It is also significant that Ovid is for ever repeating tags and phrases of this kind, and even whole lines. For example:

<i>Am.</i> 2.11.31f	<i>tutius est fouisse torum, legisse libellos,</i> <i>Threiciam digitis increpuisse lyram.</i>
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Compare *Her.* 3.117f:

<i>tutius est iacuisse toro, tenuisse puellam</i> (see below), <i>Threiciam digitis increpuisse lyram.</i>

Not to go outside the Amatory Poems, there is:

Should we glance at the pentameters immediately following the penultimate example, we shall see that the poet is adhering to a stereotyped pattern:

The technique is most plainly seen from repetition in consecutive verses: see especially Norden's edition of Verg. *Aen.* 6, page 383.

“numeret ω , *fortasse recte*.” Remove the *fortasse*. The argument necessitates the subjunctive: “*let* not the fair charge for their favors; or rather, *let* only the rich man pay; *let* the poor man reckon his service as his return; *let* everyone contribute what he can.” Compare *Ars* 3.533 *carmina qui facimus, mittamus carmina tantum*. *Numerat* (PS) is a mere slip of R’s for *-et*.

When it comes to judging between *-et* and *-at* and the like, our manuscripts are not to be allowed much authority, as may be inferred from the following select list of errors in the *best* manuscript (the others being worse offenders); the correct reading is given first, and the reading of R (P) in brackets:

<i>Am.</i> 1. 4.15 <i>-et(-it)</i>	<i>Ars</i> 1. 21 <i>-et(-it)</i>	<i>Ars</i> 2.104 <i>-et(-it)</i>
1. 4.21 <i>-et(-it)</i>	1.278 <i>-et(-at)</i>	2.550 <i>-at(-et)</i>
2.16.27 <i>-at(-it)</i>	1.576 <i>-as(-es)</i>	2.558 <i>-ent(-ant)</i>
2.16.28 <i>-at(-et)</i>	1.692 <i>-es(-is)</i>	2.666 <i>-it(-et)</i>
2.19.34 <i>-ar(-or)</i>	1.730 <i>-ant(-ent)</i>	2.682 <i>-at(-et)</i>
3. 5.40 <i>-it(-at)</i>	2. 42 <i>-unt(-int)</i>	3. 52 <i>-es(-is)</i>
3.14.37 <i>-it(-et)</i>	2. 62 <i>-et(-it)</i>	3. 75 <i>-es(-as)</i>

<i>Ars</i> 3. 76 -unt(-ent-)	<i>Ars</i> 3.682 -et(-it)	<i>Rem.</i> 415 -es(-is)
3.225 -emus(-amus)	3.749 -as(-es)	478 -et(-at)
3.360 -it(-at)	<i>Rem.</i> 82 -at(-et)	531 -ant(-ent)
3.637 -et(-it)	309 -is(-es)	573 -es(-is)
3.644 -as(-es)	383 -at(-et)	683 -et(-at)
3.647 -ant(-unt)	384 -et(-at)	732 -et(-it)

Dissent from Kenney's reading is also warranted in the following passages, which likewise involve vowel-variations:

Am. 3.9.61 obuius huic *uenies* hedera iuuenalia cinctus.

"uenies ω: uenias *P.*" There is little difference in sense, but much in tone. The indicative is dogmatic, if a statement; peremptory, if a command: the subjunctive is suitably deferential ("may you come to meet him"), and thus to be preferred.

Ars 1.211 qui fugis ut uincas, quid uicto, Parthe, *relinques*?

"O Parthian, who flee to gain victory, what resource *will you leave* yourself in defeat?" So O, Sa, and Og (probably derived from O). All the other manuscripts, however, have *relinquis*, which must have been the reading of the archetype. This there is no reason to reject: it is here invested with the "all-time habitual" force of the present tense. Whereas *relinques* refers the question to a specific occasion (Augustus's forthcoming campaign), *relinquis* represents the question as being concerned with habitual practice, as if Ovid had said: "I know that you adopt tactics of flight in the battles you win; what do you do in the battles you lose?" This is not merely rhetorical, it is facetious: it is, in fact, more Ovidian. O's testimony often incurs the suspicion of being conjectural; and there can be small doubt that *relinquis* was more likely to give rise to *relinques* than the converse.

Ars 1.709f uir prior accedat, uir uerba precantia dicat;
 excipiat blandas comiter illa preces.

"Let the man make the approach and speak words of entreaty: *let her* respond to smooth appeals." The subjunctive makes nonsense of the argument. Read *excipiet* (ς): "she will respond . . ." Ovid is writing for Romeo, not Juliet: his aim is to overcome the latter's coyness, not prescribe it. Here, and at a large number of other places, the Loeb translator wisely based his rendering on something quite different from what he printed on the left-hand page.

Ars 2.695 qui *properent*, noua musta bibant.

Merely a slip of the quill by R's scribe. There is no justification for the subjunctive in the relative clause (compare *Ars* 2.505f *qui . . . placet, . . . uitet; qui canit . . . , canat; qui bibit . . . , bibat*): the *properant* of all other manuscripts is correct.

Ars 3.594 has artes tolle, *senescit* amor.

Heinsius, with the support of a few manuscripts, read the future *senescet* (as did the editio princeps): this has the effect of transforming the previous sentence into a protasis, which gives the meaning patently intended by the poet, and the construction he customarily favors: "If these arts are neglected, his love will grow cold." A similar correction must be made at *Rem.* 435f. *adtrahet ille . . . , / . . . petetis*: the context shows that the meaning is "If he intensifies . . . ;" a jussive subjunctive (*adtrahat* Ca, Pc, Bentley) is needed to transform the first sentence into a protasis.

Am. 1.11.17f aspicias oculos mando frontemque legentis:
et tacito uultu scire futura licet.

"What is wrong with *et*?" asks Kenney (*Notes* 57): principally the ambiguity which results from "Even by means of (*or* because of) a silent expression one may learn the future." If the ablative is one of means, we do not know whose face is meant; if it is causal (perhaps a more natural assumption to make), then it gives the wrong sense ("because she is silent").

Et is unnecessary: the pentameter explains the injunction contained in the hexameter, and the context requires the meaning "you may learn her intentions *from* her silent looks"; the reservation implicit in *licet* dispenses with the need for an "even."

The source of information after verbs like *scire*, *discere*, *intelligere*, etc., is normally expressed by a preposition and the ablative. In view of the perpetual confusion between *e* and *et* (even in manuscripts as good as Virgil's) we may be reasonably certain that the preposition was expressed here, and was *e* (Heinsius). Housman collects several examples of *et* for *e* in the Manilian manuscripts in his note on 4.634, whilst *et gelidumque* for *egelidumque* at *Am.* 2.11.10 reveals how ready an Ovidian scribe was to make the mistake even when *-que* stood at hand to warn him against it.

apprised of the details — with *lacerti* or *bracchia*, not with *manus*. Let no one be misled by irrelevant references to Housman on Luc. 3.406 (*siquis* “if . . . at all”) and passages such as Verg. *Aen.* 11.743 *dereptumque ab equo dextra complectitur hostem*. When Kenney asserts (*Notes* 57, note 3) that *manus* commonly has the sense of “arms,” he is stabbed in the back by treacherous supporters: these are either metaphorical as *Her.* 17.166 “hands which can be felt afar,” or explicable literally as *Her.* 10.40 “hands gesticulating”; at *Her.* 10.146 the meaning of *manus* is fixed by *plangendo pectore lassas* in the preceding verse; and *Her.* 20.58 *ueniant in mea colla manus* must be understood without altering the usual meaning of the words, since *in* does not mean *circum*.

The reading of the chief manuscript will be found in the appendix: *quem magis*. With the change of a single letter Riese and Madvig independently restored *quem mauis* “whom you prefer” (i.e., to Tithonus), “your lover.” Heinsius had already conjectured *malles*, but the contrary-to-fact hypothesis is less vigorous than the plain unvarnished truth. As a result of the constant confusion between *u* and *b*, what stood in the archetype was *mabis*, out of which α made *magis*, β , *mabus*.

Am. 1.14.24ff heu, mala uexatae quanta tulere comae!
quam se *praebuerant* ferro patienter et igni!

The manuscripts’ *praebuerant* shows the usual corruption of the perfect -*erunt* (Heinsius): balance demands the same tense in both exclamations: *quanta tulere comae! quam praebuerunt comae!* Kenney’s reference to *clamabam* in 27 is irrelevant. What has this imperfect to do with the matter? The subject is different, and the tense is frequentative: “I kept crying out.”

Am. 1.15.25 Tityrus et *fruges* Aeneiaque arma legentur.

Ovid specifies three works, not by prosaically naming author and title, but by the poetic device of alluding to them and permitting the reader the thrill of recognition. The first and third clues are unmistakable, and reveal the key to their selection. *Tityrus* came from the first line of Virgil’s *Eclogues*; and *arma* came from the first line of Virgil’s *Aeneid*. But whence came *fruges*? Not from the first line of Virgil’s *Georgics*, which Ovid clearly meant to specify. As a clue, *fruges* no more specifies

Virgil's *Georgics* than Nicander's, or the *Works and Days*, or the *De Re Rustica*, or the latest number of the *Farmer's Gazette*. Nor can we reasonably assume that our poet, whom Kenney himself declares (*Ovidiana* 204) to have been "intimately acquainted" with the *Georgics*, did not know the first line. Recalling this line and the first noun in it, Naugerius over four hundred years ago found no difficulty in repairing the damage to Ovid's text. This was so easy that he probably thought it superfluous to explain that after *Tityrus* $\langle \&seg \rangle \&es$ had been miscopied as *Tityrus&es*, the specious but false supplement *frug* was inserted to renovate the verse.

Am. 2.1.5 me legat in sponsi facie non frigida uirgo.

Apparatus: "in sponsi facie . . . i.e. coram sponso" (also *Notes* 59). The construction, as the Loeb translator rightly takes it, is *non frigida in sponsi facie* "the girl who blushes at the gaze of her betrothed" (cf. *Am.* 2.5.36, [Tib.] 3.4.31f). Similarly at *Her.* 1.14: *nomine in Hec-toreo pallida* "pale at the mention of Hector;" *Am.* 2.7.9: *in te . . . frigidus* "unmoved at you." After certain verbs (mostly in -eo) and certain adjectives (mostly in -idus) *in* with the ablative means "at," and denotes the object of emotion, e.g., *Cat.* 22.17 *gaudet in se*; *Verg. Aen.* 10.446 *stupet in Turno*; rather boldly *Manilius* 4.15 *et Cimbrum in Mario . . . uictum* "overcome at the sight of . . .," 5.572 *uictus in Andromeda* "smitten at the sight of . . ." The idiom seems to be a peculiar development of a circumstantial usage, *in* with the ablative meaning "in the case of." See Rothstein on *Prop.* 1.3.44; Tränkle, *Sprachkunst des Properz* (1960) 90f; Fordyce on *Cat.* 64.98.

From the apparatus at *Ars* 1.428 should be removed the observation "ne, i.e. ut non," taken via *Notes* 249 from Shackleton Bailey's *Propertiana* 170: *ne* here introduces a parenthetical clause of purpose, dependent upon some such unexpressed verb as *dico*, and means "lest," "in case" ("*ne prosit forte, quod didicisti literas*" Heinsius) — Kenney's own Latin contains several instances of *ne* used in the identical construction, in his apparatus at *Ars* 1.544, for example; the positive parenthetical clause of purpose (*ut ita dicam*) is no less common. The suggestion at *Propertiana* 170 arose from an ill-judged attempt to overthrow Tyrrell's pretty conjecture *mitti* at 3.11.23 (for the corruption, cf. *Am.* 3.14.42 *falsi* mss, *falli* Madvig). Housman's exposition of the Propertian passage (*JP* 21 [1893] 191) leaves nothing more to be said.

decidit atque cadens 'pater o pater, auferor' inquit.

Am. 2.4.11 siue aliqua est oculos *in se* deiecta modestos.

<i>Am.</i> 3.6.67	<i>oculos in humum</i> deiecta modestos;
<i>Her.</i> 6.26	<i>lumina fixus humo</i> ;
<i>Her.</i> 21.242	<i>lumina fixa tenens plena pudoris humo</i> ;
<i>Met.</i> 2.710	despectabat <i>humum</i> ;
<i>Met.</i> 6.607	deiectoque <i>in humum</i> .

Let no one cite *Am.* 1.8.37, *Her.* 11.35, or 21.113, where *gremium* (-o) is of course not the same as *se*. How *in se* should become *in me* is not obvious, whilst the progress of error from *inUM*<*UM*> to *in um* to *in me* will have encountered little impediment. In some sources at *Met.* 5.588 *ad humum* (through *adUM*<*UM*>) has become *ad inum*, at *Trist.* 2.489 *humum* (through *hUM*<*UM*>) has become *hum*[o], and at [*Am.*] 3.5.30 *humum* (through *UM*<*UM*>) has in *ω* become *opem*.

Am. 2.5.3f uota mori mea sunt, cum te peccasse recordor,
ei mihi, perpetuum nata puella malum.

Had Shakespeare's Caesar possessed the theatrical urge of Suetonius's Nero, he might have said "*Et tu, o Brute!*" But he could not, I conceive, have said "*Et tu, ei mihi, Brute!*" *Ei mihi* is a cry of anguish,

not addressed to anybody; it soliloquizes; it cannot introduce a vocative, nor separate a *tu* or *te* from the vocative which these words signal.

The Italians restored, and Heinsius and Bentley approved: *o mihi perpetuum*, etc. The particle *o* regularly accompanies extended vocatives of the "O suitably attired in leather boots Head of a traveller" type, whilst the pronoun is required for service as a dative of advantage with *nata* . . . *malum*. A few examples may be appended:

Prop. 2.22.4	o nimis exitio nata theatra meo!
Am. 2.17.12	o facies oculos nata tenere meos!
Her. 15.22	o facies oculis insidiosa meis!
Trist. 1.3.66	o mihi Thesea pectora iuncta fide!
Trist. 5.14.2	o mihi me coniunx carior!

The not dissimilar invocation at the beginning of Lucretius Book 3 has been brilliantly reinstated by Timpanaro, *Philologus* 104 (1960) 147ff:

O tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen
qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda uitae,
te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus . . .

Ker's suggested *in mihi perpetuum* (*Ovidiana* 226) is — not to comment on the tmesis — unnecessary: the sense he desires to import is already there: *perpetuum malum* is the nominative of purpose, occasionally resorted to by the Augustans as a variation on the usual dative (Löfstedt, *Syntactica* 1.194ff). The error arose from the common confusion of *o* with *e*, a confusion which has caused no end of trouble in the Amatory Poems (let me raise a renewed paean for Baehrens' *o* instead of *e* at Cat. 9.1).

I also follow Heinsius and Bentley in reading at *Am.* 2.4.25:

huic, quia dulce canit flectitque facillima uocem,
oscula cantanti rapta dedisse uelim.

The *haec* of the tradition, accepted by Kenney, removes the tight connection between the clauses, and unnecessarily deprives the sentence of smoothness by raising and then frustrating the anticipation of a third person singular verb. Compare Kenney's punctuation of verse 33:

tu, quia tam longa es, . . .

after which the reader as naturally expects a second person singular verb as he does the remaining three and a half feet of the hexameter.

Haec is merely the interpolation of someone who thought a nominative desirable to balance the nominative in verse 27. It is not: see *Am.* 2.1.23, 25, 27 *carmina . . . / carmine . . . / carminibus . . .*; 2.3.11 *hanc . . . / huius . . .*. The identical error occurred at *Ars* 3.145 *huic* RA, *hanc* ω (to balance *hanc* in 147).

Am. 2.5.5ff non *mihi deceptae* nudant tua facta tabellae,
 nec data furtiue munera crimen habent . . .
 13 ipse miser uidi . . .

Apparatus: “*deceptae, i.e. furtim redditae: interpretatus est Housman.*” There seems to be a misunderstanding here. Housman asserted at *CR* 14 (1900) 259 that *decipere* may mean *dissimulare*, and in his note on *Man.* 1.240 that it bears such a sense here. The meaning, then, will be “No dissimulation of tablets betrays to me your infidelities.” The circumstances are far from obvious. I gather from Housman’s cryptic note that the dissimulation is practiced by Corinna, and that the tablets are sent her by a lover: Ovid will either have stumbled upon a love-letter hidden by Corinna or have caught her hiding one or have detected a falsehood in her explanation of one (evidently the dissimulation did not come off). This far-fetched explanation hardly fits in with our knowledge of lovers’ *tabellae* gained from such a source as *Prop.* 3.23. Moreover, it is puzzling that the poet should (1) have used *decipere* with such a rare meaning in a context where it habitually signifies “deceive,” “be unfaithful to,” and (2) have phrased so awkwardly a thought capable of much more lucid expression.

We should therefore reject Housman’s defense of the text. And we should also reject Ernout’s (*Rev. de Phil.* 26 [1952] 125), “une lettre surprise par moi,” for although the translation makes satisfactory sense, the verb *decipere* does not bear such a meaning. Finally, the very idea of Ovid’s intercepting letters is ruled out by the context: he is not looking for incriminating evidence; on the contrary, he is, as he admits, only too willing to explain it away.

Emendation is inescapable. Of the solutions proposed, from the *decepto* of the cod. Sarrav. (but *tabellae* needs an epithet) to Ehwald’s *deprensae* (but the verb is more naturally used of persons), one stands out conspicuously, and describes the most likely situation, namely Ovid’s accidental sight of a note of assignation. Nowhere else in Ovid is *nudare* followed by a dative, and the dative *mihi* in verse 5 comes suspiciously close to the same word in verse 4. Then the cod. Vat. Pal.

Lat. 910 (15th-century) proffers the puzzling reading *mihi deletae*. The combination of these two clues inspired Heinsius to propose *male deletae* "no tablets imperfectly erased betray, etc." Compare *Ars* 3.495 *nec nisi deletis tutum rescribere ceris*. The progress of error may have been as follows: *l* was misread as *c*, giving rise to *male decetae*; the participle was made into a Latin word by the addition of *p*; and the scribe of the archetype altered the now embarrassing *male* into the not unsuitable pyrrhic lying right overhead — a series of corruptions, it is true, but none as violent as the change of *rursus* into *uidi* at *Am.* 1.2.12.

Am. 2.6.27f ecce, coturnices inter sua proelia uiuunt,
forsitan et *fiant* inde frequenter anus.

Fiunt of ω ($=\beta$) is right. The poet is stating facts: *coturnices uiuunt et fiunt frequenter anus*; *forsitan* merely modifies *inde* ($=ex$ *proelianter uiuendo*). The α manuscripts (followed by Kenney, as by all editors) have again corrupted the indicative at *Am.* 3.7.36:

forsitan impatiens *sit* latus inde meum.

We must read *fit* with β : *inde* shows that the verb means $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ and not $\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}$. The two passages plainly confirm one another.

I also favor the transposition of *Am.* 2.6.27f after verse 32 (Markland at *Stat. Silv.* 2.4.35). As it now stands, the word *ecce* is totally devoid of its usual function of marking a break from the preceding (cf. *Am.* 1.5.9, 2.7.17, 2.11.7, 3.8.9, 3.9.7, *Ars* 1.177, 1.525, 2.703, 2.745, 3.173, *Rem.* 795), a function which will be elegantly restored if it introduces the sequence *ecce, coturnices uiuunt; uiuit uultur, miluus, graculus; uiuit et cornix*; moreover (Markland's point), the account of the parrot's *mores* is harshly interrupted by the present position of the couplet, but runs smoothly if the transposition be made.

How, it will be asked, came the couplet to be misplaced? Kenney's defense of the traditional order suggests an answer: some early medieval scholastic noted that the peaceful nature of the parrot is contrasted with the savage temper of the quail; and, wishing the contrast to be spelled out more clearly, he deliberately moved the couplet. He did not notice that he left two consecutive pentameters in *-or aquae*, nor that six couplets which the poet had composed in the order A₁, A₂, A₃, B₁, B₂, B₃, he had distorted into the order A₁, B₁, A₂, A₃, B₂, B₃ (the *ecce* of B₁ now deprived of its function of marking the end of A₃).

Am. 2.7.25 scilicet ancillam, *quod erat* tibi fida, rogarem?

Unlike the conjecture in the text, the *quae tam* of ω ($=\beta$) makes sense, conforms to grammar, and explains the corruption in the other manuscripts. Desiring a verb in the subordinate clause, some annotator jotted *erat* above *tam*, whence arose in α the unmetrical *quae erat* (S_5 , later touched up to the scannable *quae sit* of BEa). The scribe of P unthinkingly altered *queerat* — for this is how *quae erat* was written in his exemplar — to the nearest Latin word he knew: *quierat*.

The same turn of speech occurs at *Ars* 3.117f, and again it must be brought up from the cellar. Read (with β):

Curia, concilio *quae nunc* dignissima tanto,
de stipula, Tatio regna tenente, fuit.

The *nunc est* of R ($=\alpha$) shows that the relative was jettisoned without compunction. I have also restored from A a word which can denote an assembly of men: the difference between *concilium* and *consilium* is the difference between Tweedledum and Tweedledee: it is invisible to the ordinary eye and has to be ascertained by asking questions.

If in these two examples no great damage has been perpetrated, thanks to the immunity enjoyed by β , the same does not hold for *Am.* 3.11.31f, where the insertion of the copula has ousted a key word.

desine blanditias et uerba potentia quondam
perdere: non ego *sum* stultus, ut ante fui.

“No longer waste your blandishments, so powerful *once*: I am not a fool, as *before* I was.” *Non ego nunc stultus* (cod. Scriv., Heinsius, Bentley) repairs the want of precision, and gives punch to what the poet intended as a punch-line: as at *Ars* 3.117, the temporal adverb dispenses with the need for a verb. See also Prop. 1.2.25, 1.6.1, 1.19.1 for the collocation *non ego nunc*.

Am. 2.9.1f O numquam *pro me* satis indigne Cupido,
o in corde meo desidiöse puer, . . .

“O Cupid, thou that hast never shown adequate indignation on my behalf . . .” Considered merely as words without a context, the first line contains nothing to affront either the shade of Priscian or even the Muse of Elegy. But when the sequel reveals the poem to be the Nasonian counterpart of Prop. 2.12, with the theme *si pudor est, alio traice tela, puer* (so read with V2, the other manuscripts are delirious), then the

utter absurdity of the opening is plain. Ovid has not had too little of Cupid, but a good deal too much; the indignation is not that felt by Cupid towards uncompliant girls (Munari), but that felt by Ovid toward Cupid.

The changes needed to transform the sense of the poet into the non-sense of his editors were slight; and to reverse the process Burman had only to alter *m* into *r*, and Madvig *-ate* into *-āde*:

O numquam *pro re* satis *indignande* Cupido . . .

"O thou whom no words could ever adequately revile to do justice to the facts!" Burman compares Verg. *Aen.* 4.337 *pro re pauca loquar*; see also *Met.* 8.659 *non indignanda*.

Am. 2.9.23f me quoque, qui totiens merui sub amore *puellae*,
defunctum placide uiuere tempus erat.

"For me, too, who so oft have campaigned under the banner of love of a girl, it is high time to *die* and live at peace."

(1) The metaphor pictures military service under a general whose identity has already been declared in the first three verses: *Cupido . . . miles numquam tua signa reliqui*. The poem raises a cry of mutiny against Cupid's autocratic rule; not a word so much as hints that a *puella* is responsible in any way for Ovid's servitude: indeed *puellae* as well as *uiri* (15) are subject to the tyrant's whim. To call the harsh commander *amor puellae* is to ruin the whole poem.

(2) Augustan usage of *defunctus* "quit of . . .," "through with . . .," requires an ablative, e.g., Verg. *Georg.* 4.475 *defunctaque corpora uita*; Hor. *Carm.* 3.26.3 *defunctumque bello*; Ov. *Met.* 9.254 *defunctum terra*. Otherwise it means "dead:" Ov. *Am.* 1.8.108 *ut mea defunctae molliter ossa cubent*, and would be specially charged with such a meaning in close proximity to the word *uiuere*.

It can be no coincidence that therapy for the one ailment should prove remedial for the other. Put a comma after *amore* (or, if you like, *Amore*), and [†]*puellae*[†] is revealed as the mangled remains of an ablative to be taken with *defunctum*. The triumvirate of Bentley, Burman, and Markland, which up to this point commanded the allegiance of the discriminating, is now shattered by discord. Markland's *duello* is quite impossible for an elegiac poet who is not deliberately archaizing (as Ovid is at *Fast.* 6.201 *Tusco . . . duello*, the only occurrence: see Axelson,

Markland and Némethy independently made the simple and satisfying emendation *quam* tibi . . . ! "How much I shall fear . . . !" See Prop. 2.26.7f:

quam timui ne forte tuum mare nomen haberet
teque (Heinsius) tua labens nauita fleret aqua!

Also Verg. *Aen.* 6.694:

quam metui ne quid Libyae tibi regna nocerent!

And *Fast.* 6.437:

heu, quantum timuere patres . . . !

The correctness of *quam* is convincingly established by:

<i>Ars</i> 3.73	<i>quam</i> cito, me miserum, . . . !
<i>Fast.</i> 1.598	me miserum, uirtus <i>quam</i> brevis illa fuit!
<i>Fast.</i> 4.82	me miserum, Scythico <i>quam</i> procul illa solo est!
<i>Her.</i> 19.121	me miseram, <i>quanto</i> planguntur litora fluctu!
<i>Met.</i> 13.280	me miserum, <i>quanto</i> cogor meminisse dolore . . . !
<i>Trist.</i> 1.2.19	me miserum, <i>quanti</i> montes uoluuntur aquarum!
<i>Trist.</i> 1.4.5	me miserum, <i>quantis</i> increscunt aequora uentis!
Prop. 2.33.35	me miserum, <i>ut</i> multo nihil est mutata Lyaeo!

Indeed, *quam* is also supported by other verses which a superficial mind might interpret as supporting *quid*:

<i>Am.</i> 2.5.8	me miserum, quare <i>tam</i> bona causa mea est?
<i>Am.</i> 2.17.8	me miserum, cur est <i>tam</i> bene nota sibi?

Confusion between exclamatory *quam* and interrogative *quid* is recorded in the apparatus on the very same page: *Am.* 2.11.28 *quam* PS₅; *quid* Pf. What more could one ask for?

Am. 2.15.11ff tunc ego *te* cupiam, *domina*, et tetigisse papillas
 et laeuam tunicis inseruisse manum:
 elabar digito quamuis angustus et haerens
 inque sinum mira latus ab arte cadam.

Apparatus: "domina et *Madvig*: . . . dominae PS_ω." Revilo P. Oliver's article ("Ovid in his Ring," *CP* 53 [1958] 103ff) has admirably settled the reading of this passage. Here I merely restate his conclusion with another line of reasoning.

The *laeva manus* is the man's (full references in Brandt's edition): consequently *tetigisse* and *inseruisse* are prolative infinitives after *cupiam*; *dominae* is unexceptionable, and it is probably *te* which is corrupt. The harsh asyndeton after *manum* is therefore to be removed by emending *te* to a subordinating conjunction. The Italians, essentially correctly, read *tunc ego, si cupiam* . . . Conforming more with Ovid's practice, however, and providing a source of error is Rappold's *tunc ego cum cupiam*, i.e., *tunc ego* <CŪ> *CU**p**iam* (*cum* lost by haplography). The passage, then, reads as follows: *tunc* (having been changed into the ring) *ego, cum cupiam* (that is, Ovid *qua* man) *tetigisse et inseruisse, elabar* (that is, Ovid *qua* ring) *et cadam*.

Oliver is also to be followed in rejecting the subjunctive in line 21:

non ego dedecori tibi *sim*, mea uita, futurus.

So PSOb (that is α); *sum* ω (that is β) is correct, *futurus sum* being in any case an equivalent of *sim*, just as at *Her.* 17.68 *futurus eras* is the equivalent of *esses*.

Am. 2.15.19 †*si dabor ut condar*† *loculis, exire negabo*.

The text is perfectly sound: "If I am to be given to the casket to keep." *Loculis* is dative. The usual construction involves the gerundive (i.e., *si dabor loculis condendus*): *Ars* 3.421 *se quoque det populo mulier speciosa uidendam*; 3.528 *huic equites, illi signa tuenda dedit*; *Fast.* 2.134 (*moenia*) *tu dederas transilienda Remo*; 2.521 (*farra*) *flammiis torrenda dederunt*; 3.375f . . . *iuuena* / *quae dederat nulli colla premenda iugo*; *Met.* 15.472 *ubera dent saturae manibus pressanda capellae*. Oliver relevantly cites *Cat.* 64.152f . . . *dilaceranda feris dabor alitibusque* / *praeda*. The same construction is to be recognized at *Am.* 3.6.9ff:

quid properasse iuuat, quid parca dedisse quieti
10 tempora, quid nocti conseruisse diem,
 si tamen hic standum est, si non datur artibus ullis
 ulterior nostro ripa premenda *pede*?

From the inferior manuscripts Heinsius rightly prints *pedit*, followed by most editors (including some like the Loeb editor who have misconstrued it). The syntax is: *si non ullis artibus ulterior ripa nostro pedit datur premenda* "if by no device the farther bank is given to my feet to tread." Kenney says (*Notes* 64) "It seems wilful to desert the majority

("a favourite expression of Ovid" Lewis and Short) occurs a dozen times elsewhere in the poet: *damna* must mean "damage," my only demur to Oliver's excellent article. The error (a kind of Perseverations-fehler) was particularly easy, since *fer per-* came immediately beneath *perfun-* of the hexameter. I similarly explain the error *pudenda* at *Ars* 1.644 as being induced by *imPUne PUellas* in the preceding verse: Kenney's obeli should be removed and the pentameter read with Naugerius (Burman, who lived two centuries later, should not be credited with what he himself imputed to the earlier scholar):

hac *minus* est una fraude *tuenda* fides.

No more certain correction was ever made in Ovid. The idiom was fully illustrated by Gronovius, *Observationes*, II.1, whereto Housman has added examples at *Man.* 1.778.

Am. 2.16.23ff non quae uirgineo portenta sub inguine latrant,
 nec timeam uestros, curua Malea, sinus,
25 nec quae submersis ratibus saturata Charybdis
 fundit et effusas ore receptat aquas.

Apparatus: "uestros, *i.q. tuos: expl. Housman. cf. III i 40*" (*CQ* 3 [1908] 244ff). As Housman would have been the first to remark, "*expl.*" goes too far. In fact he gave no explanation at all, but merely isolated four passages of Latin poetry in which the word *uester* seemed to him to be incapable of reference to more than a single person or thing.

One of those passages is given above. Says Housman: "The 'sinus' formed by the curve of Malea are her own, not held in partnership with any other cape on the coast." Not so. According to Pomponius Mela the "sinus" formed by the curve of Malea are not her own, but held in partnership with two other capes on the coast, cf. *Chorogr.* 2.3.50: *Inter Scyllaeon et Malean sinus Argolicus dicitur, inter Malean et Taenaron Laconicus*. Consciously or unconsciously, Ovid is associating the gulfs with the other two capes, and can therefore say with perfect correctness *uestros*, that is, *quos possidetis*. Moreover, it would seem that the poet *was* conscious of Cape Scyllaeum, for Scylla is alluded to in the previous verse. This interpretation will account for the otherwise strange separation of Scylla and Charybdis, which disconcerted Ehwald so much that he transposed the couplets. We learn from Pausanias

(2.34.7) that Cape Scyllaeum was named after Scylla, daughter of Nisus, who is confused by Virgil as well as Ovid with Charybdis's colleague.

Touching *Am.* 3.1.40 Housman was very careful to state that there is nothing which demands the explanation "uestra, i.q. tua:" "Here *uestra* looks as if it meant *tua*; for to whom but its queen does the palace of Tragedy belong? Well, perhaps to Atreus and Oedipus and the other princes whose crimes and misfortunes are her chief concern: 'regum facta' is Horace's name for the themes of tragedy in *serm.* 1.10.42."

Housman does not favor the importing of *uester* = *tuus* into Ovid by conjecture: at *Her.* 9.1 the text is defended by *Luc.* 2.555; at *Her.* 19.62 *iuncto nostra* "there is much to be said for the conjecture of Merkel" (*nostro iuncta*).

<i>Am.</i> 2.18.19ff	quod licet, aut artes teneri profiteamur Amoris . . .
21	aut quod Penelopes uerbis reddatur Vlix scribimus et lacrimas, Phylli relictas, tuas, quod Paris et Macareus et quod male gratus Iason Hippolytique parens Hippolytusque legant,
25	quodque tenens strictum Dido miserabilis ensem dicat et [†] <i>Aoniae Lesbis amata lyrae</i> . [†]
34	. . dat uotam Phoebo Lesbis amata lyram.

Read *Aoniam* . . . *lyram* with Bornecque and *Lesbis amica* with *s* (*amata* in 34 "her love now returned" proves the incorrectness of the word in 26). "I write either the *Amores* (Rand, *AJP* 28 [1907] 287ff) or the 1st of the *Heroides*; and the 2nd; and the 5th together with the 11th, 6th, 10th, and 4th; and (=the 7th) what says wretched Dido with drawn sword in hand and (=the 15th) what with Muses' lyre the Lesbian flame."

Bornecque's conjecture is slight, but scintillating: the parallelism between hexameter and pentameter is exact, accusative adjective and noun sandwiching nominative noun and adjective. Of course, when Ovid describes Dido and Sappho as penning epistles with sword and lyre respectively in hand, he merely signifies that each is on the point of suicide, Dido about to stab herself with Aeneas's sword, Sappho about to leap off the Leucadian rock with her lyre (*Her.* 15.181ff). Dabrowski points out to me that the stucco relief on the apse of the Pythagorean

Basilica at the Porta Maggiore, dated to about the middle of the first century after Christ, depicts Sappho making the leap lyre in hand (a good illustration is provided by Carcopino, "De Pythagore aux Apôtres" [Paris 1956] Plate I facing p. 46).

Some pre-archetypal scribe failed to perceive that the accusative *Aoniam lyram* depended on *tenens* (it is not for the last ten centuries or so of Latin scholarship to suggest that this was obvious), and altered it to a dative after *amica*: this is what stands in ς , and may have stood in the archetype. By way of "improvement" a variant *amata* was then added, fairly clearly taken from 34: hence the reading of α . Most of the β manuscripts seem to imply a further alteration, *Aonio . . . uiro*, designed to provide *Lesbis amata* or *amica* with a boy-friend. Verse 34, "the Lesbian, her love requited, offers Phoebus the lyre she vowed," is charged with more point, certainly more clarity, if the lyre has already been mentioned. *Aoni(us)* means simply "of the Muses": coupled with the noun *lyra* (cf. *Am.* 1.1.12, etc.) it loses completely any geographical significance potentially available to it, so that the old scholars' *Aeoli(us)* is not to be countenanced.

These instructive verses demonstrate conclusively the authenticity of the *Epistula Sapphus*. Since Ovid partially adheres to a numerical order (which may in the middle couplet have been disturbed for metrical reasons), a guess may be fairly hazarded that the Sappho was the last piece in the original edition. Ovid has devoted the same number of verses (6) to the answers composed by Sabinus; the fact that Penelope's mail is mentioned first and Sappho's last I interpret as a poet's intimation that replies were sent to all. But Ovid has tastefully not repeated the whole list and, equally tastefully, has varied the order: for example, the last couplet (33f) effectively tells us that Hypsipyle received a disappointing, Sappho a heartening, answer.

Whether this original edition contained all fifteen of the appeals from Her to Him is not easy to decide. If it did, then Ovid committed an aesthetic blunder in sending two separate ones to Jason; and in composing replies Sabinus will have had his resourcefulness tested to the full. The 12th Epistle, from Medea to Jason, like the passage in the *Metamorphoses* (7.1-424) presupposes the existence of Ovid's own tragedy, but this is probably subsumed in the reference at *Am.* 2.18.13. The edition represented by the archetype, on the other hand, seems to have been a 20-letter collection, with the *Sappho* excluded as dealing with a historical personage. I follow recent scholars in considering *Heroides* 1-21 as Ovidian.

Am. 2.19.19ff tu quoque, quae nostros rapuisti nuper ocellos,
 20 saepe *time insidias*, saepe rogata nega,
 et sine me ante tuos proiectum in limine postis
 longa pruinosa frigora nocte pati.

Only two passages defy Lachmann's pronouncement (on *Lucr.* 3.954) that Ovid in his elegiacs did not elide iambic words before a long syllable. To the first, *Her.* 17.97 *disce* meo exemplo *formosis posse carere*, Palmer's self-explanatory *ex exemplo* has administered an elegant *coup de grâce*. The second, however, *time insidias*, is to be arraigned for treason against sense as well as meter.

The young married woman who has recently captured Ovid's fancy is so responsive that he feels cheated of the thrills of illicit love. To remedy this unsatisfying situation he offers her the following advice: "Often fear traps; often, when I ask, deny me." Heinsius understood the traps to be the snares for seduction set by the lover: but the girl's enthusiasm does not give her lover time to set them. And it is Burman who, addressing himself to the elucidation of *time*, has scented a more promising trail: "Pretend that you are afraid of your husband." Compare *Am.* 3.4.31f:

indignere licet, iuuat inconcessa uoluptas:
 sola placet, '*timeo*' dicere si qua potest.

Similarly *Am.* 3.8.63 *in me timet illa* maritum ("when I ask, she tells me she is afraid of her husband"). Lastly, Ovid prescribes the feigning of fear for these very circumstances at *Ars* 3.603ff:

 quae uenit ex tuto, minus est accepta uoluptas;
 ut sis liberior Thaide, *finge metus*.
 605 cum melius foribus possis, admitte fenestra,
 inque tuo uultu *signa timentis habe*.

However, two obstacles stand in the way of interpreting *time insidias* by the passages cited above. First, *time* will have to mean "pretend to fear": but the verb is parallel with *nega*, which cannot mean "pretend to deny." Secondly, *insidias* will have to mean "husband's traps": but the husband is not trying to inveigle his wife into adultery, but to prevent it; and what she is to pretend fear of is no underhand stratagem to catch her, but the painful consequences of being caught. Tibullus supplies a further piece of corroboration, 2.6.49f:

saepe, ubi nox mihi promissa est, languere puellam
 nuntiat aut *aliquas extimuisse minas*.

There is nothing insidious about the threat of a thrashing.

If reason be any guide, then, *insidias* disguises a word which, when constructed with *time*, signifies "pretend to be afraid." And just such a word exists, tailored to fit the verse to perfection: *simulans*. The conjecture not only removes the illegitimate elision, it restores a grammatical balance to the verse with adverb, imperative, and participle in each half. It also provides the probable cause of the mischief: if *simulās* were ever miscopied as *simulas*, it would naturally seem that a feminine noun in the accusative plural had been faultily transcribed: *insidias* is the nearest such noun to *simulas*, and has proved, as editions of Ovid attest, a truly deceptive piece of putty.

Am. 2.19.52 at mihi *concessi* finis amoris erit.

"But of love yielded to me there will be an end." The sense is incomplete: when, how, or why will there be an end? Nor can any satisfactory answer to the question be given by asserting that *concessi* has a conditional force "if yielded to me:" such a genitive cannot play protasis to the main verb's apodosis.

P's reading, *concessa*, is unexceptionable: the word is an ablative absolute, with *puella* understood from verse 47 "but, if she is yielded to me, there will be an end of my love." A much bolder ellipse of *puella* awaits us at *Am.* 3.7.55. Alteration by the inferior manuscripts of *concessa* to the specious *concessi*, agreeing with *amoris*, was much more likely than the reverse alteration (not an obvious conjecture) in the best manuscript.

Am. 3.1.53ff uel quotiens foribus duris *incisa* pependi
 non uerita a populo praetereunte legi!
 55 quin ego me memini, dum custos saeuus abiret,
 ancillae *missam* delituisse sinu.

The manuscript Vb has *a . . . infixā . . . miseram*, preserving in each case, I believe, the hand of the poet.

(1) From the apparatus is to be inferred that α gave *uel*, and β *a*: Ovid frequently uses *a* with an exclamation, emphatic *uel* (for it cannot here be disjunctive) never. Possibly the corruption arose from an interlinear sign marking the loss before this verse of 47f.

(2) Surely no serenader ever *incised* his amorous lays upon the beloved's door? Surely nothing *incised* upon a door can be said to *have hung* (as though temporarily) upon it? Why is the door called hard? Are we meant to imagine the poet laboring away with mallet and chisel?

The verses are composed by the poet at home on a sheet of paper, and are taken as a gift; when he is denied admission, or a deaf ear is turned to his warblings of love, he fastens the sheet to the door. *Elegea* complains of this indignity in language suggestive of servile crucifixion. See *Lucr.* 4.1179 *foribus miser oscula figit*, *Hor. Serm.* 1.3.8off *si quis eum seruum . . . / in cruce suffigat*, *Ov. Fast.* 1.557 *ora super postes adfixaque bracchia pendent*, *Her.* 9.89 *Threiciis adfixa penatibus ora*, *Pont.* 1.6.38 *atque aliquis pendens in cruce uota facit*. Probably *infixa* was corrupted to *incixa*, and then miscorrected in the archetype.

(3) *Missam* inelegantly severs the connection between *dum abiret* and *delituisse* by obtruding an unnecessary verbal idea. The ideal word, expressing a desirable reference to the indignity suffered, is *miseram* (preferred by Bentley), which could easily have been corrupted through *mis'am*. Compare *Fast.* 4.176 *facti . . . pudore latet*, *Met.* 3.393 *spretata latet*; and, for *miser* used adverbially, *Ib.* 300 *qui miser aurifera teste pependit aqua*, *Trist.* 4.1.60 *dum miser Euxini litora laeua peto*.

Am. 3.2.5f tu *cursus* spectas, ego te: spectemus uterque
quod iuuat, atque oculos pascat uterque suos.

Bentley's *currus* is certainly right: he compares *Trist.* 4.2.63 *currus spectet eburnos* (where one manuscript has *cursus*), and *Ars* 3.634 *spectet iunctos . . . equos*. *Currus* is perpetually corrupted into *cursus* (so LQ at *Ars* 1.329); and the impossibility of the abstract noun *cursus* here ("courses," "tracks," "orbits") is recognized by the *codd. dett.*, which have miscorrected the word to *cursum* ("track"). But lines 7ff show that Ovid's light-o'-love is looking at the competitors.

The same error occurs in the manuscripts of Manilius at 1.174 and 1.198, in both places corrected by Bentley. Housman, who apropos of *cursus* and *currus* declared "*neque enim ulla est in hac re codicum auctoritas*," unfortunately misunderstood the former of these two passages (I have tried in *Phoenix* 13 [1959] 102f to show that Bentley is right) and further found himself unable to determine which *cursus* to alter in (174) *non ageret cursus . . .* (175) *Phoebus . . .*, (176) *lunaue . . . regeret . . . cursus*: but Phoebus has a chariot, the moon has not.

Am. 3.2.75f en reuocant; *at*, ne turbet toga mota capillos,
in nostros abdas te licet usque sinus.

A sense-pause after the second foot followed by a monosyllable occurs only twice in Ovid, at *Fast.* 6.443 and *Her.* 12.89, in each of which instances the monosyllable is the proclitic *et*. On metrical grounds, therefore, the hexameter as given above is suspect. Instead of the ad-versative *at*, read the continuative *ac*, which coalesces with *ne* to form a metrical word-group: *ac ne* was the reading of α (=the archetype, and Ovid), as is revealed by the apparatus (the *agne* of P represents a common phonetic adjustment, which has much vitiated the spelling of names like *Cnosus* and *Procne*).

Bentley drew attention to the word-group *ac ne* in his note on Hor. *Carm.* 1.18.7 *ac ne quis . . . transiliat*, where, comparing

Epist. 1.1.13 *ac ne forte roges*;
Epist. 1.19.26 *ac ne me . . . ornes*; and
Epist. 2.1.208 *ac ne forte putes*,

he pointed out that at *Rem.* 465 Ovid wrote:
ac ne forte putes . . .

As against Kenney, who gives the manuscript *et* without comment, I agree with the pre-Heinsian editors, Bentley, Burman, and Lewis and Short, s.v. *atque* IV 10 a. Corruption was easy: *ac* became *at* (as, for example, at *Am.* 3.2.75 above), and then *at* became *et* (cf. *Am.* 1.8.42 at Ps, *et* s; *Rem.* 232 at REw, *et* K).

Am. 3.3.15ff dicite, di, si uos impune fefellerat illa,
alterius meriti cur ego damna tuli?
(at non inuidiae uobis Cepheia uirgo est
pro male formosa iussa parente mori.)
non satis est, quod uos habui sine pondere testes,
20 et mecum lusos ridet inulta deos?

Kenney's practice of parenthesizing whole couplets (e.g., *Am.* 2.8.11-14) seems to me a reproach to the poet; and there is also the danger that it may degenerate into a typographical device for evading a clear and decisive judgment about the authenticity of such verses.

Corinna — so let us call the damsel concerned — has perjured herself after swearing by the gods, and without the slightest ill-effect.

The gods have penalized Ovid instead. He remonstrates: "Say, gods, if she deceived you, why have I paid the penalty? *Yet no ill-will is owing to you over Andromeda, whom you bade be sacrificed for her mother.* Is it not enough that you ignore my appeals and allow her mockery of us to go unpunished?" The italicized words ruin the whole logic of the expostulation: if the gods could damn Andromeda for another's crime, why should they not damn Ovid for Corinna's? It would be difficult to imagine a more tactless remark by a plaintiff.

Of emendations the only one worth mention is Bentley's (*sat non . . . mori?*), which may even be right. But *sat* was not written by Ovid. Ovid did not write the couplet at all: it is, as Dabrowski conjectures, spurious. It not only destroys a strong and effective argument; it not only introduces irrelevant mythology: the point which it makes is false. Andromeda was sentenced not by *di* or *aeterni di*, but by *iniustus Ammon* (Met. 4.671). The couplet was fabricated by a pasticheur (see Met. 10.730f) who was unable to refrain from parading his paltry learning. Without the inept interruption the second indignant question follows naturally and forcibly upon the heels of the first.

The matter of spurious verses in the Amatory Poems deserves further attention. Happily, the difficulties do not reach the magnitude of those we encounter in the *Heroides*, concerning which Palmer (at 2.29) has written justly, if ungrammatically: "*uix dici potest quam misere interpolatae sint hae epistolae, quam multi uersus adulterini pro Ouidianis legantur et legentur.*" Nevertheless, inasmuch as the *Heroides* and the *Carmina Amatoria* share the same archetype, an *a priori* probability exists that the latter as well as the former have been infected.

Kenney recognizes five non-Ovidian insertions already inherited by the archetype: (2) *Am.* 2.2.23f; (3) *Am.* 3.8.51f (note the word *quoque*; the desire to show off a knowledge of mythology); (4) *Am.* 3.11.35f; (5) *Ars* 1.585-8 (note the phrase *tuta frequensque*; the word *quoque*); and (6) *Rem.* 25f (note the ineptitude: "arrows bare for war," "death-bearing blood"). To these (all of which I agree are spurious) I should add a further six.

(7) *Am.* 1.6.65f:

iamque pruinosos molitur Lucifer axes,
inque suum miseros excitat ales opus.

These verses are exposed as counterfeit by the structure of the poem, which consists of nine stanzas of eight lines each, the central five stanzas ending with the refrain *excute poste seram*; they are isolated between the end of the eighth stanza and the beginning of the

ninth. There are other signs of illegitimacy: although the distich represents the dawn as being at hand and the cock crowing, the lover tells his garland in the very next pentameter to lie before the door "all night" and then says "when my mistress sees you in the morning;" *ales* badly needs an epithet; *suum* has to refer awkwardly to *miseros*; and finally *miseros*, which ought properly to mean "the wretched," has to be stretched to mean "all (wretched) mortals." The couplet was inserted by a critic who desired some motivation for terminating the paraclausithyron; however, *omnia consumpsi* in 61 sufficiently indicates that the lover resigns himself to failure and has abandoned hope, while verses 68 and 69 prove that he has no intention of staying till dawn.

(8) *Ars* 3.587f, deleted by Damsté, *Mnemosyne* 39 (1911) 445:

adde forem, et duro dicat tibi ianitor ore
 'non potes,' exclusum te quoque tanget amor.

The poet, who is addressing women (576 *carpite*; 589 *ponite*), hardly broke off in an unannounced apostrophe to a single man, and four times, too (*adde, tibi, potes, te*). *Adde* is odd: add to what? *Quoque* recalls the interpolations at *Am.* 3.8.51f, and *Ars* 1.585ff.

(9) *Ars* 3.655f:

quid sapiens faciet? stultus quoque munere gaudet:
 ipse quoque accepto munere mutus erit.

The hexameter obviously reproduces the form of *Cat.* 66.47 and *Verg. Buc.* 3.16, which requires *faciet, stultus cum munere gaudet?* (Merkel): possibly the pretentious interpolator spelled the conjunction *quom*, which, after *m* was swallowed up by *munere*, opened the door to *quoque*.

But the couplet is preposterous. The conduct of the wise man is not to be inferred from the actions of a fool; *sapiens* and *stultus* are not poetic attributes of janitors; *ipse* is more naturally referred to the husband (hence *ipse uir* ω); *cum* should take the subjunctive (cf. 3.633ff); *quoque* recalls the interpolations at *Am.* 3.8.51f and *Ars* 1.585ff; the repetitions of *munere* (after 652 and 653) are intolerable. When to all this is added that the couplet spoils the flow of the argument, its spuriousness is made plain beyond doubt.

(10) *Rem.* 565f:

hic male dotata pauper cum coniuge uiuit:
 uxorem fato credat obesse suo.

This couplet is damned by its inappropriateness to the context. We are to subdue our passion for a mistress by worrying about possible disasters of a non-amatorial kind which may befall us (559f). Illustrations follow in 561–574: if we are borrowers, we must worry about the repayment; if we have a stern father, about parental severity; and so on. “If a man is poor and has a poor wife, let him worry about the impediment his wife causes to his destiny.” How on earth this reflection, enough to add fuel to the flames, could dampen anyone’s ardor for another woman is quite beyond me. None of the other examples makes any reference to the eternal triangle: their whole *raison d’être* is to distract attention from it. Among criticisms of detail may be mentioned: *hic pauper* is unidiomatic; *hic* is in any case harsh after *huic* in 564; and *male* (hardly to be divorced from *dotata*) recalls the interpolation at *Am.* 3.3.17f.

(11) *Rem.* 669f, deleted by Heinsius (“Nemo mihi persuaserit hoc distichon Nasonianae venae foetum esse”):

tutius est aptumque magis discedere pace
nec petere a thalamis litigiosa fora.

Ovid does not mix unlike adjectives of a type “*tutum et aptum est*”; *pace* cannot be used adverbially; *nec* for *quam* (read by many manuscripts) is impossible; the pentameter is clearly intended to signify “than to resort to litigation,” but the form is terribly clumsy — *a thalamis* presumably means “leaving the bed-chamber.” The pertinence of the couplet is much more neatly expressed by the following one: “let her keep what you have given; don’t resort to litigation in an attempt to recover it: cut your losses.”

(12) *Rem.* 745f, deleted by Lucian Müller and Madvig:

Cnosida fecisses inopem, sapienter amasset:
diuitiis alitur luxuriosus amor.

Cnosida is ambiguous, the pluperfect subjunctives inelegant. But the compelling reason for excision lies in the utter absurdity of the contrary-to-fact condition, which implies *Cnosida feceras opulentam*. Who, then, is *tu*? Not Neptune (743). Certainly not the reader. The lines are as their author gave them, but he was not Ovid (except that the pentameter is an insipid version of *Fast.* 1.690).

Since certain of these characteristics recur (*male*: 1, 10; mythology: 1, 3, 12; *quoque*: 3, 5, 8, 9; *tutum et* . . . : 5, 11; ineptitude: 6, 11, 12), a single agent may be responsible for these pre-archetypal interpolations.

Am. 3.4.7f nec corpus seruare potes, licet omnia claudas:
omnibus *occlusis* intus adulter erit.

"You cannot preserve your wife's chastity, though you shut every door: with every door shut up, an adulterer will still remain within." Well, obviously, if he is hiding under your wife's bed. And what exactly is the force of *omnibus*? Every door in the house? How many entrances to the house are envisaged?

The true reading is *exclusis* of P and almost all manuscripts; this gives the pointed sense which alone is appropriate to the context: "With every man shut out, an adulterer will still remain within" (that is, in the woman's mind): *omnibus* is contrasted with (*unus*) *adulter*; *ex-clusis* with *intus*. *Excludo*, of course, is the standard term: *Am.* 1.6.31, 1.8.78, *Ars* 3.69, 3.588, *Rem.* 36.

Against the confederation of P and ω , the authority of S (grossly exaggerated by Knoche, *Gnomon* 8 [1932] 523ff, who unfortunately influenced both Munari and Kenney) is negligible; and where that confederation represents (as it mostly will) the concurrence of α and β , and hence the archetype, then the authority of S is nil. Two other of S's readings call for proscription. At *Am.* 3.2.22 *illa*, read *ista* "this lady here" (Palmer on *Her.* 10.85), which is more colloquial and peremptory than the formal *illa*. At 3.2.84 *hoc satis hic*, read *hoc satis est*: *satis* is properly an adverb, and the Romans would have found it harder to supply *est* than editors imagine; *satis* for *satis est* is rare, and usually permits of easy emendation (e.g., *sat es* for *satis* at *Luc.* 1.66).

Am. 3.6.45f nec te praetereo, qui per caua saxa uolutans
Tiburis Argei *pomifer* arua rigas.

Here are four nouns and four attributes, exactly one for each. But *qui* (= *Anio*) has two, and *arua* has none; and one of *Anio*'s attributes does not fit, because apple-trees do not grow in rivers. Not surprisingly it fits *arua* very well, and the Italians accordingly restored *pomifer* <A> *Arua*: "Nor forget I the Anio, which, tumbling over deep-worn rocks, waters the fruitful orchards of Argive Tibur."

Platnauer's factitious objection (*LEV* 89) — as if there were anything special about the elision of a short *a*! — takes no account of *Silius* 4.225 *pomifera arua* (no need to guess at the name of the river watering these fruitful orchards!). Bentley's note at *Hor. Carm.* 1.7.14 (where he upholds Broukhusius's *pomosis Anio qua spumifer incubat aruis* at

Prop. 4.7.81, the model for Ovid's verses) should have settled the reading once and for all.

Am. 3.6.73f o utinam mea lecta forent patrioque sepulcro
condita, *dum* poterant uirginis ossa legi!

"O that my bones had been interred, while they were a virgin's!" Surely not all the time? Tenses of the indicative other than the present endow *dum* with the meaning "all the time that . . .," "so long as . . ." The reading of the best manuscript, *cum* "at a time when . . .," "when . . . still," should dissuade us from outraging Silvia's syntax as well as her honor. Compare *Her.* 1.5f:

o utinam *tum*, *cum* Lacedaemona classe petebat,
obrutus insanis esset adulter aquis!

Grammar also raises an admonitory hand at *Ars* 1.577f:

et quemcumque cibum digitis libauerit illa,
tu pete, *dumque petes*, sit tibi tacta manus.

"Reach for whatever food she fingers, and in reaching contrive to touch her hand." The manuscripts are divided between *petes* (Ow), *petis* (Abs), and *petas* (R). Exact logic requires *dumque petis* ("in the process of reaching"), as at *Am.* 1.4.52:

dumque bibit, furtim, si potes, adde merum.

Theodulf read *dumque petis*, to judge from *Carm.* 28.360:

quae pete, *dumque petis*, fer pia uota deo.

The remaining sixty-one occurrences of *dum* in the new edition conform strictly to rule.

Am. 3.6.85f *dum* loquor, increuit *latas spatiosus in undas*,
nec capit admissas alueus altus aquas.

Apparatus: "latas . . . undas *ego*: latis . . . undis *codd.*" The conjecture should mean "your channel has grown spacious enough to contain wide waters," which is ruled out by the context. Not to consider the unpleasant jingle of -as . . . -as / . . . -as . . . -as, the ablative is certified by *Met.* 11.47f *lacrimis quoque flumina dicunt / increuisse suis* and

Trist. 1.4.5 *quantis increscunt aequora uentis*. The required sense "has grown more spacious with wide waters" is given by Bentley's *latis spatIOS<IOR> undis*, which further explains the corruption: *-ior* was lost by haplography, and the verse tamely patched up with *-us in*. The comparative recurs at *Ars* 2.645.

Am. 3.7.53ff a tenera quisquam sic surgit mane puella,
 protinus ut sanctos possit adire deos?
 55 sed, puto, non [†]blanda[†] non optima perdidit in me
 oscula, non omni sollicitauit ope?
 illa graues potuit quercus adamantaque durum
 surdaque blanditiis saxa mouere suis.

Housman wrote *finis* to this crux in *CQ* 22 (1927) 11, dismissing as contemptible and gratuitous the conjectures made upon it, and deigning only to refute the Heinsian *sed non blanda puto*: "*puto* in Ovid, who uses it more than thirty times, invariably has its final syllable short, and its proper place is immediately after the conjunction, as in u.2 'at, puto.'" The text is sound, and should be printed thus: *sed, puto, non blanda: non optima . . . ope*. These are ironical musings, technically statements, for *puto* cannot parenthesize a question (I should also point out that Kenney's question-mark at the end of *Ars* 2.714 is incorrect). In English, however, a clear rendering of the irony needs an interrogative form.

Offered his girl-friend's favors, Ovid has been frustrated by his own impotence: in this poem he ruefully describes the occasion. How could it possibly have happened? What possible excuse could there be? "Whoever gets up in a state of chastity from a young girl's bed? Well, perhaps it was not from a seductive one's? Perhaps she did not lavish passionate kisses upon me? Perhaps she did not try every means to excite me? Nay, that girl's seductiveness could have moved stones." The syntax of 55f is continued from the previous sentence: *sed, puto, non blanda* a puella sic surrexi. As Housman says, the construction is natural, that is to say, a Roman would have had no difficulty in supplying from the context (and from the ensuing *perdidit in me*) both the change of tense and the change of subject to which *surgit* must be adjusted. I do not think, however, that Housman's simple Ciceronian quotation illustrates these adjustments, nor can the change of subject from *ego* (*surrexi*) to *illa* (*perdidit*) be reckoned other than rough. Nevertheless, the couplet is clearly a tricolon of the same shape and timbre as verses 1 and 2, and the word *blanda* is clearly guaranteed by *blanditiis* in verse 58.

Am. 3.9.25ff adice Maeoniden, a quo ceu fonte perenni
 uatum Pieriis ora rignantur aquis:
 hunc quoque summa dies nigro submersit Auerno;
 defugiunt auidos carmina sola rogos.
 durat opus uatum, Troiani fama laboris
 30 tardaue nocturno tela retexta dolo:
 sic Nemesis longum, sic Delia nomen habebunt,
 altera cura recens, altera primus amor.

Apparatus: "*uatum codd.: uatis Francius, Heinsius: uatis uel uati Bentleius. sed durat bis intellegendum.*" I do not think the explanation would have satisfied any of the three scholars, who might have inquired whether *durat* could be twice understood in the line *durat opus uatum*, *pascua rura duces*, and if so, whether it would make acceptable sense.

The flaw is most simply revealed by a précis of the argument: (25ff) even Homer died; but poetry lives on; (29f) the work of *poets* survives, *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; (31f) so too Tibullus's *Delia* (Book 1) and *Nemesis* (Book 2) will survive. *Vatum* is therefore to be impugned on two grounds: (1) the line of reasoning *ut durat opus uatum, sic durabit opus Tibulli* implies that Tibullus is not a *uates*: note well that Ovid has written *sic*, not *ergo*, *igitur*, *itaque*, or the like; (2) the words *Troiani . . . dolo*, an elaborate description of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, are in apposition to *opus uatum*: but Maeonides is not two poets, but one.

Vatis, the earlier correction, displeases on account of the homoeoptoton *-is . . . -is* in unrelated words at caesura and verse-end; and Bentley's *uati* (no doubt based on Am. 2.19.23, Fast. 4.830; Am. 1.1.27, Prop. 4.1.67, Man. 1.113), which escapes this criticism, involves a similar jingle *uat-i Trojan-i* and poorer sense ("the work endures for the bard").

What Ovid wrote was:

durant, uatis opus, Troiani fama laboris . . .

The plural verb is needed for a proper balance with *habebunt* (i.e., *ut durant Ilias et Odyssea, sic durabunt Delia et Nemesis*). For *uatis opus* in apposition, see Met. 5.112 *sed qui, pacis opus, citharam cum uoce moueres*; for the word-order *-is opus*, see Fast. 6.484 *uatis opus*, 6.641 *urbis opus*, 6.662 *artis opus*.

Two slight errors led to the manuscript reading: (1) the original error was *uatum* instead of *uatis*, a Perseverationsfehler induced by *uatum* in 26; (2) the unmetrical *durant uatum opus* was then corrected to *durat opus uatum*. This is not unsupported guesswork. Evidence of the process is still visible in the best manuscript, the reading of which,

durus optat uatum, Kenney has relegated to the appendix as an insignificant spoonerism. Such mistakes are rare in Latin manuscripts; and when they occur at a place regarded by Francius, Heinsius, and Bentleius as corrupt, they deserve mention in the apparatus. The second stage of the depravation reconstructed above occurred in the archetype, which looked something like this (I purposely exaggerate interlinear spacing for the sake of clarity):

defugiutauidoscarmina . . .
 op
 us
 durâtuatumopustroiani . . .

The source of the β group correctly executed the intentions of whoever made the amendment. The source of the α group, however, misinterpreted the deletion of the sign for n ; he was tired with transcribing, and had long since given up the attempt to think about the Latin he was copying; he thought that the letters *usop* were to be inserted between the letters *r* and *a*. Hence he transcribed the verse as *durus opat uatum*, which P (or more probably its exemplar R) altered into the Latin words *durus optat uatum*. The same thoughtless incorporation in α of interlinear letters confronts us at *Ars* 3.300 (*allicit ignotos ille fugatque uiros*): in anticipation of *fugat* the scribe of the archetype wrote *alligat* (read by some manuscripts); this was corrected with an interlinear *ci*, which α (and hence R) incorporated by reading *allicigat*.

Am. 3.9.37f uiue pius: moriere pius; cole sacra: colentem
 mors grauis a templis in caua busta trahet.

That J. C. Jahn rightly placed the semi-colon after *moriere* will become clear from a paraphrase: "However piously you live, you will die; however piously you worship the gods, death will hale you off to the grave in the midst of your devotions." *Sacra pie colere, deos pie colere* are standard phrases, cf. *Cic. Nat. Deor.* 1.17, *Tib.* 1.3.25.

Am. 3.9.39f carminibus confide bonis: iacet ecce Tibullus;
 uix manet e toto, parua quod urna capit.

"Dead lies Tibullus; scarce what a small urn holds remains from *the whole*:" *tanto* "from *so much*," which is needed for a satisfactory

sense and balance, was found by Heinsius in two manuscripts. This is certainly Ovid's way of putting it: *Ars* 3.499, *Fast.* 2.324, 2.408 (*heu, quantum fati parua tabella tulit!*), *Met.* 5.417, 11.200f, 12.615, (*de tam magno restat Achille / nescioquid paruum, quod non bene compleat urnam*), 14.147f (*de tanto me corpore paruum / longa dies faciet*: words uttered by the Sibyl, in case anyone thinks that *tanto* is appropriate only in the case of Achilles). The difference is little more than the difference between *o* and *a*: see note on *Ars* 2.125f.

Am. 3.10.39 *ipse locus nemorum canebat frugibus Ide.*

Ceres has fallen in love with a Cretan heart-throb and can think of him alone: as a result, whilst the rest of the world is aghast at barren fields, in Crete corn is growing all over the place. "Ida, the *very* home of forests, was white with harvest," says the Loeb translator. But what means this "very"? Were trees more at home on Cretan Ida than on the slopes overhanging Pontic Cytorus or a thousand other woodlands celebrated in ancient song?

Heinsius recognized the difficulty by admitting the superior aptness of *ille* (ς) "that wooded mountain." But the word *Ide* is still uncomfortable without an epithet, and the line still unrelated to the context. It was left to the twentieth century to discover the simple truth: *ipsa* (Né-methy), *locus nemorum*, *canebat*, etc., "*Even* Ida, abode of forests, etc." Corn is luxuriant in Crete, *even* in forests. *Locus* merely effects an apposition, as at *Trist.* 1.5.70 *imperii Roma deumque locus*. The same balance with *ipse* occurs at Verg. *Buc.* 7.7 *uir gregis, ipse caper deerrauerat*. The corruption was practically inevitable, as it was at Man. 2.115f:

quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,
et reperire deum, nisi qui pars *ipse* deorum est?

The manuscripts have *ipsa*, the correction is Scaliger's.

Am. 3.13.29 *ore fauent populi tum, cum uenit aurea pompa.*

Since Ovid is describing a parochial procession in the small town of Falerii, the mention of *populi* ("nations") is ridiculous, especially as in verses 13 and 36 he refers to *populus* ("folk"). The difficulty vanishes with the change of a single letter, *orA fauent populi* "the tongues of the townsfolk observe a silence," found in Bodl. Auct. F. i.17 and

independently conjectured by Madvig. Ovid several times has *ore fauente*, Propertius once (4.6.1) *sint ora fauentia sacris*. A collocation such as *ora fauent populi*, which cries out for miscorrection, was doomed in manuscripts such as ours.

Madvig's Ovidian conjectures are particularly felicitous, and most are very properly accepted or noticed by the editor: but the latter should not have tampered with *ut, quam, si* at *Am.* 3.11.52, nor placed last in a field of four *incautos* at *Am.* 1.13.19, practically certified by the pentameter; others I commend elsewhere.

MEDICAMINA FACIEI FEMINEAE

The manuscript tradition of the *Medicamina* furnishes no point of contact with that of the other elegiac poems which Ovid wrote before his exile. From the size of the extant fragment, 100 verses, we may surmise that our text represents two leaves, each containing 25 verses to the page, of a manuscript which once contained more. It is just conceivable that the surviving leaves were not consecutive, for the transition between 50 and 51 is a trifle abrupt and has led to the conjecture that some verses are missing; and the contrast of style between the two leaves is certainly remarkable. In the principal manuscript (M, of the 11th century), which contains none of the Amatory Poems, the fragment is preceded by the *Nux*; and in several other manuscripts it rubs shoulders with the *Ibis* and the *Somnium*. Its tradition, then, would seem to belong to that of the Minor Poems.

Medic. 25ff feminea uestri poliuntur lege mariti,
 et uix, ad cultus, nupta, quod addat, habet.
 † *pro se quaeque parent et quos uenerentur amores*
 refert. munditia crimina nulla meret. †
 rure latent finguntque comas; licet arduus illas
 celet Athos, cultas altus habebit Athos.

30

Let us concede no triumph to this specter of despair. Poets do not say "it matters that..." or "it matters who..." this mode of expression they leave to prose-writers. Ovid uses *rēfert* only in negative or virtually negative sentences. Heinsius's *nec* for *et*, which is further recommended by the general tenor of the argument, is therefore assured. *Meret* has no better authority than *paret* and *ueneretur*, and I suspect that M, which attests the plural verbs in line 27, supports in line 28 the

merent of Guelf. 371. *Venerentur* is adequately explained from Tib. 1.5.33, Prop. 2.20.33, and *Ars* 2.307. For *pro se* (horribly prosaic) . . . *parent* we require something synonymous with *sua lege poliuntur nuptae* to contrast with line 25: after replacing the indicative (the subjunctive having been caused by *uenerentur*) we need only accept Heinsius's necessary correction of *pro se* (cf. Ter. *Heaut.* 288, Prop. 2.24.48) to secure coherence for the whole passage:

*se sibi quaeque parant, nec quos uenerentur amores
refert: munditia crimina nulla merent.*

The drift of the passage is as follows: "The husband of today imitates woman's example in grooming himself, and his bride is hard put to it to add to her art of appearing attractive. One and all adorn themselves to satisfy their feminine instincts, and however humble the man of their choice, they try their utmost to look perfect. Though they are buried in the country or isolated in some rocky wilderness, women still take pains over their coiffure and cultivate a glamorous appearance."

Medic. 33ff laudatas homini uolucris Iunonia pennas
 explicat et forma muta superbit auis.
35 sic potius [†]*uos urget*[†] amor quam fortibus herbis,
 quas maga terribili subsecat arte manus.

Peacocks attract mates by means of their gaudy feathers, and their beauty is such that they do not need the additional allure of song. "Love . . . by this means rather than by means of potent herbs, culled by the dread art of the sorceress."

Heinsius's *nos uret* "will inflame us" is disqualified because in this composition the poet nowhere identifies himself with the male sex. But his conjecture also involves, as do the others mentioned in the apparatus, a suspiciously awkward ablative: *amor fortibus herbis / nos uret / consurget / nascetur*. The ablative suggests that a *passive* verb is wanted; the adjacent indicatives, that we are looking for a *present* and not a future tense.

Our passage is floodlit by the following: *Met.* 1.523 *ei mihi, quod nullis amor est sanabilis herbis*; *Her.* 5.149 *me miseram, quod amor non est medicabilis herbis*; and *Her.* 6.93f *male quaeritur herbis, / moribus et forma conciliandus amor*. The last illustration reveals that the object of our search is a gerundive, producing the sense *sic* (i.e., 34 *formâ*) *potius quam fortibus herbis conciliandus amor (est)*: "should be united."

uos urget is a metrical inversion of *urgetuos*, an attempt to make sense of *urgeotus*, which in Carolingian minuscule is two hairs' breadth removed from *iūgēdus*, that is *iungendus*, the original word. Compare *Ars* 2.623 *iuncta uoluptas*, 2.679 *Venerem iungunt*, *Trist.* 2.536 *iunctus amor*; *iungo* is used by Ovid in connection with love over thirty times, e.g., *Met.* 4.679 *iunguntur amantes*, 10.29 *uos quoque iunxit Amor*.

Medic. 51f *dic* age, cum teneros somnus dimiserit artus,
candida quo possint ora nitere modo.

If the text is sound, *dic* invokes the didactic muse: but there is nothing to indicate her presence, whilst *exue* three lines lower makes clear that the poet is instructing the female student. *Disce*, an early correction — unless Pb here preserves a genuine tradition —, should be accepted. Ovid employs *age* with a large variety of verbs; and Manilius in his directives has 2.788 *ergo age . . . animum compone*, 3.43 *nunc age . . . perspice*, 3.275f *nunc age . . . cognosce*, and 4.585f *nunc age . . . percipe*. Grattius 127 even has *disce agedum*, whilst at Prop. 4.8 the imperative *disce* followed by an indirect question introduces the poem.

Confusion between *discere* and *dicere* is common, and occurs even in the manuscripts of Virgil. In *Phoenix* 13 (1959) 100 I referred to corrections of the error made at Prop. 1.4.14 and Man. 1.403: another still awaiting recognition is Heinsius's *disci* for *dici* at *Fast.* 3.326.

Medic. 97f tempore sint paruo molli licet illita uultu,
haerebit toto *nullus* in ore color.

"Though the mixture be applied to your soft cheeks for but a short time, . . . color will remain upon the whole of your face."

Nullus cannot be right. *Nullus color* signifies a deathly white, compare *Her.* 11.27 *fugerat ore color* and (whence I believe the verse to have been corrupted) *Am.* 2.11.28 ("If there is a storm at sea, . . .") *quam tibi sit toto nullus in ore color!* But that it was an unmitigated disaster for a girl to have *nullus color* is demonstrated beyond argument by *Ars* 3.73f *quam cito* (i.e., with the approach of old age) . . . / . . . *perit, in nitido qui fuit ore, color!* We should read *multus* with BeN, "a full complexion," "a lasting complexion." Possibly the error was caused by somebody who jumped to the unwarranted conclusion that *multus color* meant "a florid complexion."

ARS AMATORIA

Ars 1.40 haec erit admissa meta *premenda* rota.

Apparatus: "premenda *RSaA5*: terenda *rOw*: tenenda *B²(u.l.)Oa*." The last may be dismissed as an interpolation from *Trist.* 4.8.35 or Verg. *Aen.* 5.159. Of the other readings *terenda* is preferable on two grounds: (1) *premo* means "to press from above;" *rotis premi* ought thus to refer to the surface on which the wheels run, cf. *Her.* 18.134 *uia pressa rota*; (2) in illustration of *metam rotis terere* Heinsius compares Prop. 2.25.26 *septima quam metam triuerit ante rota* and *Ars* 2.426 *interior curru meta terenda meo est*: see also *Am.* 3.2.12 *nunc stringam metas interiore rota*, *Am.* 3.15.2 *raditur haec elegis ultima meta meis*, *Ars* 3.396 *metaque feruenti circueunda rota*, further support for *terenda*. The scribe of R mistook in his exemplar the compendium for *-er-* and, confronted with *treenda*, which he may even have misread as *preenda*, falsely emended it to *premenda*: Sa and A have cribbed other mistakes from R, and could have cribbed this one, too.

Ars 1.109ff respiciunt, oculisque notant sibi quisque puellam
 110 quam uelit, et tacito pectore multa mouent;
 dumque rudem praebente modum tibicine Tusco
 ludius aequatam ter pede pulsat humum,
 in medio plausu (plausus tunc arte carebant)
 rex populo praedae signa [†]*petenda*[†] dedit.
 115 protinus exiliunt, animum clamore fatentes,
 uirginibus cupidas iniiciuntque manus.

Kenney's acute analysis (*Notes* 242f) brings out sharply the difficulties of line 114, but leads to none but inconclusive conclusions.

The interpretation of *praedae signa petenda* as *signa praedae petendae* ("Schol. Haun.") may be at once consigned to the limbo of lost causes. Transference of epithets is permissible for artistic ends only when it is recognizable and when the epithets are literary, e.g., Cat. 51.11 *gemina teguntur / lumina nocte*; Verg. *Aen.* 6.2 *Euboicis Cumarum adlabitur oris*; Ov. *Am.* 3.7.20 *flammas aditura pias aeterna sacerdos*. However, to say *filius militis furiosus* when one means *filius militis furiosi* is to pass from enallage into insanity, whilst the gerundival construction of the *pacis petendae causa* type, though it blooms in profusion over the plains of prose, is not a flower to be found on Parnassus.

Kenney's main contention, that *signa praedae* meaning "signal for rape" is unusual Latin, must be granted. But no further comment is called for when he writes "it is clearly not indefensible and might have been constructed on the analogy of, for example, *signa pugnae* (*Fast.* 3.216)."

As for the corrupt *petenda*, this was an alteration of a similar word made by someone who wished to secure the meaning "the signal which had to be waited for" and was possibly encouraged by reminiscence of *Am.* 2.3.10 *signa ferenda*, *Ars* 3.528 *signa tuenda*, *Her.* 16.258 *signa tegenda*, *Rem.* 432 *signa pudenda*. The word it is most likely to have been altered from — the word which I therefore believe Ovid wrote — is *petita*, independently conjectured by Bentley and Madvig. Since *signa petita* is as imprecise as "the sought signal," clarification will depend on the context: Brandt reasonably renders it "*das ersehnte*," "the signal they had been looking for," which, as he remarks, fits *cupidas* in 116.

Kenney's interpretation of the conjecture, that the people in their eagerness urged the king to give the signal, introduces an idea which is historically unsound. The king is not represented as yielding to or tempted by importunate demands for an advance of the zero hour. The plan of the operation, a tactical feat unsurpassed in military annals, called for concerted maintenance of the utmost discretion; and the words *protinus exiliunt* leave no doubt that timing was perfect, surprise complete, and discipline exemplary.

Ars 1.117f ut fugiunt aquilas, timidissima turba, columbae,
 utque fugit uisos agna nouella lupos, . . .

- (1) ut fugit <in>uisos : Ovid, ς (from conjecture)
- (2) ut fugit uisos : RO, archetype (=loss by haplography)
- (3a) utque fugit uisos : rA ω (=interpolation of -que)
- (3b) ut fugit et uisos : SaDU (=interpolation of et)

With the readings thus arranged further explanation is superfluous. Ovid's fondness for asyndetic grouping of comparative *ut*-clauses may be illustrated by *Ars* 1.553f, *Her.* 14.39f, *Pont.* 1.1.69ff, and *Ibis*, *passim*. A similar error befell *Am.* 1.7.55, where *ut leni*, mistaken for *ut læui*, has become *utque leui* in ω .

Here I mention out of turn *Rem.* 268:

longus et inuito pectore sedit Amor.

EHT offer us *in inuito*, which I do not doubt is a conjecture. But it is right: compare *in pectore* *Am.* 1.1.26, 1.4.36; *Rem.* 108; *Trist.* 1.5.6, 3.6.25, 5.4.24, etc. The loss of *in* was the cue to trot out the standard stopgap from the storeroom. What brands *et* as an interpolation, however, is not palaeographical probability, but the damage it inflicts upon sense and style: a glance at the preceding couplet will make all plain. Kenney refers to the same corruption at *Ars* 3.242 *plorat in inuisas sanguinolenta comas*, where again the best manuscripts (and presumably the archetype) read *et* (impossible), and again *in* is presented by inferior mss (which have recovered it by conjecture).

Ars 1.133f scilicet ex illo *sollemnia* more theatra
nunc quoque formosis insidiosa manent.

Madvig's *sollemni* is no less inescapable than his interpretation of *ex illo* as *ex illo tempore* (see now Enk's compilation at Prop. 2.29.42).

Kenney's attempt (*Notes* 243f) to retain *sollemnia* founders on his translation "our theatres, traditionally sacred." Not to labor the absurdity of the Roman theater being sacred or of the traditionally sacred *still* being fraught with danger to the fair, the words should mean "customarily traditional."

Ovid, however, never uses *more* by itself, but *de more* ("d'*habitude*"); else he attaches the word to a genitive ("like . . ."), or modifies it with an attribute, *antiquus*, *patrius*, *priscus*, *solitus*, *uetustus*.

The *mos* of 133 is patently the custom of seducing women at the theater, a custom inaugurated with the rape of the Sabines. *Sollemni more* means "by traditional custom" or rather, allowing the adjective a secondary nuance and Ovid a characteristic facetiousness, "by hallowed custom."

Ars 1.337f fleuit Amyntorides per inania lumina *Phoenix*:
Hippolytum *rabidi* diripuistis equi.

(1) Housman's fine conjecture, *lucis* for *Phoenix* (*CR* 16 [1902] 442), merited at least a notice: he argues that the patronymic is not normally accompanied by its identification, and that *inania lumina* requires explanation (cf. *Met.* 14.200, otherwise the words would mean "empty eye-sockets"). The second contention is more cogent than the first, but the first ought not to be dismissed: the poet is here less concerned

with the genealogies of lovers than with their sticky ends. Glosses and interpolations are particularly frequent at the close of a line: Kenney's apparatus and appendix furnish examples at *Am.* 1.8.16, 1.10.9, 1.15.12, 2.9.51, 2.11.41, 3.7.79, *Ars* 1.76, 1.269, 1.341, 1.416, 1.548, 1.684, 1.692, 1.693, 2.3, 2.256, 2.269, 2.308, 2.594, 2.697, 3.20, 3.173, 3.359, 3.428, 3.486, 3.573, 3.721, 3.753, *Rem.* 66, 185, 334, 693.

(2) In weighing the alternatives *rabidi* and *pauidi*, Kenney (*Notes* 248) has overloaded the scale of the former and given short weight to the scale of the latter. The horses which killed Hippolytus were not rabid, but frightened. True, their terror afflicted them with a temporary madness, but they are described as rabid only in contexts which narrate the whole story and lay even greater stress on their fright (i.e., the *Hippolytus* of Euripides and Ovid *Met.* 15). Wherever the myth is but briefly alluded to, the horses are always termed "frightened." Ovid has *Fast.* 5.310 *consternatis . . . equis*, 6.741 *solliciti . . . equi*, *Ibis* 578 *attonitis . . . equis*, *Rem.* 744 *pauidos . . . equos*. Kenney quotes *Fast.* 3.265 *Hippolytus furiis direptus equorum*, but the oldest manuscript reads *loris*, which Bömer rightly accepts (cf. *Met.* 15.524).

The corruption is a *Perseverationsfehler*. The *rabidos* of 332 (clearly correct) so lingered in the mind of the copyist that he wrote *rabidi* instead of *pauidi*, a word of similar shape. Ovid was not a poet of such meager invention that he needed to spoil a passage by repeating a distinctive word. The same type of mistake happened earlier in this book at 328 *carere*: six verses before Ovid had written *placete* in the same position in the verse, and as a result all manuscripts have *placere*.

Whether the *pauidi* of Pb (13th-century) preserves an authentic tradition (as Kenney assumes O did at 328) or has been interpolated from conjecture (this would not invalidate its truth), it is not possible to say with any certainty. If it is a conjecture, it is a felicitous one, and a testimony to the acumen of its maker. On the other hand, even in Kenney's apparatus, which only in a small percentage of readings explicitly records the testimony of Pb, the manuscript seems to stand out conspicuously from the multitude.

Ars 1.389 aut † *non temptasses* † aut perforce.

There is no dispute about the sense. There should be none about the reading. *Non temptaris* (Pb): "*Mutarunt id scioli, quod nescirent ultimam syllabam saepe produci in hujusmodi verbis*" (Heinsius).

Syncopated tenses are always getting into trouble. Since the scribes are for ever replacing these forms with more familiar ones, we should not harbor ill-grounded scruples about reversing the process at the command of reason. At *Ars* 2.319f, ... *cubabit* ... *senserit*, the sense requires future perfects: read, therefore, *cubarit*. At *Rem.* 501f, ... *simulabat* ... *decideratque*, the sense requires pluperfects: read, therefore, *simularat*.

Quintilian (1.5.50) roundly condemns the construction *non feceris* (for *ne feceris*) as a solecism. Ovid would, I am sure, have sustained the fiat, but explained that *non* is given respectability by a following positive imperative, the contrast of which it serves to accentuate, cf. *Cat.* 66.91f *non siris* ... *sed* ... *affice*. Similarly, though *non* and the imperative are incompatible creatures and not on speaking terms, occasionally they are found in the same company, when *non* has its attention specially occupied: *Her.* 17.164 *sed tu non ideo cuncta licere puta* "think not on that account that ...;" *Pont.* 1.2.103 *non petito ut bene sit, sed* ... "ask not that ... but that ..."

Nevertheless, at *Ars* 3.129 there is nothing which can have invited its presence, and it should be firmly asked to depart.

uos quoque *non* caris aures onerate lapillis
130 quos legit in uiridi decolor Indus aqua,
 nec prodite graues insuto uestibus auro.

Apparatus: "non *RAω*, *uni Ellisio*, *quod sciam*, *suspectum*: nec *L*, *fortasse recte*." Bentley, it may be said, conjectured *ne*: but Ovid's penchant for *nec* ... *nec* ..., and the frequency with which *nec* has been altered into *non* in our manuscripts (e.g., *Am.* 1.10.37, 1.15.5, 2.8.13, *Rem.* 288, 352, 448) leave small doubt that *nec* is right. No euphonic objection should be leveled against *nec caris*: Horace, as a matter of fact, writes *nec cari* (*Carm.* 4.13.14) in the same context.

Ars 1.439f blanditias ferat illa tuas imitataque *amantum*
 uerba, nec exiguas, quisquis es, adde preces.

"Let the letter convey your flatteries and *imitated lovers' words* ..." What a very clumsy expression! What does *imitata* add to *amantum uerba*? Suspicion is heightened by Ovid's customary employment of the past participle of *imitor* with an active meaning: only at *Met.* 9.481 it is used with passive force. Heinsius, followed by Bentley, restored *imitataque amantem/uerba* "words that play the lover," which he

supported with *Ars* 1.611 *est tibi agendus amans*. Some will doubtless object that the actual words, being inanimate, cannot assume, still less feign, personality. Let them turn to Mart. 11.104.9 *basia . . . blandas imitata columbas*. Moreover, Ovid often (e.g., *Am.* 3.13.36) identifies with human beings things and abstractions associated with them, and usually as here with excellent effect: for a close parallel compare *Ars* 2.689f:

me uoces audire iuuat sua gaudia fassas
quaeque, morer meme sustineamque, roget.

“ . . . words that confess their delight and beg me to . . . ” Editors will please notice Heinsius’s splendid restoration in the pentameter: Kenney prints *utque* (*atque* R) . . . *roget* of the tradition, which gives the poor sense and balance “ I like to . . . and let her beg me . . . ” Also poor is the balance at *Am.* 2.2.37f *tu . . . obicies . . . / et . . . deme*: Heinsius’s *obiciens* is correct; in the next verse *et ueris* is better explained as “ even from true ones. ” The corruption of *quaeque* to *utque* (and *atque*) arose from a haplography *QUE<QUE>*, and the same confusion of *quae* and *que* occurred also at *Am.* 1.5.15, where *cumque ita pugnaret* (Heinsius, with six manuscripts) became first *cum quae ita pugnaret* and then *quae cum ita pugnaret* (most manuscripts, editors).

Ars 1.515f † *lingua ne rigeat*†; careant rubigine dentes;
nec uagus in laxa pes tibi pelle natet.

Jack is about to meet Jill, and in this section of the lover’s manual receives instruction about his appearance: each couplet stresses a particular aspect; for example, the next refers to hairdressing.

It is therefore odd that, whilst the pentameter urges Jack to wear sandals which fit (cf. Aristoph. *Equ.* 321, etc.), the hexameter appears to refer to hygiene of the mouth. This oddity, however, is set right by Palmer’s brilliant *lingula ne ruget* “ let your shoe-strap not be creased, ” which restores the link between the two verses. Not that Palmer has quite hit the target. He compares *Ars* 3.443f (“ Girls, do not be taken in by spruce Lotharios ”) *nec coma uos fallat liquida nitidissima nardo / nec breuis in rugas lingula pressa suas*; but this must mean that the smart guys *do* display a shoe-strap “ folded into creases ” (i.e., pleated, tied): *ruget* must be wrong.

There is no need to alter the verb: from *lingula ne rigeat*; *careant* . . . the following excellent sense is yielded: “ let not shoe-strap be tied too

Ars 1.729f palleat omnis amans: hic est color aptus amanti;
hoc decet, hoc *multi* [†] non ualuisse [†] putant.

"Let every lover wear a pale face: paleness is the lover's hue; this becomes him, this *many* deem of no avail." So the manuscripts (*multis* in Kenney's edition was an unfortunate slip: see *CQ* 12 [1962] 31; other editorial slips needing correction are: *Am.* 1.7.22 *tacente*, a *Perseverationsfehler*, for *silente*; 2.5.2 *mea sint*, an *Antizipationsfehler*, for *mihi sint*; *Ars* 1.427 *tibi*, for *domi*; 1.709 *rogantia*, another *Perseverationsfehler*, for *precantia*; 2.598 *facient*, for *faciet*; 3.561 *solum*, for *solam*; *Rem.* 304 *suos*, for *suas*; 678 *subeat*, for *subeant*; and a misplaced comma in *Am.* 1.6.16).

Non ualuisse is quite sound, and the sole correction necessary is Hertzberg's *stulti* "only fools:" a subject is needed for *putant*, a verb which insinuates mistaken belief. Compare *Am.* 3.3.24 *stulta . . . credulitate*, *Ars* 1.316 *stulta decere putet*, *Fast.* 6.295 *stultus . . . putai*, *Pont.* 1.6.20 *stulta . . . decet*, *Verg. Buc.* 1.19f *putai* / *stultus*.

Against Kenney's suggested *multis mox ualuisse* is to be objected: (1) that *mox* is used only in narrative; (2) that Ovid leaves *multi* without amplification (*Ars* 1.159, 2.332, 2.396, 3.316, *Rem.* 528, 716 — his own references); (3) that the logic "let every lover pale; it has done the trick for *many*" carries the damaging implication that for some the precept has proved unsuccessful.

Ars 1.747f si quis idem sperat, *iacturas* poma myricas
speret et e medio flumine mella petat.

Lamb, chase wolf! River, flow uphill! Tamarisk, . . . apples! The topsyturvy world of impossibility (hardly the place to inspire Newtonian physics) knows only one supplement: Theocr. 1.134 ὁ πίτυς ὄχνας ἐνείκει; 5.125 τὰ δέ τοι σία καρπὸν ἐνείκει; *Verg. Buc.* 3.89 *mella fluant illi*, *ferat et rubus asper amomum*; *ibid.* 8.53f *nunc et ouis ultro fugiat lupus, aurea durae / mala ferant quercus*. And at *Ars* 1.747 *laturas* (β) and not *iacturas* (α) would appear in all our texts, had not Gronovius and Heinsius fallen under the weird spell of a passage in Frontinus, dealing with legal disputes caused by fruit dropping outside the property in which the trees were situated.

Skepticism is here denied a last refuge in manuscript authority. The natural inference that *laturas* was miscopied as *iaturas*, which was then miscorrected, is as good as proved by the identical sequence of

Met. 1.216 Maenala transieram latebris horrenda ferarum;
Mart. Spect. 27.4 Arcas Maenaliū non timuisset aprum;
Mart. Ep. 5.65.10 quot tua Maenaliōs collocat hasta sues.

Not *scandere*, but a word meaning "hunt in," "scour," or the like is wanted; and that word can be restored from the verses which Ovid is here imitating, namely Tib. 1.4.49f:

nec, uelit insidiis altis si *claudere* ualles,
dum placeas, umeri retia ferre negent.

In this technical sense, *claudere* means "surround," "cordon off:" Verg. *Buc.* 6.56 *nemorum iam claudite saltus*, Man. 5.185 *retibus et claudunt campos, formidine* ("with a chain of feathers") *montes*. The task of looking after the toils and setting the *formido* often fell to the junior members of the hunting party: Nemes. *Cyn.* 298ff:

id curent famuli comitumque animosa iuuentus.
necnon et casses idem uenatibus aptos
300 atque plagas longoque meantia retia tractu
addiscant raris semper contexere nodis
et seruare modum maculis linoque tenaci.
linea quin etiam, *magno circumdare saltus*
quae possit uolucresque metu *concludere* praedas,
305 digerat innexas non una ex alite pinnas.

This rare meaning of *claudere* probably caused some scribe to alter the word deliberately; though *scandere* would be an easy "correction" of *claudere*.

(2) I am inclined to agree with Heinsius that Ovid did not write *nec iubeo* in two consecutive verses: the words could have been foisted into 194 by a reader who could not wait two verses for the main verb. If the original words were obliterated, any conjecture is bound to be a long shot. Even so, Heinsius's proposal *subdola nec*, which harmonizes with the *fallacia* of 189, is so strikingly supported by Martial (*subdola retia* at 2.40.3; 2.47.1; 3.58.26) that it may be right.

(3) Has Ovid any other arts besides the cautious one? Can his art be called "cautious"? Does he ever add an attributive adjective to *ars mea* or *ars nostra*? Does classical Latin favor expressions like *noster mutuus amicus*? The answers to these questions being "no," the authenticity of *cautae* evaporates and becomes as naught beside Heinsius's *cauto*: "The cautious lover will find the commandments of my art moderate." *E* and *o* are many times confounded in the Amatory Poems; and that *caute* would, with *meae* at the end of the verse, become or,

rather, be interpreted as *cautae* was certain. Heinsius clinches his emendation by citing *Ars* 2.386 *crimina sunt cautis ista timenda uiris*.

Ars 2.300 *gausapa si sumit, gausapa sumpta proba.*

"If she *is putting on* tweeds, praise the tweeds she has put on." Ovid, I am sure, meant the student to wait until she has actually put them on. Nay, logic and balance, no less than decorum, require *sumpsit*. Compare, a few lines lower, 304 *torserit igne comam: torte capille, place*. Now although the archetype may well have read *sumit*, we here enjoy access to authority independent of and rather superior to the archetype: Charisius (*GL* 1.104.10) and Priscian (*GL* 2.333.16) both quote the verse, and both quote it with *sumpsit*, which was in fact the vulgate lection before the Ehwaldian era.

The testimony of the grammarians ought to be cited regularly in the apparatus. At *Ars* 2.375 Kenney prints

nec lea, cum catulis lactantibus ubera praebet.

Apparatus: "lactantibus *R* ς : lactentibus *A* $\omega\phi$." The schism is between α and β : that *R* has fallen into error and that β preserves the archetypal reading is suggested by Charisius (*GL* 1.103.25), who quotes the verse with *lactentibus*. Furthermore, in his comment on *Georg.* 1.315 Servius informs us that *lactare* means "to give suck" and *lactere* "to be suckled." Ovid seemingly adheres to the commentator's rule: *lactens* "suckling" at *Fast.* 6.137, *Met.* 2.624, 6.637, 13.547 (*catulo lactente orbata leaena*), *Pont.* 4.8.41 (and let us read *lactentes uitulos* at *Met.* 10.227 with the old editions); *lactans* "giving suck," *Fast.* 2.656, *Met.* 6.341, 7.321. For the meaning "milky," *lactens* seems invariable (cf. Caper, *GL* 7.98.2, *LACTENS lacte abundans*): *Fast.* 1.351, 2.263, *Met.* 15.201.

Ars 2.307f ipsos concubitus, ipsum uenerere licebit,
quod iuuat, et [†]quaedam gaudia noctis habe.[†]

Apparatus: "*locus desperatus*." This would probably be true, had the text been preserved in the α family alone. But inspection of β 's reading enables the *lasciate ogni speranza* signs to be removed after the change of no more than a single letter:

ipsos concubitus, ipsum uenerere licebit,
quod iuuat, et quae dat gaudia uoce notes.

So A, except that Burman has restored *quae dat* for *quaedam*. "You may even rave over going to bed with her, and over the joy of union, and signify in words the thrills she is giving you." The same tricolon crescendo (Fraenkel, *Horace*, 351, note 1) with *licebit* occurs at *Ars* 1.499f, and the phrase *gaudia dare*, which I suppose we ought to say is used in a technical sense, is also found at *Ars* 2.459, 3.462, *Rem.* 728.

Critics, even Housman, have embarked on an argosy of futile conjecture through failing to observe that R's reading is the result of a haplography. The first stage was the loss of *uoce* (i.e., *gaudia* <UOCE> *NOTES*); *notes* immediately following *gaudia* had to undergo a prosodic change into a trochee, hence *noctis* (possibly under the influence of *Her.* 18.107); and finally *habe* was lamely brought down from the previous pentameter to make up the verse.

C and T in minuscule are often indistinguishable, and a similar haplography involving them threatens to obscure for ever the true reading at Prop. 3.7.60:

attulimus CAS<TAS> in freta uestra manus.

Castae manus also at Ov. *Fast.* 4.260, 4.324, 6.290 (Paetus was an effeminate youth). After the loss of *tas*, the adjective *longas* (as inappropriate as in Ovid the imperative *habe*) was interpolated from 2.2.5 to make up the verse. *Francias emendauit*

Ars 2.315ff saepe sub autumnum, cum formosissimus annus,
 plenaque purpureo subrubet uua mero,
 cum modo frigoribus premitur, modo soluitur aestu,
 aere non certo corpora languor habet.

Apparatus: "premitur, soluitur, sc. aer." Strictly speaking, *aer non certus* would have to be understood: "Oft at the fall's approach, when the year is at its loveliest and the full grape begins to blush with purple wine, when it (=the changeable air) is now stiffened by the cold and now melted by the heat, the changeable air causes a languor to possess bodies." But even granting that the ablative can be so anticipated, the alternation of *frigora* and *aestus* is itself the *aer non certus*. The thought of the passage lacks logic, and its form lacks elegance. Further argument is fortunately obviated by the apparatus, which also tells us that, with the solitary exception of R (whose scribe gives the above), every manuscript reads *premimur . . . soluimur*. This makes perfect sense, and further allows *nostra* to be understood with the

otherwise bare *corpora*; moreover, at *Ars* 2.431 Ovid inserts a first person plural into just such a generality (429-432) of just such a form as we have here: *nam modo Threicio Borea, modo currimus Euro*.

The presumptive authority of a "best" manuscript is least when its reading differs by a mere letter from the consensus of the other witnesses: its scribe is no less likely to have erred (nay, rather more likely) than the scribe of the source behind the other manuscripts (where a multiplicity of chances for correction existed). At *Ars* 3.771 R has *sint* (taken over by Og), the rest have *sit*: when confronted by the variants *nota sibi sint quaeque femina* and *nota sibi sit quaeque femina*, even a first-year student of Latin should be able to decide which is right and which is wrong without any help from Richard Bentley.

<i>Ars</i> 2.353ff	Phyllida Demophoon praesens moderatius ussit, exarsit uelis acrius illa datis;
355	Penelopen absens sollers torquebat Vlixes; Phylacides <i>ab</i> erat, Laodamia, <i>tuus</i> .

Absence makes the heart grow fonder. The first couplet provides a clear and apt illustration, and the following verse a second, more allusive, but apt enough. The last verse, however, is strange, and lacks the suggestion of love intensified by absence; further, *tuus* attached to *Phylacides* (as if other *Phylacidae* were in question) is foreign to Latin poetic style. Heinsius's sensibilities were so offended that he deleted the whole couplet ("*est enim frigidiusculum*").

Now we learn (from the appendix) that the principal manuscript reads not *tuus* (one of the suspected words), but *tuos*. This was an extraordinary error for a scribe to make after penning the verb *ab*erat. Without pretending to any assurance about the suggestion, I wonder whether the original text ran thus:

Penelopen absens sollers torquebat Vlixes,
Phylacides *sensus*, Laodamia, *tuos*.

That is: *Phylacides absens torquebat Laodamiae sensus* "Penelope by his absence did the crafty Ulysses torment, as did Protesilaus the feelings of Laodamia." The corruption would then have been caused by an annotator writing *absens* above the pentameter, which was then mistakenly accepted as a correction of *sensus* and finally and necessarily made into a finite verb.

Ars 2.455f si spatium quaeras, breue sit, *quod* laesa queratur,
ne lenta uires colligat ira mora.

“Do you ask *how long* she should nurse her grievances? Let the period be short: else undue delay will add strength to her resentment.” In the prelapsarian days before the fruit of the Überlieferungsgeschichte-baum had been tasted by scholarship, editors printed *quo*, which is right.

According to the grammars, duration of time is expressed in classical Latin by the accusative case. Grammatical rules, however, are merely the codification of usage, which they reflect and do not prescribe, and in this matter usage had begun to waver toward the end of the republic. The accusative case was so much felt by the Romans to be the objective case that a gradual pressure was built up to transfer certain adverbial functions hitherto falling within the sphere of the accusative to the case more generally associated with adverbial functions, namely the ablative. This is a small but typical incident in that great and still unfinished revolution in Indo-European grammar wherein the aristocracy of the cases, tested beyond endurance by the ever-growing demands levied upon it, has fought a valiant but obviously losing battle against the proletarian prepositions and socialized word-order.

When phrases intrinsically signifying duration of time are used adverbially, they are from the end of the republic onward frequently placed in the ablative case, as being the case appropriate for them. Löfstedt (*Phil. Komm. Per. Aeth.* 51ff) identifies as the first extant example Cat. 109.5 *tota . . . uita* “for the whole of our lives,” and has gathered specimens from Caesar and Cicero; whilst of the Augustans Virgil, Horace, and Livy are conservative, the elegiac muse keeps up with the times, e.g., Prop. 1.1.7 *toto . . . anno*, Ov. *Fast.* 1.49 *toto . . . die*. Now if the ablative is “*bei Ovid schon der gewöhnliche Kasus*” for this expression of time, he is sure to have placed in the ablative a relative pronoun anteceded by the noun *spatium* (cf. Prop. 2.24.43 *paruo . . . spatio*): *quod* is already a much over-worked word, and at *Ars* 2.455 was liable to be mistaken for the object of the verb. In commenting on *Her.* 7.40 Palmer rightly denies that *quod* can express the space traveled over.

The alteration of *quo* to *quod* (under the influence of the accusative *spatium* and the transitive verb *queratur*) required little provocation, less indeed than at *Ars* 3.205 (*quo* Aw: *quod* RFPa).

Ars 2.521f dicta erit isse foras, *quam tu* fortasse *uidebis*:
 isse foras et te falsa uidere puta.

The lover must take no for an answer: "Suppose she, *whom you will* perchance see, has been said to have gone out. Believe her to have gone out, and that your eyes deceive you."

The meaning is clear enough, but the relative with a future indicative is out of place in this paratactic style; *tu* is overemphatic; and instead of the present *uidere*, we expect a perfect. And *where* shall we perhaps see her? If "out of doors," then the couplet is robbed of all point.

From the appendix (for there is no note in the apparatus) we learn that the best manuscript reads *uideres*; and further investigation discloses Heinsius's *uidere est* and Bentley's *intus*, splendid conjectures unnoticed for two hundred years and more:

dicta erit isse foras; *intus* fortasse *uidere est*:

"And suppose it is possible to see her inside." The present and perfect infinitives in hexameter and pentameter now nicely balance; and *foras* is answered by *intus*. Theodulf, that sedulous Carolingian imitator of Ovid, has *specie intus et apta foris* at *Carm.* 56.2.

The progress of error was as follows: *intus* had its final -s swallowed by *f-ortasse*, leaving what appeared as *m tu fortasse uiderest*; the appearance of the pronoun was the signal for an immediate alteration to *uideres*; and for *m* was substituted a relative to repair the metre. So far the archetype, and so far α ; the β group got rid of the subjunctive by amending to the only reasonable tense of the indicative.

Ars 2.589f hoc tibi *perfecto*, Vulcane, quod ante tegebant,
 liberius faciunt, *et* pudor omnis abest.

In verse 580 Mars and Venus are detected in *flagr. del.*; after several lines summarizing the sequel, the unhappy pair are released, and *Mars Thracen occupat, illa Paphon*. Then, according to the text, a most prosaic ablative absolute—"This having been completed by you, Vulcan, they . . ." What a hard bump on the ground for our chirpy songster, who has so far fluttered about on a graceful wing!

Before talking of the poet's failure, let us reconsider. Only R gives *perfecto*; most give the senseless, and therefore suspicious, *profecto*. And, come to think of it, *perfecto* scarcely provides adequate sense: Vulcan's efforts had been completed in verse 578, and we expect

some new point to be recounted. A few manuscripts furnish what is much more appropriate and throws light upon the corruption:

hoc tibi *pro facto*, Vulcane: quod ante tegebant,
liberius faciunt, . . .

"This is what you get *for your pains*, Vulcan: the affair they once kept dark, they carry on openly, . . ." *Pro facto* was misread as a single word, hence misinterpreted as a proper Latin word *profecto*, and then mis-corrected to the Bavian *perfecto*. But we are not quite through. According to several collators R reads *ut pudor*, which Heinsius and others rightly bid us keep: ". . . now that all sense of shame is thrown to the winds."

The restoration seems supported by the next couplet, *saepe tamen demens stulte fecisse fateris*, etc.

Ars 2.609ff condita si non sunt Veneris mysteria cistis
 nec caua uesanis ictibus aera sonant,
 at tamen inter nos medio uersantur in usu,
 sed sic inter nos ut latuisse uelint.

Observe the signposts of the reasoning: "Although the rites of love are not secret, *yet* are they public, *but* in such a way as to desire secrecy." The period has one adversative particle too many.

The most economical of the four corrections recorded in the apparatus, Heusinger's *haud tamen* for *at tamen*, may be dismissed first. It fails to satisfy the strict demands of logic, since *sic* has to be stretched to mean *sic tantum*; and it is put right out of court for the reason that Ovid deliberately avoids *haud* in his elegiacs. The negative particle *haud* had become by Augustan times stilted and old-fashioned, except when used in a few clichés: suitable for use in pretentious writing, it would have struck a false chord in the smart poet's naughty cicerone to the sweet mystery of life. It is found more than fifty times in the *Metamorphoses*, in the elegiacs but once, and even then in a phrase redolent of epic usage (*Trist.* 1.3.73 *haud aliter, quam si*).

The other three correctors properly address themselves to the expulsion of one of the adversative particles. Bentley's *scilicet* for *at tamen* and J. C. Jahn's *sic tantum* for *sed sic* are obviously no more than first aid, but Bentley's further alteration *sic tamen* for *sed sic*, producing a poetic equivalent of the needful *ita tamen ut*, paved the way for

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But let us to sterner business. (1) Ovid advises the student to tone down the defects of the beloved: these are illustrated in 658 (she is a darky), 659 *paeta* (she has an *attractive* cast in her eyes), *raua* (she has the fierce eyes of an animal), and 660 (she is skinny). Now so far from being a derogatory term, *paeta* is a complimentary one, and cannot be what Ovid meant. (2) From 659 is missing the main verb, which (the sense of the couplet shows it to be *sit*) is difficult to anticipate — even with apostrophes — from 660, a verse of unlike expression, having a relative instead of a conditional clause. (3) Finally, the archetype (here elicited from the readings of RA ω) gave not *paeta*, nor anything like it, but *crasia*.

Out of this desperate corruption Bentley (whose note at Hor. *Serm.* 1.3.47 rates a mention in any apparatus) restored:

si *straba*, sit Veneri similis; etc.

The chief credit goes to Heinsius, who had conjectured *si qua straba est, Veneri similis*; etc.

Everything now receives an explanation: (1) we have endowed the girl with an undeniable defect, *strabismus*, which the lover must torture into a compliment; (2) the missing main verb is reinstated, and is found to produce an agreeable inversion of balance with the pentameter: *si straba, sit similis; sit gracilis, quae male uiua est* (a chiasmic order is also found in the next verse); (3) the archetypal reading is accounted for: *sistRA<BA>situeneri* was the main cause of the trouble, producing *sistrasitueneri*: *c* and *t* are practically identical, and after *si* was (on account of *si raua*) substituted for *sis* as the first word, this left *si crasit ueneri* from which to the archetypal reading is a short step; (4) *paeta* (I agree that this is indicated by the *laeta* of a few manuscripts, all, however, later than R and A) is a medieval attempt to mend the corruption, possibly from *Priap.* 36.4 *Minerua rauo lumine est, Venus pacto*. But if Venus was *paeta*, then for ancient girls and boys *paetitudo* must have been pretty close to *pulchritudo*, and needed no palliation.

As Horace makes clear, *strabus* is the blunt term for one with a squint or cast, *paetus* is the diplomatic understatement, cf. *Serm.* 1.3.44f *strabonem / appellat Paetum pater*. It is also made clear by Varro (quoted by Priscian, *GL* 2.209.12) *non haec res de Venere paeta / strabam facit*. What Ovid means in 659 is: *si qua straba est, paeta uocetur*.

Ars 2.699f scilicet Hermionen Helenae praeponere posses?
et melior *Gorge* quam sua mater erat?

The serious student ought not, preoccupied by the investigation of virginal beauty, to disregard the richness of a vintage paramour. "Could anyone prefer Hermione to Helen? And was Gorge more desirable than her mother?" "Good God, no!", we are about to reply, for on the lips of poets and politicians rhetorical questions command the full rigor of mathematical proof. On this occasion, however, the needful response is delayed whilst we reach for our mythological handbooks to discover the identity of Gorge's glamorous mother. Though a moment's consultation enables us to brush aside Kenney's "*Gorges mater quae fuerit in dubio est*," inasmuch as Apollodorus (1.64) explicitly names Althaea and is supported by Ovid himself at *Her.* 9.165 and *Met.* 8.543, yet this satisfaction of our curiosity gives way to a greater puzzlement. The pentameter is utterly devoid of that speciousness which charges a rhetorical question with power. Was Althaea more desirable than Gorge? No one has told; no one can say.

Nevertheless, we may be sure that this couplet alludes to two pairs of mother and daughter who provide unshakable evidence for the contention that older women may be more attractive than younger ones. After parading the fairest of mothers in the hexameter, the poet could not select a second without tumbling into an anticlimax. Now this is not one of Ovid's faults. On the contrary, time and time again, when we feel certain that the variations of a theme have been exhausted, his irrepressible wit contrives to outsmart our anticipations. I suggest that, having named the most beautiful mother in the world, Ovid proceeded to name the most unbeautiful daughter:

et melior *Gorgo* quam sua mater erat?

"And was Medusa any improvement on *her* mother?" Clarity and aptness are now restored; no reader needs to know who Medusa's mother was: she may have been ugliness incarnate, but at any rate her

face was not, like that of her daughter, instantaneously fatal to the beholder.

We find in the Latin poets two forms, *Gorgo*, -us and *Gorgon*, -onis, corresponding to the doublet *Γοργώ*, -οῦς and *Γοργών*, -όνος. Since Manilius switches from the nominative *Gorgo* at 5.576 to the ablative *Gorgone* at 5.618, we should not suspect the same mixture of declensions in Ovid, who elsewhere three times employs *Gorgonis* and twice *Gorgone*.

A final -o has several times been mistaken for -e in the Amatory Poems, as I have observed apropos of Heinsius's *cauto* at *Ars* 2.196, and elsewhere.

Ars 2.725f sed neque tu dominam uelis maioribus usus
 defice, nec cursus anteat illa tuos.

The conjecture *defice* is disproved by sense and Latinity. Whilst the Romans said *ab aliquo deficio* "I defect from someone," and *aliquid me deficit* "I run out of something," they did not say *aliquis aliquem deficit*. In *Her.* 5.75 *sic Helene doleat defectaque coniuge ploret*, to which Kenney adverts (*Notes* 256), the ablative (the bare ablative, mark you, not a *coniuge*) corresponds to the *aliquid* of the second usage given above, for *defecta coniuge* signifies "left without husband" (that is, "without a husband"), as *Met.* 5.96 *sanguine defectos* signifies "left without blood." Secondly, the context — as the word *maioribus* shows — refers not to defection and inadequacy at all, but to the very opposite: forwardness and superabundance.

The poet delicately consummates his amatory instruction by adopting a metaphor from yacht-racing, and the gist of what he said was plainly *nec tu dominam anti, nec domina te anteat*. The first word of the pentameter, therefore, — the stark and uncouth *desine* of all manuscripts but one should be unceremoniously shown off the premises — was a dactylic synonym of *anti*. Just such a word exists, coming from a verb which is found in contexts of boat-racing (*Verg. Aen.* 5.220) and aeronautics (*Ars* 2.84) with the meaning "speed away from," "leave behind"; and this word is so close diplomatically to *desine*, with which it was, in fact, accidentally confused at *Met.* 3.478, that it must be what Ovid wrote: *desere*, the reading of Pb, a manuscript offering other excellent and evidently true readings which may descend along a lucifuge line of authentic tradition.

Ars 3.169f quid de ueste loquar? nec *nunc* segmenta requiro
 nec quae *de* Tyrio murice, lana, rubes.

"Nor *now* do I look for flounces . . ." Then when, Publius, will you look for them? And why do you tell us in the next couplet that it is madness to do so?

The apparatus apprises us that most manuscripts read, not *nunc* at all, but *uos*; and the credentials of *uos* are instantly vouched for by the apostrophe in 170. Likely enough, it became *nos* and then *no* (with *-s* swallowed up by *segmenta*: at Prop. 4.1.71 *-s?* *fuge* became *-s uge*, and stands in our texts as *-s uage*). From *no* arose the interpolations *nunc* (R) and *non* (A). The same error occurred at *Am.* 3.9.33 *uos sacra* P; *nos sacra* ω; *nunc sacra* σ.

What on earth is the preposition doing in the pentameter? The Latin for "to be red with" is *rubere* with the plain ablative, cf. *Met.* 4.482 *cruore rubentem*, 6.222 *rubentia suco*, 12.277 *igne rubens*. Compare also Verg. *Aen.* 4.262 *Tyrioque ardebat murice laena* and Tib. 2.4.28 *et niueam Tyrio murice tingit ouem*. *De* is an intruder which has infiltrated from the previous verse, *quid de* paving the way for *quae de*. With it expelled, the reader will, I doubt not, have already anticipated my conclusion that Ovid gave the sentence thus:

nec uos, segmenta, requiro
 nec te, quae Tyrio murice, lana, rubes.

The pronoun is sorely needed to help *lana* to stand on its own feet as a vocative; otherwise an epithet would have been necessary.

Ars 3.229ff multa uiros nescire decet; pars maxima rerum
 230 offendat, si non interiora tegas:
 aurea quae *pendent* ornato signa theatro
 inspice, contemnes: brattea ligna tegit.

"There is much in the world which would displease, did not one cover up what lies beneath. Inspect the golden statues which *are poised* in the decorated theater, and you will think them worthless: gold foil covers up wood." Kenney has written excellently on 232 (*Notes* 257), but has less commendably rejected Burman's *splendent* "glitter" from the previous verse. His illustrations of *pendent* all carry the word's basic meaning "are poised," which does not suit statues, nor these statues particularly.

And, then, the context demands an antithesis which the manuscript representation of it conspicuously lacks: "Inspect closely the statues *which win your admiration*, and they will *arouse nothing but your contempt*." If anything, *pendent* suggests something rickety (cf. Juv. 7.46) and does not evoke the right feeling at all. The correctness of *splendent* is shown by such passages as Cat. 64.44 *fulgenti splendent auro atque argento*, Lucr. 4.984 *scenaique simul uarios splendere decores*, Tib. 1.8.11 *fuco splendente genas ornare*.

Ars 3.239ff tuta sit ornatrix: odi, quae sauciat ora
 240 unguibus et rapta bracchia figit acu;
 deuouet, *et* tangit, dominae caput illa simulque
 plorat in inuisas sanguinolenta comas.

"Let the slave who dresses your hair be safe from harm: I hate a woman who scratches her maid's face and sticks needles in her arms: the poor girl curses, and touches, her mistress's head, and at the same time, still bleeding, weeps upon the hated locks."

The subtlety which editors recognize in *et tangit* ("wodurch die Wirkung des *deuouere* erhöht wird" Brandt) is an hallucination. Ovid does not mean that the girl utters an imprecation and hastens to touch her mistress's head. Obviously, the mistress has no notion that her head is being touched for the purpose of furthering a curse; she must be under the impression that her head is touched in the ordinary course of events. And there is nothing significant about the *ornatrix* touching the head of the *domina*: it is her job, and she performs it daily. The sense intended is not "when she curses, she touches," but the more natural and forcible "when she touches, she curses."

So evidently Heinsius, who restored *deuouet, ut tangit. Ut* is often corrupted to *et* (I have no doubt that we should read *ut ferat* with Heinsius at Ars 3.630 for the manuscripts' *et feret*), and could have puzzled a scribe here, where it is followed by an indicative; he, I imagine, was obsessed with the expectation of a subjunctive, and altered the conjunction to *et* when his expectation was frustrated.

The word *et* does not, in Ovid at any rate, bear the meaning *et . . . quidem*, however smooth and appropriate this may be made to look by the typographical device of a comma placed before it. As a conjunction, *et* merely joins. At *Am.* 3.3.13f all modern editions read:

perque suos illam nuper iurasse recordor
 perque meos oculos: *et* doluere mei.

This means "I recall that she recently swore by her eyes and mine, and mine hurt," for editors have no business putting a colon before *et*. A Latin word which, as at *Met.* 13.71, can properly introduce a lively ejaculation at something unexpected is *en* (corrupted at *Ars* 1.205 to *e-* in O, and at *Fast.* 3.352 to *et* in GM), and *en* is found in Ph and ten other manuscripts, was read by the *editio princeps*, and was explicitly preferred by Bentley.

Ars 3.281f quis credat? discunt etiam ridere puellae,
 quaeritur atque illis hac quoque parte decor.

(1) When the so-called dative of the agent is associated with the present tense of a verb, that verb expresses a state rather than an action, e.g., Verg. *Aen.* 1.440 *neque cernitur ulli* "nor is visible to . . .;" Hor. *Epist.* 1.19.3 *scribuntur aquae potoribus* "are attributable to . . ." (= "are authored by"); Livy 5.6.14 *non uni aut alteri militi audiuntur* "are inaudible to . . ." In 282 *quaeritur* expresses not a state "is required of them" (Loeb), but, as *quis credat* demonstrates, an action "is sought after by them."

(2) The Augustans hardly ever postpone *atque* "and . . . too," "as well as." Before the Silver Age it is found six times only, once in Manilius (1.426) and five times in Horace (where, however, it is the couple "'n" as in "rock 'n roll," and does not weld sentences together). Postponed *atque* should not be imputed to Virgil, for at *Buc.* 6.38 the word *altius* is to be construed with the previous sentence; nor to Propertius, for at 3.13.39 the true reading is Volscus's *Idaei* (*atque dei* is an attempt to make sense of *i dei*).

The combination of the two anomalies, the minuteness of the correction needed to remove them, and the very great likelihood of the postulated reading being altered to what the manuscripts in fact present, conspire to pronounce Haupt's *aque* a certain restoration.

Ars 3.285ff nec sua perpetuo contendant ilia risu,
 sed leue nescioquid femineumque sonet.
est quae peruerso distorqueat ora cachinno;
 cum risu laeta est altera, flere putes.
 illa sonat raucum quiddam atque inamabile: ridet,
290 ut rudit a scabra turpis asella mola.

How a woman should not laugh. Lines 287f may be rendered: "One will disfigure her features with a hideous grin; when another is laughing happily, you would think she is sobbing."

The objection to *risu laeta* is that it does not arouse the revulsion which gives point to the other verses: there is such magic in happy laughter as to transpose a harsh croak to music of the spheres. That Ovid wrote something else is indicated by the chief manuscript's *cum risu usa est*. The reading of A *cum risuque laeta est* appears to be a conflation of two attempts to mend the hiatus, *cum risuque usa est* and *cum risu laeta est*.

The true reading was recovered by Alton (*Hermathena* 19 [1922] 278f) *risu concussa est*: "When another is doubled up with laughter, you would think she is sobbing." *Concuti* is used both of violent laughter (Lucr. 1.918, Stat. *Silv.* 5.1.179, Quint. 6.3.9, Juv. 3.100f) and of violent sobbing (Verg. *Aen.* 9.496, Ov. *Am.* 3.9.12, Petr. 18): it is the perfect word for the context.

The stages of corruption were easy: *risu c̄<c>ussa est* became *risu c̄ ussa est* and then *risu cum usa est*: hereupon *cum* (conceivably someone thought it was the preposition) was moved in front of *risu*. This was the reading of the archetype: the remaining processes of depravation may be inspected in the apparatus.

Ars 3.295f in uitio decor est: *quaedam* male reddere uerba
discunt, posse minus, quam potuere, loqui.

The "defect" refers to lisping and other mispronunciations affected by women. Previous editors had placed the main stop after *uerba*, construing the hexameter as "there is charm in the defect of mispronouncing certain words." Ker, however (*Ovidiana* 226), pointing out that *reddere* cannot depend on *decor*, placed the colon after *est*. But having so admirably rescued Ovid from the frying pan, he proceeded to roast him in the fire, for he asserted, and has persuaded Kenney, that the infinitive depends on *discunt*. All of the poet's pretty conceit goes up in the flames of an appalling asyndeton.

Quaedam is strange. What are these "certain" words? Do women mispronounce some words, but not others? No doubt this is the case in reality, but a rhetorical poet is not concerned to specify or even allude to the phonological details of such shibboleths: *uerba* means quite simply *sermonem*, and *quaedam* nothing in particular. We look, therefore, in *quaedam* for a verb which will sanction the infinitive

If ladies do not control themselves at the card table, the sequel is sure to be "displays of anger and greed, quarreling and brawling, distress and grief; accusations are uttered, shouts ring to high heaven, and everyone invokes the aid of outraged gods. *The table has no credit: what is not sought with vows?* And frequently have I seen the flow of tears."

The text and meaning of the manifestly corrupt 377 were settled by Burman. Read with Og:

nulla fides, *tabulaeque nouae* per uota petuntur,

"A player goes bankrupt, and pleads that the slate be wiped clean, and oft, as I have seen myself, gives way to tears." See Lewis and Short, s.v. *tabula* II B fin. The couplet explains the *sollicitus dolor* of 374. *Est* is to be understood with *nulla fides* (similarly at *Am.* 1.4.9).

The corruption, as the reader will know from my notes on *Am.* 2.7.25 and *Ars* 1.439, arose from a confusion of *que* with *quae*.

Ars 3.439f uix mihi credetis, sed credite: Troia maneret,
praeceptis *Priami* si foret usa *sui*.

"You will scarcely believe me, but believe me you must: Troy would be standing now, had it heeded the warnings of *its own Priam*." Who was the other Priam (or Priams), then? And to what city (or cities) did he (or they) belong? A sensitive renaissance scholar circumvented this particular absurdity with *Priami . . . senis* (cf. *Her.* 1.34).

However, RA5, which usually preserve the reading of the archetype, give the following unmetrical line:

praeceptis, *Priame*, si foret usa *tuis*.

This is the text which the 12th-century corrector of A has emended to produce the absurd vulgate, and it is consequently from this text that Ovid's thought and words must be recovered.

The thought was correctly divined by Madvig (*Adv. Crit.* 1.114): the implication that the Trojans were culpably incredulous must refer to their disregard of *Cassandra's* prophecies (cf. Verg. *Aen.* 2.246f, Prop. 3.13.61ff, 4.1.51f). However, both his own attempt (*Priami*) and Housman's (*Priamis*) to produce a scannable patronymic vocative are unsuccessful — as Housman candidly admitted, note on Luc. 8.251 — because during the classical period such vocatives end in a short -i. Postgate's *Priami, praeceptis* (CR 25 [1911] 222) removes one anomaly of scansion only to set up another: the lengthening of the first vowel

is confined to the quadrisyllabic *Prīamides* (after Homeric and Virgilian example); in other forms of the name (viz. *Priamus*, *Priameis*, *Priameius*) the first syllable is invariably short. Add to this that neither Ovid nor any other Latin poet employs a patronymic *Priamis*, and it becomes obvious that the "open sesame" of this crux still eludes us.

The magic words, I believe, are these:

praeceptis *Priamo* si foret uSA <SA>tae.

"...had it heeded the warnings of the daughter of Priam." The haplography left *tae*, or rather *te* (as it was commonly written in the middle ages) at the end of the pentameter, where an iambic word — one modifying *praeceptis* — seemed to be required. Inevitably, then, the second stage of corruption was *Priamo . . . tuis*. But *tuis* cannot stand without a vocative, nor *Priamo* without a construction. No less inevitably, therefore, the third and archetypal stage is reached: *Priame . . . tuis*.

The error may be paralleled at *Rem.* 66, where *uicTA* <CA>*dent* (REK) became first *uicta dent* and then *uicta forent* (ς). If anyone thinks there is anything suspicious about the sequence of identical syllables in *u-SA SA-tae*, let him forthwith renounce that heresy. Limiting investigation to the final two words of the pentameter in the Amatory Poems, and excluding twenty-six instances of pseudo-repetitions, such as *Am.* 1.4.4 *al-tER ER-it*, *Ars* 1.412 *mem-bRA RA-tis*, *Ars* 2.332 *fe-cIT I-Ter*, *Rem.* 712 *u-tram-qUE UE-nus*, the seeker will find:

<i>Am.</i> 1.4.22	tan-GE GE-nas;
<i>Am.</i> 1.9.18	hos-TE TE-net, also <i>Medic.</i> 18, <i>Ars</i> 3.178;
<i>Am.</i> 1.13.14	ar-MA MA-nus, also <i>Am.</i> 2.11.12, 3.8.48, 3.11.42, 3.15.10, <i>Ars</i> 2.672, 3.576;
<i>Am.</i> 2.19.36	ip-SE SE-quor, also <i>Ars</i> 1.14;
<i>Am.</i> 3.1.22	pu-do-RE RE-fers, also <i>Ars</i> 1.460;
<i>Ars</i> 1.228	ap-TA TA-men, also <i>Ars</i> 1.478;
<i>Ars</i> 1.632	ad-DE DE-os, also <i>Ars</i> 3.244;
<i>Ars</i> 2.64	se-cun-DA DA-to;
<i>Rem.</i> 600	sae-PE PE-des.

See also Housman's addendum to his note on *Man.* 2.242, and Pease on Verg. *Aen.* 4.47.

The patronymic locutions *aliquo satus*, *aliquo natus*, and the like, are great favorites with Ovid. They are found mostly in the nominative or vocative, and used of females as well as males, e.g., *Met.* 2.858 *Agenore nata* (Europa). But the oblique cases occur, too: accusative,

e.g., *Met.* 9.233 *Poeante satum* (Philoctetes), 13.749 *Crataeide natam* (Scylla), see also Verg. *Aen.* 1.297 *Maia genitum* (Mercury); dative, e.g., *Pont.* 1.3.39 *Pandione natae* (Philomela); ablative, e.g., *Met.* 15.639 *Apolline nato* (Aesculapius). I have come across no other instance of a genitive, and none of the components being separated, for *Her.* 3.29 *Laerteque satus* (Ulysses) hardly counts; a little closer is *Met.* 12.624f. *Telamone creato* / *Laerteque* (i.e., *et Laerte creato*). Nevertheless, the last words of the first and second halves of the pentameter are so often felt to be closely joined to each other that the dependence of *Priamo* on *satae* would not place any greater strain on a Roman ear than that of *damni* on *metu* in line 92 of this same book.

I must point out that the emendation (which I am sure I should never otherwise have dreamed of) occurred to me when I saw "*priamo RA5*" in Kenney's apparatus; I subsequently became suspicious of this statement in view of other editors' unanimity over the unmetrical *priame*, and in answer to my query Kenney confirmed that *priame* is indeed the reading of the manuscripts, *priamo* being a mistake (from which he honorably exonerates his printer). This does not affect my analysis of the crux, in which I had already postulated *priame . . . tuis* as one of the stages between *priamo . . . satae* and *priami . . . sui*: still, credit — if credit is due — must go to Fors Fortuna.

Ars 3.453f sunt quoque non dubia quaedam mala nomina fama:
deceptae, *a*, *multi* crimen amantis habent.

The conjecture *a, multi* imputes to Ovid three extraordinary whims: it represents him as (1) attaching the groan *a* to a sententious utterance, where it cannot enjoy the satisfaction of even a sigh; (2) placing it, contrary to his practice on the fifty other occasions when he employs it, in the middle of a sentence before a word devoid of emotive force; and (3) effecting with it an elision of the diphthong *ae*, an elision he permits himself but five times in over twenty-thousand verses of elegiacs.

What Ovid actually wrote will be found in the apparatus: *deceptae multi* (Hilberg). The sense of the couplet will best emerge from a free rendering: "A few villains there also are notorious for their infidelity: those guilty of the crime are legion." *Multi* is contrasted with *quaedam* and acquires emphasis from its position.

Some medieval scribe, the tangled threads of whose substitute for thought I own to not having completely unraveled, failed to perceive

that *multi* was the subject of the sentence; bamboozled by the word-order, he construed *deceptae* as a nominative plural, and he took this word to be the subject; he could not construe *multi*, which being a man of action he promptly altered to *a multis* "women deceived by many." This is what stands in the manuscripts. The essential correction to *multi* was made by Burman, who, however, neither diagnosing the cause of corruption nor apprehending the power of the asyndeton, initiated a series of vain attempts to preserve some letter or letters between *deceptae* and *multi*. Of these Ehwald's interpretation of the preposition *a* as the ejaculation *a*, accepted by all subsequent editors, is singled out by its blind adherence to the ductus litterarum, without regard for other and more pertinent considerations, as undoubtedly the worst.

Ars 3.455f discite ab alterius *uestris* timuisse querelis,
ianua fallaci ne sit aperta uiro.

On purely stylistic grounds the homoeoptoton *-is* (dative) . . . *-is* (ablative) is suspect: the chime of what should not chime is displeasing to the ear. But, I hear it argued, *querelis* is dative, and we are to supply from it an ablative after the preposition: against this, however, is the rarity of the ellipse, which — as far as I know — is without parallel in our poet.

The passage also violates well-established canons of Latinity in spite of Kenney's pronunciamento (*Notes* 258) that "the Latin is correct, though unusual, and is equivalent to *discite ab alterius querelis timere ne ipsae habeatis quod queramini*."

After the verb *timeo*

- Type 1: an accusative (of the direct object) may denote the inflictor of prospective suffering, e.g., Verg. *Aen.* 2.49 *timeo Danaos = timeo ne quid a Danais patiar*;
- Type 2: it may denote the prospective suffering, e.g., Prop. 1.15.1 *multa dura timebam = timebam ne multa dura paterer*;
- Type 3: it may, if it contains a verbal notion and is provided with an indication of the subject, denote a prospective action feared, e.g., Sall. *Jug.* 25 *Iugurtha timebat iram senatus, ni paruisset legatis* ("feared the prospect of an angry senate if the delegates were not obeyed") = *timebat ne senatus irasceretur*;

Type 4: a dative (of the indirect object) regularly denotes an already existing person or thing on whose behalf fear is felt, e.g., Verg. *Aen.* 2.729 *comitique onerique timentem*=*timentem ne quid comes et onus paterentur*: in types 1 and 2 a dative may be regarded as implicit, i.e., *timeo mihi Danaos*, etc. For examples of the thing for which fear is felt, see Caes. *B.G.* 4.16 *suis rebus* (*timere*), ib. 7.44 *huic loco* (*timere*), Quint. 4.1.9 *iustitiae suae* (*timere*).

Type 5: an accusative and a dative may be combined, e.g., *Am.* 2.11.9 *tibi . . . Zephyros . . . timebo*=*timebo ne quid a Zephyris patiaris*; Juv. 6.17f *cum furem nemo timeret / caulibus*=*timeret ne quid caules a fure paterentur*.

The Livian passage (31.21.4) adduced by Kenney (to support what amounts to a theory of the dative of the direct object) conforms to and is to be explained by other instances of type 4: *lassitudini militum timuit, quod raptim ductum agmen erat* ("he experienced concern for the tiredness of the troops")=*timuit ne quid lassitudo militum pateretur*, which the context invests with the meaning *ne lassitudo efficeret ut milites uincerentur* (a Roman commander, after moving his troops over a long distance by forced marches, was presented with a splendid opportunity of attacking an unprepared enemy, but held off for the reason given). Livy might have written *lassis militibus*, which is simpler and clearer: it is not, however, as vigorous or as accurate (only their tiredness aroused concern); and Livy, who as a narrative stylist excels all other Latin writers, preferred the more colorful expression. The *lassitudo* is shown both by the dative and the indicative verb in the subordinate clause to be a state already existing. See how Quintus Curtius expresses the same thought, 3.7.9: *timere ne non uirtute hostium, sed lassitudine sua uincerentur*.

To return to the *Ars Amatoria*: the *querelae* of Ovid's readers are prospective, and not already existing; the noun *querela* contains a verbal notion; and the adjective *uester* is the equivalent of a subjective genitive: the example therefore falls under type 3. What Ovid wrote was necessarily

discite ab alterius *uestras* timuisse querelis,

and what he meant was *discite ab alterius querelis ne uos queramini timere*: "Learn from another's cries of distress to fear the prospect of your own."

Corrupting *uestras . . . querelis* (A) to *uestris . . . querelis* (Rw) took a second: rehabilitating it takes a millennium.

Ars 3.485ff ancillae pueriue manu perarate tabellas,
 pignora nec *puero* credite uestra nouo:
 uidi ego *fallentis* isto terrore puellas
 seruitium miseras tempus in omne pati
 (perfidus ille quidem, qui talia pignora seruat,
 sed tamen Aetnaei fulminis instar habent).

"Get your maidservant or slave to write your messages, but do not compromise yourself to a new *slave*. I have seen women *having an affair* at this threat submitting to a lifetime of blackmail. Only a cad will keep such evidence, but it is loaded with dynamite, even so."

(1) The mention of new slaves is puzzling. Since none of the young ladies in the seraglio of the *Carmina Amatoria* ever acquires a new slave, Ovid's warning seems to argue a misplaced solicitude. The girl with her wits about her, however, will gather from 491-8 that the element of danger is caused by new *lovers*, especially if she has read *Ars* 1.163, 2.339, and 2.358. Now whatever Ovid's faults were, they did not include poverty of invention: he cannot have used *puer* with the meaning "lover" immediately after using it with the meaning "slave:" indeed, he hardly ever uses *puer* with the meaning "lover" at all. That *puero* of most manuscripts is wrong, and *iuueni* of a few right, is a suspicion which analysis of a second error will harden into a firm conviction.

(2) The difficulty of translating 487 reveals the irrelevance of *fallentis* and the looseness of *isto terrore*. The ω manuscripts restore perfect sense and perfect Latin by a change so slight (*P* for *F*) that there can be little doubt about its correctness: *pallentes isto terrore* "terrified at this threat" (compare *Met.* 1.202, 2.180, 2.398, 9.111). By chance the same palaeographical mistake occurred two lines earlier: *perarate* Bentley, *feratarte* archetype.

The genesis of the error *puero* can now be perceived. In some ancestral manuscript *iuueni* was correctly transcribed; but by a slip *fallentes* was written in the next line. Along came a corrector, who, hitting upon the true word, penned the letter *p* over the *f* of *fallentes*. Unfortunately it obscured the first two letters of *iuueni*, which now looked like *pueni*: under the influence of *pueri* in the preceding line, "correction" to *puero* was inevitable.

(3) We have penetrated far back along the time-line of the tradition, but not yet have we reached the original text. What does Ovid mean by *isto terrore*? He has not mentioned any terror. It is true that verse 486 provides the female reader with intimations of something unpleasant; but as she makes her way to the penthemimeral caesura of 487 she

knows not whether she risks being fanned with the breeze of inconvenience or blasted with the hurricane of destruction: for *iste terror* she is quite unprepared. Moreover, *uidi ego* (*Am.* 1.2.11 and often) is a phrase which most naturally introduces confirmation of an argument; it possesses a force something like this: "In proof of what I have been saying, there is the following example, which I can testify to personally." *Vidi ego* here has no such force, and Kenney's parenthesizing of verses 489f is hardly more than a typographical *trompe l'oeil* acknowledging the difficulty without solving it.

A simple, complete, and convincing correction is achieved by transposing 489f before 487 (Damsté, *Mnemosyne* 39 [1911] 444). Now, at last, all is sound, and the couplets expound a coherent argument: (486) do not send letters to a new lover; (489) if kept, they constitute a terrible menace; (487) so terrible that I have known girls blackmailed for a lifetime; (491) the danger may be avoided by taking the following precautions.

Of all the methods of correcting a corrupt text, transposition is the most invidious. It is the hardest to prove, because no writer's thought — certainly no poet's — proceeds with Euclidean precision: complete and meaningful sentences may often be as well arranged in the order a-f-g-d-e-b-c-h as in the order a-b-c-d-e-f-g-h (the reader may care to try this on Prop. 4.11.1-8). It is also the most drastic, for it commits an editor to a decision which is conspicuous beyond all others. Even where we have cogent proof of dislocations in the transmitted text, as we have for Lucretius, Manilius, and Propertius, the difficulties of recovering the original sequence are still very great. In authors whose text is free from such jigsaw puzzles, transposition will rarely inspire much conviction. Nevertheless, no scribe ever enjoyed some god-given immunity against the capacity to omit lines, nor by some divine dispensation was every omitted line guaranteed a complete round-trip back to its own doorstep. In Verg. *Aen.* 8, verse 654 originally followed 641, but was omitted on account of the homoeomeson *-ebant . . . / . . . -ebat . . .*; it was then replaced, not after 641 (*stabant . . .*), but in error after 653 (*stabat . . .*). The standard Oxford edition of Shakespeare still preserves the archetypal inversion in *A Midsummer-Night's Dream* 5.2.49f:

Ever shall in safety rest,
And the owner of it blest.

Besides Damsté's transposition of *Ars* 3.489f after 486, two others mentioned by Kenney deserve promotion to the text. The first, his

own suggestion, that *Am.* 3.1.47f should follow 52, is commended on three grounds: (1) exegesis of 47f is comprised in 53–8, and is awkwardly held up under the present disposition of the verses; (2) *per me* in 49 should follow immediately upon *blanditiis . . . meis* in 46; (3) the couplet might easily have been omitted by a homoeomeson . . . *ferendo* (46) / . . . *pependi* (53). Weise's proposal to move *Am.* 3.14.19f after 26 also stands on three planks of support: (1) the most natural sequence of thought at the one end is 17 *illum . . .* / . . . *inde pudor* / 21 *illic . . . pudori*; (2) the most natural sequence of thought at the other is 26 *sponda lasciua . . .* / 19 . . . *lasciua . . .* / 20 . . . *in lecto . . .* / 27 *indue cum tunicis*, etc.; (3) the apparently irregular order 21 *illic*, 23 *illic*, 25 *illic*, 19 *hinc* invited the transposition of the last couplet to the beginning.

On the other hand, a third suggested transposition must be rejected: the verses *Ars* 1.585–7 were not written by Ovid after 1.742; they were not written by Ovid at all. The unimaginative repetitions 585 *tuta frequensque . . .*, 586 *tuta frequensque . . .*, 587 . . . *procurator . . . procurat*, when added to the utter inappropriateness of the verses where they stood, brand them as a moralizer's feebly composed insertion.

I have left till last Dabrowski's brilliant transposition of *Ars* 2.669–674, which appears in Kenney's text as follows:

670 [dum uires annique sinunt, tolerate labores:
iam ueniet tacito curua senecta pede.
aut mare remigiis aut uomere findite terras
aut fera belligeras addite in arma manus
aut latus et uires operamque adferte puellis:
hoc quoque militia est, hoc quoque quaerit opes.]

Apparatus: "669–74 *hic uix ferendi . . .*: post 702 *L. Müller, uix recte: haereo.*" "Whilst your powers and years permit, harden yourselves to toil: soon bowed old age with silent tread will come. So furrow seas with oar-blade or with ploughshare fields; or apply a fighter's hand to the arms of war; or else devote to the fair sex your effort, powers, and attention: this too is warfare, this too calls for resource." With this noticeably loftier strain (Dabrowski argues) the poet exhorts young men to consider an amatorial besides a mercantile, an agricultural, or a military career. The verses, therefore, belong not to the section in which they are found, 663–702 ("Why one should not disdain an older mistress"), nor to 703–732 ("How to make love"), nor yet earlier to 641–662 ("How to minimize your mistress's faults"): they are suited to one place, and one place only, in the whole of the work — the end.

One or two chords of his prooemium are here echoed: 1.36 *qui noua nunc primum miles in arma uenis* (cf. 2.672, 674); 1.41 *dum licet et loris passim potes ire solutis* (cf. 2.669). Now the substance of the *Ars* proper (the handbook for men) finishes at 2.732: the remaining verses, 2.733–746, form not so much a peroration as a personal envoi:

finis adest operi: palmam date, grata iuuentus,
sertaque odoratae myrtea ferte comae, etc.

Dabrowski recognizes in 2.669–674 the peroration of the *Ars*, and transposes the verses between 2.732 and 2.733.

Some dislocations arise from mechanical causes, as, for example, the reshuffling of leaves of a manuscript; others from an original omission, due to homoeoteleuton or the like, followed by an incorrect replacement. But a few dislocations are deliberate: verses are, by some misguided person for some misconceived reason, willfully moved from one place to another. Consider the original state of 2.647–732. Ovid is addressing a single male reader: 647 *adsuesce*, 661 *dic*, etc. But at one couplet he breaks into a brief apostrophe to the whole world of men:

utilis, o iuuenes, aut haec aut senior aetas:
iste feret segetes, iste serendus ager.

With the next verse (675) he relapses into the singular: *adde*. Now, although the peroration (669–674) is also addressed to the whole world of men, the apostrophe is implicit and has to be understood from plural imperatives; not until we arrive at 733 *grata iuuentus* do we encounter a vocative. This untidy state of affairs puzzled some diligent reader of the text, who, following sane principles of textual criticism, judged that 669–674 should be transposed from what appeared an erroneous place after 732 (which lent no support for a plural vocative) to what appeared the correct place after 667f (which supplied the “missing” plural vocative). His presuppositions, however, were faulty, and the verses should be restored to their original position.

Ars 3.613f nupta uirum timeat, rata sit custodia nuptae:
 hoc decet, hoc leges *duxque* pudorque iubent.

“... this is what law, *leader*, and shame prescribe.” What Kenney calls (*Man. Trad.* 15) the “great propensity to absurd error shown by R” is to be recognized here: *iusque* (Aω) is certainly right. Compare *Ars* 1.200 *iusque piumque*; 3.58 *pudor et leges et sua iura*; *Her.* 8.4 *iusque*

piumque; *Met.* 5.44 *iusque fidemque*. *Dux* ("commander") has a military flavor; it cannot stand for "Führer" without being foreshadowed or amplified. Nor was such a flippant reference likely here. Allusions to the emperor in Roman writers are serious, never casual.

Ovid may have convinced others — he may even have convinced himself — that his precepts excluded married women of full status. He does not convince me. His understanding of female psychology is too profound, and his treatise contains too much of universal validity to sustain the fiction of a restricted appeal: no woman ever read the *Amatory Poems* without in imagination casting herself as the leading lady, nor any man save as the perfect cavaliero. Yet, although the immorality of the poems is willful and complete, it is undisguised, never softened by excuse or hidden under the false feathers of art: it is too bad to be true. Ovid was no more a dissolute playboy than Agatha Christie is a homicidal maniac. Mrs. Christie, I grant, does not exhort her readers to attempt the pleasant perpetration of successful murder, as Ovid exhorts his to feast on the delicious thrills of forbidden love. But in each case an unmistakable air of unreality identifies for what they are these vicarious experiences in the escape world of dreams. Ovid's wit always disarms the erotic of its pruriency, whilst there is far, far too much laughter to allow any elbow-room for evil. Francesca and Paolo read *Galeotto* together, and were lost for eternity: they would have been safe with the *Ars Amatoria*.

Ars 3.742 labor, *io*: cara lumina conde manu.

The last words of Procris: "*Ho*, I faint! Close eyes with loving hand." The curtain was rung down on this comic farewell by Palmer's palmary *labor, eo* ("I faint, I die"). As he points out at *Her.* 5.118, *io* is "in Ovid always a cry or shout, either of joy or calling assistance." *Io* springs not from lips heavy with death; it is a lusty utterance, and full of noise, cf. *Met.* 3.728 *clamat "io comites . . ."*; *Trist.* 4.2.52 "*io magna uoce "trumphe" canet*. It almost always introduces the sentence, immediately preceding a vocative or imperative.

The verb *eo* is guaranteed by the following chain of parallels: *Met.* 7.859 *labitur et . . . fugiunt . . . uires*; *Am.* 3.9.49f *hic certe madidos fugientis pressit ocellos / mater*; *Prop.* 4.7.23 *at mihi non oculos quisquam inclamauit euntis*. The participle in the last passage is difficult (*eunti* Reland), though it seems supported by the one preceding it: Löfstedt's explanation of it as a genitive absolute after Homeric models (*Synt.*

1.235) takes some swallowing; his similar explanation of Prop. 4.10.43 is nothing like as plausible as Schrader's inspired *illi uirgatas maculanti sanguine bracas* (cf. Cat. 63.7, Verg. *Aen.* 3.29, Ov. *Ars* 3.395, *Met.* 1.719, 7.315, 15.107), which gives back not only correctness to the poet's grammar but also sense to his speech. In Homer the genitive is normally pendant to the main clause and starts another verse, cf. *Od.* 9.256f ἥμῃν δ' αὖτε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ, / δεισάντων . . .

REMEDIA AMORIS

Rem. 63ff da mihi Pasiphaen, iam tauri ponet amorem;
 da *Phaedram*, Phaedrae turpis abibit amor.
 65 *redde* Parin nobis, Helenen Menelaus habebit
 nec manibus Danaïs Pergama uicta cadent.

"Give me Pasiphaë, Phaedra, and Paris, and I will cure them of their love." But can *redde* mean "give"? The imperative occurs nearly twenty times in Ovid and always carries the notion of restoration: (1) "give back!" *Fast.* 2.485, etc.; (2) "give in return!" *Met.* 14.36, etc.; (3) "give as due!", "render!" *Fast.* 6.476, etc. None of these meanings is possible here. Heinsius conjectured *crede*, which is the ideal word: "entrust to me," "give me on loan." *Credo* is often used in this sense in Ovid, cf. *Ars* 1.401, 2.363f, *Fast.* 2.662, *Her.* 19.204, *Met.* 14.222, *Rem.* 451, and in particular *Ars* 2.351 *da requiem: requietus ager bene credita reddit* "Give her a rest: a field that is rested well repays what has been entrusted to it." I follow Bentley in accepting the emendation as true. If the initial letter was lost in the margin, *rede* would without a doubt become *redde*.

In 64 I think Ovid must have written *Phaedran*. The pattern for feminines in -ā is established by *Electrā* (attested by meter *Fast.* 4.177; see also Prop. 2.14.5) and *Electrān* (attested by meter *Trist.* 2.395).

Phaedrā is attested by meter at *Ars* 1.511 and *Rem.* 743, whilst at *Ars* 1.744 the manuscript reading *Phaedrā* necessarily falls under suspicion (I am tempted to go along with Lachmann, commentary on Lucr. 6.971, in reading *Cressa*, after the example of *Her.* 4.2). *Andromedan* at *Ars* 1.53 and *Met.* 4.671 shows that these forms were employed for their inherent attractiveness and not merely as a metrical device.

If at *Rem.* 63ff Ovid wrote *Pasiphaen* . . . *Phaedran* . . . *Parin* . . . *Helenen*, did he go the whole hog and write *Menelaos*? I am inclined to think not: *Menelaus* was for the ordinary Roman such a well-known

figure that anything but the Latinized form, supported by Virgil, must have seemed an affectation. But we cannot be sure. Ovid certainly wrote *Menelaon* (implying a nominative *Menelaos*) at *Her.* 5.105 and 17.249, an accusative *Menelaum* he wrote nowhere. For the nominative and accusative of Greek names of the second declension Ovid had theoretically a choice between *-us* and *-os* (identical for metrical purposes) and between *-um* and *-on*. Kenney's text shows that meter attests the form in *-on* for the following: *Acheloön*, *Euhion*, *Ilion*, *Inachon*, *Linon*, *Pelion*, *Phrixon*. Unproved by meter, but enjoying manuscript support, are: *Aegyptos*, *Alpheon*, *Asopon*, *Enceladon*, *Ilios*, *Iron*, *Mendros*, *Leandre*, *phaselos*, *Tithonos*, *Tityon*. How many metrically certified examples are there of *-um*? None. And *Ars* 1.333 *Neptun(um)* and *Ars* 2.569 *Vulcan(um)* prove that Ovid had no objection to eliding the termination in Roman names. In the *Metamorphoses* eighty different names in *-os* and *-on* are indicated, whilst the Latin termination is metrically certified only at 2.372 *Eridan(um)*, 12.75 *Cygn(um)*, 13.98 *Rhes(um)*, and 13.292 *Ocean(um)*: at least the first, and possibly all, of these may be considered as non-Greek. However, verses like *Met.* 13.258 (cf. Verg. *Aen.* 9.767) warn us against attempting any bold standardization of Greek forms. Nevertheless, suspicions linger concerning several details of the tradition's spelling. Why, for example, in *Am.* 3.6.25 should Ovid have written *Inachus* rather than *Inachos*, when he wrote *Inachon* at verse 103 and (unconstrained by meter) *Alpheon* in verse 29 and *Asopon* in verse 33?

Rem. 135 ergo ubi uisus eris *nostrae* medicabilis *arti*, . . .

The meaning is patently "when you think that you are treatable by my art," but the means is not expressed in Latin by the dative case. In view of *Met.* 9.253 *nullaque domabile flamma*, *Met.* 12.166 *nullo penetrabile telo*, and *Pont.* 1.3.25 *nulla medicabilis arte*, there should be no hesitation about accepting *nostra . . . arte* from the β group of manuscripts. The dative was doubtless induced by the propinquity of *uisus eris*: K probably derived the reading, not from its parent, but from the corruption in R. At *Met.* 9.262 *quodcumque fuit populabile flammae* the absence of an epithet seems to me to personalize somehow and so excuse the dative.

Here may be discussed *Rem.* 123f:

impatiens animus nec adhuc tractabilis *arte*
respuat atque odio uerba monentis habet.

"The spirit that is impatient and not as yet manageable *by skill* rejects and loathes my words of advice." (1) *arte* is feeble and otiose with *tractabilis*; the poet does not mean to suggest that something else can manage the unruly spirit; (2) stylistically the ablative badly needs an adjective, after the pattern of the above examples; (3) *respuit uerba monentis* is offensive, for the Latin metaphor "spits back" ill accords with the object here; and (4) more awkward is *atque* linking two unlike verbal expressions with an ἀπὸ κοινοῦ object. Instead of *arte*, read with the slightest of changes *artē* (that is *artem*: Francius), put a comma after *respuit*, and a sentence with four flaws will be restored to its original flawlessness.

Rem. 161 *quaeritis*, Aegisthus quare sit factus adulter?

This is a mere slip of the pen in R (from which "*exc. Scal.*" are derived). All the other manuscripts give *quaeritur*, which is to be preferred, since Ovid is addressing one person only: 151 *tuearis*, 152 *uade*, 154 *suscipe*, 157 *uincede*, 173 *obruere*, 175 *aspice*, etc.: the identical error was perpetrated at *Met.* 13.95 *quaeritur* ω, *quaeritis* M. Another slip of R's pen is enshrined in Kenney's as in many editions at *Rem.* 757f:

eloquar inuitus: teneros ne tange poetas;
summoueo dotes *ipsius* ipse meas.

Forms of the pronoun *ipse* occur close to a thousand times in Ovid, but apart from the above verse the form *ipsius* occurs but four times: *Fast.* 1.40, *Her.* 16.312, *Met.* 9.247, *Pont.* 1.1.36. No juxtaposition such as *ipsius ipse me(as)* occurs, so far as I know, anywhere else in Latin. However, *ipsius* draws its authority from R; the other manuscripts (EKω) agree on an intelligible and appropriate variant, Ovid's own word in fact, which in the bad old unscientific days stood in every text:

summoueo dotes *impius* ipse meas.

"Wickedly do I myself deprive you of my stores." Compare *Rem.* 3 *parce tuum uatem sceleris damnare, Cupido*. The error was natural: *īpius* was miscopied as *īpius*, which with *ipse* following was clearly doomed to become *ipsius*.

Rem. 219ff nec pluias opta, nec te peregrina morentur
220 sabbata nec damnis Allia nota suis;
4 + H.S.C.P.

nec quot transieris, *sed* quot tibi, quaere, supersint
 milia, nec, maneat ut prope, finge moras;
 tempora nec numera, nec crebro respice Romam,
 sed fuge.

For virulent cases of lovesickness the Nasonian pharmacopoeia prescribes the basic recipe *i procul, et longas carpere perge uias*. But the medicine must be taken at once: “Don’t hope it will rain, don’t stay for the sabbath, don’t let an unlucky day hold you up, don’t ask how far you have gone, . . . ask how far you still have to go, don’t think up excuses for lingering close, don’t count the days, and don’t keep casting glances behind: SCRAM!” The reader will be surprised to learn that it took a thousand years to discover and correct the error in the manuscripts: *nec quot tibi* Damsté (*Mnemosyne* 39 [1911] 446).

The unrequited cannot be warned too strongly against the superficial and dangerous interpolation *sed*. The quack psychologist responsible for it suffered from the delusion that it helps a lovelorn swain to focus his thoughts on a destination. It does not. Activity is the only antidote for a pining heart; the less cogitation the better. Ovid knew very well that an immediate take-off should not be jeopardized by pausing to estimate the time of arrival.

In verse 222, immediately below *sed*, stands the word *ut*. From the apparatus we discover that E with nearly all the manuscripts reads *nec* instead of *ut*. This is a remarkable error. It must, I think, have arisen as follows. The lines of the archetype were narrowly spaced; and the medieval erotician I postulate underlined Ovid’s *nec* in such a way as to suggest a deletion of *ut*; he inserted his *sed* by writing it on top of *nec* thus (I purposely exaggerate interlinear spacing for the sake of clarity; and I should also explain that pentameters were not inset):

220	. . . nis allia no . . .
	sed
221	. . . ris nec quot . . .
222	. . . eas ut prope . . .

As a result, whilst the source of R (=α: K has taken over R’s reading here) correctly executed the interpolator’s intentions, the source of our other manuscripts (=β) assumed not only that *sed* was to be read in 221, but also that *nec* was to be read instead of *ut* in 222. This *nec* is the misplacement of that *nec* which Damsté has conjectured.

The mistake is cognate with the “obliteration by dittography” errors, which I noted in *Phoenix* 13 (1959) 99f, and to which I should now add from Kenney’s text *Am.* 1.6.5f:

longus amor tales corpus tenuauit in usus
aptaque subducto corpore membra dedit.

From late manuscripts Heinsius replaced the obviously correct *pondere* (cf. *Am.* 2.10.24, *Her.* 15.178).

Rem. 283f hic amor et pax est, in qua male uulneror una,
 totaque sub regno terra futura tuo est.

In keeping with his insight into the workings of the female breast Ovid represents Circe's plea to Ulysses to stay as based entirely on considerations of security; he depicts Circe as unwittingly stimulating Ulysses' thirst for excitement and employing the worst arguments she could: 279 *debes . . . timere*; 281 *non hic noua Troia*; 282 *non aliquis . . . ad arma uocat*; 283 *hic . . . pax*. If *tota terra* means "the whole country," it injects a doubt where none existed before; and in any case it forces *sub tuo regno* to serve as a complement — poor Latin, and too poor to be attributed to Ovid. As Bentley divined, Circe concluded her mis-directed petition with the words:

tutaque sub regno terra futura tuo est.

"And the land will enjoy safety beneath your sway." Compare:

Ars 2.58 me duce tutus eris;
Fast. 6.209 altera pars Circi Custode sub Hercule tuta est;
Her. 9.15 se tibi pax terrae, tibi se tuta aequora debent;
Met. 13.273 Actorides sub imagine tutus Achillis;
Met. 15.585 rex eris et sceptro tutus potiere perenni;
Pont. 1.1.9f latere / sub Lare priuato tutius esse putant;
Pont. 4.9.75f illo / ripa ferox Histri sub duce tuta fuit;
Trist. 4.1.92 tutaque iudicio litera nostra suo est.

In the last passage two manuscripts read *totaque*.

Rem. 351f tum quoque, compositis *sua cum linit* ora uenenis,
 ad dominae uultus, nec pudor obstat, eas.

"Again, when your mistress is spreading vile concoctions on her features, go and look at her face, and let no shyness deter you."

<i>sua cum linit</i> K ² , Q ²	<i>cum linit</i> R, Q ¹	<i>cum collinit</i> Pc, W
<i>sua cum linet</i> E	<i>cum linet</i> Ma	<i>cum collinet</i> Cc ¹ , Pb, m
<i>sua collinet</i> K	<i>cum liniet</i> B, Cc ²	<i>cum delinit</i> Pa

The meaning of the text is not in dispute: what we have to decide is the true reading. Kenney's opinion will be found argued in *Gnomon* 33 (1961) 578, note 1.

The first step will be to ascertain the correct tense of the verb. In the Amatory Poems there are, apart from the above example, twenty-two sentences in which an indicative *cum*-clause is subordinated to an imperative or its equivalent. In sixteen *cum* is followed by the future: *Am.* 1.4.15, 1.4.21, 1.4.25, 1.4.28, 1.4.55, 2.10.36, 2.15.23, *Ars* 1.147, 1.219, 2.338, 2.340f, 2.461, 3.801, *Rem.* 494, and, deserving special mention, *Ars* 1.365 *tum quoque . . . cum*, and *Rem.* 540 *iam quoque . . . cum*. In four *cum* is followed by the present, but in each of these examples the main clause precedes the *cum*-clause (*Ars* 1.68, 2.729, 3.212, 3.358), making it easier for the present to carry its "all-time habitual" force.

The twenty-first example is *Ars* 1.503:

cum surgit, surges; donec sedet illa, sedebis.

Now by chance we have for this verse the testimony of the tenth-century Bamberg florilegium, and it, followed by several manuscripts, reads:

cum surget, surges; donec sedet illa, *sedeto*.

"When *she gets up, get up*; while she *remains sitting, remain sitting*." Stylistically this is so much the superior reading that I accept it as true (cf. *Ars* 2.199 *quicquid probat illa, probato*).

The twenty-second example is *Ars* 2.263:

cum bene diues ager, cum rami pondere nutant, . . .

Here, however, RA₅ (which will usually give the reading of the archetype) read

dum bene diues ager, cum rami pondere nutant, . . .

This there is no reason to harass with conjecture: "During the productive season, (a time) when trees are laden with fruit, . . ." *Cum* here is a relative adverb, and is consequently removed from the list under discussion (cf. *Ars* 2.315 *saepe sub autumnum, cum formosissimus annus*, etc.).

This evidence, when considered with the manuscript variants in *Rem.* 351, demonstrates that Ovid wrote *-linet*. One may wonder whether the present tense was anything more than a mere slip of R, taken over by the other manuscripts which contain it; certainly K²

(as we shall see at *Rem.* 704) sometimes obtains its readings from R.

The evidence may now be re-stated as follows:

- (1) *cum linet* (R+): corrupt, since it lacks a long syllable or two short ones;
- (2) *sua cum linet* E: metrically correct, but fails to explain the loss in R;
- (3) *cum collinet* Pb (+): metrically correct, and suggests that the loss occurred through haplography, $\bar{c} \langle \bar{c} \rangle \text{linet}$;
- (4) *sua collinet* K: a conflation of 2 and 3 (*cum* having been accidentally given earlier, *cum positis* for *compositis*).

Kenney disfavors *collinere* on the grounds that it occurs nowhere else in Ovid, whereas *linere* occurs half a dozen times. Is a writer therefore forbidden to use a word once until he has used it twice? And precisely with what exclusive cachet is *linere* invested that it may be called a *uox Ouidiana*? Is not *illinere* a *uox Ouidiana*? Or *oblinere*? Outside of contexts in which ointment is put on the eyes, curare on arrows, and paint on walls, the Latin word for "smear" is bound to be comparatively rare. The context should never be disregarded: *linere* at *Fast.* 3.760 and *Medic.* 81 means "smear" in a neutral sense; *collinere* here, as at *Hor. Carm.* 1.15.20, means "smear on in heaps," with a pejorative connotation; and the word is so used by Plautus. Now, not only does this meaning fit our passage perfectly, but the successive gutturals seem to have been deliberately contrived: *quoque compositis cum collinet* "when caking her cheeks with crude concoctions."

Pb seems yet again to have preserved the original text.

Rem. 363f dummodo sic placeam, dum toto canter in orbe,
 qui uolet, impugnet unus et alter opus.

"So long as I win worldwide fame, let a few, *who will wish*, criticize my work." Kenney's discussion of the crux (*Notes* 258) is not convincing. The discord of number (*uolet, impugnet*) is extremely harsh and understandably caused in the archetype a further corruption to the unmetrical *impugnet*. Then the relative clause is altogether superfluous, and could be omitted without detriment to the sense. But the decisive objection is the unnatural balance. What we expect, what Heinsius and Bentley thought Ovid wrote, and what can be readily explained as leading to the manuscript readings is:

quamlibet impugnet unus et alter opus.

"Let one or two criticize my work *as much as they like*." *Quamlibet* was found by Heinsius in two manuscripts. The first step along the downward path was the misinterpretation of *quam* as a relative: hence *quodlibet* in Ob, a manuscript which contains, as I shall demonstrate at Rem. 703ff, at least one reading antedating archetypal corruption. The second step was the amendment of the impersonal verb: hence *quod uolet* in RK (*qui uolet* displays a third stage of corruption).

As Heinsius observed in his note on *Her.* 6.140, the word *quamlibet* (= *quantumlibet*) is a *loquendi modus*, which "unice in deliciis est Nasoni, sed ut plurimum è vulgatis libris per inscitos librarios iussus exulare." The following (I limit myself to excerpting from Kenney's apparatus) will show how vulnerable it is to corruption:

- Ars* 3.312 *quamlibet* text: *qualibet*, *quaslibet* variants;
Ars 3.597 *quamlibet* text: *quaelibet*, *quoslibet* variants;
Ars 3.642 *quamlibet* text: *quemlibet*, *quaelibet* variants.

Rem. 417 tunc animo signa, *quodcumque* in corpore *mendum* est, . . .

So REK¹ (=α): K^{2ω} (=β, as at 415) read *quaecumque* . . . *menda*. As Kenney pointed out apropos of *Ars* 3.261 (*Notes* 257), Ovid everywhere else prefers the feminine noun *menda* to the neuter noun *mendum*. But it is not principally for that reason that the feminine must be read here; nor because the middle ages were more familiar with the neuter and were more likely to substitute the latter (*menda est* seeming a violation of concord) than the former: a concrete, physical flaw is *menda*; the neuter *mendum* is used only in a metaphorical sense, e.g., a slip in writing. Charisius (*GL* 1.72.23): "mendum neutraliter Varro in Admirandis dixit, 'magnum mendum;' sed Ouidius feminine 'nocte latent mendae' (*Ars* 1.249), item 'eximet ipsa dies omnis e corpore mendas' (*Ars* 2.653, *-et* wrongly for *-it*). ergo mendum in mendacii significatione dicitur (*-etur* Keil, wrongly), menda in culpa operis uel corporis." See also Eutyches (*GL* 5.473.3). Bede (*GL* 7.280.9) merely transcribes Charisius.

Rem. 445f grandia per multos tenuantur flumina riuos,
 laesaque diducto stipite flamma perit.

"Great rivers are diminished when drawn off into many channels, and a . . . flame dies down when its fuel is fragmented." Sense and

symmetry call for a word expressing the notion of intensity, and Merkel's *saeua* "fierce" is proved by *Rem.* 53 *saeuas . . . flammās*; *Ars* 3.567, *Met.* 2.313 *saeuis ignibus*; *Hor. Carm.* 1.16.11, *Prop.* 1.1.27 *saeuos ignis*. Both in majuscule and minuscule, V and L are easily confused; and the step from *saela* to *laesa*, the reading of the archetype, is even easier.

Kenney's translation of his reading (*Notes* 259), "If the sticks are raked apart the flames will be extinguished and die," prompts the question: what flames?

Rem. 465ff ac ne forte putes noua me tibi condere iura
 (atque utinam inuenti gloria nostra foret!),
 uidit *id* Atrides: quid enim non ille uideret,
 cuius in arbitrio Graecia tota fuit?

For *ac* in 465, see note on *Am.* 3.2.75f.

Ovid here embellishes his theme that the best remedy for a love-affair which has turned out ill is another one: *successore nouo uincitur omnis amor*. "And lest you think that I am laying down a novel law, the son of Atreus saw it." But a Roman reader would expect the construction to be *uidit haec iura Atrides*. The manuscript evidence is: *id* Es, *ut* RKsm, *et* rAbEa, which is most reasonably explained by assuming that *id* is an attempt to correct the impossible *ut* of most manuscripts.

The passage is steeped in heavy sarcasm. Ovid, like antiquity in general, regarded Agamemnon as an egregious blunderer in the amatory art (outdimmed by his brother alone), and what he meant here was: "So little is this precept a new discovery of mine that it was long ago recognized *even* by the world's worst lover." Only so does the poet's illustration make sense. He must therefore have written:

uidit et Atrides.

But is it likely, I hear asked, that *et* was corrupted into *ut*? Yes: when *et* is adverbial, it is often changed by scribes who, misconstruing it as a conjunction, cannot make head or tail of the sentence, cf. *Am.* 2.2.38 *et* (altered to *in*), *Am.* 3.7.70 *et* (altered to *ut*). In this verse it was altered to *ut* by someone who, desperately looking for a construction, decided to subordinate *uidit* to the next sentence but one (!), and produced the ridiculous sequence "And lest you think I am laying down a novel law, when Agamemnon saw Chryseis, he was in love with her." Not

but what he succeeded in imposing upon several editors within the last century.

Rem. 491f quamuis infelix media torreberis Aetna,
 frigidior *dominae* fac uideare tuae.

"Though it be your misfortune to burn with Etna's hottest fires, mind you seem colder to your mistress." Colder than what? Not simply colder than *media Aetna*: faint heart never got rid of fair lady: heroic measures are called for.

The only word possible in this context was restored by the Italians: *glacie*. Heinsius compares *Her.* 1.22 *frigidius glacie* and 10.32 *frigidior glacie*; and he also explains that *tua* is here used absolutely in the sense of "your mistress," a rare but attested usage: *Hor. Carm.* 1.15.32 *tuae*; *Prop.* 1.9.22 *tuae*, 3.8.22 *meam*; *Ov. Ars* 1.322 *meo*, 2.557 *uestras*, and *Rem.* 573 *tuam*. *Dominae* is the brainchild of someone who considered the possessive adjective inadequate.

Housman's *niue* (for *tuae*) is palaeographically neat, but bespeaks that anxious adherence to the ductus litterarum whose seductive powers over men like Scaliger and Porson distressed him so greatly. O Alfred, Alfred! The Romans no more said *frigidior niue* than we say "colder than snow"; the invariable comparisons are in Latin *frigidior glacie* and *candidior niue* (*Met.* 8.373) and in English, for example (*A Shropshire Lad* II, 1, 4, 12), *Loveliest of trees, the cherry now / . . . Wearing white for Eastertide / . . . the cherry hung with snow*; (*ib.* XXX, 6f) *Have stood and sweated hot and cold, And through their reins in ice and fire*, etc.

Rem. 703ff consilium est, quodcumque cano: parete canenti,
 utque facis, coeptis, Phoebe saluber, ades.
 705 Phoebus adest: sonuere lyrae, sonuere pharetrae;
 signa deum nosco per sua: Phoebus adest.

"All that I sing is balm: do you love-sick swains give ear to my song, and, *as you are doing*, health-bringing Phoebus, come hither for my undertaking. Phoebus has come! Lyres and quivers have sounded. The god's presence is revealed by his special signs. Phoebus has come!"

To begin with, Phoebus is absent. Ovid can hardly ask him to come

"as you are doing." Then the construction of *coeptis* with *ades* is inelegant: although *adesse* with the sense "assist at" and governing a dative is common, its meaning here is fixed by *Phoebus adest* as the equally common "come hither" (*Am.* 3.2.46 *huc ades*, Verg. *Buc.* 2.45 *huc ades, o formose puer*).

From Kenney's apparatus we learn that R and its brethren have *utque faues* and the majority of the other manuscripts *ut faueas*. Here obviously is the verb which governs *coeptis*. The first reading is felled by the argument which felled *utque facis*, and on a superficial view *ut faueas* might be thought the correct reading. However, *-que* is needed to link hexameter and pentameter together, and it is the manuscript Pb which provides, or rather all but provides the solution. Its reading, *tuque faueas*, needs only the change of a single letter to give what the poet wrote: *tuque, fauens coeptis*, etc., "and thou, with favor for my emprise, etc." Compare *Ars* 1.268 *pollicitisque fauens uulgus adeste meis*, Verg. *Georg.* 1.18 *adsis, o Tegeae, fauens*.

The corruption *utque facis* (the second hands in R and K) can be traced to its very source: this was the verse *utque facis coeptis Phoebæ saluber ades* given by Mico of Saint Riquier (*Poet. Lat. Aev. Car.* 3.292) in his prosodic florilegium, a collection of verses from Lucretius to Fortunatus: since two of Mico's Ovidian verses are quoted by Priscian and Isidore, and others are falsely attributed by him to Martial, it is possible that he drew on a tradition (that is, the text of anthologists and grammarians) independent of the archetype. The presence of a corruption in this tradition is already faintly suggested by the text of Priscian (*GL* 2.97.1) which gives only the words *Phoebæ saluber ades*. I suppose our archetype (say 8th-century) to have read *utque faues* with a marginal variant *tuque faues*: some β type manuscript preserved this variant (differently and unsuccessfully emended in Ob and Pb); the other manuscripts passed on *utque faues*; in the 11th century *facis* (obliterating the original *faues*) was inserted in R directly from Mico; in the next century, when K was created, the scribe of K (who used R as a secondary source) inserted R's reading as a variant; later still, the unsatisfactory *utque faues* was corrected to the essentially correct *ut faueas* in the *codices recentiores*.

This interesting crux thus serves to illuminate practically every aspect of the history of our text. Notice above all that Pb's reading (closest to the truth) almost certainly preserves a genuine tradition, for its unmetrical nature seems to rule out the possibility of conjecture.

Rem. 713 nec solam faciem, mores quoque confer et *artem*.

Compare your girl-friend's qualities with those of a society beauty — "not only her looks, but also her character and her *art*" (*artem* RK ς , *artes* E ς). What art? Are these ladies limited to but one, so that, if they sing like nightingales, they are sure to dance like elephants? The singular cannot be right.

In the singular Ovid uses *ars* either absolutely, e.g., *Am.* 1.15.14 *quamuis ingenio non ualet, arte ualet*, or with reference to one particular art (in which case it is accompanied by an epithet), e.g., *Am.* 1.10.60 *quam uolui, nota fit arte mea*. This context demands the wider reference of "talents," "attainments," "accomplishments," which only the plural expresses. Burman aptly cites *Am.* 2.10.5f:

utraque formosa est, operosae cultibus ambae,
artibus in dubio est haec sit an illa prior.

Compare also *Am.* 2.4.17 *places raras dotata per artes*, *Pont.* 2.5.40 *nec lateant artes eloquiumque tuum*, *ib.* 4.8.77 *sic tibi nec docti desunt nec principis artes*, *Trist.* 1.9.57 *utque tibi prosunt artes, facunde, seuerae*. I suspect that the error was a mistake of R's, taken over by K and a few other manuscripts: E ς here means β , Ω , and Ovid.

Rem. 755f illic adsidue ficti saltantur amantes;
 [†]*quid caueas*[†] actor, *qua iuuat arte, nocet*.

Immediate assent was invited by Kenney's proposal (*Notes* 260) to supersede the flat and illogical vulgate with the reading of E "... the actor's art is as harmful as it is delightful." What, he asked, could be neater or more suitable? Nothing; or so it seemed until 1962, when his colleague, Mr. W. A. Camps of Pembroke College — who has generously permitted me to publish his conjecture here —, discovered the true reading.

The suitability of E's apophthegm is beyond cavil. But its neatness is provisional. If it did not fill the whole pentameter, it is not neat at all; and no supplement seems possible which will not spoil the conceit.

The soundness of Kenney's text hinges on the main verb: only EKZ give *nocet*; all the rest give *docet*. Now K revokes its support of *nocet* by subscribing to the *quid*... *quid*... of the majority of the manuscripts, readings which presuppose the existence of *docet*. Z is an ignoble manuscript not meriting regular citation in the apparatus: it never alone preserves the true text, and, accompanied by E, never

refutes the tradition of *Rω*. The reading *nocet*, then, depends on E, which hardly once in the whole poem (for 560 *illa* is manifestly conjectural) has a clear title to sole custody of a single word of Ovid's. Moreover, E's criminal record is impressive. The same page of the apparatus lists successful prosecutions against it for false pretences at 753, 755, 756, 759, 765, 766, 774, and 775, whereas the best manuscript, R, appears in the dock only for the venial offences of misrepresenting *lentus* as *letus* in 774 and (in common with all manuscripts) *au(c)tor* for *actor* in 756, to which must be added (as I have pointed out on *Rem.* 161) its miscopying of *īpius* as *ipsius* in 758. The case is plain: *nocet* is a conjecture; the reading of the archetype was *docet*.

Correcting the above-mentioned *autor*, and employing a standard abbreviation for the first word of the verse, Camps considers the testimony of R: *qđ caueas actor qua iuuēt arte docet*; and without altering, adding, or subtracting a single letter, but by interpreting *qđ* as *qđ*, and *qua* as *quā*, he restores:

quod caueas, actor, quam iuuēt, arte docet.

"The actor's art exhibits in all its allure the very temptation you must resist." The sense of the verse is perfect, its form unmistakably stamped with the Ovidian touch. For the word-order and rhythm, compare *Pont.* 1.1.80 *plus isto, duri, si precor, oris ero*; for a relative clause as subject of an indirect question, compare *Rem.* 89 *quale sit id, quod amas, celeri circumspice mente*; for the jussive subjunctive *caueas*, compare *Ars* 1.502 *et faueas illi, quisquis agatur amans* (the very opposite of the advice given here); and for the bare *arte*, compare *Am.* 1.2.26, 1.8.6, 1.15.14, 1.15.19, etc.

The changes made by Camps to the reading of the archetype are so slight as to be negligible; the errors he postulates are errors which occur ten thousand times and more in Latin manuscripts. More yet: followed by a subjunctive and a verb capable of introducing an indirect question, the word *qđ* was practically marked out for assassination by the interrogative; and that the sequence *quā iuuēt arte* would, if not accidentally, then deliberately be altered to *qua iuuēt arte* was a dead certainty passing any that ever enriched a patron of the turf.

Applauding this latest triumph in unstopping the voice of muted utterance, we take our leave of the reader.

*Contigimus portum: fessae da sēta carinae,
quam dederat saeuīs Ars tua, Naso, fretis:
sit meliora sequi tibi non concessa uoluptas,
dempta tamen quaedam deteriora proba!*

PINDAR, *NOMOS*, AND HERACLES
(Pindar, frg. 169 [Snell²]+*POxy.* No. 2450, frg. 1)

Dedicated to Harry Caplan

BY MARTIN OSTWALD

FEW fragments of Greek poetry have been cited in ancient literature as frequently as Pindar's poem on νόμος βασιλεύς.¹ From its earliest mention, perhaps still within Pindar's own lifetime and certainly not long after his death, at the end of Herodotus' story about Darius' experiment with the Indians and Greeks concerning their respective funeral customs² down to the entry "νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς" in Hesychius' lexicon in the fifth century of our era, there are no less than twenty-two references to it,³ and the manner in which many of these are made suggests that the beginning of the poem may have become proverbial soon after Pindar wrote it and remained so throughout antiquity. The fragment, in Snell's text, consists of only six lines, the second of which has presented a number of difficulties, due mainly to textual variants. But, in addition, the poem offers in itself no decisive clues to help in its interpretation and already received widely divergent explanations in antiquity. No wonder, then, that few fragments, apart from those of the Presocratics, have been discussed by modern scholars with the same frequency and intensity as this one.⁴

New evidence on this fragment has recently come to light with the publication by E. Lobel of a papyrus from the first or early second century A.D. Its discovery has added more than two dozen new lines to the fragment, beginning where the fragment leaves off, and has given us more or less well-preserved pieces of another thirty lines, which come later in the poem.⁵ As a result, the text of the poem, to the extent that it has now become more intelligible, and its interpretation deserve renewed consideration.

I

While the new papyrus contributes nothing new to the clarification of the occasion for which the poem was composed,⁶ it leaves no doubt that its structure is triadic. In the colometry of the papyrus, strophe and

antistrophe have 13 verses each, and they were followed by an epode of at least 14 verses. Only the first strophe-antistrophe pair, the first six verses of the first epode, and the first eight of the second strophe are sufficiently well preserved to be considered in interpreting the poem and its theme. For the beginning of the poem as a whole we still depend on the literary tradition; but even here the papyrus enables us to make some revisions in the light of the beginnings of the first antistrophe and of the second strophe, and it is with this that we shall start.

The literary fragment, as known before the publication of the papyrus, runs:

- νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς
 θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων
 ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον
 ὑπερτάτ᾽α χειρὶ. τεκμαίρομαι
 5 ἔργοισιν Ἑρακλῆος.
 ἐπεὶ Γηρυόνα βόας
 Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέος
 ἀναιτήτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἔλασεν

This text⁷ is a composite of two ancient sources. The earlier and more important of these is Plato's *Gorgias* 484 b, where Callicles quotes the first five verses as far as Ἑρακλῆος. ἐπεὶ and then trails off into a paraphrase which includes the word ἀπριάτας and the explanation: λέγει δ' ὅτι οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἡλάσατο τὰς βοῦς.⁸ The Pindar text of the *Gorgias* is again quoted, probably from the *Gorgias* and not from an independent source, in Aelius Aristides' treatise *On Rhetoric*, and it is the scholiast on this passage who constitutes the second source of the literary fragment in that he provides the rest of the clause which starts with ἐπεὶ. He quotes:⁹ ἐπεὶ Γηρυόνου βόας Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέως συναιρεῖται (Oxon.: ἀναιρεῖται). καὶ ἀπριάτας ἔλασεν, and then continues with the following paraphrase:¹⁰ ἐπειδὴ τὰς τοῦ Γηρυόνου βόας οὔτε αἰτήσας οὔτε πριάμενος ἤλασεν εἰς τὸν οἶκον τοῦ Εὐρυσθέως. Boeckh was the first modern scholar to realize that this text would not do.¹¹ Apart from making the dialectical emendations Γαρύονα¹² and Εὐρυσθέος, he noticed that the scholiast's text at συναιρεῖται (or ἀναιρεῖται which is the reading cited by Boeckh) should, but does not, agree with οὔτε αἰτήσας of his paraphrase. Moreover, the correspondence of the two participles of the paraphrase — οὔτε αἰτήσας οὔτε πριάμενος — with Plato's paraphrase in the *Gorgias*: οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος suggested to him that ἀναιρεῖται is a corruption of an adjectival form of the verb αἰτέω, and he offered the ingenious emendation ἀναιτήτας τε in its place,

which has the merit of explaining the corruption as due to initial assonance and similarity in the letters involved. This emendation seemed so simple and natural that all subsequent editors of the fragment have adopted it. But this, Boeckh's most signal contribution to the establishment of a text, must now be reconsidered in the light of the new *POxy.* 2450, frg. 1.

This reconsideration can best be carried out in the context of a discussion of the text of the poem as a whole, to the extent that the papyrus makes it intelligible for us. The text which I give here is based, from line 6 on, on Lobel's *edito princeps* and on a number of restorations proposed by D. L. Page.¹³ Divergences from Lobel and Page will be indicated in the comments below.

στρ. α'	νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάται χειρί. τεκμαίρομαι ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος. ἐπεὶ Γηρύνονα βόας Κυκλώπειον ἐπὶ πρόθυρο[ν] Ε[ὕρυσ]θῆος ἀπράτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἔλασεν. κεῖνος καὶ Διομήδεος ἵππους ἔκλεψε, μὲν[αρχον Κ[ι]κόνων [παρὰ Βιστο]νίδι λίμνα[ι] χαλκοθώρ]αικος Ἐνναλίου δαμάσας] ἔκπαγλον υἷόν,
5	
10	
ἀντ. α'	Διὸς ὑποστ]όντα μέγαν παῖδ' οὐ κό]ρωι ἀλλ' ἄρετῃ. κρέσσον γ]ᾶρ ἀρπαζομένων τεθνάμεν πρὸ χρημ]άτων ἢ κακὸν ἔρμεναι.
15	
5	κρύβδαν] ἐσελθὼν μέγα στεγος ν]υκτὶ βίᾳς ὁδὸν
20	χειρῶν εὖ]ρε· λαβὼν δ' ἔν[α φῶτ]αι πεδά[ρ]σ[ιον] φά[τ]ναις] ἐν λιθίναις βάλλ[εν ὠμοτόταις] ἵππ[ων μαινομ]έ[ν]ον φρέ[νας] αἶσαι·
10	καὶ μ[ιν] κεραίζον· ταχέως δ' ἀράβη[σε] δια[λ]ευκῶν ὑστέ[ων] δοῦπος ἐ[ρ] <ε]υκομένων. ὁ δ' ἀφ[αρ π]λεκτὸν τε χαλκόν
25	
ἐπ. α'	ὑπερή[μωσ]ε τραπέζων προβά[τ]ων ἀλυσιατῶν δι' ἐρκ[έ]ων, τείρε δὲ στερεῶι [?] ἄλλαν [μ]ὲν σκέλος, ἄλλαν δὲ πᾶχ[υν], τὰν δὲ πρυμνὸν κεφαλᾶς
30	

ὁδ[ἀ]ξ̣ α[ῡ]χένα φέροισαν.

35

ζαμενε[] τυρανν[υ] — —
ἐ]κ λεχέω[ν]

στρ. β'

ἔμολ[ε κ]αὶ παῖδα[υ] —
Ἑρακλ[ε]ος ἔξα[υ] γ[υ]
τεταγμένον τούτ[α] εκατ. —
Ἑρας ἔφετμαῖς Σθενέλο[ι]ό μιν
5 υἱὸς κέ[λ]ευσσε <ν> μόνον
ἄνευ συ[μμ]αχίας ἔμιν.
καὶ Ἰόλαο[ς] ἐ]ν ἑπταπύλοισι μένω[ν] μόνος
Θήβαις Ἀμ]φιτρύωνί τε σᾶμα χέω[ν]
— — — υ]μᾶι δ' ἐπὶ θήκαι

I shall confine my comments to those passages on which Lobel, Page, or other scholars have not commented, or, as stated, where my readings differ from theirs.

Line 7: Beginning with Boeckh, all editors of the literary fragment have read this line: *Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέος*. The need for responsion with line 20:]ρε' λαβὼν δ' ἔνα φῶτα πεδάρσιον and with strophe 2, line 7: καὶ Ἰόλαος ἐν ἑπταπύλοισι μένων μόνος makes it clear (a) that Dindorf's reading of the lengthened adjectival form *Κυκλωπει-* in schol. Ael. Arist. III.408.19 is preferable to the form in -ι-, and (b) that the accusative is preferable to the genitive. For if the genitive forms were to be retained, line 7: -ων ἐπὶ would have to respond with line 20: -ρε' λαβὼν and str. 2, line 7: -ος ἐν ἐπτ; but "pairs of bicipitia following one another are . . . not found in Pindar and Bacchylides."¹⁴ Moreover, Pindar regularly follows the normal Greek practice¹⁵ of using ἐπί with the accusative with verbs of motion;¹⁶ Rumpel, *Lexicon Pindaricum* (Leipzig 1883) cites only one instance of ἐπί + genitive with a verb of motion,¹⁷ in a passage in which the verb of motion is used in a transferred rather than in a physical sense and where ἐπί is more naturally interpreted as meaning "upon the surface of" than indicating the goal of motion.

It must be admitted, however, that the reading adopted here: *Κυκλώπειον ἐπὶ πρόθυρον Εὐρυσθέος* presents some difficulties. In the first place, it compels us to regard the final syllable of πρόθυρον as long. But this metrical lengthening is not unprecedented,¹⁸ and, further, Pindar elsewhere seems to prefer the singular to the plural of πρόθυρον when a specific entrance way is mentioned.¹⁹ Secondly, the responsion of -ον Εὐρυσθέος with φῶτα πεδάρσιον and -λοισι μένων μόνος is rare

but not unattested in Pindar. A biceps between two longa occurs also at *Olympians* 10.99, and there, as here, it is in a proper name.²⁰

Line 8: The responsion of this line with lines 21: *φάτναις ἐν λιθίναῖς βάλεν ὤμοτάτας* and str. 2, line 8: *Θήβαις Ἀμφιτρύωνί τε σᾶμα χέων* compels us to abandon Boeckh's emendation *ἀναιτήτας τε* as being too long by one syllable. But what are we to put in its place? It seems to me that any restoration must satisfy three minimum requirements, if we retain the *καὶ* before *ἀπριάτας*: (1) It must respond to *φάτναις ἐν λι* — and *Θήβαις Ἀμφι* —, that is, it must follow the metrical pattern $\underline{\text{v}} - - - \text{v}$; (2) it must convey the idea that the cattle were not voluntarily surrendered as the result of a request. This idea is inherent in the *συναίρεται* or *ἀναίρεται* of the quotation we find in the Aelius Aristides scholion as well as in his paraphrase: *οὔτε αἰτήσας οὔτε πριάμενος* and in Plato's paraphrase: *οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρύονου*; and (3) it must not exceed 9 or 10 spaces on the papyrus.²¹

In addition, two features are desirable in the restoration, though they are not absolutely essential: (4) The paraphrases given by Plato and the scholiast to Aelius Aristides suggest that a correlative construction corresponding to *οὔτε . . . οὔτε* is to be restored. Since *-αι* is legible on the papyrus before *ἀπριάτας*, *τε καὶ* seems a natural restoration, leaving us 7 or 8 spaces before *τε*. (5) Furthermore, if we take *καὶ ἀπριάτας* of the papyrus to correspond to *οὔτε πριάμενος*, which is common to both paraphrases, the presumption is that the expression occupying the 7 or 8 spaces remaining before *τε* is negative, perhaps an adjectival form beginning with an *α*-privative or with *νη*-.

Lobel (p. 149) thought of *νηποῖνους τε*, which adjective is found in *Odyssey* 1.160 and would give us a phrase equivalent to the Homeric *ἀπριάτην ἀνάποινον* at *Iliad* 1.99. But recognizing its excessive length, he suggested that an adverb in *-ί* might fill the space more comfortably than an adjective followed by *τε*. This suggestion was taken up and modified by D. L. Page, and, independently, it seems, by H. J. Mette,²² who, retaining *τε*, read *ἀνατεί τε* = "without incurring punishment," "with impunity."

Yet this reading neither satisfies the second requirement, viz. that the restoration contain the ideas of involuntary surrender and absence of a request, nor does it conform to the practice of Pindar, who never, in any of the passages cited by Rumpel, joins an adverbial and an adjectival expression by *τε καί*. Open to the same objections are B. A. van Groningen's suggestion of *προικός* = "without retribution," which, in addition, does not fit the meter, and M. Treu's *ληϊστί*, ingeniously argued but unattested in extant Greek literature.²³

ἀπράτας = "not for sale" seems to be the least unsatisfactory restora-

tion. But, though it meets all the requirements and desiderata outlined above, it is not free from doubt. In classical literature it occurs in Lysias 7.6, referring to a piece of property which, as a result of confiscation, "could not be sold" for three years; in Demosthenes 34.9 it is used of merchandise alleged to be "unsaleable"; and in Aeschines 2.23 Demosthenes is accused of not having a single part of his body that is "not for sale." In other words, all these occurrences are not only post-Pindaric but come from prose literature. Still, the resulting phrase ἀπράτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας = "which were neither for sale nor had he bought them," describing the lack of a sale-purchase transaction as it does, seems to be striking enough to have a place in Pindar's style.

Lines 9ff: Although pictorial representations of the subjugation of the mares of Diomedes begin as early as the archaic age,²⁴ this seems now to be the earliest literary account of this adventure. The earliest datable literary allusion to it so far has been Euripides' *Alcestis* 481-498. This play was first performed in 438 B.C., the very year in which Pindar is believed to have died. It is impossible to determine whether the reference to this story by Hellanicus, frg. 105 (*FGrH* I) is still earlier.

van Groningen (n.23) believes that the taming of Diomedes' mares "was the main episode in Heracles' life which Pindar related in order to exemplify the truth of his initial statement." While this may well be true, the fragmentary state of the papyrus does not permit us to be confident. The intelligible scraps of what appears to be the second strophe suggest that at least one other Heracleian adventure was added to the episodes of Geryon and Diomedes. In view of that, I see no need to follow Groningen in taking ἐπεὶ (line 6) in a temporal sense; on the contrary, τεκμαίρομαι preceding it makes the causal meaning almost imperative.

Lines 10-11 ~ 23-24. The papyrus takes Κικόνων ~ ταχέως into the same colon with μόναρχον ~ -ράϊζον. However, because this results in δ' standing at the beginning of line 24, I have transposed the two words each into the next line.

Line 14. ὑποστάντα is Page's restoration. Lobel read ἰάντα before μέγαν; ἀνδριάντα, rightly rejected by Lobel on metrical grounds, is nevertheless retained by Treu.²⁵

Lines 19-20: Page²⁶ reads νυκτιβίας ὁδόν / ὕβριος εὔρε, taking νυκτιβίας = "he who is violent at night" to be an epithet of Heracles. Although Page may be right in considering this formation "Pindaric enough," one should be wary of restoring otherwise unattested epithets where other more natural possibilities exist, and in the present case, βίας is much more naturally taken as a genitive of description with ὁδόν. This, in turn, raises the question of the beginning of line 20. If

εὔρε is right, the word before it ought to respond to Κυκλω- in line 7 and to καὶ Ἴο- in str. 2, line 7. ὕβριος is possible only if βίας is not to be taken with ὀδόν; it makes more sense, however, to look for a modifier of βίας, and a word such as χειρῶν fits the sense admirably and gives us an expression well attested in Pindar.²⁷

The papyrus has a ν-movable after εὔ]ρε; but since the syllable has to be short, both Lobel and Page recognize it as a mistake and delete it. Incidentally, the converse happened at str. 2, line 5, where a ν-movable should be added to κέλευσε to make the final syllable long.

Line 27: Lobel (pp. 150–151) recognized that a verb denoting “breaking” or “detaching” must begin this line. Page (n. 26) suggests ὑπερήγνυε, but admits that the imperfect here is “unwelcome.” Further, a double rho should be expected in the text. ὑπερήλασε, suggested by van Groningen (n.23), is free from these objections, but “he pulled a chain of entwined links of bronze over the mangers of the cattle (that is, the mares)” makes the action performed by Heracles unintelligible. ὑπερήμωσε=“he freed below” or “freed stealthily,” viz. he undid the chain by which the mares were fastened, avoids all these difficulties, and perhaps adds a touch of irony at the same time; for we know of at least one passage in which the liberation resulting from Heracles’ labors is described by the verb ἐρημόω.²⁸

Line 29: According to Lobel, the ρ in στερεῶι is not certain, and the adjective by itself presents some difficulty. Treu (p. 206) suggests that it may be a “colloquial kenning” for Heracles’ club; but there is no evidence for this. Page emends to στερεῶς, following a suggestion of Lobel’s, but it may equally well be that a dative singular noun needs to be supplied. Unfortunately, we get no help from metrical responsion, since no other epode is preserved.

Of the rest of the first epode beyond line 32 the text is too scrappy to permit an intelligent attempt at restoration or interpretation. The difficulty of restoration extends also over the first three lines of strophe 2, and the difficulty of interpretation also over the rest. Still, it may not be amiss to delineate the boundaries within which speculation about the possible content of this strophe may move.

Strophe 2, lines 1–2: If παῖδα[s] (?) Ἡρακλέος belongs together, it may be that Heracles’ slaughter of his children by Megara, which forms the theme of Euripides’ *Heracles*, was described here. At any rate, I know of no other adventure of Heracles’, with the exception of Hyllus’ services to his father on Mt. Oeta, in which children of Heracles played a part. Pindar refers to this slaughter in *Isthmians* 3/4.81–82: . . . ἔμπυρα χαλκοαρᾶν ὀκτῶ θανόντων, τοὺς Μεγάρα τέκε οἱ Κρεοντίς υἱούς.²⁹ If we are right in suggesting that Pindar may have

referred to this story here, the letters *τυρανν*- read by Lobel at what would be line 35 of our numbering might refer either to Lycus or to Creon, and *ἐ]κ λεχέω[ν* in the next line might be a reference to Heracles' marriage with Megara.³⁰

This brings us to the problem of interpreting *Ἥρας ἐφετμαῖς* in line 4. The fragmentary state of the preceding lines makes it impossible to determine whether Hera's behest applies to something said in an earlier line, or whether Eurystheus' command, presumably to Heracles, if he is meant by *μιν*, or else to the subject of *ἔμολε* in line 1, to undertake some journey unaided was actuated by the behest of the goddess. The lack of a conjunction or a connecting particle gives us reasonable assurance only that no new sentence begins with line 4, and the phrase may, accordingly, be taken either way. But reasoned speculation may let us take one further step. I know of no representation in Greek art or description in Greek literature in which the assignment of a *specific* task by Eurystheus to Heracles is inspired by Hera. Hera is often credited with the imposition of the labors as such,³¹ but she is never involved, as far as I can ascertain, in the assignment of a particular deed. Although we must not reckon without the possibility that Pindar adopted a version of a Heracles story not attested elsewhere, this creates a justified presumption that Hera's behest was not directed at Eurystheus in the present passage.³²

If we are to take Hera's behest, then, to refer to some incident in the Heracles legend, there are two stories in particular that come to mind. One is the madness which she sent against Heracles to make him slay his children by Megara.³³ This would fit our speculation that this episode may have been told at the end of the first epode and the beginning of the second strophe. But equally suggestive is the story of how Hera dispatched a crab against Heracles as he was engaged in combat with the Lernaean Hydra:³⁴ according to one version,³⁵ it was as a result of this that Iolaus came to Heracles' aid against the monster,³⁶ and that would fit in well with Eurystheus' command in lines 5-6 that Heracles, again if *μιν* in line 4 refers to him, undertake the next adventure alone and unaided. In fact, Apollodorus specifically states that, because of Iolaus' assistance, Eurystheus refused to count the subjugation of the Hydra as a labor and imposed an additional task upon Heracles.³⁷

All this, it must be admitted, is no more than reasoned speculation on the basis of what extraneous information on the Heracles legends we possess, and certainty is impossible to attain. But even speculation loses its basis when it comes to interpreting lines 7-9 of the second strophe. It may not be too fanciful to restore *μόνος exempli gratia*

at the end of line 7; yet neither ancient literature nor ancient art provides us with any tradition attributing to Iolaus the erection of a funeral mound for Amphitryon. Amphitryon's tomb was believed to be in Thebes³⁸; but the only connection between it and Iolaus is Pindar's account that Iolaus was buried in Amphitryon's tomb after he had slain Eurystheus.³⁹ This makes it very hard to explain]μιῶν δ' ἐπὶ θήκαι in line 9; for the phrase suggests that Iolaus erected the mound over a tomb which Amphitryon shared with someone else, but of course Iolaus himself cannot well have been that person.⁴⁰ All we know about Amphitryon's death is Apollodorus' statement that he fell in the same war against the Minyans of Orchomenus in which victory brought Heracles the prize of Megara.⁴¹ This version which, unlike the version adopted by Euripides, does not let Amphitryon survive Heracles' children by Megara, leaves room for the guess that it may have been these children whom Iolaus buried in one tomb with their grandfather. Yet, though Pausanias mentions in the same breath the tomb of Amphitryon and of Heracles' sons by Megara at Thebes,⁴² there is not a shred of evidence that they were buried in a common grave or even that they were buried by Iolaus. The question remains unsolved until, as we may hope, further evidence comes to light.

II

With this we may turn to the problem of interpreting the text as we now have it. But before doing so, it might be advisable to give a rough translation:

Nomos, king of all, mortals and immortals, brings on with sovereign hand what is most violent and makes it just. I infer this from the deeds of Heracles, since he drove the cows of Geryon, which were not for sale and for which no purchase-money had been paid, to the Cyclopean entrance-way of Eurystheus. He also stole the horses of Diomedes, after he had subdued by the Bistonian marsh the monarch of the Kikones, the marvelous son of bronze-corsleted Enyalios, who resisted the great son of Zeus not by reason of greedy insolence but because of his valor. For it is better to die in defense of one's property when it is being robbed than to be a coward. Having stealthily entered the great palace at night, he <sc. Heracles> found the road of violent force of hands. He seized one man high in the air and cast him in the stone mangers to satiate the most brutal hearts of the raving mares, and they slaughtered him. And quickly there rang abroad the dull sound of white bones being crushed. Straightway he freed the entwined bronze chain from the cattles' tables throughout their enclosures; and with a firm {-} he wore out one mare as she was carrying a leg, one as she was carrying an arm, and another as she was

carrying with her teeth the neck, the lower part of the head. — . . . came also . . . child of Heracles . . . at Hera's behest the son of Sthenelus bade him go alone without alliance. And Iolaus, staying alone in Thebes of the seven gates and building a funeral mound for Amphitryon . . . on (or: for) one grave . . ."

I have intentionally refrained from translating νόμος, the first word of the poem, since the crucial question in any interpretation of the poem must be about the meaning of this term. In fact, the poem as a whole — and the portions lost to us must also be included — evidently involved a statement on the nature of νόμος. Pindar begins with two assertions. In the first place, νόμος is king not only over men but even over the gods, and secondly, it is powerful enough to make just what is elsewhere in Greek thought regarded as the very opposite of justice, namely violence.⁴³ If this is the thesis which Pindar proposes to advance, his arguments, as far as they are preserved and recognizable, are taken from at least two of the labors of Heracles. That it is no exaggeration to apply the quasi-philosophical terms "thesis" and "argument" to this poem is indicated by the use of τεκμαίρομαι in line 4, the same concept which Thucydides uses so often to bolster his contentions.⁴⁴ The personal commitment inherent in the first person singular of the middle voice gives the term a force and a prominence which it has nowhere else in Pindar.⁴⁵

The first and shorter argument, then, is that Heracles used violence in gaining possession of Geryon's cattle. He drove them off, although neither had Geryon consented to sell them nor had Heracles offered to pay for them. No word signifying "violence" appears in lines 6–8 but the idea of violence is clearly present: the causal conjunction ἐπεὶ⁴⁶ makes the story serve as an explanation of the contention that νόμος brings on and justifies what is most violent, and the verb ἔλασεν often bears overtones of violent action.⁴⁷ In other words, the fact that the prey was seized and was not acquired by way of a regular commercial transaction suggests violence on the part of Heracles over against something ordinarily described as injustice which, in this account, was sustained by Geryon. Geryon is here not depicted as the terrifying triple-bodied monster, which he is in other versions of the legend,⁴⁸ but as the victim of violence unjustly perpetrated by that hero who is commonly regarded as the liberator *par excellence* from monsters that trouble mankind. We are not told, however, in what way νόμος makes this βιαιότατον just.

That this is the way in which we are to understand Pindar's first argument is corroborated by the manner in which the story of Diomedes' mares is told. We must proceed warily and not lean too heavily

on restorations such as ἔκλεψε for the portrayal of Heracles' character. That violence is involved in the treatment meted out by Heracles is explicitly stated in line 19 (βίᾱς) and supported by the participle ἀρπαζομένων in line 16. Moreover, the glory elsewhere attributed to the exploit⁴⁹ is undercut by the fact that it took place in the dark of night (νυκτί in line 19) and, if Page's restoration κρύβδαν in line 18 is correct, secretly. It is further impaired in an indirect way in that the valor of Heracles' opponent, Diomedes, is increased. He is described as ἔκπαγλος, while Heracles, if the restorations are correct, is only μέγας. But more than that, we are told that Diomedes' resistance was motivated by ἀρετή and not by κόρος. There is little doubt about the meaning here, despite the fact that κόρῳ is only a restoration. For an explanatory marginal note on the papyrus reads, according to Lobel: οὐκ ἐπὶ ὕβρει ἀλλ' ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα. τὸ γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ προΐεσθαι ἀνδρείου ἐστὶ . . . ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕβριστοῦ. Ἡρακλῆς δὲ ἡδίκηει ἀφελόμενος.⁵⁰ In view of this, κόρῳ seems to be the only reasonable restoration which the surviving -ρωι permits, and though it usually designates a kind of "satiety" or "surfeit" that comes from greed and leads to ὕβρις⁵¹ or which is begotten by ὕβρις,⁵² there are passages in which it is used almost as a synonym for ὕβρις.⁵³ At any rate, any suspicion of greed or insolence is removed from Diomedes, and his valorous fight for his property leaves no doubt that here again Heracles is depicted as the villain: ἡδίκηει ἀφελόμενος, as the anonymous commentator puts it.

The remainder of the first antistrophe and the beginning of the first epode seem to do little more than fill in the picture of the βίᾱ displayed by Heracles on this occasion. The treatment given to the attendant is told in great detail, and we get a vivid picture of the mares munching human flesh as they are being led away. Again, there is no clue here, any more than there was in the narration of the Geryon episode, about the way in which Pindar thought of νόμος as making such violent deeds just. About the end of the first epode and the preserved parts of the second strophe there is too much uncertainty to include them in the interpretation of the poem as a whole. Suffice it to say that, if our suspicion is correct that the slaughter of Heracles' children had a place in the narrative, we have a further adventure which would lend itself to an unfavorable presentation of Heracles.

So with only fragmentary evidence added to the literary fragment, it would seem that not much has been gained to help us interpret the meaning of νόμος in this poem.⁵⁴ But this is not altogether true. Though fragmentary, the new papyrus leaves no doubt that in this poem Pindar treated the demigod, whom he elsewhere regarded as the deliverer of mankind from various monsters,⁵⁵ as the arch-perpetrator of a kind

of violence which received, perhaps poetically expressed toward the end of the poem,⁵⁶ its justification through νόμος.⁵⁷ What did Pindar understand by νόμος in this context?

Before attempting to answer this question, we must formulate the problem more precisely. The term νόμος has many different connotations in Greek, ranging from "law" as a written political enactment⁵⁸ to a custom or habit which may or may not have absolute validity,⁵⁹ and from the rules of a game⁶⁰ to that ordered state of society on which civilized existence rests.⁶¹ The question is, therefore, which of these or of the many other connotations of the word Pindar gives it in this context. That means, to state it again, that we shall have to find in Pindar and in the language of his age a use or uses of νόμος in the light of which the qualities Pindar predicates of it here make sense. We have to find a νόμος of which it can reasonably be said that it is king over immortals as well as mortals, which makes the most violent things just, and of which the two labors of Heracles cited provide a fitting explanation. It will not do merely to find a word in a modern language which we can substitute for νόμος, for there is no single modern equivalent — be it "law," "custom," "convention," "Sitte," "Ordnung," "coutume," "règle," and so on — that is not open to ambiguities similar to those inherent in νόμος.⁶² We must, rather, concern ourselves with contexts and within these try to define νόμος in the most narrowly precise way possible, in order to see which use or uses are most germane to the poem under discussion.

We may begin by eliminating some possibilities from the outset. The most common use of νόμος as "law" in the sense of a written statute, the sense in which we find it in the orators and philosophers of the fourth century B.C.,⁶³ obviously does not apply here. For not only would it be ludicrous to visualize a written law as king even over the gods, but the very idea of a written statute prescribing violence as the way to justice is hardly conceivable. The same objection holds true of the kind of political νόμος which, like the laws enacted for the Spartans by Lycurgus, may or may not be written. Apart from the fact that such laws usually aim at preventing rather than encouraging violence as a way to justice, they are confined to members of the same political community. And though Pindar could say elsewhere: ἐν ἀνδράων, ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν / ματρὸς ἀμφοτέροι, ⁶⁴ this does not imply that he thought of men and gods as forming one political community ruled by the same νόμος. Nor would Heracles' violence against Geryon and Diomedes be a fit illustration for this kind of νόμος, since there was no common political bond between them.⁶⁵

This leads us to a further point. If νόμος cannot be regarded as a

law ruling men and gods as members of the same political community, could Pindar not be thinking of it as establishing some other kind of community between them, for example, a community of fate? That Homer, the fountainhead of Greek poetry and thought, often speaks of Fate as superior even to the gods is well known,⁶⁶ and several modern commentators have taken Pindar as translating this idea into a "law of Fate" here.⁶⁷ But by itself such a concept is not very helpful, any more so than the identification of νόμος with the will of Zeus⁶⁸ or its derivation from Orphic or Pythagorean sources.⁶⁹ At best, it gives us a source while leaving us in the dark about the content of such a νόμος. But there are other serious objections. The case for Orphic influences⁷⁰ rests on an Orphic hymn to Nomos which does not antedate the second century A.D.,⁷¹ too late to constitute trustworthy evidence for Pindar. That the will of Zeus played a part in Pindar's account of the Geryon story in *Dithyrambs* 2, frg. 81, is doubtful but possible; yet that does not necessarily imply that Pindar meant to identify it with νόμος here.⁷² On the contrary, the fact that νόμος in frg. 169 rules immortals as well as mortals suggests that Zeus, being an immortal, is also ruled by it, so that it could not very well be equated with his will. For the same reason, incidentally, an explanation of νόμος here by reference to Heraclitus' famous statement: *τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*⁷³ is misleading, since Heraclitus does not speak of a νόμος that rules the gods also. Moreover, the preserved portions of our poem contain no hint in what way the exploits of Heracles might have served as an illustration of the proposition that the law of Fate is king over gods and men and makes violence just. We do not know whether an explanation to this effect was included in a part of the poem which is now lost to us. Still, there are some passages in the preserved parts which argue strongly against such a view. For if Fate played a prominent part in the narrative, it is difficult to see (a) why the bidding of Eurystheus, explicit in strophe 2, lines 4-5, and implicit in line 7, is mentioned so unequivocally as a motivating force; (b) what the relation may have been of Hera's behest in strophe 2, line 4, to the law of Fate; and (c) why the negative aspect of Heracles' violence is emphasized as heavily as it is. If the Diomedes episode in the new papyrus teaches us anything, it is that we are to regard Heracles' failure to have purchased the cattle of Geryon as a more serious flaw than has hitherto been done, and this suggests that Pindar put the responsibility on him and not on an impersonal Fate. Furthermore, we would expect a law of Fate to lay down a general rule which is valid for every case, but, as Otto Schroeder has rightly pointed out, νόμος here is neither "eines einzelnen olympischen Gottes persönliches Regiment," nor is

the violence which it justifies "jede Gewalttat, sondern eben nur die von ihm gelenkte, in seinem Sinn getane."⁷⁴

Related to the use of νόμος as denoting a "law" of some kind is another use that deserves consideration. In one of the earliest occurrences of the word in Greek literature, Hesiod attributes to Zeus the disposition of the νόμος that beasts, living as they do without justice (δίκη), devour one another, whereas to men he gave justice (δίκη), "which turns out to be by far the best."⁷⁵ νόμος here describes a general universal "order," an order which becomes the norm or way of life of those to whom it applies. For Hesiod, this order is god-given, as it is for Heraclitus in the fragment just cited.⁷⁶ But elsewhere, for example in Pindar, the source of νόμος is not invariably divine.⁷⁷ Several scholars have interpreted νόμος in frg. 169 in this sense, some identifying the "order" with the law of Fate that transcends the gods,⁷⁸ others giving it a divine origin,⁷⁹ and others again calling the order itself "sacred and inviolable" without explicitly attributing its sanctity to a divine source.⁸⁰ This divergence of opinion about the source of νόμος is of course due to the fact that Pindar says nothing about it, apparently because it was of little consequence for the point he wanted to make. But, the question of origin apart, can we regard νόμος as an "order" or a norm in the context of the poem as a whole? I think the answer must be negative. A norm always constitutes an absolute standard, and it is inconceivable that Pindar either held "justice through violence" as an article of faith, proposing it as a norm for all to follow, or that the extraordinary deeds of Heracles would provide an apt illustration of such a norm — or of any norm for that matter.⁸¹

The content attributed to νόμος by some of the scholars who translate it as "order" brings us to a further meaning of the term, which forms part of one of the earliest interpretations of the Pindar fragment. When Plato in *Gorgias* 484b makes Callicles quote the first few lines of the poem, he also puts into his mouth its interpretation as the νόμος τῆς φύσεως,⁸² the law of nature which, in Callicles' view, gives the right to the stronger. In other words, taking our poem in this sense, we should have to say that Heracles was right in robbing Geryon of his cattle and Diomedes of his mares simply because he was the stronger, and, because he was the stronger, νόμος, as the law of nature, sanctioned his violence by making it just. There are several indications that Plato interpreted Pindar's poem in this way,⁸³ and through his influence this interpretation gained wide acceptance in antiquity.⁸⁴ A. Boeckh was one of the earliest modern adherents of this interpretation,⁸⁵ while others modified it to refer to the superior morality of the hero⁸⁶ or of

the nobly born,⁸⁷ or imbued the alleged Pindaric "law of the stronger" with religious overtones.⁸⁸ However, the Plato-Callicles interpretation bears the stamp of the νόμος-φύσις controversy, which did not flourish until several decades after Pindar's death, and it is hazardous to retroject into Pindar's poem views which were articulated only by a later generation. Dodds is right in pointing out that "we can hardly credit the pious Pindar with this shocking opinion."⁸⁹ Nor is it likely that Pindar wrote the poem to support the view that heroic morality is a law unto itself. In *Nemean* 9, it is true, he could justify the expulsion of the sons of Talaus by Adrastus with the remark: κρέσσων δὲ καππαύει δίκαν τὰν πρόσθεν ἀνὴρ;⁹⁰ but in our poem, as we saw, he makes a special point of emphasizing unheroic qualities in Heracles and of stressing the ἀρετή of his opponent Diomedes. Moreover, Diomedes, son of Ares and Cyrene, was also nobly born, and that fact is not overlooked by Pindar here.⁹¹ Pindar cannot well have wanted to quibble that Heracles, as the son of Zeus, was more nobly born and had, therefore, νόμος on his side. And, more generally, it seems difficult if not impossible to find any universal "law" at all which the deeds of Heracles might have exemplified.

Apart from "law" in its several senses, νόμος is frequently found in Greek literature describing the "customs" or "conventions" current among a people, practices religious or secular which are accepted as valid and binding by the society within which they prevail. Among Greek authors it is Herodotus in particular who never tires of reporting interesting νόμοι of this kind. To give a full list of practices which he describes as νόμος would take us too far afield, and it may suffice to cite the Babylonian custom of auctioning off marriageable girls as an example of a secular νόμος,⁹² and Adrastus' request to Croesus for purification κατὰ νόμους τοὺς ἐγχωρίους as an instance of a religious practice.⁹³ The meaning of "custom," "convention," has been read by several modern scholars into Pindar, frg. 169.⁹⁴ But again, this road leads us to an impasse. Surely, customary or conventional practices do not ordinarily lead to justice through violence. And in addition, as Dodds has rightly observed, "the deeds of Heracles are no apt symbol of the customary."⁹⁵ Heracles' theft of the cattle of Geryon and of the mares of Diomedes does not establish either for him a precedent or for us a custom to follow. Nor is anything gained for a correct interpretation of the poem if we follow those modern scholars who speak of "alte heilige Sitte" or of the "heilige Brauch" in this context;⁹⁶ for a long tradition of divine sanction or sanctification does not infuse any more sense into "custom" here, but rather surrounds νόμος in Pindar's

poem with an inscrutable aura of mystery which makes the quest for rational comprehension hopeless.

The preceding argument has tried to show that none of the normative uses of νόμος in Greek literature yields a satisfactory interpretation of Pindar's poem. Pindar cannot be thinking here of either a written statute or a general political ordinance; he does not have in mind a law of Fate, which predetermines the outcome of all things, or a general order, which sets the standards ruling human and divine action; nor does he use νόμος in the way in which the Sophists after him spoke of it either as a "law of nature" which gives the right to the stronger, or as mere "custom" and "convention," which is binding only for the ignorant mob. We must, therefore, look for a solution in a different direction.

There is one sense of νόμος which, though it has been recognized before, has never been set off with sufficient stringency from the connotations we have discussed so far. In addition to signifying an objective norm of some kind, a law, an order, a ritual, and so on, νόμος may also denote the attitude traditionally or conventionally taken to a norm by those to whom it applies. That Pindar may have had this use of νόμος in mind when he wrote this poem has been seen by some scholars, who believe that, rather than articulating a general norm, Pindar is here content to state a specific fact of experience.⁹⁷ Still, the implications of this view, it seems to me, have not yet been fully worked out and exploited for an interpretation of this poem.

The best way to isolate this meaning of νόμος as a traditional attitude which implies certain deep-seated convictions and beliefs may begin with a detailed consideration of the context in which we find the earliest reference to our poem. Pindar's contemporary Herodotus relates at 3.38 an experiment, referred to at the beginning of this paper, in which the Persian king Darius questioned some Greeks and some Indian Kallatai about their respective funeral practices. The story is not told in connection with Herodotus' account of the history of Darius, but is meant to illustrate an insight which Herodotus had gained through his narrative of Cambyses' mad behavior in Egypt. As evidence for Cambyses' madness, Herodotus cites the fact that he opened ancient sepulchers and inspected their corpses; that he laughed at the cult-statue in the temple of Hephaestus because of its resemblance to the pygmy-like figure on the prows of Phoenician ships; and that he unlawfully (οὐ θεμιτόν) entered into the sanctuary of the Kabeiroi, to which only priests were admitted, and set fire to the cult-images.⁹⁸ These actions are summed up at the beginning of the next chapter by the statement that Cambyses' madness consisted in ridiculing ἱποῖσι

τε καὶ νομαίοισι, things sacred and sanctioned by νόμος. If we stop for a moment to reflect what precisely is meant by νόμαια in this context, we shall have to conclude that a translation such as "customary things" does not provide a satisfactory answer. Surely, not to laugh at a cult-statue or not to enter a forbidden sanctuary and burn its images is more than just a custom. That it is related to custom is clear, at least in the sense that Herodotus is here speaking of *relative* practices, things which are practiced in some parts of the world but not in other parts, things which are binding elsewhere, but are not obligatory practices at home. For Herodotus attributes Cambyses' madness to the very fact that he does not respect that which is respected in a country other than his own. But these νόμαια are not, in themselves, practices: if derision heaped upon a cult-statue of Hephaestus constitutes a breach of νόμος, that νόμος cannot be a practice but must be a belief or an attitude, viz., the attitude of reverence in which the traditional belief of the local population holds that image. In other words, νόμος in this sense includes the "conventional or customary" attitude to and belief in a practice which is accepted by a given population as valid and binding for itself. For no people will suffer strangers to insult that which it regards as valid and binding and to which it feels committed to the exclusion of all contrary practices and the beliefs and attitudes that go with them. Or, as Herodotus puts it: εἰ γὰρ τις προθείη πᾶσι ἀνθρώποισι ἐκλέξασθαι κελεύων νόμους τοὺς καλλίστους ἐκ τῶν πάντων νόμων, διασκεψόμενοι ἂν ἐλοίετο ἕκαστοι τοὺς ἑωυτῶν· οὕτω νομίζουσι πολλὸν τι καλλίστους τοὺς ἑωυτῶν νόμους εἶναι.⁹⁹

It is to substantiate this contention that the story of Darius' experiment is told. The revulsion of the Greeks at the suggestion of eating the bodies of their dead fathers and the horror of the Kallatiai at the thought of burning them demonstrate not so much that different peoples have different customs as that the *attitude* which each people has toward its traditions is so deeply ingrained in it that nothing can cause it to abandon them. Herodotus rounds off this story by quoting the beginning of the poem we have been discussing: καὶ ὀρθῶς μοι δοκεῖ Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι.¹⁰⁰ That Herodotus understood Pindar correctly was recognized essentially by Wilamowitz, when he translated νόμος in frg. 169: "wie es die Menschen gelten lassen,"¹⁰¹ and by Pohlenz' translation "konventionelle Meinung,"¹⁰² although neither scholar distinguished this sense of νόμος with sufficient clarity from its other connotations.

The fact of experience, then, to which Pindar gave expression in this poem is that a basic popular attitude, that is, the common acceptance of a traditional belief as a valid and binding conviction, is king; in

other words, that it has absolute, unchallengeable, and legitimate power, both among men and among the gods. And when such an attitude involves the acceptance of violence, the very fact of its traditional acceptance gives even an act of violence its justification. Pindar cites Heracles as evidence for this contention: he robbed Geryon of his cattle, and he was furtive and violent in stealing the mares of valiant Diomedes. No other Greek author, to the best of my knowledge, ever told the story of Heracles' labors from the standpoint of the hero's victims, to show a less attractive side of what were normally looked upon as glorious exploits; *Nemeans* 1 is in itself sufficient proof that Pindar himself shared the high opinion in which most men held his heroic Theban compatriot. That the violence described in the preserved parts pervaded the entire poem at the expense of the glory conventionally attributed to Heracles is unthinkable. On the contrary, Pindar's purpose must have been to reconcile the glorious renown of the hero with the violent actuality his deeds involved. He did so by invoking νόμος, king of all, mortals and immortals. The traditional attitude of men toward the hero who rid the world of monsters and of the gods toward the son of Zeus who was granted immortality and was given Hebe as his wife¹⁰³ makes just the violence of the acts which he committed. The end of the poem is now lost, but, should it ever be found, it may well contain the reconciliation not only of right and violence, which many modern scholars have recognized in it,¹⁰⁴ but also of Heracles' violence with the glory of his renown.

III

The distinctions which we have tried to establish among the different connotations of νόμος are artificial and unreal in one very important respect. When Pindar — or any other Greek for that matter — used the term in some specific context, he cannot have wanted to stress only one of its many nuances to the exclusion of all others. And if poets are more keenly aware of the many facets of a single word and play with the ambiguity which multiple meanings create, this applies to Pindar, poet of poets, above all others. Each word, each concept, carries its total value within itself at all times, even when a particular aspect of the total value dominates a given context. And yet, the task of scholarship consists not only in demonstrating the artistic use of a complex nexus of different ideas transmitted through a single word. We must also isolate the different strands that make up the concept and draw distinctions between them that are artificial, because they remained only latent in the minds of the ancients; but without drawing them we

would shut ourselves off from an understanding of things which they took for granted. This must be borne in mind, as we shall now try, in conclusion, to determine the place occupied by Pindar's poem in the history of Greek thought.

The central notion inherent in the concept of νόμος is something like the meaning predicated of it for our poem by Wilamowitz¹⁰⁵: it is something generally accepted as valid and therefore as binding. Many things in many spheres of life could be and were accepted as valid and binding νόμοι by the Greeks: in political life, νόμος may designate a law by which a people lives or the way of life which it follows¹⁰⁶; in a different context, it may describe the order which we see in the universe,¹⁰⁷ a customary practice in a society,¹⁰⁸ a ritual practice in religion,¹⁰⁹ or it may, as in Pindar's poem, denote a traditional attitude which is generally accepted as an article of faith. All these connotations and many more lie undifferentiated side by side in the single concept of νόμος.

Still, a development in the Greek attitude to νόμος can be traced through a number of clearly articulated steps. In the first of these stages, which can be dated from the beginning of Greek literature to roughly the middle of the fifth century B.C. and even beyond, the validity of νόμος is absolute and imposes an unchallenged obligation, the recognition notwithstanding that different political or social groups may have different νόμοι. The most signal example of this is probably Heraclitus' derivation of all human νόμοι from the one which is divine¹¹⁰ and the demand based upon this that "a people must fight for its νόμος as for its walls."¹¹¹ We find it in Hesiod's description of the νόμος given by Zeus to beasts and men,¹¹² in the universal νόμος in Aeschylus that bloodshed demands more blood,¹¹³ in the lament of the Furies that their ancient νόμοι are being overthrown,¹¹⁴ and in the appeal of Athena to the Athenians not to adulterate their νόμοι.¹¹⁵ Equally binding are the νόμοι ὑψίποδες in Sophocles, "whose father is Olympus alone,"¹¹⁶ the νόμοι which give a man high stature in his city,¹¹⁷ and of which there are innumerable other examples, among them the νόμοι which, according to Herodotus, prevail among different peoples in all parts of the world.

If we compare this value of νόμος with, for example, the value given it by Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias*, we are struck by a tremendous difference. When Callicles asserts that it is νόμος unjust and base to seek to get more than most people, whereas φύσις proclaims that it is just for the better to get more than the inferior and just for the more powerful to get a greater share than the less powerful,¹¹⁸ he does indeed recognize νόμος as something generally accepted and regarded as binding by

most people. Yet at the same time he undercuts the obligatory nature of νόμος by opposing φύσις to it: νόμοι were made by the majority of people, who are weaklings, for their own self-protection,¹¹⁹ while true justice comes from φύσις, which gives the right to the stronger.¹²⁰ The obligation inherent in νόμος thus becomes binding only for the ignorant multitude, but the enlightened intellectual is no longer bound by it. He must follow the path of truth, and it is φύσις which shows him that path. νόμος is mere custom and convention, which may claim the unquestioning allegiance of the uneducated, but, since it contains less truth than φύσις or none at all, it must be rejected by the philosopher. Herodotus could have Demaratus attribute to νόμος the freedom enjoyed by the Spartans,¹²¹ but now νόμος is no more than a fetter which keeps the ignorant in thrall. Calicles was not alone in subscribing to these views. The speech put into his mouth by Plato makes him merely the most explicit and articulate exponent of what many Greeks believed in the last part of the fifth century B.C. and through most of the fourth. Hippias of Elis called νόμος "a tyrant of mankind," who "often does violence against φύσις";¹²² the Hippocratic author of *De Victu* attributed permanence to god-given φύσις over against the impermanence of man-made νόμος¹²³; and Antiphon looked upon the advantages safeguarded by the νόμοι as "fetters of φύσις," while those afforded by φύσις are "free."¹²⁴

Needless to say, this deprecation of νόμος did not come all at once, but was the result of a gradual change — of which we can see the first traces at an earlier stage — which is first reflected in the literature of the last third of the fifth century. We need not here inquire into the causes which produced this change¹²⁵; its symptoms are uses of νόμος which indicate a challenge to the unquestioning allegiance which it had demanded a few decades before, and which we saw expressed in the works of Heraclitus, Aeschylus, and others. Now we hear, for example, Cleon reproach those clever people who want to appear wiser than the νόμοι and praise the simple folk who mistrust their own insight and are content to be less learned than the νόμοι.¹²⁶ In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, the Unjust Argument boasts of having originated the idea of contradicting the νόμοι, and Pheidippides is proud of his newly won power of superior thinking which enables him to despise the established νόμοι.¹²⁷ In Euripides, one character can complain that bastard children are only νόμῳ but not in fact inferior to legitimate offspring, while another praises a good character as being more reliable than νόμος.¹²⁸ Yet it is noteworthy that, though all these authors also use νόμος in the older sense as something unquestioningly accepted as binding,¹²⁹ none of them opposes φύσις to νόμος as a higher value.¹³⁰

We may therefore regard these authors as representing an intermediate stage between the absolutely obligating νόμος, which flourished prior to the middle of the fifth century, and the relative Sophistic νόμος for which Callicles stands.

This step in the development of νόμος has some forerunners in the early period. Empedocles, for example, knows as a philosopher that it is more correct to speak of "mixture" and "separation" than of "birth" and "death"; yet he accepts the common usage when he speaks as an ordinary citizen: νόμῳ δ' ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.¹³¹ He recognizes that νόμος sanctions the use of "birth" and "death," and therefore he, too, feels bound by it. Similarly, Democritus accepts the way in which people commonly talk of "color," "sweetness," and "bitterness" despite his own insight that only atoms and the void are real.¹³² In medicine, we find the author of the treatise *On the Sacred Disease* asserting that the popular belief (νόμῳ) in the diaphragm as the seat of understanding does not correspond to fact.¹³³ But he, too, seems resigned to leave φρένες as part of the common language. Finally, Herodotus goes along with the general view (νόμῳ) that a certain promontory ends at the Arabian Gulf, though he knows that this is not actually so.¹³⁴ In all these examples, an individual proclaims his own knowledge of the way things really are, a knowledge which distinguishes him from the ignorant; yet this superior knowledge does not lead to a rejection of the popular views. The scientist is also a member of a social group and as such the νόμος of ordinary parlance remains valid and binding for him, too.

We may, then, summarize our findings: roughly four different attitudes can be detected in the Greek view of νόμος. The earliest, which held the field alone until about the middle of the fifth century B.C., does not challenge the absolute validity of νόμος. Toward the middle of the fifth century, a second attitude sets in, which, while adhering to the obligation imposed by νόμος, sees that other values, discovered by science, have a greater reality than does νόμος. A third position, for which our evidence comes mainly from the last third of the fifth century, sets an incipient challenge to νόμος side by side with a regard for its binding nature, and finally leads to the νόμος-φύσις controversy, in which the law of nature, the νόμος τῆς φύσεως, alone claims allegiance and rejects all other νόμοι as mere conventions, mandatory only for the ignorant.

We can now raise the question for the sake of which we have undertaken this digression: which place are we to assign to Pindar's νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς in this development? That his νόμος has nothing to do with the conflict between νόμος and φύσις has already been sug-

gested.¹³⁵ Moreover, the uses of νόμος in all his other poems show that he regarded it as something binding and unchallengeable: νόμος denotes a universal order in *Pythians* 2.43 and in *Nemeans* 1.72; it is almost tantamount to "law and order" at *Pythians* 2.86, and at *Pythians* 1.62 and 10.70-71 it describes the standards which a particular tribe recognizes as true; νόμος signifies the proper performance of a ritual at *Olympians* 8.78, and the normal proper way of doing things at *Nemeans* 3.55 and *Isthmians* 2.38. There is, in other words, no indication that Pindar ever doubted the validity of νόμος, and the very fact that he died before the beginning of the last third of the fifth century, when a challenge to νόμος is first attested, makes it improbable that he would have done so.

Much of Pindar's poetry is hard to date, and to find an exact date or an occasion for our poem is impossible at present. Still, all those who have given any thought to the matter agree that frg. 169 comes late in the Pindaric corpus.¹³⁶ In view of that, it is not surprising if we find him in this poem among those who, like Empedocles and Democritus, accept the validity of νόμος only with resignation and in the knowledge that what it expresses is not altogether satisfactory. Two considerations lead us to believe that this was, in fact, Pindar's view of νόμος here. We have already mentioned the peculiar fact that his is the only treatment of Heracles' encounter with Geryon and Diomedes in which the innocence and valor of the victims highlight the violent and furtive character of the hero. This procedure of turning a myth inside out, as it were, is familiar enough from the plays of Euripides, who makes Jason the villain of the *Medea* and Orestes the cowardly executioner of the senseless plans of a neurotic sister in the *Electra*. But it is most unusual for Pindar. Of course, Pindar's interpretation of the Heracles legend does not go to Euripidean extremes: it is inconceivable that Pindar remained content to draw the picture of a violent Heracles merely to disparage the traditional view. On the contrary, the first three lines of the poem show that some justification of Heracles' violence through νόμος was the point which Pindar wanted to demonstrate, and such a justification is impossible without a return, toward the end of the poem, to the traditional view of the glory and honor which the labors brought Heracles from gods and men. Still, it does not seem far-fetched to see in Pindar's treatment of Heracles in this poem an immediate intellectual forebear of the treatment meted out by Euripides to the heroes of tradition. The difference between the two poets is merely that Pindar remains faithful to the tradition despite its unpleasantness, while Euripides lets contradictions challenge and upset traditional views.

The second consideration which favors the view that Pindar accepts νόμος, but with resignation, is based upon a dithyramb in which he evidently treated Geryon in much the same way in which he treated him in frg. 169. The lines which have come down to us read: σὲ δ' ἐγὼ παρά μιν / αἰνέω μὲν, Γηρυόνα, τὸ δὲ μὴ Δί / φίλτερον σιγῶμι πάμπαν.¹³⁷ This scrap is too short to enable us to guess its context. Metrical considerations make it impossible to regard it as a lost part of the νόμος poem. But there can be no doubt that here, too, Pindar's sympathy was on the side of Heracles' victim. Moreover, if the explanation, added by our source for this fragment, formed part of the poem, as some scholars believe,¹³⁸ the treatment of Geryon bears some striking verbal resemblances to the description of Diomedes in lines 16-17 of the νόμος poem. For after quoting frg. 81, Aelius Aristides continues: οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, φησὶν, ἀρπαζομένων τῶν ὄντων καθῆσθαι παρ' ἐστίᾳ καὶ κακὸν εἶναι;¹³⁹ compare POxy 2450, frg. 1: κρέσσον γὰρ ἀρπαζομένων τεθνάμεν / πρὸ χρημάτων ἢ κακὸν ἔμμεναι. In both poems Pindar disapproves of acts of Heracles. But, while in the dithyramb he can only respond with silence to the knowledge that his own sympathy for the victim brings him in conflict with Zeus' approval, by the time he wrote frg. 169 he had reached the conclusion that the approval of Zeus formed part of a larger picture. He has come to realize that all mortals and immortals share the view which Zeus takes of his son's glory, and this attitude of respect brings with it the justification of the violence perpetrated in the performance of the labors. Pindar has not made a discovery which, like the discoveries of Empedocles and Democritus, makes his acceptance of νόμος a concession to less informed opinion. His discovery has been that the glory of Heracles entailed violence and that this violence clashes with what he knows to be right. But he no longer glosses over the discrepancy in silence. He now sees a solution in νόμος, an unpleasant solution, to be sure, but the only one which he can find to help him out of the dilemma presented by the Heracles story. He makes no attempt to resolve the problem of right and might dialectically, but merely acknowledges its existence as a fact of experience consisting of factors which can be reconciled but not resolved, and he accepts the deeds of Heracles as just, when he sees that νόμος, the traditional attitude which rules as king over mortals and immortals, makes them so.

NOTES

1. Except where specifically stated, I shall base the following discussion on the text given as frg. 169 in B. Snell (ed.), *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis*² (Leipzig 1955). Other recent publications of the text are: A. Puech (ed.), *Pindare* 4 (Paris 1923), frg. 49; C. M. Bowra (ed.), *Pindari Carmina cum*

*Fragmentis*² (Oxford 1947), frg. 152; and A. Turyn (ed.), *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis* (Cambridge, Mass. 1952), frg. 187.

2. Herodotus 3.38.

3. My count is based on Turyn's *apparatus criticus* (above, n.1) 350-352. See also the less full *apparatus* in Th. Bergk (ed.), *Poetae Lyrici Graeci* 1³ (Leipzig 1866) 344-346, and O. Schroeder (ed.), *Pindari Carmina* (=PLG 1⁵) (Leipzig 1900) 457-458.

4. For the most important modern treatments, see the works discussed by M. Gigante, *Nomos Basileus* (Napoli 1956) 79-92, and his own discussion, *ibid.* 72-102. To these should be added: E. Laroche, *Histoire de la racine νειμ- en grec ancien. Études et commentaires* 6 (Paris 1949) 174-175; E. des Places, *Pindare et Platon* (Paris 1949) 171-175; E. R. Dodds, *Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford 1959) 270-272; and F. Alderisio, "Il Nomos di Pindaro nel Gorgias e nei Nomoi di Platone," *Rassegna di scienze filosofiche* 13 (1960) 22-46. The last-mentioned work has not been accessible to me.

5. E. Lobel (ed.), *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*. Part XXVI (London 1961) no. 2450, frg. 1. That the papyrus belongs to the literary fragment 169 of Pindar is guaranteed by its first three lines, which correspond unmistakably to the end of the fragment.

6. It may have formed part of Pindar's two books of *Dithyrambs*, see E. Lobel (above, n.5) 141.

7. The text is Snell's in the Teubner edition of 1955, but I have changed his colometry in two places in the light of antistrophe 1 and strophe 2 of the papyrus. I have divided Snell's lines 1 and 4 to be my lines 1-2 and 5-6. The texts of Bowra (above, n.1) and Turyn (above, n.1), differ from Snell's in that each incorporates Schroeder's emendation (above, n.3, 458) Γαρύονα in line 6 in place of Γηρυόνα, which had itself been emended from the Γηρυόνου of the manuscripts by A. Boeckh (ed.), *Pindari Opera Quae Supersunt* 2. 2 (Leipzig 1821) 642. Moreover, Turyn follows Boeckh also in accepting the variant reading ἤλασεν in place of ἔλασεν in the last line, and he emends line 3 to read: ἄγει δίκαιον τὸ βιαϊότατον. We shall have more to say about this emendation below, n.8. Snell's third edition of Pindar's fragments (Leipzig 1964) appeared after the completion of this article. I am happy to see that the colometry now adopted by Snell is identical with what is suggested here.

8. Plato, *Gorgias* 484 b. It is noteworthy that all the best manuscripts of the *Gorgias*, the Bodleianus, the Venetus, and the two Vindobonenses W and F read βιαίων τὸ δικαιοτάτον in line 3; only a marginal note in the Parisinus (V) has the reading accepted by Snell, Bowra, and most modern editors. Even Wilamowitz, who believed that the *Gorgias* quotation ran βιαίων τὸ δικαιοτάτον (*Platon*² [Berlin 1920] 95-105), admits for Pindar, *ibid.* 95, that "an dem Wortlaute, wie ihn Boeckh wesentlich hergestellt hat, kann kein Zweifel sein." I agree with Dodds (above, n.4) 272, that the corruption in the good manuscripts is no more than a spoonerism. For when Plato paraphrases Pindar in *Laws* 4. 714 e-715 a, using the words ἄγειν δικαιοῦντα τὸ βιαϊότατον, he certainly had in mind what has come to be the modern text; and that this text is Pindar's is also confirmed by a scholion on Pindar's *Nemean* 9.35 a, where the beginning of our poem is quoted down to χεῖρῃ in line 4. Turyn's reason for changing δικαίων to δίκαιον is not very cogent. He argues that the present tense of -δω verbs is very rare in Pindar and Bacchylides; still, this does not exclude its use here, and the interpretation which results ("legem vim maximam pro iusto habere") gives a meaning to ἄγειν for which I cannot find a parallel.

9. Schol. Ael. Arist. Dindorf 3.408. 20-21.
10. *Ibid.* 22-23.
11. A. Boeckh (above, n.7) 640-643.
12. See n.7 above.
13. *Proc. Cambridge Philol. Assn.* No. 188, N.S. 8 (1962) 49-51.
14. P. Maas, *Greek Metre* (Oxford 1962) sec. 40.
15. See R. Kühner and B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* 2. 1³ (Hannover and Leipzig 1898) 496 and 503.
16. E.g., Pindar, *Olympians* 3.10, 8.12; *Pythians* 3.69, 4.203, 11.49; *Nemeans* 10.11 and 73.
17. Pindar, *Pythians* 4.273: ἀλλ' ἐπὶ χώρας αὐτὺς ἔσσαι <sc. πόλιν> δυσπαλὲς δὴ γίνεται.
18. See P. Maas, *Die neuen Responsionsfreiheiten bei Bakchylides und Pindar* 1 (Berlin 1914), Exkurs II.3, 18-20, and B. Snell (above, n.1) 320, both cited by E. Lobel (above n.5) 149.
19. Rumpel, *Lexicon Pindaricum*, cites only one passage for the plural (apart from frg. 169) against four for the singular.
20. Cf. P. Maas (above, n.14) sec. 38, where the reference is erroneously given to *Olympians* 10.9.
21. Lobel's estimate (above, n.5) 149, of about seven spaces before the κ seems to be too conservative; on the basis of the reproduction in natural size of the papyrus, *ibid.* Plate XV B, it appears that as many as nine or even ten letters can be accommodated before κ, especially if some of them include ι or ρ.
22. H. J. Mette in *Glotta* 40 (1962) 42-43. This reading has also been adopted in Snell's third edition of Pindar's fragments (above, n. 7).
23. B. A. van Groningen in *Gnomon* 35 (1963) 129; M. Treu in *Rheinisches Museum N.F.* 106 (1963) 199.
24. A black-figure Attic lekythos, a metope of the Treasury of the Athenians at Delphi, a relief on the Amyclae Throne as described by Pausanias 3.18.7, a metope of the Temple of Zeus at Olympia, and a relief from the vicinity of Sounion are cited by F. Brommer, *Herakles: Die zwölf Taten des Helden in antiker Kunst und Literatur* (Münster/Köln 1953) 34.
25. M. Treu (above, n.23) 204-205.
26. D. L. Page (above, n.13) with note on p. 51.
27. See Pindar, *Nemeans* 5.19: εἰ δ' ὄλβον ἢ χειρῶν βίαν ἢ σιδαρίταν ἐπαινῆσαι πόλεμον δεδόκηται. Cf. also Bacchylides (Snell?) 11.91.
28. Euripides, *Heracles* 360.
29. That the children are older than they are in Euripides and that their number is eight rather than three does not affect our argument.
30. M. Treu (above, n.23) 203 seems to take ἐκ λεχέων as a reference to Diomedes leaving his bed, ready to give battle, after the slaughter of the attendant. But Pindar, in seven out of eight cases cited by Rumpel, follows the more usual Greek employment of this term for "marriage bed," see *L.-S.-J.* s.v. λέχος.
31. See, e.g., *Iliad* 19.114-133; schol. *Iliad* 19.108; Diodorus 4.9.5; Servius on Vergil, *Georgics* 3.4.
32. For a different view, see M. Treu (above, n.23) 195 and 208.
33. The earliest mention of this story was evidently in the *Cypria*, see Proclus, *Chrestomathy* 1 (Loeb ed., p. 492), where the μανία Ἡρακλέους is one of the stories told Menelaus by Nestor. See also Euripides, *Heracles* 831-832,

855, 859, 1127, and 1392-1393; schol. on Pindar, *Isthmians* 3/4.81-82; Apollodorus 2.4.12; Diodorus 4.11.1.

34. Hesiod, *Theogony* 313-318; schol. on Plato, *Phaedrus* 89 c (= Herodorus, frg. 23 and Hellanicus, frg. 103 in *FGrH*. 1); Eratosthenes, *Catasterismi* 11 (Robert); and Hyginus, *Astronomica* 2.23.

35. Schol. on Plato, *Phaedrus* 89 c.

36. Iolaus' assistance is more frequently attested for this labor than for any other; see Hesiod, *Theogony* 317; Euripides, *Ion* 190-200; Apollodorus 2.5.2; Diodorus 4.11.6; and Quintus Smyrnaeus 6.215-219. In art, representations of Iolaus' presence begin as early as the eighth century B.C. on two bronze fibulae. The most famous are from a pediment found among the "Perserschutt" on the Athenian Acropolis and from one of the metopes of the Hephaisteion in Athens. For a fuller discussion, see F. Brommer (above, n.24) 12-17.

37. Apollodorus 2.5.2 and 11. The additional tasks for this and for cleaning the Augean Stables for pay were the procurement of the apples of the Hesperides and the descent to Hades to fetch Cerberus.

38. Pindar, *Pythians* 9.79-82 with scholion; *Nemeans* 4.19-20 with scholion; Pausanias 1.41.1.

39. Pindar, *Pythians* 9.79-82; cf. also the statement of the scholiast on *Nemeans* 4.20 that the gymnasium of Iolaus was situated near the tomb of Amphitryon.

40. Against M. Treu (above, n.23) 208-209 and 210.

41. Apollodorus 2.4.11.

42. Pausanias 1.41.1.

43. See, e.g., *Iliad* 16.387-388; Hesiod, *Works and Days* 275; and Solon, frg. 24.16 (Diehl³), where the opposition is implied.

44. For Thucydides' use of *τεκμήριον* and related concepts, see A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 1 (Oxford 1945) 92 and 135.

45. Cf. the active use of the verb at *Olympians* 6.73 and *Nemeans* 6.8, and the middle at *Olympians* 8.3.

46. Pace van Groningen (above, n.23); see above, p. 113.

47. Pindar, *Nemeans* 5.16; 7.42; 10.70; *Olympians* 10.71. In Homer, the verb is regularly used of stolen cattle or horses, see *L.-S.-J.* s.v. *ἐλαύνω* 1.2.

48. Hesiod, *Theogony* 287-294, 981-983; Stesichorus, *Geryonis* in J. Vürtheim, *Stesichoros' Fragmente und Biographie* (Leiden 1919) 13-21; Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 870; Euripides, *Heracles* 422-423; Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 1082; Apollodorus 2.5.10. For pictorial representations, see F. Brommer (above, n.24) 39-42 and 90-92.

49. Euripides, *Alcestis* 481-498; *Heracles* 380-388; Apollodorus 2.5.8; Diodorus 4.15.3-4.

50. E. Lobel (above, n.5) 149-150. I translate: "Not as a matter of insolence, but for the sake of valor. For not to give up one's own is the mark of a courageous . . . but not of an insolent man. But Heracles acted unjustly in taking away."

51. Theognis 153 (Diehl³); Solon, frg. 5.9 (Diehl³), cf. also *ibid.* 3.34.

52. Pindar, *Olympians* 13.10; oracle in Herodotus 8.77; cf. also ὕβρι κεκορημένος *ibid.* 3.80.4.

53. See, e.g., Pindar, *Olympians* 2.95-96: ἀλλ' αἶνον ἐπέβα κόρος / οὐ δίκᾳ συναντόμενος. Cf. also *Nemeans* 1.65; *Isthmians* 3/4.2.

54. One minor gain is that the papyrus has given the *coup de grâce* to the long-discredited view of F. Duemmler, *Kleine Schriften* 1 (Leipzig 1901) 191, that

the poem described Geryon rather than Heracles as the guilty perpetrator of βιαιότατον, because he had himself not bought the cattle, the theft of which made Heracles restore justice. For a similar view in antiquity, see Olympiodorus' comments on Plato, *Gorgias* 484b in W. Norvin (ed.), *Olympiodori Philosophi in Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria* (Leipzig 1936) 129.

55. See Pindar, *Nemeans* 1.62–69.

56. Cf., for example, Teiresias' prophecy of Heracles' marriage to Hebe at the end of *Nemeans* 1.

57. That it is the problem of justifying violent robbery that stands at the root of the poem has long been seen; cf. O. Schroeder in *Philologus* 74 (1917) 201; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon*² (Berlin 1920) 95–96; see also Pindaros (Berlin 1922) 462; H. E. Stier in *Philologus* 83 (1928) 227; A. Menzel, *Hellenika* (Baden bei Wien 1938), 114, 115–116; W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*² (Stuttgart 1942) 160; M. Untersteiner, *The Sophists* tr. by K. Freeman (New York 1954) 297, n.30. M. Treu (above, n.23) 211–214, argues that the theme of the poem is the opposition between νόμος, "claiming as its right" (δικαιῶν) violence, and the assertion of ἀρετή in Diomedes' resistance to Heracles (line 15). This interpretation obscures rather than clarifies the meaning of νόμος in this context, and it is hard to see how the words πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων permit a limiting sense of δικαιοῦω, on which Treu insists.

58. See especially Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.40–46, and in particular 42: πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἐγράψε. The orators use the term almost invariably in this sense.

59. So, for example, the νόμος of all heralds to exaggerate their reports in Euripides, *Heraclidae* 292.

60. E.g., the νόμοι for playing draughts in Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazousae* 987–988.

61. E.g., Theognis 53–54. — Here and in the following I leave out of consideration the musical sense of νόμος as well as the geographical νομός.

62. To cite but one example of the contradictions in which mere translation can get involved: E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums* 3² (Stuttgart 1912) 453 writes: "Sie <sc. die angeborene Art des tüchtigen Mannes> darf ihre Überlegenheit frei zur Geltung bringen, ja sich, wie das Beispiel des Herakles und seines Rinderraubes lehrt, unter dem Schutze der Götter mit der Selbstherrlichkeit des freien Recken selbst über die conventionellen Sittengebote hinwegsetzen: 'denn Sitte (νόμος), der König aller, der Sterblichen wie der Unsterblichen, erhebt mit beherrschender Hand das Gewaltthätigste zum Recht' (fr. 169)." Obviously, the "conventionellen Sittengebote" cannot be identical with the "Sitte." Cognate words are used here in a way which obscures their relation with one another and thus fails to explain in which of the nineteen senses listed s.v. "Sitte" in Grimm's *Deutsches Wörterbuch* 10.1 (Leipzig 1905) cols. 1238–1248 we are to understand Heracles' deeds.

63. The earliest use of νόμος in this sense is perhaps in an inscription from Halicarnassus in M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* 1² (Oxford 1946) no. 25, lines 33 and 35, dated between 460 and 455 B.C.

64. Pindar, *Nemeans* 6.1–2.

65. This point is made by A. Menzel (above, n.57) 116.

66. For the most important passages, see W. C. Greene, *Moirā: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, Mass. 1944) 15–16. Cf. also Aeschylus, *Prometheus* 515–518.

67. A. Boeckh (above, n.7) 642; W. Nestle (above, n.57) 164; E. Laroche (above, n.4) 174–175; E. R. Dodds (above, n.4) 270.

68. H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurt 1935) 49-50; M. Untersteiner (above, n.57) 297, n.30; M. Gigante (above, n.4), 75, 91, and 92; and E. R. Dodds (above, n.4) 270.

69. Orphic influences were first posited by W. Nestle in *Philologus* 70 (1911) 251; cf. also the same author's *Vom Mythos zum Logos*² 164. This was accepted by O. Schroeder in *Philologus* 74 (1917) 202 and, with strong reservations, by V. Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* (Leipzig 1921) 120, less reserved in "Anfänge des griechischen Naturrechts," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 35 (1923) 123. F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel 1945) 68-70, has the first full-fledged argument in favor of Orphism, and M. Gigante (above, n.4) 75, adds Pythagoreanism to it.

70. See F. Heinimann (above, n.69) 68-70.

71. For the date see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* 2³ (Darmstadt 1959) 505-509, most recently accepted by G. Quandt (ed.), *Orphei Hymni*² (Berlin 1955) 44*.

72. E. Thummer, *Die Religiosität Pindars* [= *Commentationes Aenipontanae* 13] (Innsbruck 1957) 118-119, identifies the two and defines νόμος as "die von Zeus gewollte Rechtsordnung, wonach jeder Mensch so viel an Glück, Erfolg, Besitz haben darf, als er auf Grund seiner mehr oder weniger göttlichen Natur vertragen kann, jene Ordnung, in der sich das Mass des Rechtes nach dem Mass der Areta, der mitgeborenen göttlichen Kraft, richtet." The ἀρετή of Diomedes in the new fragment makes this position now untenable.

73. Heraclitus, frg. 114 (DK⁶): "for all human laws are nourished by the one divine."

74. O. Schroeder in *Philologus* 74 (1917) 196. Cf. also A. Menzel, *Hellenika* 110.

75. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 276-280: τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων / ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηροῖ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς / ἐσθέμεν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοῖς. / ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἥ πολλὸν ἀρίστη / γίγνεται.

76. Heraclitus, frg. 114 (DK⁶), as cited above, n.73.

77. The source is divine in *Pythians* 2.43, where he calls the Centaur, offspring of Ixion and the cloud, γόνον ὑπερφίαλον / . . . οὗτ' ἐν ἀνδράσι γερασφόρον οὗτ' ἐν θεῶν νόμοις, and a divine origin is perhaps implied in the σεμνὸς νόμος of *Nemean* 1.72; but it is not in *Pythians* 1.62, where Hiero's foundation of Aetna is said to have taken place Ὑλλίδος στάθμας . . . ἐν νόμοις, and in *Pythians* 10.70: ὕψου φέροντι νόμον Θεσσαλῶν / αὔξοντες, although it is probably better to follow E. Kapp in accentuating νομόν and take the word in a geographical sense.

78. E.g., W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*² 160; E. Laroche (above, n.4) 174-175.

79. E.g., O. Schroeder in *Philologus* 74 (1917) 200 and 202; H. Gundert (above, n.68) 50; F. Heinimann (above, n.69) 70; cf. also E. Thummer (above, n.72) 118-119.

80. E.g., H. E. Stier (above, n.57) 238; M. Untersteiner (above, n.57) 297, n.30; H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (New York 1951) 608 (=2nd ed. [München 1962] 545-546). Similarly, M. Treu (above, n.23) 212, calls it "eine überpersönliche, sogar über Götter und Menschen gesetzte, wenn auch in Götterbefehlen sich äussernde Ordnungsmacht."

81. I do not understand on what basis Gigante (above, n.4), 91, can make Heracles "il demiurgo di questo νόμος". To call it with U. Galli, *Platone e il νόμος* (Turin 1937) 94, "un ordinamento morale superiore" is patently absurd.

82. Plato, *Gorgias* 483 e.
83. Plato, *Laws* 3.690 bc, 4.714 e-715 a; cf. also 10.890 a, where Pindar's name is, however, not mentioned.
84. Aelius Aristides 45.52 (Dindorf 2.68-70): Libanius, *Declamationes* 1 (*Apologia Socratis*) 87; Hesychius s.v. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς.
85. A. Boeckh (above, n.7) 640: "*lex summae naturae a fato constituta, cui et dii et homines parent*", and 642: "*Fatalis lex, inquit, etiam vim maximam affert eamque iustam efficit, quum humana ratione sit iniusta: quia quod summa lex imperavit, etsi iniustum nobis esse videatur, iustum sit necesse est.*"
86. E. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte* 2 (Halle a.S. 1899) 253, n.2; and *Geschichte des Alterthums* 3².453.
87. W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos*² 160.
88. M. Gigante (above, n.4) 75.
89. E. R. Dodds (above, n.4) 270. Cf. also F. Duemmler (above, n.54) 191; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon* 2².96; V. Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* 119; and H. E. Stier (above, n. 57) 238.
90. Pindar, *Nemeans* 9.15: "a stronger man puts an end to the justice which prevailed before he came."
91. See line 12 of our poem and Apollodorus 2.5.8.
92. Herodotus 1.196.1-4.
93. *Ibid.* 1.35.1.
94. A. Croiset, *La poésie de Pindare*³ (Paris 1895) 233 translates "coutume," and is followed in this by A. Puech (above, n.1) 218. See also G. Perrotta, *Saffo e Pindaro* (Bari 1935) 109; G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945) 58; and K. Latte in *Antike und Abendland* 2 (1946) 73.
95. E. R. Dodds (above, n.4) 270.
96. V. Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* 120.
97. A. Croiset, *op. cit.* (above, n.94), 234; A. Menzel, *Hellenika* 117.
98. Herodotus 3.37.
99. *Ibid.* 3.38.1: "For if one were to set before all men beliefs and practices, bidding them to choose the fairest of all the beliefs and practices, each people would upon examination choose their own, so strong is the belief of each that their own beliefs and practices are the fairest by far."
100. *Ibid.* 38.4: "And I think Pindar is right when he says in his poem that belief and attitude is king of all."
101. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon* 2².96; cf. also *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen in Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, ed. P. Hinneberg (Berlin and Leipzig 1910) 59, where he speaks of νόμος as residing "in dem Rechtsbewusstsein des Volkes"; and *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 462.
102. M. Pohlenz in *Philologus* 97 (1948) 139.
103. See Pindar, *Nemeans* 1.69-72.
104. O. Schroeder in *Philologus* 74 (1917) 201; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Platon* 2².95; H. E. Stier (above, n.57) 227; A. Menzel (above, n.57) 114, 115-116; M. Untersteiner (above, n.57) 297, n.30.
105. See above, n.101.
106. See above, nn.58 and 63.
107. See above, nn.75-77.
108. See above, n.92.
109. See above, n.93.
110. Heraclitus, frg. 114 (DK⁶).
111. *Ibid.* frg. 44.

112. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 276-280; cf. n.75 above.
113. Aeschylus, *Choephoroe* 400.
114. Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 778 (=808).
115. *Ibid.* 693.
116. Sophocles, *Oedipus the King* 866-869.
117. Sophocles, *Antigone* 369-371.
118. Plato, *Gorgias* 483 cd.
119. *Ibid.* 483 bc.
120. *Ibid.* 483 d-484 c.
121. Herodotus 7.104.4-5.
122. Plato, *Protagoras* 337 d.
123. [Hippocrates], *De Victu* 1.11.
124. Antiphon, frg. 44 A 4.1-8 (DK⁶).
125. F. Heinimann (above, n.69) 110-120, believes Archelaus to have been the first to undermine the obligating character of νόμος; cf. also M. Pohlenz in *Hermes* 81 (1953) 431-433.
126. Thucydides 3.37.4.
127. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1039-1040, 1400.
128. Euripides, frgg. 141 and 597 (Nauck²).
129. To take some random examples: Thucydides 1.24.2, 2.34.1, 4.118.1 and 3, 6.54.6, 8.76.6, etc.; Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1185-1186, *Birds* 1656, *Ecclesiazousae* 944-945, 1022, *Thesmophoriazousae* 947, etc.; Euripides, *Heracleidae* 1009-1011, *Orestes* 486-487, 492-495, *Bacchae* 331, etc.
130. The only exception is Euripides, frg. 920 (Nauck²): ἡ φύσις ἐβούλεθ', ἡ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει. In *Ion* 643-644, however, νόμος and φύσις complement one another. There is a contrast between νόμος and φύσις also in Thucydides 3.84.2, but that chapter is generally conceded to be spurious; see A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (Oxford 1956) 382-383.
131. Empedocles, frg. 9 (DK⁶).
132. Democritus, frgg. 9 and 125 (DK⁶).
133. [Hippocrates], *De Morbo Sacro* 20. That τῇ φύσει entered the manuscript tradition late was first seen by Wilamowitz; cf. the discussion by F. Heinimann (above, n.69) 86, n.71.
134. Herodotus 4.39.1.
135. See above, p. 122.
136. O. Schroeder in *Philologus* 74 (1917) 200; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros* 462; W. Theiler, *Die zwei Zeitstufen in Pindars Stil und Vers* (Halle a.S. 1941) 9. Only M. Treu (above, n.23) 214, regards it as early.
137. Pindar, *Dithyrambs* 2, frg. 81 (Snell³): "I praise you, Geryon, more highly than him (sc. Heracles), but I had rather keep complete silence about something not dear to Zeus." — The fragment probably belongs to the Cerberus Dithyramb, see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros* 344.
138. A. Boeckh (above, n.7) 583; Th. Bergk (above, n.3) 306.
139. Aelius Aristides 45.53 (Dindorf 2.70): "For it is not seemly, he says, to sit down by the hearth and be a coward while one's substance is being robbed."

THE SINCERITY OF AUGUSTUS

BY MASON HAMMOND

WHETHER or not Augustus was sincere is a question to which anyone concerned with the Augustan achievement must formulate an answer.¹ His personality constituted the most important impetus and determinant in all aspects of his age: political, social, moral, religious, literary, and artistic. Why this should have been so; whether because of some mystique in himself, or because he satisfied the world-wide longing for peace, prosperity, and unity, or, as the Church has maintained, because he prepared the setting for the Gospel of Peace, it is not the purpose here to enquire. The thesis is here more limited: to seek to contradict the general picture of Augustus as a hypocrite who deliberately concealed monarchy under the guise of a Restored Republic, as a politician who cynically reestablished traditional religious, social, and moral standards while behaving himself as a free-thinker and a libertine, and as a propagandist who astutely patronized arts and letters to glorify his achievements and extol his superhuman personality. Against this view, it will be proposed that a personality which so profoundly influenced its own times and the future for the good must itself have been sincere. Such an argument is ultimately a statement of faith, not a demonstration of reason.

Indeed, historical, literary, and artistic criticism become, in their wider, more basic, terms, arts, not sciences. Scholarship may claim to scientific objectivity in the accumulation and evaluation of detailed evidence bearing on a limited problem, though even then, judgments must often be formed on the basis of an intuitive appreciation rather than through a calculated proof. Even more, in larger questions of interpretation, judgment and understanding play as large a part — if not larger — than does knowledge. This is especially true in classical fields, where the surviving evidence is never complete and must be drawn from a variety of disciplines, and where the gaps in knowledge must constantly be bridged by informed hypothesis. The classicist should not shrink from attacking larger problems because science must be supplemented by art. Nor should he hold back because, although in detailed scholarship further research tends to enlarge rather than

contradict, the interpretative generalizations of one age tend to be displaced by those of the next — though even so, the displacement is more often an absorption and restatement than a complete negation. Moreover, the classicist should be willing to attack the larger problems on all fronts; that is, he should not compartmentalize them as historical, literary, archaeological, etc., but should seek a solution which may be applied broadly.

The sincerity of Augustus presents such a general problem, involved in every aspect of the Augustan age. Tacitus, writing a century or more after the death of Augustus, summarized in a well-known passage at the opening of his *Annals* the favorable and unfavorable opinions which circulated about the recently deceased *princeps*.² He gives first the favorable interpretation of Augustus' career and achievement, and then skillfully sets against this the opinion that Augustus' various actions were hypocritical, selfish, and cruel. The contrast is so effectively drawn that the unfavorable view remains uppermost in the reader's mind. The other two major historical sources for Augustus agree with this unfavorable interpretation of his sincerity. Suetonius, who wrote at the same time as Tacitus but apparently independently of him, does not, indeed, impose on his material so consistent an adaptation to a preconceived characterization. His arrangement of his material by topics, and by balancing good against bad, means that he has preserved much that supports a more generous view of the character of Augustus, particularly in his private life and personal relations. Nevertheless Suetonius, like Tacitus, seems to have regarded Augustus' political arrangements as basically monarchical and his claim to have restored the Republic as insincere.³

The third major historian, Dio Cassius, wrote about a century later than Tacitus and Suetonius, under the Severi. He wrote in Greek and it is questionable whether he drew directly on the two earlier Latin writers. He states even more explicitly than did they that Augustus founded a monarchy, particularly at the opening of his fifty-second book, where he says that: "after this (i.e. after the end of the Republic), the Romans reverted to monarchy, although Caesar planned to lay down his arms and to entrust the management of the state to the Senate and the People."⁴ There is no reason to take the second part of this statement seriously; perhaps it reflects Augustus' own claim to have restored the Republic but primarily it serves to introduce the famous debate which Dio places in the mouths of Agrippa and Maecenas on the best form for the government which Augustus was about to establish. Agrippa urges Augustus to resign his powers, avoid monarchy, and reestablish

the traditional government by the Senate and Roman People. Maecenas, on the contrary, points out that considerations both of personal security and of public responsibility required that Augustus continue to control the state. He then gives very full and precise advice on how the government and administration should be organized. It is immaterial whether Dio meant this famous speech of Maecenas to represent what he believed Augustus to have intended or whether he used it as a vehicle to advise Severus Alexander on how to rule.⁵ Dio makes clear his own opinion that Augustus, by adopting the advice of Maecenas, established a monarchy under the thin disguise of a restored Republic and that this monarchy had during the succeeding two centuries become increasingly overt.⁶

The view common to Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio that Augustus, at least in his political program, was insincere shows that this unfavorable interpretation was already established in the sources on which they, probably independently, drew.⁷ These sources undoubtedly reflected senatorial opinion, which was throughout the first century critical of, when not actively opposed to, the principate. Initially the noble families of republican antecedents were jealous of the Julio-Claudian emperors because they had themselves lost their monopoly of privilege and power. Later, when these older senatorial families had been replaced by newer ones, more and more of Italian or provincial origin and promoted through imperial favor, there developed an acceptance of the principate as such, but only if presented in Stoic terms as the rule of the best in collaboration with all good men. Opposition to the autocracy of a Domitian was therefore to be expected, and even Vespasian seems to have aroused criticism by his overt recognition of heredity, rather than character, as the basis of succession.⁸ Thus, throughout the first century, historians who reflected the sentiments of the upper classes must have presented Augustus as one whose achievements and reputation were great but whose personality was insincere and they must, like Tacitus and Dio, have regarded this insincerity as responsible for the development of the Augustan principate into a monarchy or, at times, a tyranny.

Against so unfavorable an interpretation of the personality of Augustus should be set the admiration and respect for him expressed by writers of his own time. His record of his achievements, the *Res Gestae*, in which he claims to have given the state back into the control of the Senate and Roman People and to have excelled his colleagues in the magistracies not in power, *potestas*, but only in influence, *auctoritas*, is naturally to be discounted as understandable propaganda, significant not only for what it says but for how it says it, and for what

it passes over in silence.⁹ Livy's account of the triumvirate and of the early principate of Augustus has been lost. But the preserved anecdotes about his friendship with Augustus, who did not object to the historian's Pompeian sentiments, suggest that Livy came to take a more optimistic view of his own times than he did in his preface, and that he did not regard Augustus as an insincere monarch posing as a reviver of those Republican traditions which Livy himself so extolled in his history.¹⁰

Several remarks in Seneca the Elder's *Controuersiae* suggest that, towards the end of his reign, Augustus was less tolerant of differences of opinion and criticism than he had been with respect to his friend Livy or to Asinius Pollio, who preserved a wholly independent position and attitude.¹¹ Seneca particularly inveighs against censorship by the actual burning of books in the preface to book X, when he is discussing a certain orator named Titus Labienus, whose life was corrupt, and whose speeches and writings were full not only of "Pompeian" sentiments but of bitter attacks on others.¹² Labienus' works were burned by order of the Senate and he himself committed suicide. Seneca's account suggests, however, that Labienus' books suffered more because of their immoral and vituperative content than because of his political opinions.¹³ Moreover, though Labienus' death is generally put in A.D. 12 on the basis of a general statement by Dio under that year that Augustus permitted the burning of books, Suetonius links the destruction of his books with that of those of Cremutius Cordus and Cassius Severus, the latter of whom certainly, and the former possibly, suffered censorship under Tiberius.¹⁴ Such censorship seems in any case to have been due to senatorial rather than imperial action, and even if Augustus did permit or even encourage it, allowance must be made for the tendency of an older man, long in power and short in health and temper, to react more sharply against criticism than he did when younger.¹⁵ The one sure case of direct action by Augustus himself is the relegation of Ovid in A.D. 8 and that, as will appear later, was only partly due to Ovid's writings, which, in any case, suffered little if at all.¹⁶

Velleius Paterculus wrote a brief summary of Roman history about A.D. 30. He was a military officer who turned, as Ammianus Marcellinus was to do three centuries later, to the writing of history in his retirement. Hence he may be condemned for superficiality and particularly for an unduly laudatory attitude toward his former commanders, Augustus and particularly Tiberius. His view of Augustus is one of admiration for a great man; indeed his tone toward both Augustus and Tiberius approximates that of subject towards ruler.¹⁷ Nevertheless, he says

that the only constitutional change which Augustus introduced into the republican government was to raise the number of praetors from eight to ten.¹⁸ Thus he did not regard Augustus as one who hypocritically concealed monarchy under a republican disguise.

More persuasive is the general respect for and admiration of Augustus evinced by the literary figures of the period. The critics of his sincerity regard this tone as a fawning return for patronage.¹⁹ Sir Ronald Syme, with his penchant for Tacitean epigram, remarks in his *Roman Revolution* of Horace's ode on the victory of Actium: "*Nunc est bibendum* sang the poet Horace, safe and subsidized in Rome."²⁰ More seriously, Syme entitles his thirtieth chapter "The Organization of Public Opinion" and in it describes Maecenas as the agent through whose patronage of poets Augustus presented his propaganda to the public.²¹ He comments: "Virgil, Horace and Livy are the enduring glories of the Principate; and all three were on terms of personal friendship with Augustus . . . If Livy, Horace and Virgil had private and material reasons for gratitude to Augustus, that fact may have reinforced, but it did not pervert, the sentiments natural to members of the pacific and non-political order in society."²² In this statement, Syme interprets their admiration for Augustus both as simple gratitude for patronage and as sincere praise for his restoration of peace by writers not concerned with the loss of political liberty. Others regard the exaltation of Augustus by Horace and Vergil, and particularly their frequent identification of him with some god, as the perpetuation of literary flattery which had developed in the Hellenistic courts.²³ However, it seems hardly credible that an author of the independence of mind which characterizes the poetry of Horace, or one who felt as deeply and intensely as did Vergil, could write about Augustus in such laudatory terms merely in return for patronage or for courtly flattery. Their terminology may be exaggerated to modern ears, and it is certainly difficult to determine how far they really regarded Augustus as superhuman, either in a religious or in a philosophic sense. But the feeling behind the expression is deep and honest, and must have been called forth by a personality itself not only attractive, skillful, and beneficent, but sincere.²⁴

It is harder to go behind a work of art to determine the feeling of the artist. However, the sculptures of the *Ara Pacis* give the impression of having been conceived in the same spirit as were the tributes of Horace and Vergil. The great past and the peaceful and prosperous present of Rome afford the themes of the four symbolic panels at either end; on either side, processions of the Senate and Magistrates and of the Augustan household move toward an act of sacrifice performed by

Augustus not as king or dictator but as a leading Roman citizen.²⁵ Likewise the finest of the portrait busts and statues of Augustus reflect the impression made on the artists by his personality and sincerity. Even though the best known, that from Prima Porta, shows him in the pose of a Hellenistic monarch, the representation is that of a Roman *princeps*.²⁶ In short, the high literary and artistic achievement of the period, centered as it is upon Augustus, expresses a strong conviction not only of his greatness but of his sincerity.

In one respect, the literary and artistic picture of Augustus may, indeed, be accused of exaggeration, if not of deliberate misrepresentation. A major theme therein is that Augustus was *par excellence* the Roman *dux* and *imperator*, continuing and fulfilling the republican traditions of military conquest and empire-building.²⁷ In the *Res Gestae*, Augustus himself boasts of his successful wars, of the additions which he made to the empire, and of the numbers of soldiers who served under his command. Yet, although charges that at Mutina, at Philippi, and at Naulochus he played the coward may well echo Antony's hostile propaganda, there is no reason to regard Augustus as an outstanding general either in the purely military sense of tactician and strategist, or as a magnetic leader of men who, as had Caesar, inspired intense devotion in his troops.²⁸ Even when he was himself present on campaigns, it may be surmised that the actual conduct of military operations was left to his subordinates. He did, to be sure, emerge victorious from the wars of the triumviral period and to that extent won the support of able generals and loyal troops. He also as *princeps* carried forward the military campaigns necessary to round out the frontiers to what he regarded as their most defensible lines. But, as Justin says, he won his greatest triumphs by diplomacy, notably in obtaining from the Parthians first the return of the legionary standards lost by Crassus and Antony and then the giving of hostages.²⁹ Moreover, the summary of the state of the empire left by Augustus at his death and read by Tiberius in the senate ended with the advice that the empire be kept within the boundaries which he had established.³⁰ Although Tacitus comments sarcastically *incertum metu an per inuidiam*, Augustus clearly felt that further expansion of the empire would overstrain its resources in men, money, and supplies; witness his distress at Varus' loss of three legions in A.D. 9.³¹ He surely realized that the continuance of powerful offensive commands might revive the rivalries and revolts which had proved the undoing of the Republic. It would be safer, less expensive, and less of a burden on the civilian population if the armies were posted along a defensive frontier and kept strictly

under his own control. Each must judge for himself how far this contrast between his real avoidance of grandiose military undertakings and his portrayal as a great general show a fundamental insincerity or merely a realization that the popular imagination expected a leading Roman citizen to be outstanding in war as well as in peace, *togae armisque*. This much may be said, that though Tacitus regarded Augustus' defensive policy as an abandonment of the glorious traditions of republican warfare and admired Trajan for resuming a policy of conquest, modern historians on the whole respect Augustus for his appreciation of the limits of empire and condemn Trajan for overstraining the resources of the Mediterranean world on campaigns which may at the end of his life have been inspired by a megalomaniac desire for personal glory.³²

Even those who most severely criticize Augustus for political hypocrisy usually accept as sincere his attempt to restore traditional social and moral values.³³ They note with pleasure that much that is reported of his personal behavior is in conflict with his official attitude.³⁴ Early in his career he took Livia from her previous husband with an arbitrary haste which shocked even the lax opinion of the late forties B.C.³⁵ Suetonius reports other stories of his moral laxity, though much of what he says may be discounted as either hostile propaganda or mere gossip.³⁶ More serious is the difficulty of reconciling Octavian's cold-blooded rise to power with Augustus' later generous tolerance of opposition and even of treason.³⁷ Something must be allowed, as the favorable comment in Tacitus proposes, for the difference between the young man on the make, surrounded by powerful and treacherous rivals, and the mature man, secure in control and free from fear. It does seem that whatever be the truth about his early career, Augustus was sincere in his later social policy and his public behavior. His attempt by example and legislation to revive the old Roman standards of morality, both in politics and in personal relations, particularly marriage, suggests that he fully agreed with the sentiments of Ennius: *moribus antiquis res stat Romana uirisque*.³⁸ Convincing evidence of his sincerity is the unrelenting bitterness which he displayed towards his adulterous daughter and granddaughter and towards Ovid, whom he regarded as the spokesman of the cult of *la dolce vita*.³⁹ Their behavior clearly touched him at a very sensitive point; he must have felt that those on whom he counted to support his program had "let him down badly."

Augustus evinced a similar conviction in his efforts to purify and consolidate the social structure of the "Restored Republic." Sir Ronald Syme, an acute and learned scholar in the prosopography of the early

empire, calls attention to the number of new men, chiefly supporters of Augustus, who appear in the senate during his principate. But even Syme, in his thirty-second chapter entitled "The Doom of the *Nobiles*," admits that Augustus gave more recognition and prestige than their talents often justified to representatives of the noble families of the later republic. Augustus also secured the withdrawal from the senate of those unfit to belong, either because they had been improperly introduced by Caesar or during the Triumvirate, or because they lacked the requisite moral character or financial means.⁴⁰ It is generally true of aristocracies that they fail to perpetuate themselves, particularly when they enjoy privilege and affluence, and the vanishing of older senatorial families, whether those of republican antecedents under Augustus or later those of triumviral and Augustan creation, necessitated the constant admission to the senatorial class of families of equestrian status (and this status itself often recent) and of ever wider geographic origins.⁴¹ Augustus similarly sought to revive the equestrian order and to incorporate at least some members in the financial services of the state. By elaborate legislation he sought to regulate marriage, inheritance, and the family, and to keep citizenship from being too readily extended to freedmen or provincials.⁴²

It may of course be argued that this emphasis on the prestige of the senate and of Roman citizens generally merely reflects Augustus' realization of how disastrous to Caesar had been his attempt to flout the former; and how much his own success in the campaign of Actium had depended on his appeal to Italian patriotism against the Hellenistic monarchy of Antony and Cleopatra.⁴³ Amid its many failures, the last century of the Republic may claim at least one significant achievement. In 90 and 89 B.C. the Italians had by revolt extorted from Rome the extension of citizenship to all the peninsula south of the Po, and Caesar had carried it to the Alps.⁴⁴ The result, as so often happens when outsiders secure admission to envied status, was that the prestige of Roman citizenship and the sense of Roman patriotism were not diluted but intensified. The Italians justly felt that the success of Rome for nearly two centuries had been half, or more, the result of their co-operation and that they had finally secured the recognition which they deserved and their fair share in the power and wealth of Rome and in the privileges of her citizenship. They were in consequence if anything more patriotic than the older Roman stock and were fully prepared to support Augustus in defending the preëminence of Rome against any such effort to internationalize the empire as that represented by Antony and Cleopatra. But Augustus himself seems to have shared

in this sense of Romano-Italic patriotism sincerely, not simply because of political expediency or gratitude. He would surely have echoed — if indeed he did not inspire — the familiar lines of Vergil:

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
— hae tibi erunt artes — pacique imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.⁴⁵

The question of the political sincerity of Augustus in his claim to have “restored the Republic” with the addition of a *princeps* has been postponed to this point in the perhaps Tacitean hope that a bias in favor of his general sincerity would be created by the discussion of his cultural and social policies. It is, of course, in respect to the principate that he has been most generally accused of hypocrisy. To cite only two opinions, both from English historiography, Gibbon, writing under the influence of the liberal, anti-monarchical spirit of the late eighteenth century, remarked that Augustus’ “tender respect for a free constitution which he had destroyed can only be explained by an attentive consideration of the character of that subtle tyrant.”⁴⁶ And Sir Ronald Syme, one of the severest critics of the sincerity of Augustus, concludes his *Roman Revolution* with this sentence: “For power Augustus had sacrificed everything; he had achieved the height of all mortal ambition and in his ambition he had saved and regenerated the Roman People.”⁴⁷ Both these quotations suggest that those who regard Augustus as no more than an able but self-centered and hypocritical politician fall into a moral, if not a historical, dilemma, namely that such a politician can do evil that good may come of it.

Scholars have generally abandoned the interpretation of Augustus’ government proposed by Mommsen. He thought that Augustus established two semi-independent organs of government; on the one hand, the Senate and Roman People resumed their traditional functions as the embodiment of the “restored Republic,” while on the other, the *princeps* through his *imperium* represented the armies and provinces.⁴⁸ It appears, however, both from the *Res Gestae* itself and from the accounts of the bestowal and transmission of the imperial powers: first, that Augustus represented himself as deriving his powers and functions from the Senate and more especially from the Roman People; that is, that he was the agent of the state, not an independent equal or a monarchical superior; secondly, that he represented himself as entrusted with a number of different powers and functions, not with any single position or office; and, thirdly, that these powers and functions were given to him personally for specific periods of time and were not

transferable by him to another except insofar as he could delegate his military *imperium* to subordinates who acted in his name. Thus, at least overtly, there was no position of *princeps* and no automatic continuance of his powers and responsibilities after his death.⁴⁹ Any control of the state which Augustus exercised outside of the powers and responsibilities entrusted to him had to be through the informal, though great, influence which he exerted, namely, through his *auctoritas*. For this reason the view that the basis of his monarchical control was, precisely, his *auctoritas* rather than his *imperium*, whether or not this was superior to other *imperia*, has bulked large in contemporary discussions of the principate.⁵⁰ Moreover, any arrangements which he made for the perpetuation of the principate had to be indirect, through the designation of a personal heir to his own very great wealth and through obtaining for a possible successor a grant of powers in his independent right.⁵¹

The question of the sincerity of Augustus with respect to his claim that he had "restored the Republic" depends, therefore, on how far he intended in fact to control the Senate and Roman People both through specific powers and through his *auctoritas*, and how far he meant to perpetuate the principate through hereditary succession. Those who regard the republican façade as hypocritical point to the occasions on which Augustus clearly intervened in areas for which he had no direct responsibility, as attested, e.g., by the Cyrene Edicts.⁵² They cite also the special prerogatives which permitted him to control admission to the senatorial career and advance through the *cursus honorum*, as well as to oversee the introduction of business into the senate and the assemblies.⁵³ They finally observe that he did in fact make clear efforts to ensure the continuance of the principate in the person of somebody selected by himself and presented as successor at least partially on the basis of relationship, where by blood or by marriage.⁵⁴

In defense of the sincerity of Augustus with respect to the restoration of the Republic and the subordination thereto of the *princeps*, it is easy to cite the very great efforts which he made to encourage the senate and assemblies to fulfill their functions, his apparent willingness to permit freedom of discussion in the senate and independent initiative on the part of the magistrates, the fact that he did not use his special prerogatives to ensure that only persons favorable to himself should be admitted to and promoted in the senatorial career, and the further fact that only in emergencies did he intervene in spheres not entrusted to him.⁵⁵ It does, however, appear that Augustus, conscious of the risk of dissension and conflict if some provision were not made for a con-

tinuance of his system, did try to ensure that he would have a successor. On the other hand, despite the innuendos of Tacitus, modern historians increasingly take as sincere Tiberius' initial refusal of the imperial powers and his effort to make the senate consider seriously the question whether the principate should be continued.⁵⁶ In so doing, he was perhaps a more thorough-going republican noble than Augustus had been; certainly he was also diffident of his own capacity. However, despite his attested devotion to the precedent of Augustus in other respects, it would not be safe to argue that here also he was following what he conceived to have been Augustus' desire.⁵⁷ But the debate reported by Tacitus, and particularly Tiberius' attitude, if sincere, indicate that the Augustan principate was based on the sovereignty of the Senate and Roman People and that Tiberius felt that the powers and responsibilities of the *princeps* could be bestowed only by them.⁵⁸

These arguments become highly technical and largely reflect a personal evaluation of the evidence. The present discussion has sought to suggest that a final answer to the nature of the principate cannot be reached simply in terms of scholarly analysis of the sources. It must be broadly based on a general judgment concerning the contribution of Augustus himself to the high achievement of his age. It has been suggested that the personality of Augustus constituted an essential factor in that achievement. Furthermore the respect and admiration which he commanded from the writers and artists of his period appear more profound than would have been paid merely to a patron or monarch who was using their work for his own propaganda; they admired him because he had brought to its peak the imperialistic expansion on which Romans prided themselves and had put an end to the turmoil of the later Republic and established world-wide peace and prosperity. The noble personality presented in the literature and art is wholly consistent with Augustus' program of reviving the ancestral *mores* and religion. It is not consistent with the political hypocrite presented by Tacitus and characterized by Gibbon's "subtle tyrant" or Syme's statement that "for power Augustus had sacrificed everything."⁵⁹

It might be argued that in disguising monarchy behind the façade of the "Restored Republic" Augustus was merely sugar-coating the necessity of monarchical control under forms acceptable to the general public devotion to the traditions of the city-state, just as he disguised his defensive frontier policy behind propaganda presenting him as an outstanding military figure. Augustus did, indeed, fully realize that the traditional Roman government had proved inadequate to rule an empire, and he therefore supplemented it by taking under his own control

the armies and to a large extent the finances. The crucial question about his sincerity is whether he in fact meant himself to be the monarch that his successors increasingly became or whether he hoped that he, and they, could maintain the delicate compromise between supervision and control; whether, in short, the *princeps* was to be the master or the agent of the Senate and Roman People. The impression made by Augustus on his contemporaries and his evident sincerity in his social and religious programs make it unlikely that he was a hypocrite in his description of his own role in the state. And, to state an opinion which there is not time to support here, that role appears to be the one which Cicero had envisaged in his essay on the Commonwealth, the *de Republica*.⁶⁰ To regard the Augustan Principate as a deliberate fraud raises a question not so much historical as moral, namely, how enduring a political or social system can be built on hypocrisy.

Space permits of raising only very briefly two further fundamental questions which are closely related to that of the personality of Augustus as a motivating force in the achievement of the Augustan age. These two questions are: first, what is the chief characteristic of the Augustan culture? And second, was the Augustan achievement ultimately a success or a failure?

Augustan culture survives largely as art and literature. With respect to these, modern critics vary widely in their estimate both of the culture itself and of the contribution made to it by Augustus. Hellenists look down upon Roman art and literature as merely a continuation of the Hellenistic degeneration from the high attainment of the classical age of Greece. They attribute any excellencies which may be found in Roman culture to successful imitation of the Greek.⁶¹ Romanists on the other hand maintain that Roman culture carried forward the more primitive cultures of the various Italic peoples. Granted that both the early Italians and the Romans adopted the outward forms and concepts of the Greeks, they expressed through these a native spirit and attitude. Surely the art of, for instance, Cicero differs from that of Demosthenes, that of Horace from that of the Greek lyric, that of Vergil from that of Homer, and that of the *Ara Pacis* from that of the frieze of the Parthenon. These differences are not only factors of different times, places, or persons, but of different ethnic characters. Hence in Roman culture there existed throughout the republic a tension between the Greek form and the native content. The achievement of the Ciceronian and Augustan age was the successful resolving of this tension. Many elements entered into this success: the talent of the artists themselves, the thorough absorption of Greek culture by Rome, the sense of Roman

greatness. But at least in the Augustan period, the personality of Augustus himself was central. And his influence far exceeded what might be expected from patronage and flattery; it must have resulted from conviction and admiration on the part of artists who were themselves men of high caliber and integrity.⁶² It is arguable, though probably incapable of convincing demonstration, that Augustus was far more influential in the culture of the age which takes its name from him than were, for instance, Pericles, Cicero, Charlemagne, or Louis Quatorze. Again, as in the political sphere, the question poses itself: could such a house have been built on the sand of insincerity?

The Augustan achievement was such that it bequeathed to succeeding ages an inescapable classicism, in the broadest sense. Outward respect was paid to the "Restored Republic" — to the senate, to the magistrates, and even to the people — down to the end of the empire, and their ghosts continued to haunt the Middle Ages and Byzantium. What Justin called the magnitude of Caesar's name — indeed of the three names *Imperator Caesar Augustus* — imposed itself on rulers down to modern times.⁶³ Literature and art of the later empire could not free themselves from the classical formulations of the Augustan age and in the effort to excel through imitation descended into exaggeration and empty rhetoric. Even Christianity failed in its initial effort to reject the classical tradition and was forced to adopt it. The substitution by Augustus of a defensive rather than an offensive frontier policy may have meant in the long run that the drive which had created the empire weakened and finally gave way under pressures from without; his perpetuation of a traditional class structure resulted in the ultimate loss of contact between upper and lower classes which contributed to the final collapse; the antiquarianism of his moral and religious program contained nothing to satisfy the spiritual needs of an ecumenical society; and whether or not Augustus intended it, the principate soon became a monarchy and ultimately a despotism. In short, Augustus may be charged with having imposed on the future the outworn concepts of the city-state when what was needed was a break with the past and the shaping of new concepts suited to a world state.⁶⁴

Seen in historical perspective, such criticism may be justified, but it asks more of Augustus than there is any right to expect. It encompasses in one paragraph the history of more than four centuries. It proposes historical "ifs" which are incapable of a conclusion: for instance, that if Caesar, rather than Augustus, had been the successful architect of government and society, he would have shaped a world state more in accord with the needs of the future and one which would therefore

have avoided the sterile classicism, the defensive mentality, the social immobility, and the authoritarianism which eventually overtook the Augustan structure. Finally, these criticisms presuppose that Augustus should have had a superhuman foresight. As against such criticisms, Augustus deserves credit for having seen clearly that a viable solution for the problems of his time must take account not only of the need of a world state but also of the sentimental hold which the city-state still had on the imagination of the whole Mediterranean world. He, not Caesar, successfully resolved the conflicts which threatened to put an end to the classical world. He created a government and society which commanded the loyalty of both the Roman west and the Greek east, which maintained peace and prosperity for more than two and a half centuries, which remained a precedent for the later empire, and which bequeathed an ideal of universal empire to both medieval Europe and the Byzantine empire, one which came to an end only when in 1806 Francis the Second of Austria resigned the crown of the Holy Roman Empire. Had it not been for the achievement and personality of Augustus, it may be questioned whether classical culture would have been preserved to be absorbed by Christianity and handed down to the Middle Ages in both east and west, eventually to fructify the Renaissance and hence the culture of the modern Western world.⁶⁵

In conclusion, whether Augustus was a clever but hypocritical politician or a sincere statesman of genius is a question of fundamental importance for any evaluation of the Augustan age. If the personality of Augustus commanded the respect of, and served as an inspiration to, the writers and artists who created Augustan culture, he must have had more stature than a mere patron or object of servile flattery. If he was sincere in his revival of tradition Roman social, moral, and religious values, it is fair to assume that he was also sincere in his restoration of the political forms of the Republic. The high achievement of Augustan culture and the durability of the Augustan state can hardly have resulted from a hypocritical program. That in the end classical culture became sterile and the empire became petrified and dissolved cannot justly be blamed upon Augustus. Rather, he deserved the central eminence which he occupies in both the culture and the society of his time because he sincerely adopted the role of director, not master, of the state.⁶⁶

NOTES

1. The substance of this paper was first presented in Italian before the Istituto di Filologia Classica of the Università degli Studi di Trieste and then summarized in English before the American Academy in Rome, both in May

1963. The following books are sufficiently frequently cited in the notes to be abbreviated:

Jean Béranger, *Recherches sur l'aspect idéologique du Principat* (Schweiz. Beiträge zur Alt.-Wiss. 6; Basel: Reinhardt, 1953).

CAH: *The Cambridge Ancient History*.

V(iktor Emil) Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, 2 vols., text and notes, each in three parts (Leipzig: Teubner, 1891-1904).

Pierre Grenade, *Essai sur les origines du Principat* (Bibl. des Écoles franç. d'Ath. et de Rome 197; Paris: de Boccard, 1961).

Mason Hammond, *The Augustan Principate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933).

Mason Hammond, *The Antonine Monarchy* (Rome, Pap. and Mon. Am. Acad. Rome XIX, 1959).

RE, RE2: *Real-Encyc. der class. Alt.-Wiss.* ed. Pauly-Wissowa usw., erste Reihe (A-Q), zweite Reihe, often denoted by A (R-Z); especially cited is Lothar Wickert, *Princeps (ciuitatis)* in RE 22 (44) 1998-2296.

M(ikail Ivanovitch) Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press) ed. 1 (1926) and ed. 2 (2 vols., 1957).

SH: Martin Schanz und Carl Hosius, *Gesch. des röm. Lit.* (Müller-Otto, *Handbuch der Alt.-Wiss.* VIII) II: *Die röm. Lit. in der Zeit der Monarchie bis auf Hadrian* (Munich: Beck, 1935).

Sir Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939).

Sir Ronald Syme, *Tacitus*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).

2. Tac. *Ann.* I 9-10, where it is implied that the opinions were not formally expressed, e.g. in the senate, but simply circulated at the time. Paragraph 10 ends briefly: *ceterum sepultura more perfecta templum et caelestes religiones decernuntur*, i.e. by the senate, and par. 11 introduces the effort in the senate to persuade Tiberius to undertake the principate. Syme, *Tac.* I 408-435, devotes two chapters to a defense of the Tacitean proposition that the principate was intended to be disguised monarchy and that Tiberius continued this hypocrisy by pretending to be loath to undertake the principate; see below, nn.7, 56.

3. Suet. *Aug.* 61.1: *Quoniam qualis in imperiis ac magistratibus regendaque per terrarum orbem pace belloque re publica fuerit exposui*. Mario Attilio Levi, *C. Suet. Tran. Divus Augustus* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1951) xxvii-xxx, analyzes the discussion by Suet. in ch. 28 of the formation of the principate, in comparison with the monarchical viewpoint of Tacitus and Dio and the republican of Livy and Velleius, and concludes that Suetonius stands between them but that he accepted the "Restored Republic" as false or hypocritical.

4. Dio LII 1.1 (trans. E. Cary in the *Loeb. Class. Lib.*); see addenda, p. 162.

5. Paul Meyer, *De Maecenatis Oratione a Dione ficta* (Berlin: Heymann, 1891), argued that the Speech of Maecenas was a *speculum principis*, or advice on how to rule, addressed by Dio to Severus Alexander, whereas Mason Hammond, "The Significance of the Speech of Maecenas in Dio, Book LII," *TAPA* 63 (1932) 88-102, held that it represents what Dio really thought that Augustus had intended, as seen across two centuries of increasingly overt monarchy. Levi, *Suet. Aug.* xxviii, accepts the second position, though regarding Dio as wrong in his interpretation of the principate. For a development of this position in the terms of Dio's own concept of the empire as a monarchy with the coöperation of the best, see Emilio Gabba, "Sulla Storia Romana di Cassio

Dione," *Rivista Storica Italiana* 67.3 (1955) 311-325 and appendix pp. 331-333. See also addenda, p. 162.

6. Dio's view of a monarchical principate is adopted by Gardthausen I 1348-1349; cf. *RE* 22 (44) 2076.

7. Syme, *Tac.* I 271-274, discusses in general terms the derivation of Tacitus', Suetonius', and Dio's accounts of the death of Augustus and the accession of Tiberius from independent use of the sources. In II 688-692 (Appendix 36) and 781-782 (Appendix 77), he analyzes the relationship between them in greater detail and suggests that both Suetonius and Dio may have known the *Annals*, though they used them little if at all; cf. above, n.2, below, n.56, and *SH* II 629-632 on Tacitus and Schanz-Hosius-Kruger (above, n.1) III (1922) 52-53 on Suetonius, in both of which discussions it is concluded that they wrote independently of each other and of Plutarch and Dio.

8. For a brief statement on senatorial opposition during the early empire, see Hammond, *Ant. Mon.* 248-249, 272-273 nn.31-34; for the overt dynastic policy of the Flavians, see Mason Hammond, "The Transmission of the Powers etc.," *Mem. Am. Acad. Rome* 24 (1956) 78-86, especially 79 n.88; *RE* 22 (44) 2167-2169.

9. For the character and tone of the *Res Gestae*, see the edition by Jean Gagé, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* (Publ. de la Fac. des Lettres de l'Univ. de Strasbourg, Textes d'étude 5; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, ed. 2, 1950) 23-26.

10. For Livy's friendship with Augustus, see *SH* II 298 under 8.

11. Several instances of "censorship" reported by Seneca the Elder are discussed by Paolo Tremoli, *M. Anneo Lucano I: L'ambiente familiare e letterario* (Univ. degli Studi di Trieste, Fac. di Lett. e Filos., Ist. de Filol. Class. 8, 1961)

10. Syme, *Tac.* I 366-367, argues that Livy stopped his history in 9 B.C. because he found the later rule of Augustus difficult to reconcile with the "Restored Republic" which he had himself initially accepted as genuine; see also his "Livy and Augustus," *HSCP* 64 (1959) 27-87, especially pp. 69-71, 74-75. J(acques) André, *La Vie et l'oeuvre d'Asinius Pollion* (*Études et commentaires* VIII; Paris: Klincksieck, 1949), portrays Pollio as perpetuating the republican traditions of uprightness, independence of judgment, and outspokenness; see especially p. 24 for Pollio's criticisms of Augustus, pp. 61-64 for his *Histories*, and the conclusion on pp. 121-127. See also Gardthausen I 1243-1249, II 840-843 nn.21-34.

12. For Titus Labienus, see Sen. *Contr.* X praef. 4-8. There is no ancient evidence that he was a son of Caesar's lieutenant Titus Labienus, who deserted to Pompey, and hence a brother of Quintus Labienus, who later deserted to the Parthians; see *RE* 12 (23) 270 under *Labienus* 8.

13. Seneca, after discussing the career of Labienus as an orator, says (sec. 5): *libertas tanta ut libertatis nomen excederet et, quia passim ordines hominesque laniabat, Rabienus uocaretur. Animus inter uitia ingens et ad similitudinem ingenii sui uiolentus et qui Pompeianos spiritus nondum in tanta pace posuisset. In hoc primum excogitata est noua poena; effectum est enim per inimicos ut omnes eius libri comburerentur; res noua et inusitata supplicium de studiis sumi.*

14. Dio LVI 27.1 (trans. Cary): "And learning that some vituperative pamphlets were being written concerning certain people, Augustus ordered search to be made for them; those that were found in the city he ordered to be burned by the aediles, and those outside by the officials in each place, and he punished some of the writers." On the basis of this passage, *SH* II 344-345

date the punishment of Labienus in A.D. 12; *RE* 12 (13) 271 gives no date. Suet. *Cal.* 16.1 says of Caligula: *Titi Labieni, Cordi Cremutii, Cassii Severi scripta senatus consultis abolita requiri et esse in manibus lectitarique permisit*. For Cremutius Cordus, see SH II 422, 643-644. Tac. *Ann.* IV 34-35 places his trial for publishing praises of Brutus and Cassius in A.D. 25 and states that his books were burnt by the aediles after his suicide. The date of the exile of Cassius Severus is debated, see SH II 346; Tac. *Ann.* I 72.3 does say: *primus Augustus cognitionem de famosis libellis specie legis eius (i.e. de maiestate) tractavit, commotus Cassii Seueri libidine, qua uiros feminasque inlustres procacibus scriptis diffamauerat*. Hence he may have suffered at the time indicated by Dio as A.D. 12, along with Labienus. Cassius died in exile (according to Jerome *s.a.* 2048) in A.D. 32 after XXV years of exile, which would place his exile in about A.D. 7. Tac. *Ann.* IV 21.3 reports a discussion in the senate in A.D. 24 about making his exile more severe because he had continued his defamatory writings.

15. Tremoli (above, n.11) suggests that Tiberius may have influenced the elderly Augustus towards a more severe policy against defamatory or immoral writings.

16. For Ovid's exile, see Mason Hammond, "Plato and Ovid's Exile", *HSCP* 63 (1958) 347-361, where it is suggested that Augustus, besides regarding Ovid's love poetry as an encouragement to the "fast set" among whom Julia committed adultery (below, n.39), also felt, with Plato, that literature should be in accord with the policies and morals of the state; see p. 349 for censorship under the Republic and p. 360 n.40 for "book burning," especially Arthur Stanley Pease, "Notes on Book Burning," *Munera Studiosa (Studies in Honor of W. P. Hatch*; Cambridge, Mass.: Episc. Theol. School, 1946) 145-160. Ovid indicates, *Tristia* III 1.59-82, that his love poetry had been excluded from the three public libraries in Rome; cf. SH II 260 bottom. He does not suggest that they had been burned. He himself in a dramatic gesture burnt a copy of the *Metamorphoses* on the night of his exile but was later glad that other copies survived, *Tristia* I 7.13-24.

17. Syme, *Tac.* I 368-369, is very condemnatory of Velleius Paterculus as "voluble and unscrupulous" and as exemplifying "the mature imperial age in its abasement before power"; cf. also SH II 584, where he is portrayed as a retired officer subservient to his former commanders.

18. Vell. Pat. II 89.

19. For a balanced view of Augustus as a patron, see SH II 8-9.

20. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 299 on Hor. *Od.* I 37.

21. H(erbert Jennings) Rose, *A Handbook of Latin Literature* (London: Methuen, 1936, and later reprints) 240, says of Maecenas: "who seems to have been (unofficially, for he had no wish for titles) Octavian's minister of Propaganda, a post which fitted well with his own love for literature"; cf. SH II 19.

22. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 464-465; cf. his remark on Livy, p. 463: "Like other literary composition fostered by the government, Livy's history was patriotic, moral and hortatory." Presumably, even though Livy sincerely admired these virtues, Syme would feel that he was patronized because he advertised them. Hans Petersen, "Livy and Augustus," in *TAPA* 92 (1961) 440-452, finds in Livy's Book I implied references to contemporary events and not all of them complimentary to Augustus, particularly in tyrannical actions of the Tarquins which seem to echo the behavior of Augustus. While he may have exaggerated some of the parallels, his argument suggests that Livy was enough of a

"Pompeian" (Tac. *Ann.* IV 34.3) to retain his independence of judgment. Cf. the article in the same volume by William R. Nethercut, "*Ille parum cauti pectoris egit opus*," *TAPA* 92 (1961) 389-407, which argues that Propertius, despite his praise of Augustus in his later books, similarly preserved an independent and often critical attitude; see also addenda, p. 162.

23. See Mason Hammond, "Hellenistic Influences in the Structure of the Augustan Principate," *Mem. Am. Acad. Rome* 17 (1940) 5 n.47, on the equation of rulers with gods. Michael Grant, *From Imperium to Auctoritas* (Cambridge University Press, 1946) 368-375, entitles this section "Augustus as Heir to the Hellenistic Monarchs" but actually devotes more space to Antony and Cleopatra. Béranger, *Recherches*, discusses throughout the influence of Greek concepts on that of the *princeps*, see his conclusion on pp. 281-282, 284.

24. The writers of the Augustan age may have influenced Augustus as much as he did them; cf. Augusto Rostagni, *Storia della letteratura Latina* (Turin, UTET) II (1952) 11, and bibliography in n.3 on p. 23; Edward Kennard Rand, *The Building of Eternal Rome* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1943) 55-80. Cf. Rostovtzeff, *SEH* ed. 1 44 = ed. 2 I 42-43.

25. For the Roman character of the *Ara Pacis*, see Eugenie Strong, "The Ara Pacis Augustae," *CAH* X (1934) 546-549; Inez Scott Ryberg, *Rites of the State Religion in Roman Art* (Rome, *Mem. Am. Acad. Rome* 22, 1938) 40-48. For a résumé of the discussion whether this monument is rightly identified as the *Ara Pacis*, see the appendix to Hans Peter L'Orange, "Ara Pacis Augustae: La Zona floreale," *Acta ad Arch. et Artium Hist. Pertinentia* (Inst. Rom. Norv.) I (1962) 15-16, who concludes with Toynbee for the identification, against Weinstock's attack.

26. On the portraiture of Augustus, see Strong, "Portraiture," *CAH* X 557-559; Giovanni Becatti, *L'Arte Romana* (Milan: Garzanti, 1962) 58-59.

27. For the implications of *Dux* and *Imperator*, see Béranger, *Recherches* 47-54, who considers them as emphasizing the military aspect of *princeps* and *principatus*. A discussion of Augustus as a military figure in Augustan literature, art, and numismatics was submitted as an unpublished Senior Honors Thesis at Harvard in 1962 by Tobias M. Goodman, who hopes to develop a full consideration of similar Augustan "propaganda."

28. *CAH* X 90-92 discusses the propaganda against Antony at the time of Actium and cites M(artin) P(ercival) Charlesworth, "Some Fragments of the Propaganda of Mark Antony," *CQ* 27 (1933) 172-177, and Kenneth Scott, "The Political Propaganda of 44-30 B.C.," *Mem. Am. Acad. Rome* 11 (1933) 7-49. For charges of Octavian's cowardice at Mutina, Philippi, and Naupactus, see Charlesworth 174 under nos. 4 and 5; Scott 18-19, 21-22, 34. See also R. F. Rossi, *Marco Antonio nella lotta politica della tarda Repubblica Romana* (Univ. degli Studi di Trieste, Fac. di Lett. e Filos., Ist. di Storia Ant. 1, 1959) throughout, especially for the above battles p. 140 n.548, which also cites the above two articles.

29. Justin XLII 5.10-12: *Post haec, finito Hispaniensi bello, cum in Syriam ad componendum Orientis statum uenisset, metum Phrahati incussit ne bellum Parthiae uellet inferre. Itaque tota Parthia captiui ex Crassiano siue Antoni exercitu recollecti signaque cum his militaria remissa. Sed et filii nepotesque Phrahatis obsides Augusto dati, plusque Caesar magnitudine nominis sui fecit quam armis facere alius imperator potuisset.* Seel, *Pompeius Trogus: Fragmenta* p. 172 frag. 153 e, cites the last phrase (*sed . . . potuisset*) as from Trogus but places it in bk. XXXVIII as

having probably actually referred to Julius Caesar and Pharnaces; from whom Justin transferred it to Augustus Caesar and Phraates. For both the return of the standards in 20 B.C. and the giving of hostages in 10 B.C., see Suet. *Aug.* 21.3; *RG* 29.2, 32.2, with Gagé's notes on pp. 135-136, 142.

30. Tac. *Ann.* I 11.4 states that Augustus' *consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii* formed the conclusion of an autograph *libellum* outlining the resources of the state which Tiberius read in the senate during the discussion on the succession. Whether the *breuiarium imperii* listed by Suet. *Aug.* 101.4 among the three left by Augustus in addition to his will (i.e. directions for his funeral, the *Res Gestae*, and the accounting of the empire) contained this advice, or whether there was a fourth personal document of advice for Tiberius, as stated by Dio LVI 32.1a, 33.1, is disputed; see Grenade, *Essai* 398-400.

31. Suet. *Aug.* 23 describes Augustus' distress over the loss of Varus and three legions in A.D. 9. For a balanced judgment on Augustus' frontier policy, see M. P. Charlesworth in *CAH* X 596-602.

32. Syme, *Tac.* 221-222, 409-497, discusses Tacitus' admiration for Trajan as having revived the republican traditions of conquest. F(rancis) A. Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian War* (Oxford *Class. and Philos. Mon.*; Oxford University Press, 1948) 191-204, attributed the over-extension of Trajan's campaigns at the end of his life to megalomania ("desire for fame" in Dio LXVIII 17.1). F(riederich) Oertel, *CAH* XII (1939) 256-257, and Rostovtzeff, *SEH* ed. 1 309-315 = ed. 2 I 355-362, regard the financial weakening of the empire in the mid second century A.D. as in part due to the costs in men and money of Trajan's wars. Ronald Syme, "The Imperial Finances under Domitian, Nerva and Trajan," *J. Rom. Studies* 20 (1930) 55-70, defended Domitian from the then common charge that he had left the empire exhausted by his wars and buildings and regarded Nerva's reign as one of inadequate controls and corruption. He argued that, nevertheless, Trajan inherited from Domitian adequate resources for the buildings and wars of his early years without the need of the "gold of Dacia," the accumulated treasure of the Dacian kings brought to Rome in A.D. 106, which Jérôme Carcopino regarded as having saved Trajan's financial situation, see his article "Les richesses des Daces et le redressement de l'empire romain," *Dacia* I (1924) 28-34, reprinted as "Un retour à l'impérialisme de conquête: l'or des Daces," *Points de vue sur l'imp. rom.* (Paris: 1934) 73-86 = *Les Étapes de l'imp. rom.* (Paris: 1961) 106-117, with a final note, p. 86 = 117 n.1, in which he replies to Syme's criticisms.

33. Even Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 440-458 ch. XXIX: "The National Programme," accepts the sincerity of Augustus' moral program as reflecting the "municipal virtue" of the class from which the Octavii came; see especially pp. 453-458. Cf. also Gardthausen I 863-912; see below, n.42.

34. E.g. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 452-453, calls attention to the "certain duplicity" and "strong suspicion of fraud" in Augustus' moral reforms since it is not certain "that the Princeps himself was above reproach, even with discount of the allegations of Antonius, the scandal about Terentia and all the gossip that infests the back-stairs of monarchy" — and, be it added, "democracy." Cf. below, n.36.

35. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 229, concludes his brief account of the marriage of Augustus and Livia by saying: "The marriage was celebrated at once, to the enrichment of public scandal (Jan. 17, 38 B.C.);"; cf. Suet. *Aug.* 62.2; Gardthausen I 1020-1021, II 634-635 nn.11-15; *RE* 13 (25) 902 under *Livius* (-a)

37. Three points might be noted, though space does not permit of developing them: the hastiness of the marriage, so in contrast with the usually cautious temper of Augustus, suggests that he was swept off his feet; the marriage so hastily consummated lasted for fifty-two years (until Augustus' death in A.D. 14) even though there were no children; and the picture of Livia as a loyal and self-effacing Roman wife during Augustus' lifetime contrasts strongly (if not strangely) with that drawn of her by Tacitus as the evil genius of the Julio-Claudian house until her death in A.D. 29, see his summary of her personality in *Ann.* V 1.

36. Suet. *Aug.* 68-70 collects charges of sexual irregularities against Augustus and in par. 69 gives some of Antony's remarks on this subject. He opens par. 71 as follows: *Ex quibus siue criminibus siue maledictis infamiam impudicitiae facillime refutauit et praesentis et posteræ uitæ castitate*, but adds shortly: *circa libidines haesit, postea quoque, ut ferunt, ad uitandas uirgines promptior, quæ sibi undique etiam ab uxore conquirentur*. Dio LVIII 2.5 (trans. Cary) quotes Livia as saying that she had retained her influence over Augustus "by being scrupulously chaste herself, doing gladly whatever pleased him, not meddling with any of his affairs, and in particular by pretending neither to hear of nor to notice the favorites that were the objects of his passion." Tac. *Ann.* V 1.3 calls her *uxor facilis et cum artibus mariti, simulatione filii bene composita*, which, though cited by Levi on Suet. *Aug.* 71.1, may not mean "easy toward his unfaithfulness." See Gardthausen I 1026, II 638 nn.28-31, who cites, besides these passages, a story from Zonaras X 39 about advice given to Augustus by his old teacher Athenodorus on the risk of committing adultery with wives of men who might be powerful enough to plot against him. Parallels could be cited for statesmen who felt that sexual license was permitted to themselves but not to the generality of mankind.

37. For the ruthlessness of Octavian during the triumviral period, see Suet. *Aug.* 10-16, and for his suspicion of conspiracies par. 27. A change toward greater tolerance seems to have begun with the sparing of Lepidus in 36 B.C. (par. 16.4) and to have been continued in his treatment of the Romans who sided with Antony at Actium, and even of Antony's own children (par. 17.5); see Levi's notes for parallel passages. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 299-300, does not regard him as mild and thinks that besides executing Caesarion and Antyllus, he may have put Ptolemy Helios to death. For his later private life, see Suet. *Aug.* 72-77, and for his tolerance of conspiracies pars. 51, 66-67. Cf. in general Gardthausen I 1232-1249, II 837-843: "Augustus und die Opposition"; Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 476-489 ch. XXXI: "The Opposition," who thinks, pp. 479-481, that though much hostile gossip has been preserved, Augustus was not as "good" as the favorable sources represent him to have been.

38. Ennius in E(ric) H(erbert) Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin* (Loeb *Class. Lib.*) I (1935) 174 frag. 467 = Vahlen ed. 3 frag. 500, cited by Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 442, as a motto for the Augustan "National Programme."

39. For Julia the Younger, see Gardthausen I 1253-1254, II 846-847 nn.15-18; *RE* 10 (19) 906-908 under *Iulius (-a)* 551; Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 432. For Ovid, see Syme 468 and above, n.16; also addenda, p. 162.

40. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 349-386 chs. XXIV: "The Party of Augustus" and XXV: "The Working of Patronage," shows how Augustus favored his own supporters, and in ch. XXXII (pp. 490-508) describes "The Doom of the *Nobiles*." In his "Livy and Augustus," *HSCP* 64 (1959) 59, Syme regards the

revival of the republican *nobiles* as necessary for the stability of the new Augustan regime.

41. For the gradual vanishing of the old Roman families from the senate and the appearance of newer ones, first Italian and then provincial, during the first two centuries of the empire, see Hammond, *Ant. Mon.* 349-356, 273-280 nn.35-69, with further bibliography, particularly a summary statistical article by Mason Hammond, "Changes in the Composition of the Roman Senate etc.," *J. Rom. Studies* 47 (1957) 74-81. A table in the article on "Birth Control" in the *Ency. Brit.* ed. 14 (1929) III 647 gives comparative statistics for the birth-rate of five social classes in England between 1911 and 1921, a period of decline. The proportions remained relatively constant, at about 70 per cent of the average of all classes for the highest (economically) and about 130 per cent for the lowest. Fertility is stated to have been nearly twice as high in the lowest as in the highest group. Against the low rate of the higher classes should, however, be set their lower rate of infant mortality, which dropped from 68 to 41 per cent of the average for all classes during the decade in question while the rate of the lowest class remained constant, at 122/123 per cent. The article "Birth Rate" on pp. 651-65 gives the chief reasons for the low rate of the upper classes as late marriage, since the fertility of women is highest between 18-22 and becomes negligible after 45, and deliberate limitation of births.

42. For the social policy of Augustus, see Gardthausen I 887-935, II 518-548; Hugh Last, "The Social Policy of Augustus," *CAH* X 425-464; A. D. Winspear and L. K. Geweke, *Augustus and the Reconstruction of Roman Government and Society* (*University of Wisconsin Studies in Soc. Sci. and Hist.* XXIV; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1935); Syme, *Rom. Rev.* ch. XXIX (above, n.33).

43. For the opposition to Caesar at Rome in 44 B.C., see Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 59; for Italian support of Octavian against Antony, pp. 271-293 ch. XX: "Tota Italia"; *CAH* X 82 (Cleopatra's ambitions), 97-99 (the final break), 585-586 (Augustus' *Romanitas*); Hammond, *Ant. Mon.* 23 n.44; Mason Hammond, *City-State and World State etc.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951) 143-144.

44. For the Romanization of Italy after the Social War, see A(drian) N(icholas) Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939) 126-148 ch. V: "The Political Unification of Italy and the Consequent Changes in the Idea of Roman Citizenship." In the first ch. of pt. II, pp. 170-180, he discusses the extension of citizenship to the provinces by Caesar and Augustus and points out that, though such extension was considerable, particularly under Augustus, it took place in areas in which there was already a solid foundation of Italian immigration or of romanization. On pp. 172-173 he opposes the view that emigration of Italians to the provinces was never considerable, even in the late republic, a view argued by W(illiam) E(merton) Heitland, "A Great Agricultural Emigration from Italy?," *J. Rom. Studies* 8 (1918) 34-57, summarized in his *Agricola etc.* (Cambridge University Press, 1921) 274-275. Heitland was particularly doubtful about the emigration of agricultural workers either in the second century B.C. after the devastation of the Punic wars or during the first century. Tenney Frank, *An Economic History of Rome* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, ed. 2, 1927) 357-358, speaks of "a decided influx of Roman citizens into Africa" in the early Augustan period, but in his *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome I: Rome and Italy of the Republic* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,

1933) 291 he merely mentions emigration as a factor impossible to estimate; in V: *Rome and Italy of the Empire* (1940) 169 n.43 he cites Verg. *Ec.* I as evidence of agricultural emigration after the confiscations of 42 B.C. Rostovtzeff, *SEH* (eds. 1 & 2) 17-18, 34-36, seems to regard emigration as mostly commercial or of nonlaboring agricultural entrepreneurs in both the second and first centuries B.C. Increasing evidence has come to light for the settlement of Roman (or Italian) traders in the provinces even before their influx into Delos after 167 B.C. but this not yet been fully synthesized; for agricultural exports from Italy see briefly Fritz M. Heichelheim and Cedric A. Yeo, *A History of the Roman People* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962) 163. Settlement of military veterans in colonies in the provinces became common only under Augustus, see Kornemann in *RE* 4 (7) 565 under *Coloniae*. Romanization must have been extensive, particularly in the western provinces, without Italian immigration, since the administration was entirely Roman, since opportunities for advance in commerce, the army, or government would be open to Romanized natives, and since there would be a tendency for less civilized peoples to adopt the more advanced civilization of their conquerors.

45. Verg. *Aen.* VI 851-853.

46. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. III, in the edition by J. B. Bury (London: Macmillan) I (1896) 70, opening of last paragraph.

47. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 524.

48. Theodor Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* (Leipzig: Hirzel) II.2 (ed. 3, 1887) 748, coined the word "Dyarchie" to describe what he regarded as the independent status of the senate and the *princeps*; cf. III.2 (1888) 1255; Hammond, *Aug. Princ.* 4-5, 201-202 nn.1, 4, 5; below, n.58.

49. For the sincerity of the "Restored Republic" and the lack of any "office" of *princeps*, see Grenade, *Essai* throughout, especially the analysis of the significant passages of the *Res Gestae* 7 and 34 in pp. 6-42 ch. I; also Hammond *Aug. Princ.* throughout; *RE* 22 (44) 2295-2296.

50. For the discussion on the significance of *auctoritas* and the nature of the *imperium*, see the bibliography in Hammond, *Ant. Mon.* 42-44 nn.1-4, to which should be added Grenade, *Essai* 364-393 ch. X: "L'évolution des pouvoirs impériaux d'Auguste," where there is a return to Mommsen's view that the *imperium* continued to be the chief legal basis of the principate as against Grant's substitution of *auctoritas*. Cf. also *RE* 22 (44) 2270-2278 for the *imperium proconsulare* and 2287-2290 for *auctoritas*, with reference back to col. 2047 for the *auctoritas* of *principes* during the later republic. While Wickert regards Grant's thesis on the importance of *auctoritas* as one not to be taken lightly (col. 2289 lines 5-7) he does not seem to think that *auctoritas* replaced the *imperium proconsulare* as the legal basis of power; see his discussion of the present state of the debate about the *imperium* in cols. 2273-2278.

51. For the means taken by Augustus and his successors to ensure a perpetuation of the principate, see Hammond, *Ant. Mon.* 13 n.1, especially his article on "The Transmission of the Imperial Powers etc.," *Mem. Am. Acad. Rome* 24 (1956) 61-133; Béranger, *Recherches* 3-28 ch. I "Avenement officiel et 'Principat'"; *RE* 22 (44) 2157-2178: "Der dynastische Gedanke in der öffentlichen Meinung" and 2200-2222: "Erbprinzip und Leistungsprinzip"; Wickert points out, cols. 2053-2054, that even under the republic, the concept of *princeps* involved not only personal but ancestral worth. For the situation

on the death of Augustus, see Grenade, *Essai* 394-396; *RE* 22 (44) 2138; Hammond, *Ant. Mon.* 17 n.22.

52. For Augustus' interference in senatorial provinces, see Hammond, *Aug. Princ.* 54-64, and *RE* 22 (44) 2272-2273, both of which attribute it to an *imperium maius*, as against Grant's view that it was due to *auctoritas* (above, n.50).

53. For Augustus' prerogatives vis à vis the senate, magistrates, and assemblies, see Hammond, *Aug. Princ.* 117-147 chs. XIV-XVI.

54. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 439, ends his ch. XXVIII (pp. 419-439): "The Succession" with the murder of Agrippa Postumus on the accession of Tiberius and concludes: "The arbitrary removal of a rival was no less essential to the Principate than the public conferment of legal and constitutional power . . . From first to last the dynasty of the Julii and the Claudii ran true to form, despotic and murderous"; cf. *RE* 22 (44) 2178-2181: "Der dynastische Gedanke als Gefahr für den Princeps."

55. Hammond, *Aug. Princ.* 123, 141, 144, argued that Augustus did not use his powers to dominate the republican organs but to try to make them effective; contrast Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 369-405 chs. XXV: "The Working of Patronage" and XXVI "The Government," of which the former concludes: "Political competition was sterilized and regulated through a pervasive system of patronage and nepotism," and the latter: "On all sides the monarchic Princeps robbed the other *principes* of power and honor"; cf. also his concluding ch. XXXIII (pp. 509-524): "*Pax et Princeps*." Gianfranco Tibiletti, *Principe e Magistrati repubblicani etc. (Studi pubbl. dall'Ist. ital. per la Storia ant. 9; Rome: Signorelli, 1953)*, studied carefully the control of elections by the *principes* in the light of the evidence of the *tabula Hebana*; his general view, given on pp. 11-15, is that Augustus and Tiberius used their prerogatives to try to strengthen the senate, not to dominate it, until Sejanus became the intermediary between Tiberius and the state and used his power to promote his supporters and strengthen his own position.

56. The sincerity of Tiberius' "refus du principat" is maintained by Grenade, *Essai* 394-443, in an analysis of Tacitus' account in *Ann.* I 7-15 of the debate in the senate concerning the grant to Tiberius of the powers and responsibilities of the principate; see also *RE* 22 (44) 2258-2264, especially for Tiberius col. 2261. Béranger, *Recherches* 137-169 (especially for Tiberius p. 137 n. 3), regards the "refusal" as from the beginning what it certainly became later, a polite formality meant to elicit a general appeal to assume the principate, a *consensus uniuersorum*, for which see also *RE* 22 (44) 2264-2269. Cf. above, nn.2, 7.

57. For Tiberius' devotion to the memory and precepts of Augustus, see Grenade, *Essai* 397-398 with references.

58. O(tto) T. A. Schulz, *Das Wesen des röm. Kaisertums usw. (Studien zur Gesch. u. Kultur des Alt. VIII Heft. 2; Paderborn, Schöningh, 1916)*, first demonstrated, against Mommsen (above, n.48), that the only recognized legal source of the powers of the principate was the senate, initially with the co-öperation of the *populus*; later alone, as representing the sovereign *Senatus Populusque Romanus*.

59. For the phrases from Gibbon and Syme, see above p. 147 and nn.46, 47.

60. The influence of Cicero's *de Republica* on the Augustan principate has often been denied, notably by Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 318-321, ending: "Only a robust faith can discover authentic relics of Cicero in the Republic of Augustus." For such robust faith, see Hammond, *City-State etc.* (above, n.43) 153-158; Grenade, *Essai* 108 (with further references in n.1), 129-133, 446-449; Ettore 6+H.S.C.P.

Lepore, *Il princeps ciceroniano e gli ideali politici della tarda Repubblica* (Naples: Inst. Ital. per gli Studi Storici, 1954).

61. Few scholars would state baldly that Roman culture was simply a late and inferior manifestation of the Greek, but Arnold J. Toynbee, in his *Study of History*, lumps Greece and Rome together as the "Hellenic Society" and Gisela M. A. Richter, in her *Ancient Italy* (*Jerome Lectures* IV; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), especially in her conclusion on p. 104, finds Greek artists the "creators" of Roman art, to mention only two Hellenists.

62. For the impact of Augustus on the literature of his age, see briefly SH II 8-9. Becatti (above, n.26) p. 58 uses the term "classicizing" for the combination of Hellenic and Roman in Augustan art; cf. Strong in *CAH* X 545, and, in general, Rostovtzeff *SEH* ed. 1 44-45 = ed. 2 I 42-43.

63. Justin as cited above, n.29.

64. That the organization of society and culture on "classical" lines by Augustus meant the end of the creative spirit of classical culture is suggested by Rostovtzeff, *SEH* ed. 1 478-482 = ed. 2 I 532-536; he refers to E. Kornemann, "Das Problem des Untergangs der antiken Welt," *Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* XII (1922) 5-6, for the view that Augustus' military policies led to the eventual inability of the empire to defend itself. Rostovtzeff expressed the same opinion in his *History of the Ancient World II: Rome* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927, and paperback reprint, 1960) 363-366. F(rank) W(illiam) Walbank, *Decline of the Roman Empire in the West* (London: Cobbe Press, 1946) 67, discounts the selection of any specific date for the beginning of the decline and regards ultimate decay as inherent in the conservative structure of ancient society. For the stultifying effect of "classicism" in Augustan poetry, see the too condemnatory remarks of Eric A. Havelock, *The Lyric Genius of Catullus* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1939) 172-177.

65. Richard Mansfield Haywood entitled an examination of the various explanations of Rome's decay *The Myth of Rome's Fall* (New York: Crowell, 1958). Although he points out, as is done in the text, the degree to which the achievement of the classical world was transmitted by Rome to later ages, he fails to convince that the "dark ages" were simply a period of change and innovation, not of a real breakdown of society and decline of culture.

66. A posthumous paper by Richard Heinze, "Kaiser Augustus" in *Hermes* 65.4 (1930) 385-395, argues that Augustus was essentially Roman in sentiment, as against the more Hellenistic spirit of Cicero and Caesar, and that his ambition was not to be a monarch but a "First Citizen" whose eminence would be justified by his concern for the *res publica*.

Addenda to notes.

4. F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (Oxford: 1964) 93-102, holds that Dio regarded Augustus as the founder of a monarchy which had continued to his own time.

5. Millar (last n.) p. 102 analyzes Dio's "Speech of Maecenas" on Meyer's view that it was meant as a program for his own time.

22. Sir Ronald Syme, lecturing at Harvard in April 1965, cited the relative silence of the elegiac poets, including young Ovid, to show in them a "republican" disregard for the "new order."

39. Syme, *Rom. Rev.* 432, argues from the suicide of Julia the Younger's husband, L. Aemilius Paullus, that the affair was in fact a conspiracy.

TWO NEW BRONZE OBJECTS IN THE McDANIEL COLLECTION: AN ETRUSCAN STRAINER AND A ROMAN INCENSE SHOVEL

BY DAVID GORDON MITTEN

THE Alice Corinne McDaniel Collection of Classical Objects was presented to the Department of the Classics, Harvard University, by Professor Walton Brooks McDaniel in memory of his wife, with a fund for the acquisition of further objects. In 1962 the Department acquired a well-preserved bronze strainer. A bronze incense shovel, also recently purchased for the collection, is another example of the kind of object that Professor McDaniel had in mind when he began a collection that was "to illustrate Greek and Roman private life."¹

The bronze strainer (Plate I a-b) is intact and in excellent condition, uniformly covered with a light, gray-green patina.² A separate handle of crimped bronze wire is riveted to the bowl of the strainer, which, instead of the more usual flat or shallow rounded basin, is sharply divided into two parts: a flat, saucer-like bowl with a low vertical rim and a small perforated hemispherical, almost globular, bowl sunk below the outer basin. The rim and bottom of the outer basin slope inward. When wine or some other liquid containing impurities was passed through the strainer, it would filter rapidly through fourteen concentric rows of tiny perforations in the bottom of the inner bowl, leaving the dregs concentrated in easily disposable form. The concentration and settling of these impurities was aided by the slight constriction around the top of the filtration cavity, and the low, rounded rim around the bowl of the strainer, with its slightly flattened, inverted lip, minimized spilling.

The handle, a length of bronze wire bent double and crimped into five oval compartments, is fastened to the bowl of the strainer by rivets driven through the ends of the wire, which have been flattened and fashioned into two elongated human hands; delicate incisions delineate the tapering fingers. As a result, the handle, where it has been attached to the strainer, produces a peculiar Crucifixion-like effect when seen from below (Plate I b).³ At the same time, the lively rhythm of the curves formed by the symmetrical crimping of the wire handle gives it a feeling of springy elasticity. A groove inside the end of the handle

may have been formed while the strainer was suspended from a nail driven into the wall of a tomb, or was otherwise in prolonged contact with an iron object.

The form of this strainer is unusual, lying between the simpler *colum*⁴ and the more complicated, compound *infundibulum*,⁵ which usually had a deep separate cavity for the concentration of impurities. Dorothy Kent Hill lists strainers with compound bowls similar to that of our strainer from many sites in Italy, as well as some in Greece, dating from the sixth through the fourth centuries B.C.⁶ A fine Etruscan strainer in the Walters Art Gallery, dated in the fifth century B.C. and published by her as representative of the class,⁷ has a comparable shallow outer basin with a depressed globular strainer cavity; the handle, however, cast in one piece with the rim and bowl, is completely different from ours. Two Cypriote strainers in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, have comparable bowls, but with a set of three little horse-shoe-shaped handles arranged around the rim instead of a single long handle.⁸ An almost exact duplicate of our strainer, however, with a crimped wire handle divided into five compartments, is in Chiusi⁹; another, also very similar, was found in a tomb at Bologna in association with Attic black-figured pottery of the last quarter of the sixth century and an Attic red-figured kylix of ca. 470 B.C.¹⁰ A third example, badly damaged, comes from a tomb in the archaic necropolis of Pontefratte, near Salerno, also in association with Attic black-figured pottery and some Corinthian vases.¹¹ A fourth example, in Milan, has a wider basin and shorter handle than does the McDaniel strainer.¹² From these analogies, it would seem likely that the McDaniel strainer dates in the sixth or early fifth century B.C. It is a superb illustration of a type of strainer that is comparatively rare among the diverse and ingeniously designed bronze utensils and vessels that form such a conspicuous part of the furniture placed in Etruscan tombs during the late archaic period. It seems probable, too, that strainers of this form were prototypes for the more complicated *infundibula*, in which a globular strainer cavity was hinged so that it fitted inside a pointed funnel.

The second instrument here described, a bronze shovel with rectangular pan,¹³ appears to have been designed for some ritual function (Plate II). The shallow rectangular pan is framed on three sides by a flat everted rim, incised with grooves and ornamented at the two rear corners by small projections. The handle, cast as a hollow half-cylinder, takes the form of a Corinthian column. The pan rests, trivet-fashion, on four short rectangular legs 0.005 m. high. The capital of the column which forms the handle projects above the rim of the pan where it



a. Top view.



b. Bottom view.

PLATE I. Etruscan strainer.



PLATE II. Roman incense shovel, top view.

joins the shovel. Except for a nick in the outer edge of the pan and two cracks running from the front edge toward the handle, the shovel is intact and in good condition. The rough blackish-green patina of the bronze has been rubbed smooth in spots.

The shovel appears remarkably mirror-like when it is held upright; the columnar handle seems to support the pan, enclosed by its architectonic frame with the akroterion-like projections at the corners. The Corinthian capital forms a convenient thumb-rest at the top of the handle, while the upturned end of the handle, which forms the base of the column, rests against the palm of the hand. This end may have had a fifth leg to support the handle when the shovel was placed on a flat surface.

The shallow pan of the shovel is perforated by two tiny holes 0.023 m. from the rear edge of the rim and 0.055 m. apart; what looks like a third hole, in the center of the pan, is bounded by one incised ring and a trace of another. Five concentric circles, one in the center and one in each corner, are incised into the pan of a similar shovel in the Metropolitan Museum¹⁴; it is uncertain from the description given in the catalogue, however, whether these are also holes or are merely a decorative device meant to suggest holes.

The Metropolitan shovel is one of three similar shovels, of differing sizes, said to come from the Hauran in Syria¹⁵; all three are similar to the McDaniel shovel, but larger. A set of three small shovels, neatly graduated in size and also provided with shallow rectangular pans and handles in the shape of Corinthian columns, formed part of a cache of Roman copper or bronze vessels recovered by an Israeli archaeological expedition from a dry cave in one of the ravines west of the Dead Sea; in the same cave was a package of letters and other documents signed by Simeon bar Kochba, leader of the Jewish revolt under Hadrian in A.D. 132.¹⁶ This find suggests that the three shovels in the Metropolitan Museum, all acquired in 1900 and bearing the same provenance, may have formed a similar set. Several other comparable shovels are listed by E. R. Goodenough¹⁷ as coming from Palestine and Syria. A rectangular object, often depicted in the floor mosaics of Palestinian synagogues in association with the *menorah*, *lulab*, and *shofar*, has been identified as such a shovel, used to burn incense.¹⁸ Although the provenances of these shovels seem to suggest that this implement was especially common in the eastern Mediterranean area, a fine example was found in Pompeii.¹⁹

The architectonic structure of the shovel, extending down to the akroterion-like projections at the corners, suggests that it may have been

used as a portable miniature altar, either carried in the hand for censuring or resting on its legs when placed on a table or other flat surface.

During what time span was our shovel made? The two projections at the outer corners of the pan remind one of the crisply modeled lugs and other trim on bronze lamps of the first century A.D.²⁰ The acanthus leaves on the capital retain the slender proportions of acanthus on the handle guards of lamps from the Augustan period and later. The Israeli shovels are thought to have formed part of a group of ritual vessels, perhaps captured from the shrine of a legion camped near the cave where they were found; the associated documents of bar Kochba indicate that they cannot be later in date than the beginning of the second quarter of the second century A.D. Later incense shovels, like one excavated from a mansion of the mid-sixth century A.D. at Sardis,²¹ lost their grace and careful articulation as they became more specifically sectarian. The Sardis shovel, looking more like a dustpan than a tray, is surmounted by a cross flanked by dolphins. It is highly likely, then, that the McDaniel shovel was made in the first century A.D. A fine specimen of a ritual utensil probably used by both Romans and Jews, it furnishes a specialized and eloquent insight into the apparatus of private religion in the early Roman empire.

NOTES

1. I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to Professor Mason Hammond for encouraging me to publish these two recent accessions to the McDaniel Collection and aiding me in locating parallels for them. This note has also benefited from the knowledge and criticism of Professor George M. A. Hanfmann. Professor Erwin R. Goodenough greatly improved the discussion of the shovel by many helpful remarks. Mr. James Ufford of the Photographic Department of the Fogg Art Museum kindly made the photographs of the strainer (Pl. I, a-b), while Miss Betsy Root photographed the incense shovel (Pl. II).

2. Purchased from Hesperia Art, Philadelphia, in December 1961. L: 0.26 m., diam. of bowl: 0.12 m., depth of bowl with strainer cavity: 0.062 m.

3. An almost identical strainer from Bologna (A. Zannoni, *Gli scavi della Certosa in Bologna* (Bologna 1884) pl. xxix, 20-21) has a handle ending in serpents' heads, whose eyes are formed by the rivets fastening the handle to the bowl.

4. E. Saglio, "Colum," Daremberg et Saglio, *Dictionnaire* I, II (Paris, 1884), 1331-33.

5. E. Saglio, "Infundibulum," *Dictionnaire* III, I (Paris 1900) 516ff. M. Zuffa, "Infundibula," *Studi Etruschi* (ser. 2), 28 (1960) 165-207, catalogues the major examples of this instrument and establishes a chronology for them.

6. D. K. Hill, "Wine Ladles and Strainers from Ancient Times," *Journal of the Walters Art Gallery* 5 (1942) 54, Table II.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 49, figs. 10 and 11. Walters Art Gallery 54.109. L: 0.285 m.
8. G. M. A. Richter, *Greek, Etruscan and Roman Bronzes* (New York 1915) 231-232, nos. 640-641.
9. Chiusi, Museo Civico, no. 2110. D. Levi, *Il Museo Civico di Chiusi* (Rome, La Libreria dello Stato 1935) 125.
10. A. Zannoni, *Gli scavi della Certosa in Bologna* (Bologna 1884) pl. xxix, 20-21.
11. A. Maiuri, "Una necropoli arcaica presso Salerno e tracce dell' espansione etrusca nell' agro picentino," *Studi Etruschi* 3 (1929) 99; pl. xii, 1.
12. Milan, Museo Civico Archeologico, no. 443. M. Zuffa, "Infundibula," *Studi Etruschi* (ser. 2) 28 (1960) 171, no. 13; pl. xix, a.
13. L: 0.028 m; W: 0.107 m.; L. of handle: 0.105 m.; H: 0.03 m.
14. Richter, *Catalogue of Bronzes* 236, no. 660. Acc. no. 139.
15. *Ibid.*, 235-236, nos. 658-660; Acc. nos. 137, 141, 139, respectively.
16. Y. Yadin, "Finding Bar Kochba's Dispatches: The Exciting Story of an Archaeological Expedition Among the Dead Sea Caves," Part I. *The Illustrated London News*, November 4, 1961, 772-775, fig. 15. Y. Yadin, "New Discoveries in the Judean Desert," *The Biblical Archaeologist* 24 (1961) 42.
17. E. R. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*. Bollingen Series 37 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953) 174.
18. M. Avi-Yonah, "A Jewish Relief from Beth-shan; On the Problem of the Shovel as a Jewish Symbol," *Bulletin of the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society* 8 (1940) 20-21; pl. ii, 2. I am indebted to Professor E. R. Goodenough for this reference; the original article is in Hebrew, from which it was translated for Professor Goodenough by Immanuel Ben-Dor.
19. E. Saglio, "Batillum," *Dictionnaire* I (1884), fig. 806.
20. H. Menzel, *Antike Lampen im Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseum zu Mainz* (Mainz 1954) 106-108; Abb. 89 (bronze lamps); 25-30; Abb. 25, 1-3, 6-8; Abb. 26, 16 (terracotta lamps).
21. G. M. A. Hanfmann, "Excavations at Sardis, 1958," *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 154 (April 1959) 24, 31-32, n.65; fig. 11.

THE DESIGN AND MYTH IN EURIPIDES' *ION*

BY CHRISTIAN WOLFF

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἥ δ' ὅς, οὐ ῥαδίως εὐρήσεις
ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν, εἰάν τὸ
ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμάσῃς.

Plato *Charmides* 173d6f

ION has not the bitterness of an *Electra* or *Hecuba*, nor the force of a *Medea* or *Bacchae*. It seems more like a romance. And, like *Helen*, *Iphigenia among the Taurians* and *Orestes*, it has no catastrophe. Disaster is averted, though very narrowly. If one thinks of it as a kind of romance, then a certain leisurely digressiveness — descriptions, talk of myths, of political life in Athens — is not inappropriate, and a number of critics, complaining of distracting irrelevancies, might be fairly answered. Yet the play is also genuinely serious, to which at least its near catastrophe can testify; it must somehow qualify as a tragedy. To try to show wherein *Ion*'s seriousness lies is the object of this essay. But to do so we shall have to account further for the play's seeming digressions, the role of Athens in it, and the way the myth is used. And for that purpose we begin with its formal design, its plot.

I

Hermes opens the play; Athena appears at its conclusion. Gods frame its action, suggesting their providential care yet also underlining the helplessness of human beings acting within the limited spheres of their knowledge and on the impulses of their feelings. Humans have to be protected from themselves.

The prologue spoken by Hermes recounts the past and forecasts the outlines of the plot to come: that Apollo's oracle will give the god's child by a human mother to her human husband Xuthus (69f), that Creusa will know her lost son when he comes to her house (71f), and that Apollo's union with her will be kept secret as Ion comes into his inheritance (73). Yet this forecast omits the principal substance of the play; its main action will originate in human impulses and feelings. Xuthus thinks it better to hide from his wife the son that the god has

given him. Yet she finds the deception out and in her outrage plots to kill Ion, forcing the god's hand. Recognition takes place in Delphi, not Athens, and what the god had intended to keep hidden is revealed. The prologue gives only a partial and — an unusual feature — an inaccurate forecast. Even a god's foresight, even Apollo's, who is said to prophesy "the things that are and that will be" (7), seems to be limited. We are, after all, left with doubts about the god's reliability. And his limitations are brought to light precisely by the force of human feelings. Divine providence, evident though it finally is, is only at the edges, so to speak, in the past and future, of human experience.

That Hermes should speak the prologue keeps Apollo, whom we might have expected, at a certain distance — which will be maintained throughout the play. Athena, in turn, will speak for him at the end because he "does not think it fitting to appear lest he incur public blame for what is in the past" (1557f).¹ Hermes, on the other hand, is a more familiar god, a mediator between gods and men. He is also sometimes a guide out of dangerous or remote places. In *Helen* it is Hermes who brings the heroine to Egypt, saving her from the havoc at Troy and the loss of her virtue (*Hel.* 44, 670, 910), and it is he who promises that she will return home (57). It was also Hermes who came to say that Odysseus would have to leave Calypso's island, "the navel of the sea" (*Odyssey* 1.50). It was Hermes, he himself now tells us, who brought the infant Ion to Delphi, having helped to save him from death at his exposure (37ff). And now he has come to find him once more, a youth grown up, at the "navel of the earth" (5, 223), and to introduce the action that will bring Ion back to Athens and his inheritance.²

The appearance of Hermes, then, is the first of a series of repetitions, and so establishes the principal means of the play's construction. The story of Creusa's unwilling union with Apollo, her secret giving birth, and the child's exposure — in the same cave in which the union took place (17f) — is repeated six times. The past is continually kept before us, while each telling of the story, always in a somewhat different mode and context, marks successive turns of the plot. For all its surface action, intrigues and violent complications, this plot turns on revelations of the truth about the past, on knowledge and recognitions (recalling, in this respect, the story of another foundling, Oedipus).

After Hermes' detached expository account in the prologue (8–27), Creusa tells her own story, or rather, only as much of it as she knows, and disguises her part in it by claiming to speak for a friend (338ff). She tells it to Ion, its other human protagonist, in stychomythic ex-

change, neither of course knowing his true relation to the other, though the boy notices how close the story is to his own (360f, cf. 354). The exchange reveals an unconscious sympathy between the two (cf. 307, 312, 320), while underlining the lack of knowledge which separates them. A brief retelling follows by the chorus who evoke the mythical coloring of the story's setting, Athens' Steep Rocks and the cave of Pan (492-506). They too are in ignorance, unaware that their mistress is the subject of their song. Next, at the center of the play, in the middle of the third of five episodes, Creusa tells her story once again (881ff). But now she speaks openly — or rather sings, for it is a lyric monologue, an aria, which carries the rush of her feelings. The story is given in its fullest detail, an intimate revelation and re-evocation of the experience of its human participant. At this dramatic crux of the plot an expression of the greatest intensity of feeling coincides with the greatest ignorance of circumstances. Revealing her innermost experience, Creusa is in the deepest obscurity about its actual ramifications. Her despair is occasioned by wrongly thinking her child dead and her sense of betrayal by supposing Apollo had abandoned it and has now given, not her, but Xuthus another. Her revelation is repeated in an exchange with her old manservant (936ff) as the sense of having been wronged is turned outward into a plan for revenge, a plot on the seeming intruder's — Ion's — life. Finally, at the recognition of mother and son, when the story nears its conclusion, it is told once more (1479ff). The human actors in it have identified one another. The loss it recounted is made good. And yet at this point, with a shift from the interplay of knowledge and ignorance to that of doubt and belief, Ion finds that he cannot wholly accept the story. Though once having been convinced that Apollo might have ravished a woman (339ff, 355), he now rejects the possibility and refuses to believe that the god could have deceived (1523ff, 1537ff). Athena must appear to persuade Ion, complete the story and give it her authority.

The retelling of a story out of the past marks the stages of its fulfillment in the present — the actual plot that we witness. This latter too, then, is partly made out of a repetition of elements of the oft-told tale. Hermes who first saved Ion's life is once again present as Ion finds a new life. Ion's extraordinary survival with a god's help at his birth recalls his mother's miraculous survival as the only child of Erechtheus (277ff; cf. 280 and 31). Ion's birth is repeated symbolically in the action of the play. He is given a name for the first time (81, 661, 800ff). A birthday feast is arranged for him (651ff). He learns who his parents are, and he is assured of his inheritance. "Having died" and

seeming "no more dead" (1444), he is born again to a new life.³ And Ion's second birth is accompanied by a violence of despair as his first birth, preceded by the violence of desire (cf. 11), is attended by the violence implicit in fear. Creusa plots to kill Ion, in the course of the play's action, at the celebration of his birthday, and so unwittingly repeats the past. She had left her nameless child — nameless as the Ion against whom she plots is anonymous — to die (cf. 18, 27), principally out of fear and despair (cf. 898, 1497; yet contrast 965). But just as the god did not let the infant Ion die, so chance — or providence — causes Creusa's attempted poisoning to fail (1187ff). Ion's own actions, his violent intentions against Xuthus (524f) and Creusa (1261ff),⁴ have of course no correspondence in the past, yet they suggest in part his family past, his father. Ion's ultimately harmless violence parallels Apollo's original violence to Creusa, a violence mixed with love and fortunate in issue. And Ion's first appearance, it has been pointed out, a handsome youth, wearing fillets (522) and carrying a bow (108, 158), would recall the figure of Apollo.⁵ The setting in which he appears, further, the splendid morning scene of Delphi, is like a counterpart of the beautiful landscape in which Apollo appeared to Creusa (887ff).

The play's action is also made up of formal structural repetitions. Two recognition scenes, a deceptive one between Ion and his supposed father Xuthus and the true one between Ion and his mother, are its focal points. Two consultations of Apollo's oracle initiate it, Xuthus' about progeny and Creusa's more private inquiry about the fate of her lost son. And two attempted killings, Creusa's of her son and Ion's of his mother, mark its dramatic climaxes.⁶

Thus far one might say that the effect of these repetitions and doublings out of the past is to give the play a specifically mythical atmosphere, a dream-like quality and a sense of *déjà vu*; doublings are one of the most characteristic features of mythical stories.⁷ Euripides appears to be making a particular effort to evoke a sense of legend and myth. Thus the play also includes an unusually high number of passing references to myths not directly affecting its action. And, of course, the outlines of its story — about a foundling, child of a god, who after an obscure youth and apparent death is revealed as the eponymous hero of a great people — include some of the most common archetypal features of myths. But a certain nostalgia informs this treatment of myths seemingly for their own sake. As the play moves out of a marvelous past to complete its story in a more ambiguous present, its purpose is shown to be more than the re-creation of a legendary mood. The

very time of its composition, in the latter years of the fifth century,⁸ would indicate as much. One further repetition may serve as demonstration: Ion's double parentage. He has two fathers, one divine and invisible, the other human and present. The one, we are assured, is the true father, the other, we see, is only putative, only in the "fond illusion" that he is father (1602). (Ion's other mother is Apollo's priestess, the Pythia; cf. 321, 1324.) And yet the true father is a figure in the remote world of a divine story, while the supposed one stands before us, drawn with an all but comic realism.⁹ What, in fact, the play asks in an almost Pirandellian fashion, is the substance of the truth. We must now follow its wry, ironic, sad and comic interplay between the remote and immediate, realistic and mythical, true and suppositious; between the nostalgia — and absurdity — of dreams and the disillusion of conflicting harsh feeling and reason.

II

The setting of the play is, of course, Delphi. But the story is an Athenian one. The chorus is made up of visiting Athenian attendants on an Athenian *grande dame*, Creusa. That Xuthus is not a born Athenian is the principal cause of the suspicions held against him by the chorus and Creusa. Ion, raised in Delphi and devoted to its life, will almost be killed as a foreign pretender to Athenian rule (702ff, 813ff, 1058ff). The final scene of recognition will also be a recognition of Ion's true city, and the play ends with a departure, or rather return, to Athens, under the guidance of Pallas Athena who, "gracious in Athens and in this place" (1554), comes to Delphi to set the seal of her authority on Ion's parentage and progeny. The play is also filled with the figures of Athenian legend: Cecrops and his daughters the Aglauridae (23, 272ff, 1163), Erechthonius, Erechtheus (cf. 24, 267ff, 723f, 999ff), the Gorgon (210, 999ff, 1055, 1265), and, of course, Athena herself (cf. 209ff, 452ff, 991ff). The procession to Eleusis and the celebrations there are recalled as a peculiarly Athenian privilege (1074-1089). The setting of Apollo's encounter with Creusa, the landscape at the edges of the Acropolis, the Steep Rocks, the hill and cave of Cecrops (936, 1400), the cave and probably later shrine of Apollo (283f), a cave and altar of Pan (490ff, 938, cf. Herodotus VI.105), are all continually evoked. We hear of an apparently current practice of putting amulets into the cradle of a new-born child (20f, 1322f), and it is these, together with a typical Athenian girl's weaving, picturing a Gorgon, and a branch of Athenian olive, that are the tokens by which Ion is recognized

(1416-1436). He finds his mother and his city by the latter's characteristic emblems.

For some commentators *Ion* is in fact principally a kind of glorification of Athens.¹⁰ No doubt Athenians would take pleasure in their national stories. But the extent of this glorification may be gauged by contrast to a play such as Euripides' *Suppliants*, an "encomium of Athens," as the hypothesis calls it, or to *Erechtheus*, Euripides' earlier treatment of this part of Athenian legend — both plays of the later 420's.¹¹ The tenor of *Ion*, on the other hand, is not so much praise of Athens, but rather nostalgia for the city's past expressed through poetic elaborations on her earliest mythology and lingering recollections of the hope of a Ionian empire (cf. 74f, 1575ff). It is a nostalgia which may well be imagined in the years after Sicily. Further, if the play is considered patriotic, it shows a patriotism of the narrower sort. Athens is no longer represented as the city of refuge for outsiders or the oppressed as before in *Medea*, *Heraclidae*, *Suppliants* or *Heracles*. We see an Athens for the Athenians, insisting on her autochthony and the exclusiveness of her citizenry (cf. 589ff, 673ff, 290ff), a reflection of a more militant and inflexible national attitude, and of a more intolerant self-assertiveness suggestive of the latter years of the war.¹²

But the most telling indication of how we may view Athens' political life breaks in on the action of the play when Ion speaks against it. It has been noted that Ion, without knowing that he is born of an Athenian mother, is drawn rather like a young Athenian of good family, similar to the young men in some of Plato's dialogues.¹³ Yet he first reacts to his presumed father's offer of wealth, rule and family in Athens by rejecting it. And through his long speech of rejection — usually ignored or declared irrelevant by the commentators¹⁴ — Euripides momentarily dispels the legendary aura otherwise surrounding Athens in the play. Beside the mythical he sets a contemporary view. The resulting clash, then, is surely not a sign of incompetence — at such length in so polished a play — but a deliberately disturbing interruption.

Like almost all the speeches in Euripides which have a programmatic look about them or seem out of context, this one is qualified by its situation. Ion is moved to speak, in great part, by the mistaken assumption that he is illegitimate and of foreign birth. And, though he begins by remarking that the appearance of things is not the same seen from a distance as it is close up (585f) — preparing us for a disparity of viewpoints, he nevertheless goes on to describe an Athens he has never seen and knows only "from a distance." But the substance of what he says still serves to remind his audience of contemporary politics.

We hear that if anyone seeks to play a prominent part in the city, he is hated by the powerless many out of envy for his gifts, ridiculed by those who are "good" and have the sense to keep quiet, uninvolved in public affairs, and kept from office by the extreme contentiousness of those who hold it (595-606). These are all motifs characteristic of the history of Athenian politics, though hard to locate at any specific moment of it.¹⁵ After indicating the difficulty of taking part in Athens' political life, Ion passes on to a rejection of political life as such. He does this by the somewhat oblique way of a critique of tyranny or kingship (621ff), begun with a repetition of the distinction between pleasant appearance and questionable actuality (622f).¹⁶ The contrast between public and private life then becomes one between life in Athens and life in Delphi (633ff), a transition effected by Ion's refusal of wealth with its troubles and his preference for a "measured" existence "without pain" (629-632). Delphi is thus a place of refuge and withdrawal, and Ion wishes to choose a life whose terms, as his language suggests,¹⁷ can be called hedonistic.

Ion ends his speech asking to be left to live his life in Delphi, "for there is equal charm in delighting in great things" — the public life of rule — "and in having the small with pleasure" (646f). This slightly contradictory close — for it qualifies rather than drives home the point of his argument — suggests that preference for Delphi is in part theoretical; it makes the qualification "other things being equal." But in fact they are not, and there is actually no question of Ion's not going to Athens with his new father. Xuthus simply ignores Ion's arguments altogether (650ff). On the other hand, Ion has made clear how qualified his acceptance of public life is and at what cost he leaves Delphi. An ideal of existence, poetically exemplified in his opening monody (82-183), is expressly preferred to the fulfillment of a national destiny. And, aside from the contrast of ways of life, we see in Ion a young man at a transition between them, growing up to face a harsher kind of existence and first recoiling at the difficulties of it. An immediate question frames his speech: who is his mother (540ff, 563ff, 668ff)? (This preoccupation is unconsciously reflected in the middle of his speech when he expresses pity for the childless Creusa [618ff].) The speech itself turns on the question "where can he live?" Ion, unable as yet to see their interrelation, knows only that neither question can be satisfactorily answered. Thus he falls back on what he has known, his life in Delphi, and what he has been, a servant of Apollo.

By giving a qualified view of Athens and suggesting an ideal of life

whose values are private and nonpolitical, Ion's speech, then, has its place in the dramatic fabric of the play. Furthermore, one can also see through it the play's principal affective motifs. As the plans of Apollo had intended the action's end in Athens and yet it was precipitated in Delphi, so the mood and feelings ascribed by Ion to his prospective home erupt already in his present one. Athens he had described as "a city full of fear" (601) and the life of the *tyrannos* as beset by fear (624, 628). Fear also moves the present actors. Xuthus is fearful in his anxiety over Ion's distraction (584). After witnessing the reunion of Ion and Xuthus and having been threatened with death if they reveal it, the chorus look forward with fear to misfortune (686); and so too then Creusa and her attendant (757, 755). Ion had, in his speech, expressed fear of his presumed stepmother if he should come to Athens (611ff). It is a fear fully warranted by the plot against his life in the following scene, a plot encouraged by the suspicious fear which ignorance generates (cf. 685ff, 808ff, 1300f). Creusa, as we noticed earlier, is here moved by a fear comparable to the one which had originally caused her to expose her child (898, 1497). Ironically, it is only her hesitating fear, before planning her vengeance on Apollo, which she finds easy to overcome (975ff). But, her plan discovered, she flees, once again in fear, to Apollo's altar (cf. 1280). And at the end, even Apollo is moved, Athena tells us, to allow the reunion of Ion and Creusa in Delphi rather than Athens, "fearing" that mother and son might kill one another (1564f). Yet the last inner disturbance, and that most ambiguously resolved, is again human. Ion is "shaken" lest Apollo's oracle prove false (1537f). This fear calls forth Athena herself to resolve it, or rather to reconcile Ion to the fact that the god did lie. The youth's equanimity is disturbed before he comes to the "city full of fear." The simple life of Delphi he had thought he could choose is disrupted for him willy-nilly.

Ion's speech links fear with hatred and violence. The powerless in the city would hate him, he says (597), and so straightway the chorus of Athenian women turn against him and wish him dead (704, 720). The hatred Ion foresees from his apparent stepmother (611) is immediately revealed in his unknowing mother. A tyrant hates the good citizen (628). Ion himself becomes an object of hatred and then turns with hatred on the woman who plotted his death. He had spoken of the proverbial violence of women, given to poisoning and murder (616), and of the violence threatening the tyrant's life (624 [if we read Stephanus' βίαν], 628). Yet violence is at the heart of the story from the beginning. Apollo took Creusa by force (βίᾱ, 11, 437, 892), a

characteristically Olympian way, Ion remarks (445). The violence these actors intend against one another we have already noticed. And throughout myths of violent action are recalled: Heracles, Bellerophon, and the Olympian gods destroying monsters and giants (190-218), Erechtheus killed by Poseidon (282), the daughters of Cecrops making bloody a cliff in their death (274), Athena warring on the Earthborn and slaying the Gorgon (987ff, cf. 1054f). In all the reaches of the play — among its individual actors, in the distantly apprehended world of politics, amidst the figures of the myths — there is violence and force. What is threatened in the human world, however, is never, in the course of the action, realized, while the gods' violence proves beneficent.

Ion's outburst about Athens — the interruption of a contemporary view of the city in an otherwise legendary setting — is an isolated occurrence in the play. It is only a momentary reminder. And as it is allowed to fade, so is violence shown finally under control. Though violence permeates the action, it is subordinate to an apparently providential design. To what extent that design is due to a genuine sense of divine ordering or to poetic — and thus wishful and hypothetical — disposition remains to be seen. For the moment we may notice the ineffectiveness of human actions which the plot shows, men's inability to realize on their own what they wish.¹⁸ Human capacity for violence is not a capacity for strength. We see it most clearly in Creusa's old manservant, who has barely the strength to get himself on stage, "willing" though he is (746, cf. 1215),¹⁹ and, of course, in Creusa herself who suffered Apollo "against her will" (941). In trying to kill Ion, Creusa had acted, she says, "unwillingly" (1500). We might have expected her to say "unknowingly": human action without knowledge seems no more than human suffering under constraint. The implications of this thought Ion had indicated earlier (when Creusa would have forced an answer about her son from Apollo): "We should indeed be foolish were we to try to make the gods speak against their will what they did not wish" (374f, cf. Sophocles *OT* 280f). "For," he continues, "what we strive after by force, against the gods' will, we shall obtain as goods of no use, but in those things they give willingly we shall profit" (378ff). To Ion, at this point, a life without involvements, *apragmosyne*, seems divinely ordained.²⁰ He remarks in his speech about Athens that he himself is "what one would wish for men, even against their will," namely of a just nature (642f). If humans cannot quite achieve what they wish by force, they may have it forced upon them. And yet even Ion, who had said that the god's hand could not be forced, tries finally to do so in order to assure himself of his true paternity (1547f).

He thus brings about the appearance of Athena. It is a curious final compromise between human and divine intentions. If the motif of violence and force in the play shows how powerless humans are, their helplessness is yet a condition of favor, though that favor may be mixed.

The play has a happy ending. It shows favor. The human actors, on the one hand, are bound up in fear, hatred, and futile violence. Compassion alone sometimes redeems them: the Pythian priestess who takes in the infant Ion out of pity (cf. 47); the mutual sympathy of Ion and Creusa when neither knows the other (cf. 307, 312, 359f) — though Ion is tempted by a kind of Apollonian indifference (433f, cf. 439); Ion's pity for the childlessness of Creusa (618f); his pity for his unknown mother — ironically expressed as he holds Creusa at bay before Apollo's altar (1276f, 1369f, 1378f); and the compassionate, if misguided, loyalty of Creusa's manservant (cf. 925ff). But such feelings alone are not sufficient. Only by divine favor are these figures saved, a favor sometimes distant, sometimes violent (cf. Aeschylus *Ag.* 180–4). Apollo's rape is called a "favor" done Aphrodite (896). Hermes rescues the infant Ion as a favor to his brother (36f). Divine graciousness is evident only in the larger perspective of time. Human beings, for the most part, can hardly understand it. Creusa, unaware of its future, feels only the "thankless betrayal" of her union with Apollo (880), and immediate circumstances confirm her feeling. Offering thanks to the chorus for any news of Xuthus' consultation of the oracle (751), she must hear that her husband, to whom no favor seems due (914), has been given a child, she none. Yet she had herself been given to Xuthus in recompense for his service to Athens (62, 297). He, in turn, seems only to have shown ingratitude, hiding from her his son (1100) and presumably having done another woman favor (1104). The only favor bestowed by a human and referred to as such is done in deception. The old manservant pretends to do Ion a favor as he hands him a poisoned cup (1183).

Between the distant divine favor and the immediate obscurity of human passions — between Apollo and Creusa — stands Ion. Set apart from ordinary circumstances, his past life had a gracious quality about it, but now we also see its limitations. Not only a god's son, he finds ties to humanity. Not only son of a remote and heavenly Apollo, he discovers his mother, granddaughter of one of the earthborn. Favor is shown him by the discovery of his parentage. Yet, as Ion finds his mother and comes into an inheritance proclaimed glorious, he loses the peace of his early life, is caught up in violence and may look

forward, in an Athens he had described, to new hazards. Favor has its price. However, we are made to see not only its qualified nature but also a view of things in which it is possible.

III

Human feelings such as the play represents are immediately recognizable. We can call them realistic. Divine favor, on the other hand, is part of a myth, a poetic invention. Thus, similar to the repetitions in the present of a story out of the past shaping the play's plot, there is a drama in the interaction of what is immediate and human with the remote and divine. And a like interaction between what is mythical and what seems humanly reasonable is dramatized principally through the characters of the play themselves. But before turning to them we should notice the way mythical elements as such are represented, for, aside from being the drama of its actors, the play is, in a sense, also about myth itself.

The chorus makes its entrance singing an account of what they see represented before them on Apollo's temple: Heracles destroying the Hydra, his companion Iolaus, "subject of stories told as we sit by our weaving," and the battle of "Giants on the marble walls" with the Olympians, among whom Athena is singled out (190ff, 205ff, 209ff). We are reminded at the beginning of the play's action that the figures we see on stage may also be part simply of a body of stories. Athena, who will herself appear at the end, is also seen as a figure in stone at the beginning. The play thus creates effects of perspective, of seeing, as it were, double from differing angles. The action we witness is compelling, but throughout it we are reminded that there are others like it which are only stories one tells (cf. 225, 265, 275, 506, 994) or works of art one sees (cf. 271) — such as these sculptures, or the tapestries of mythical beings and the story of Cecrops' daughters later described at length by the messenger (1141ff, 1158ff). (The tapestries in turn are out of another story, Heracles' gift, we are told, of his spoils from the Amazons [1144f].) Pointed at in this way, the mythical elements in the play are distanced and isolated as such; they are made to appear decorative.²¹

It has been observed that the opening chorus' description of statutory, while apparently unique in tragedy as we know it, corresponds to a characteristic feature of epic, namely the description of a place when someone first arrives there (cf., for example, *Odyssey* 5.63ff, 7.84ff).²² Such description sets a scene, of course; but it also serves to introduce

that scene from a distance and in a contemplative mode. Thus one finds it associated with the motif of gazing in wonder (cf. *Odyssey* 5.74f, 7.82f, 133f, 4.43f) and, in *Ion*, with an emphasis on seeing (cf., in this passage, 190, 194, 201, 205f, 208f, 211, 214; and cf. later 1142). Once again there is an effect of distancing. Art is set before us detached and for the viewing.

This detachment corresponds to the play's mood of withdrawal and Ion's first peaceful life. And just as there is a movement from withdrawal to the involvement and pathos of events, so descriptions and static pictures only furnish pauses in which the distance of seeing is interposed between the conflicts of feeling and action. Ion's opening monody, for example, begins by describing a beautiful morning scene: the sun's rising, the heights of Parnassus and the smoke of myrrh rising to the temple eaves (82-90). He then goes on to appoint and fulfill the various tasks about the temple, and finally ends with the flourish of chasing away the defiling birds — and it is only in the latter part of his song that Ion indicates the possibility that he may have to leave this life (152f). The scene is an outline of the play's procedure. Similarly the messenger's speech — so puzzling to critics because of its elaborations — begins with a full description of a setting and of the tapestries we have already mentioned, and only then goes on to relate what has actually happened, the attempted killing of Ion. (The tapestries, incidentally, themselves first represent static scenes of nature and then scenes of action [1147ff].) The initial description, almost half the length of the messenger's speech, is so evidently contrary to dramatic exigency — the burden of the message is a matter of life and death to the chorus (1119f) — that we cannot fail to notice the artifice of the pause.

But the most striking juxtaposition — or rather, in this instance, superposition — of detachment and involvement, of the stasis of description and the pathos of human feelings, is found at the center of the play in Creusa's monody. It is an explosion of despair and outrage (cf. 862ff); and yet simultaneously it suggests a withdrawn calm. Its procedure approaches the formality of a hymn,²³ a striking irony: its substance, a denunciation of Apollo, is cast in the form of praise. For all the sorrow Creusa expresses, we are but half moved or at least reconciled, knowing that it will prove groundless. And her outcry is modulated by the accompanying evocations of nature and the god. She begins her revelations by invoking the heavens, "Zeus' many-starred seat" (870, cf. 1, 796f), and Athena as goddess of her city's "rocks" and of the Tritonian lake (871f). The scene of the rape is colored by the flash of divine gold, of the gold and saffron of gathered flowers and the

whiteness of a girl's wrists (887ff). If in her anger Creusa cries to the god that "Delos hates you," she continues, "and the laurel's shoots next to delicately-tressed palm, where Leto gave birth to her sacred offspring, you, by Zeus' harvesting" (919ff). Her feeling seems dissolved by the beauty of the images which accompany it. Apollo, presumed betrayer, is yet described "making sing the seven-toned cithara's voice, sounding between the lifeless horns of field animals fair-sounding Muses' hymns" (881ff). The god's music stands for the detachment of art; and at the same time, before the immediacy of human feeling, for Creusa in her ignorance and overwhelmed by her sorrow, it represents divine indifference (cf. 905f; cf. 1090f). That Apollo is here described almost exclusively in his musical aspect suggests that Euripides equates him with poetry. Because we know that in time the god will put the tangle of human affairs in order, the play can sustain its poise between obscure, explosive feelings and an ironic, poetic sense of distance. If the god stands for poetry, his divine favor is the decorative work of the playwright.

The myths, then, as they are presented partly suggest detachment, a self-sufficient poetry, enhanced by images of nature — stars (84, 797, 870, 1078, 1147, 1151ff), sun (41, 82f, 1134, 1148, 1439, 1467, 1516, 1550), moon (1080, 1155), night (85, 717, 955, 1049, 1150), rocks (11, 274, 492ff, 714f, 871, 936f, 1267, 1479f, 1482), caves (17, 288, 500ff, 892, 937f, 948, 958, 1239, 1494), water (95ff, 105f, 116ff, 147ff, 167, 174f, 872, 1075, 1081ff), laurel (76, 80, 103, 112f, 148, 422, 919), ivy (217), olive (1433ff, 1480) — and the coloring of gold (9, 25, 146, 157, 192, 431, 459, 887, 890, 909, 1007, 1030, 1085, 1154, 1165, 1175, 1182, 1429f). But even as these elements of nature, apart from their suggestion of a withdrawn calm, take on the associations of a story which began in the darkness of a cave and unfolds in the natural beauty of Delphi, so the myths have their symbolic relevance. That they reflect the role of violence in the play we have already noticed, and with violence a benign end. The images of fire and snake are similar. Iolaus, in the sculptures described by the chorus, carries a fiery torch against the giants (195) and Zeus burns one down with his thunderbolt of fire (212ff). That violence serves order. On the other hand, fire is the weapon of the monster Chimaera (202). Within the action of the play itself Creusa's manservant suggests burning down Apollo's temple in revenge for her wrong (974). And Creusa, justifying her attempt on Ion's life, says she had feared he would set her house on fire (1293f). Both are fantastic suggestions, yet an indication of irrational impulses

for which a Chimaera is emblematic. However, as Olympian violence, like Apollo's — whose "Pythian lightnings" consecrate the Steep Rocks where he took Creusa by force (285) — ends with favor, so fire is also associated with the torches of Dionysus' celebrations (550, 716f, 1125f), of the Eleusinian processions (1075f), and with the sacrifices attending Ion's birthday celebration (707f). The snake (continually recalled through the figure of Cecrops [272, 936, 1163, 1400, 1571] usually represented as half snake [1164, cf. schol. Aristoph. *Wasps* 438]) likewise stands for a double power. The snake-haired Gorgon is a threatening figure destroyed by Athena (990f). Yet, turned into an image on her aegis, it becomes protective (995f). At Delphi there are two Gorgon figures who keep watch on Apollo's temple (224). Athena had put snakes by the infant Erichthonius to protect him (22f), and "in imitation of the ancient Erichthonius" snake amulets were put into Ion's cradle (1427ff), apparently an old practice of Athenian mothers (cf. 20, 25f). The positive, protective aspect of this mythical force is realized when it becomes a representation or artifact. It is like Euripides' treatment of the myth whose fantastic, irrational substance is not denied or by-passed, but preserved as it is distanced. The twofold force of the snake, finally, is perfectly expressed by the nature of the Gorgon's blood: it can either kill — as the poison intended for Ion — or it can heal and "sustain life" (1013ff).

The myths are most relevant as they are associated with the characters of the play's action, and to their relationship we turn next. Creusa, the burden of whose life is in the past, is most closely linked to the various mythical figures of the play — which is also appropriate to the feminine intensity and irrational feeling in her character. The latter Ion forcefully expresses through the images of snake and fire just noticed: "Oh father Kephisus of the bull's shape, what serpent is this woman, your progeny, what snake glancing a fire's murderous flame, all of whose rashness is the nature of the drops of the Gorgon's blood" (1262ff). The mythical images characterize precisely an immediate, psychological fact.²⁴ Creusa's closeness to the mythical world, then, is indicated by her ancestry which includes not only the river Kephisus but also one of the earthborn, her grandfather Erichthonius (20, 267f, 1000).²⁵ (His infancy was attended on by Athena [21f, 270] and it was from her that he received the drops of Gorgon's blood which are handed down to Creusa [1001ff].) Her father was Erechtheus who was swallowed up by the earth after being struck down by Poseidon (281f). And to complete her associations with legend, Creusa bears Apollo a son.

Xuthus, though a grandson of Zeus (63, 292), is, on the other hand, farthest from the mythical world. The point is nicely made when Ion, trying to discover who his mother might be, asks whether the earth might have born him. Xuthus answers drily that "the earth doesn't bear children" (542), a reasonable answer setting into a comic light all the earthborn which the play tells of — Erichthonius, the Giants (218), the Gorgon (989). However, Xuthus' is not the view of the play. He is a limited figure whose imagination does not extend beyond the everyday world and whose feelings, though well-intentioned, are obtuse (cf. 401ff). His way is to let things fall out as they might, pursuing no inquiry too far (659f, 575). We noticed that he hardly seemed aware of Ion's feelings at the prospect of leaving Delphi. And as for the mother of his new-found son, he forgets to ask the oracle who she might be; the question is raised only at Ion's insistence. Xuthus' exchange with his apparent son, the so-called "false" recognition scene, is characterized by a lightness of tone approaching comedy and by its realism. There is nothing mythical about the incident revealed out of the older man's past: he once seduced one of Delphi's girls (545ff). This dialogue is a counterpart to the one just preceding between Ion and Creusa which was characterized by its pathos, the excitement of a possible recognition and the unconscious feeling of sympathy between the speakers — in contrast to Ion's first repulsion of Xuthus' eager embrace (519ff). Yet the exchange between Ion and Creusa was also filled with mythical tales (cf. 265ff, 275ff, 336ff). The truer situation and the greater psychological rightness, the more substantial feelings, unconscious though they may be, are associated with the more extraordinary world of the myths.

Through Xuthus, too, the myths are distanced. And his role well illustrates the fact that, though distanced, they do not necessarily lose their symbolic force. We are, instead, allowed to confront them with a measure of detachment, failing which they would seem only absurd and Euripides no more than a mocker of the old stories. But once the myth is pointed at for what it is, or when it is seen, through such a figure as Xuthus, in a realistic and half-comic light, we are disarmed; our belief is easily suspended. And thus we can reconsider the myth's possible meaning and our relation to it. Xuthus' limitations lead us to look again beyond him.²⁶

The myth, more generally, may also reveal the limitations of human reason and human feeling. It has been well pointed out that Creusa's manservant, hearing of Xuthus' new son, deduces a plot — that Xuthus is trying to pass off an illegitimate child on the royal family

(816ff) — by the common sophistic and rationalist procedure of inference from likelihood, *εἰκός*.²⁷ He makes a reasonable assumption given the appearance of things. And yet, in fact, he could not be in greater error.²⁸ The myth here stands for a greater incommensurability in things, which the old man leaves out of his reckoning (a reckoning further obscured by his strong sense of loyalty; cf. 811f). By a particular irony Creusa too fails to regard the implications of the myth. She who had had so much experience of the extraordinary despairs of its possibilities. Her immediate, human sense of betrayal keeps her from hope in the miraculous. (Thus she also excludes any possibility of a fortunate turn in her situation, though she had herself remarked that mortal affairs are continually subject to reversal [969].) There is the implication that a sense of the mythical might keep one from despair. But Creusa's sense of injury outweighs hope and makes the extraordinary seem far distant. Both the simple reasoning of the manservant and the feeling of Creusa are baffled and insufficient before the obscurities which a mythical world represents.

Between Creusa who is closest to the world of legend, though misunderstanding it, and Xuthus who, in his narrower, ordinary way, is farthest from it, there is Ion. His life, as we first see it, is in accord with Delphi and the service of its god. He has an intuitive understanding of his relation to Apollo, calling him "father" (136-9, cf. 109). Though thinking he speaks symbolically, he unconsciously speaks simple truth. For him myth and his own innocent sense of the world coincide. But it is a precarious coincidence. Straightway the encounter with Creusa follows in which Ion comes to believe that Apollo, as careless seducer, does not measure up to the claims of human decency. "The god," he admits, "is unjust" (355, cf. 341, 254). But Ion still prevents Creusa from consulting Apollo's oracle. He withdraws to the view, which we noted earlier, that the criterion of divinity is power and the god cannot be forced (373ff). Tempted, next, to put Creusa and her accusations against Apollo out of his mind and to return to his simple existence (433ff), Ion nevertheless reconsiders further: "I must give Phoebus some advice. What is the matter with him?" (436f). His naiveté and the colloquial turn²⁹ are light in tone. At the same time his language changes from the poetry of his opening monody to a more prosaic and rational questioning.³⁰ A critique of divine morality follows whose general substance is the familiar philosophical and rationalist attack on the traditional gods of the myths. Ion gives abstract formulation to the tension in the play between the mythical

and the human, particularly as the latter is represented by reason and moral feeling. The gods, Ion says, strong (439, 446) and violent (437, 445), act in a way that is incommensurable with human morality and justice (cf. 449-51). And yet they "write" men's laws (442f). Where, then, in the obscurity of their circumstances, can men find an objective justice (449ff)? However, what the gods do is "beautiful" (450).³¹ The myth and the irrational state of things for which it stands are incompatible with a notion of justice, at least justice in a political, that is, human sense. For such conflicts the play indicates no solution; it simply raises them and, by the manner of their presentation, distances them. Thus Ion's words are qualified not only by a certain lightness of tone,³² but also, as in his speech about Athens, by his lack of knowledge. He is, after all, himself an unknowing witness of the fruitfulness of the god's violence. Apollo's greatest injustice, he imagines, is to have taken no care for his offspring (438f). Yet among Ion's first words in the play was a thanksgiving for the care the god had shown him (110, 137, 183; cf. 323, 327; 36). The formulation of a conflict between human and divine is subordinate to a demonstration of the limits of human knowledge. The incompatibility of "beauty" and "justice" is the result of an obscurity in the human situation from which only "beauty" — the myth — can on occasion distract us.

Creusa, we saw, resists the myth's suggestion of miraculous possibility because of the intensity of her feeling. Ion, on the other hand, recoils from a mythical world because of his demands for reasonableness. Yet both are fundamentally moved by a similar impulse. When they next confront each other, after Creusa's attempt on her son's life, she seeks asylum at the altar of Apollo. (It is a beautiful irony, not only because Creusa had denounced the god and had despaired of his help, but because she is now driven to risk her life on the efficacy of his divinity and Ion's persuasion of its worth.) Ion, then, as Creusa had been before, is impelled by his sense of injury, and he would be avenged for the attempt on his life. But first he must exclaim on the behalf of reason: the god has not made intelligent or good laws,³³ for the rights of his sanctuary should be reserved only for the good who deserve them (1312ff). And, once again, though Ion makes the reasonable objection and attempts to formulate a more rational justice, the circumstances belie his words. His argument would justify tearing his mother from the god's altar to put her to death. Once more a critical perspective on the myth is itself qualified by a deeper human ignorance, more specifically now an ignorance about one's origins. Ion does not know who his mother is (cf. 1277, 1307, 1324, 1363, 1375ff); the only hint is part of an old story.

Creusa is partly saved by the god's "unreasonable" laws. She is also saved by the entrance of the Pythia, whose office is to "preserve the old law — *nomos*" of Delphi (1322). The priestess comes with a "new story" (*μῦθος νέος*, 1340), which is actually the old one of her taking in the infant Ion. Her appearance is another of the play's repetitions, as her tale is twice-told. Having in the past been moved by her human pity and by the god's guidance to take in the child left at the temple gate (42ff), she now comes again before the same temple to urge Ion's pity and, unaware of their implication, brings the old tokens of recognition. Together with the past, the myth comes again to the fore. Creusa had been condemned by a decree of the rulers of Delphi (1111f, 1222f), a public enactment of the law. Yet when Ion comes to carry out the decree, he speaks and acts for his own outraged feelings. The decree is not mentioned, nor will the play refer to it again. Instead, the Pythia, representative of an "old law," appears and brings it about that the rights of sanctuary which Ion had attacked are upheld. She achieves this, however, not so much by appealing to them but to Ion's own feelings and understanding for the plight of Creusa (1327ff). Private feelings supplant considerations of public decree and simple reason. Implicit, as throughout the play, is a devaluation of the public, political sense of law. The actions of the gods, Ion had indicated, obscure justice for men (442-51). His speech rejecting Athens raised doubts about the meaningfulness of the city's public life. Being made a citizen "by the laws,"³⁴ Ion remarks, will never take precedence over citizenship by birth (674f). No law, claims Creusa's manservant, stands in the way of doing an enemy ill (1046f), a view which then tempts Ion. Birth, nature, and subjective feeling outweigh the usual public sense of law. The latter is replaced by the Pythia's appeal to Ion's natural feelings and to "law," *nomos*, as a way of life established by its age and, presumably, apprehended by those of better nature. It is this kind of *nomos* which Ion refers to when he says that "a way of life and nature" (*ὁ νόμος ἡ φύσις θ' ἄμα*) combined to make him "just" (643f).³⁵ In this sense *nomos* also meets the myth on the ground of their remote past.³⁶

The world of the myth and human feeling coincide at their greatest intensity in the play's climactic scene, the recognition of mother and son. The past is fulfilled. The old, reiterated story is coming to an end. The recognition is part of the myth, partly miraculous — Ion's cradle as fresh as the day it was made (1391ff), and the olive branch in it still green (1435f) — and partly providential — the Pythia's entrance and the general turn of events which Ion will call *tyche* (1514). Or, to put it

another way, the recognition is part of the play's plot, resulting from what is beyond the apprehension of the characters rather than from their reconciled feelings. But it, in turn, releases one of the most moving of human feelings, the immediate joy of a sense of life at once newly discovered and happily preserved (cf. 1444 with 953, 1038, 1441f, 1496ff).

And yet there is still a snag — the demands, once again, of human thoughtfulness. The final recognition scene is a counterpart to the earlier one in which Ion and Xuthus recognize one another falsely as father and son. The contrast between the two scenes³⁷ now recalls the question of who Ion's father really is, or rather, that Ion does not know. The reversal from ignorance to knowledge, which should characterize a scene of recognition, is not complete. At the moment when Ion's ties to both the human and divine world seem confirmed, he must question the latter. He cannot believe that Apollo is in fact his father, though he had before figuratively thought him so. Human experience suggests that Creusa has substituted the god for a human seducer (1523ff, cf. 325, 341), an assumption Ion shares with the Pythia (44f, 1365f), and for which there is precedence in Xuthus' past.³⁸ Ion, like Creusa before him, now holds to human experience, and doubts the divine. It is the play's last perspective of reason on the myth and is focused by raising the question of truth and falsehood.

If Apollo is Ion's father, the god who prophesies "the things that are," "the truth" (τὰ ὄντα, 7; cf. 531, 537, 1288),³⁹ has simply lied by indicating Xuthus to be father. "Has the god prophesied true or vainly" (ἀληθῆς ἢ μάτην, 1537; cf. 1488)? This question "shakes" Ion's heart "reasonably" (εἰκότως, 1538; cf. 557, 611). But the question of the truth or falsehood of Apollo's oracle is the last in a series asked about the myths. "Is the story true or false" (ἀληθὲς ἢ μάτην) that Erechtheus sacrificed his daughters? Ion had asked Creusa (275). "Is it true, the story they tell" (ἀληθῶς ὥς μεμύθευται) about Erichthonius (265)? Did the earth "truly" (ἀληθῶς) swallow up Creusa's father (281)? Is Apollo's temple "really" (ὄντως) the earth's navel (223; cf. *Or.* 331)? These questions are like the pointing at the myths which we noticed earlier and have a similar effect of distancing. They are also the most explicit references from within a play to the traditional associations of poetry and lying.⁴⁰ When the old stories are questioned, the effect may be partly playful, a game of perspectives between sophisticated skepticism and the seemingly naive fantasies of the myths. But the play does not rest there. Its plot, we saw, continually shows the insufficiency of isolated reason, sensibility

or feeling. Thus the question "true or not?" can also be serious. Truth is not only questioned in a detached, ironic way, but also dramatically, in the light of one human being's despair, another's shaken faith, and a third's deception. All the questions about the truth of the mythical stories are answered in the affirmative by the characters in the play. But Ion's question about the truth of Apollo's oracle is not. And though attacks on Apollo's oracle are not unusual and oracles themselves are notoriously ambiguous about the truth, such a realization can be critical in a particular instance. For Ion the play's action culminates with doubt, not simply about the life to which he has been dedicated, but — once more — about his origins, his father. He is left with the alternative of ignoring the truth or losing his sense of its worth.

Ion's doubt calls forth Athena to resolve it. But the play's happy ending is not an ideal ending. Athena's resolution is not on the private, simply human level, but on a public and aetiological one. Mythical past and aetiological future are not quite harmonized with a human present. Ion who would have lived in anonymous obscurity in Delphi will be famous, giving the Ionians their name (1575, 1587f). Between the private person we have seen and the legend that is announced there is a certain discontinuity. Between the human individual and the myth there is still some distance and obscurity. Apollo, with whom Ion seemed so closely bound at the play's beginning, who moves so much of the story's original and final action, is never seen. Like the presence of Hermes at the start, that of Athena at the end underlines Apollo's absence, his actual remoteness even in Delphi.

The play also ends with a specific deception, a residue, as it were, of its action which had been an interweaving of deceptions and truths.⁴¹ All the actors have been in some degree deceived, by others, circumstances, or themselves. Apollo — to sum it up — had deceived Xuthus into believing Ion his son, a belief Ion is first made to share. Xuthus sets out to deceive Creusa by keeping from her the god's gift of a son, albeit he is well-intentioned, wishing to put off her grief at remaining childless (656ff). Creusa, learning of his deception, in turn assumes Xuthus is working a fraud by it. These deceptions, revealed and again misunderstood, lead to a revelation of the sum of Creusa's grief, her story kept hidden for so long (874f, 895f).⁴² But another deception, the plot on Ion's life, follows. It is uncovered and the "revealed" son (978, 1188) is saved. Yet he, in his turn, is straightway shown in his greatest ignorance, about to kill her whom he would most know (cf. 1276ff, 1378f). The next reversal is the recognition of mother and son. But its revelations too are insufficient, neither final nor entirely

persuasive, until Athena, *ex machina*, comes on to reveal the truth about Apollo's purposes and to give the legend her authority. And now her final resolution includes the continued deception of Xuthus with which the action had begun. He will be kept in the "fond illusion" that he is Ion's father (1602).

"Apollo has managed everything well," Athena tells us (1595; cf. *Or.* 1664), and we can have no argument with her. But we have also been shown that the conditions under which the gods' providence works are less commensurable with truth than with poetry. And poetry, like the sung oracle (cf. 6, 92, 682) of the musician god, is a deception which can be questioned only at the risk of sorrow. That Xuthus will remain deceived is not altogether inappropriate, for he had himself tried to deceive Creusa about a son, and as an outsider not of Athenian origin (and thus comparable to the deceived barbarian kings of *IT* and *Helen*) he might be considered fair game for such a deception — which, finally, also befits the comic qualities of his characterization. There is comedy, Plato says, in the misunderstanding of appearances, in a failure of self-knowledge, so long as these are joined with harmlessness (*Philebus* 48c6–49c5; cf. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1449a34). And this, on the whole, covers Xuthus' situation. That he is only a secondary character no longer seen on stage after the first third of the play suggests the degree to which the play may be considered comic. The ignorance of Ion and Creusa is both painful and potentially dangerous. They are saved only by extraordinary circumstances. Therein lies the play's seriousness and "tragedy." We are shown the ignorance of the human state as such and — even for better natures, such as these figures clearly are — its hazardousness. The play raises the question of how one can act in a world where so much is unknown, kept hidden, or unexpected; how one can humanly reason; and how survive the intensities of human feeling. In a sense there is a moral implicit. Creusa's manservant once expresses the familiar and accepted Greek sentiment that nothing should withstand doing an enemy ill (1045ff).⁴³ But he does this in justification of the plot to kill Ion. The play thus undercuts the traditional view by raising the question: how can you do an enemy ill when things are such that you cannot really know who your enemy is? All of Ion's rationalism had been similarly undercut. Yet, beyond this implied "moral," which suggests an extreme reticence and caution for all human actions — the withdrawal, in fact, which so tempts Ion, there is still the unresolved fact that humans must act, reason, and feel passions, and that thus, in the very expression of their humanity, lies their greatest danger. The gods, at some remove, help to define this

situation: the condition of human life has always some final obscurity about it. But the gods may sometimes be gracious, as in this play which, as a result, communicates its seriousness with calm.

NOTES

1. Compare the absence of Artemis, around whom so much of the plot turns, in *Iphigenia among the Taurians*. And contrast the presence of the gods immediately concerned in the tragedies of final disaster such as *Hippolytus* and *Bacchae*.

2. Hermes, one might add, associated with lucky finds and discoveries, appropriately assists at the "discovery" (1441, cf. 1424) of Ion.

3. The prominence of the motif of birth and children in the play is noticed by A. Pippin Burnett, "Human Resistance and Divine Persuasion in Euripides' *Ion*," *CP* 57 (1962) 101, 103 n.4.

4. Cf. his threat to kill the birds defiling Apollo's sanctuary (158ff). Creusa continually imagines her abandoned child as prey of birds (cf. 504, 902, 917, 1494f), but it is a bird, accidentally dying from the poison intended for Ion, that saves his life (1196-1208). Violence preludes fortunate providence.

5. F. M. Wasserman, "Divine Violence and Providence in Euripides' *Ion*," *TAPhA* 71 (1940) 601.

6. Cf. also Xuthus' consultation of two oracles (300, 405ff) and Creusa's invention of a fictitious double of herself through whom she first tells a story about a son who would correspond exactly in age to the one standing before her (cf. 354).

7. See, for instance, Otto Rank, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (Vintage Books, New York 1959) 71f, 85ff, where a connection between doubling and the motif of rebirth is also noticed. Cf. J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato* (London 1905) 474: "With regard to . . . the fancy that 'our youth was a dream' [the reference is to *Republic* 414d] — I would only remark that Plato seems here to appeal to an experience which is by no means uncommon in childhood — to the feeling that the things here are doubles of things elsewhere. The production of this feeling in his adult patient . . . [is] one of the chief means by which the poet effects the purpose of his art."

8. The late date of *Ion*, sometimes questioned, now seems to be agreed on. See, e.g., M. Pohlenz, *Die Griechische Tragödie*, ed. 2 (Goettingen 1954) II, 165; Wilamowitz in the preface to his edition (Berlin 1926) 24; E. B. Ceadel, *CQ* 35 (1941) 78f. G. Zuntz, *The Political Plays of Euripides* (Manchester 1955) 64 n.1, suggests a connection between the play's prominent Erechtheus mythology and the rebuilding of the Erechtheion, substantially completed by 408 (*I.G.* I², 373, line 1; cf. also T. Dohrn, *Attische Plastik* [Krefeld 1957] 30). The earlier date (some time between 418 and 414), however, is again supported by D. J. Conacher ("The Paradox of Euripides' *Ion*," *TAPhA* 90 [1959] 26ff, 38) who doubts that Euripides could deal lightly with Athens' relation to Ionia after the Ionian revolts of 412. But, in the first place, there is really nothing in the play which can be shown to have a specific reference to the actual relations of Athens and her former colonies (cf. Zuntz' note above). And, furthermore, we have a good instance of Euripides' light treatment of serious matters of immediate relevance in *Helen*: discussion of war, exile and death is not there avoided

though following directly on the Sicilian defeat. Metrical criteria must surely come first in trying to date a Euripidean play, and these support the later date (Ceadel, above, n.8). For other possibly relevant considerations see p. 174 below and nn.15 and 36.

9. The confusion may be increased by the fact that there is a twofold tradition about Ion's father. Xuthus actually seems to have the earlier claim (so Herodotus VII.94, VIII.44 and Euripides himself, *Melanippe the Wise* 10f, Page). And it may be Euripides who first makes Apollo the father, for *Ion* is the earliest reference to that tradition (later there is Plato, *Euthyd.* 302d 1). For the whole matter see A. S. Owen's edition of the play (Oxford 1939) x-xvii. For the extensive use of two superimposed mythical traditions compare *Helen*.

10. E.g., H. Grégoire, in his introduction to the Budé text (Paris 1950) 168ff.

11. Though *Erechtheus* was about sacrifice in a national cause, the world of this legend is, so to speak, pre-political. The political life and organization which the Athenians associate with their city traditionally begins with the kingship of Theseus (cf. *Suppliants* 352f, 404ff; Thucydides II.15.1).

12. One might also note that the indiscriminate acceptance of foreigners in Athens is a charge made against the "extreme" democracy (cf., e.g., Aristoph., *Clouds* 998, 1321ff, *Frogs* 730ff, 'Xenophon,' *Rep. Ath.* 1.10f, Plato, *Republic* 563a). *Ion* on the whole suggests a conservative point of view, supported, for example, by the continuous emphasis on good birth, *eugeneia* (for which see Wassermann [above, n.5] 594). Professor J. H. Finley has pointed out to me that *Frogs* 964ff suggests Euripides' association with the oligarchic moderates such as Theramenes mentioned there. Cf. also *Frogs* 952ff, where Euripides is warned not to push a claim to be "democratic."

13. Wassermann (above, n.5) 593.

14. E.g., Wilamowitz (above, n.8) 15.

15. Thus, e.g., the opposition of the members of the extreme democracy to the well-born (cf. G. Hignett, *History of the Athenian Constitution* [Oxford 1952] 262ff) and "keeping quiet" (cf. V. Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne," *JHS* 67 [1947] 46ff). Pericles is made to point out that anyone intending "to do something," unlike the uncommitted and withdrawn *apragmon*, will necessarily incur hatred by his rule (Thucydides II.64.4-5). One may also recall the figure of Antiphon, at a time closer to *Ion*, who took part in politics only from behind the scenes, "held in suspicion by the multitude because of his reputation for skillfulness" (Thucydides VIII.68.1).

16. Cf. *Suppliants* 428ff, where, however, tyranny is rejected for Athenian democracy. Closest to this passage in *Ion* is *Hippolytus* 1013ff where tyranny is considered by Hippolytus to be simply corrupting; he prefers to live among his friends without hazards and his principal ambition is to win at the Pan-Hellenic games (as Ion would spend his life at the "Pan-Hellenic" Delphi). But while Hippolytus is destroyed within the confines of his life, Ion will be drawn out to another.

17. Thus ἡδύ (622, 641, 647), ἡδονή (627), χαίρειν (639, 647), τερπνόν (630), λυπρά (597, 623, cf. 632), πικρῶς (610, 613); ἀγαθά and δίκαιος appear just once each (633, 643). Such language is, to be sure, not uncharacteristic in non-philosophical contexts. Pleasure rather than virtue, fame, or even advantage, is given as the standard of life: for instance, *Hipp.* 1013, 1015, 1020, Sophocles, *OT* 592f, 596, Thucydides II.38.1, II.40.3, Xenophon, *Hiero* 1, 2-8.

18. The prevalence of this theme throughout the plays of Euripides has been well observed by H. Strohm, *Euripides: Interpretationen zur dramatischen Form* (*Zetemata* 15, Munich 1957); see his index under "Entwertung der Tat."

19. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Herakles*, ed. 2 (Berlin 1895) II, 28, on lines 107-37.

20. Cf. 598f. Creusa's plot on Ion's life is also a form of *σπουδή* (cf. 1061, 1226; 1028). Ion uses the word in connection with the god's unjust pursuit of pleasure (449). But Athena uses it of her ready coming at the play's resolution (1556).

21. Such an effect of distancing seems new with Euripides. It may stem from the device of citing a statement or recalling a mythical figure and then refuting the statement or contrasting the speaker to that figure: cf., for instance, Aeschylus, *Ag.* 750f, Sophocles, *Ant.* 621, *Trach.* 1ff, *Phil.* 676ff. The effect in these cases, however, is to intensify the particular point of the speaker's thought or situation, whereas in Euripides the effect of pointing at the myth is one of detachment or ironical contrast to what is actually presented. For the explicit breaking into a narrative one might compare Pindar pausing to indicate that he has revised a myth (*O.* 1.28f), though he is, of course, under no obligation to sustain his narrative throughout a poem. Breaking the dramatic illusion by calling attention to the myth is, on the other hand, akin to the practice of comedy which so often plays with the fact of its own fiction. As for the references to works of art, we might recall that Euripides was reported to have practiced painting (*Genos* 2). There is a striking example of the use of an image from that art in *Hecuba* when the old queen asks Agamemnon to "stand back like a painter" and view the sum of her disasters (807f).

22. P. Friedlaender, *Johannes von Gaza* (Leipzig & Berlin 1912) 5f, 28f.

23. As first remarked by W. Schadewaldt, *Monolog und Selbstgespräch* (*Neue Philologische Untersuchungen* 2, Berlin 1926) 161f. For a fine analysis of the monody see also Strohm (above, n.18) 161ff, and cf. Burnett (above, n.3) 95f.

24. Cf. Plato *Rep.* 588c where an "image of the soul" is described like "such ancient natures as they fable, the Chimaera's or Scylla's or Cerberus'." Cf. also 590a9-b1 where the middle part of the soul is called "lion- and snake-like" (the latter should not be emended [as Jaeger suggested, *Eranos* 44 (1946) 123ff]); the middle part of the soul is as contradictory and problematic as the combination of the natures of lion and snake — which is specifically suggested when Thrasymachus is compared to both [341c1-2, 358b3]). See also *Phaedrus* 229d2ff: there Centaurs, Chimaera, Gorgons and Typhon are figures of the obscurity of the soul which cannot be rationalized away.

25. His birth — like Ion's — is the fortunate result of an unhappy encounter. Hephaestus was his father, impregnating the earth on failing in an assault on Athena.

26. This is, I think, sufficient refutation of Verrall's view of the play, namely that a hoax has been perpetrated and that Xuthus is in fact Ion's real father, thus making the play an elaborate mockery of Apollo and Delphi (see *Euripides the Rationalist* [Cambridge 1895] 129ff, or the introduction to his edition of the play [Cambridge 1890]). There is of course an element of mockery, but it is such that it does not exclude the meaningfulness of what is mocked. Xuthus' character is clearly delimited. If we are persuaded that he is Ion's true father, then we must reduce the meaning of the play to his horizons. Verrall's observation that the play has a double aspect, a human and divine one, the first reason-

able, the other preposterous — apparently, is most helpful. However, by denying any meaning at all to the latter aspect, he by-passes a good part of the play's substance. Recent critics, notably Wassermann (above, n.5) and Burnett (above, n.3), while adding a number of fine insights, fall to an opposite extreme — by accepting the terms of Verrall's argument — and interpret the play as a vindication of Apollo (e.g., "the revelation of the quality of Apollo's power is the true purpose of the tragedy," Burnett 94). But why, we might ask, should Apollo need vindication? And why should not the human aspect of the play command equal attention and interest?

27. W.-H. Friedrich, *Euripides und Diphilos* (Zetemata 5, Munich 1953) 20ff.

28. Creusa and her manservant "mean to assassinate the boy they accuse Apollo of having allowed to die, and to protect the House of Erechtheus by killing its scions" (Burnett [above, n.3] 99).

29. *Τὸ πάσχει* (cf., e.g., Aristoph. *Wasps* 1). The phrase is nicely echoed towards the end of the play when Ion addresses it to himself (1385).

30. Compare, then, how he expresses his feeling that Apollo is his father first in the monody (136ff) and then (1288) with the unique use in tragedy of the abstract *οὐσία* in the sense of "being."

31. Cf. Aristophanes' *Clouds* 1020f, 1078, *Birds* 755f, Plato, *Gorgias* 482e4-5: what is "natural" is taken as beautiful and considered "right," setting beautiful and good at odds. The immediate sense of Ion's phrase *τὰ τῶν θεῶν καλά* is probably ironic ("the fine doings of the gods"). But our abstraction from it here seems possible in the context of the play as a whole which so often makes the association of gods and the beautiful, and also because speculative argument underlies Ion's speech. For another, though more striking, example of *kalos* in both an ironical and literal sense see *Bacchae* 1163 and cf. 1007 (cf. also *Phoen.* 821, Hesiod, *Theog.* 585).

32. One should also notice the incongruity of Ion's applying the language of private law-suit (444ff; see Wilamowitz [above, n.8] on 449) to the gods. As in his familiar form of address to Apollo, he unwittingly uses the language of an anthropomorphism which he seems to attack.

33. The question of such a relationship — between a god and intelligence or moral sensibility — is raised a number of times in Euripides (cf. *Med.* 223, *Hipp.* 951, *HF* 347, 655f, *El.* 294f, *Troad.* 972, 981, *Hel.* 1441, *Phoen.* 86). For the connection of intelligence and justice cf. *HF* 347 and Thucydides III.42.3, VI.40.1.

34. Reading Conington's *νόμοισιν* for the weak *λόγοισιν* of the manuscripts.

35. Such a sense of *nomos*, as partly internalized, as it were, is also suggested by Democritus when he speaks of a "law for the soul" (frg. 264, Diels).

36. It is worth noting that the phrase *νόμον σφύζουσα* used by the Pythia (1322) had been used of Creusa's observance of the tradition of putting amulets in an infant's cradle (20) — amulets which will be one of the means of identifying Ion. Could there be in these references to the "old way" an oblique allusion to the *patrios nomos*, the ancestral constitution, which the oligarchic conservatives claimed to be restoring — during the period to which we would assign this play (cf. Thucydides VIII.76.6)?

37. Each recognition is accompanied by a temptation to withdrawal on Ion's part. After the recognition with Xuthus he asked to be left in Delphi. Before the recognition of Creusa he is, for a moment, about to let the question of who his

7+H.S.C.P.

mother is go unexamined, fearing that he prove base-born (138off). This latter withdrawal from knowledge has as its outward sign the dedication of Ion's unexamined birth tokens to Apollo, that is, it suggests a withdrawal back into the mythical, into the unquestioning state in which we see Ion at the beginning of the play (cf. 433ff). But Ion here is only briefly tempted by what is in fact — like his refusal to go to Athens — impossible, an impossibility now dramatically evident in the silent, almost forgotten figure of Creusa cowering at the altar behind him. That his doubts should come first after a false recognition and then before a true one is a particularly nice psychological as well as dramaturgical point.

38. For a similar doubt about divine birth compare *Ba.* 28ff. A purely human version of this story, in which the vanished and returned seducer is a man rather than a god, makes up the plot of Menander's *Epitrepontes*.

39. For *ᾧν* as "true" cf. Herodotus' frequent *τὸ εἶν* (e.g., I.30.3, 97.1, IV. 32), Thucydides VII.8.2, Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1052 (Euripides speaking), Euripides, *El.* 346.

40. Cf., e.g., Hesiod, *Theog.* 27, Solon, 21 (Diehl³), Pindar, *O.* 1.27ff, *N.* 7.23ff. In Euripides cf. *Hipp.* 1169f, *HF* 610, 1315 and 1345f, and see Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1052f.

41. Cf. H. Strohm, "Trug und Täuschung in der euripideische Dramatik," *Würzburger Jahrbücher für Altertumswissenschaft* 4 (1949-1950) 154f.

42. Shame, *αἰδώς*, which had induced concealment (336ff, cf. 395f), Creusa abandons (861, 934), although one might think it the appropriate virtue for those caught between ignorance and knowledge. Knowledge of itself is without shame (cf. Plato *Gorgias* 494e7f), as are the actions of Apollo (895).

43. Cf. B. Knox, *HSCP* 65 (1961) 3ff.

TRADITIONAL PATTERNS OF WORD-ORDER IN LATIN EPIC FROM ENNIUS TO VERGIL

BY CARL CONRAD

ANY reader of Latin elegiac poetry cannot have failed to notice the recurrence of a particular pattern of word-order in such frequency as to be predictable and monotonous. I am referring to the placement of an adjective before the caesura of either hexameter or pentameter of the elegiac couplet and the noun modified by that adjective at the end of the line. One need only look at the opening lines of the first poem of the first book of Propertius to see this pattern in four successive lines:

Cynthis prima *suis* miserum me cepit *ocellis*
contactum *nullis* ante *cupidinibus*.
tum mihi *constantis* deiecit lumina *fastus*
et caput *impositis* pressit Amor *pedibus*, . . .

It can be stated categorically that this pattern of separation of substantive and attribute, or *Sperrung*, as it has been termed by German scholars, is the most frequent of all patterns in Latin elegiac poetry.¹ It is, in fact, in elegiac poetry that these patterns appear in their most stylized form, and the attention of scholars has been directed toward these patterns chiefly as they appear in Latin elegiac poetry.² But the patterns are by no means exclusively, nor are they in origin, elegiac.³ They are epic patterns that have undergone a considerable development from their first appearance in Homer, where they are a feature of formulaic diction,⁴ through the Hellenistic hexameter of Apollonius, Callimachus, and Theocritus, and through the Latin hexameter tradition.⁵ It is from the epic tradition that these patterns have been carried into other poetic genres by both Greek and Latin poets.

In the following pages I shall trace the patterns of separation of substantive and attribute found most frequently in the Latin hexameter poets from Ennius to Vergil. In the discussion of each pattern I shall try to show briefly the earlier history of the pattern in the Greek hexameter tradition and indicate through examples the increasingly effective employment of these patterns by successive Latin poets.

There are two basic principles involved in the patterns of separation which I shall describe.⁶ The first of these is that *the caesura functions as a boundary before which (or after which) one element of the separated group appears* (most often the adjective before a caesura, the noun after a caesura). The second principle is that of *framing, either of whole hexameter lines, or of rhetorical cola*. Let us consider each of these principles before moving into the history of the patterns in Latin poetry.

The first principle involves the caesura as a boundary determining the position of separated elements. Thus, in the first line of Propertius cited above, *suis* appears before the penthemimeral caesura of the line, and its noun, *ocellis*, appears at the end of the line. The principle, however, is not limited in its application to the penthemimeral caesura. The trithemimeral caesura may also serve as a boundary before which a separated element may appear, as in

Cicero, *Aratea*, fr. 34, 431. *hic valido cupide venantem perculit ictu*

and the hephthemimeral caesura serves the same function also, as in

Ennius, *Annales*, 301. *Livius inde redit magno mactatus triumpho*.

In the examples cited above, the second element of the separated group appears at the end of the line. This is indeed its most frequent position, but it may also appear before the end of the line *after* one of the caesurae. Thus, in the following line the adjective appears before the trithemimeral caesura, the noun after the bucolic diaeresis (which is, of course, a caesura⁷):

Cicero, *Aratea*, fr. 34, 67. *at validis fugito devitans viribus Austrum*

and again in the following line, the noun is in the same position but the adjective is before the penthemimeral caesura:

Catullus 64, 86. *hunc simul ac cupido conspexit lumine virgo*

To what are we to ascribe this function of the caesura as a boundary line for separated elements? The answer lies, as I shall try to show, in the nature of the epic hexameter itself and in the formulaic diction of the earliest poems in the meter, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

The work of Milman Parry has established the formulaic character of the Homeric epics.⁸ It is a fundamental principle of oral poetry that phrases adapted to particular metrical positions in the hexameter are employed in myriad combinations by the oral poet whose art consists in his ability to manipulate the phrases, which are termed *formulae*.

These phrases may be whole nominal groups consisting of heroes' names together with their epithets, such as *πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδύσσευς*, *εὐρύ κρέων Ἀγαμέμνων ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*; or single words, such as verbal forms that open a line and lead to the nominal groups in the last half of the line — such formulas as *ὥς ἄρ' ἔφη, τὸν δὲ ἰδὼν, τὸν πρότερος προσέειπε, τὸν δ' ἤμειβετ*.

These formulas may be short or long; they may fill a whole line or only a portion of a line, but they are bounded regularly by the caesurae of the hexameter line. This fact was recognized by Parry⁹ and some of its implications have been further analyzed by Fraenkel and Porter.¹⁰ Fraenkel's work is the most systematic analysis of the hexameter and its caesurae, which are determinants of the metrical form of the epic formulas. Since that analysis will form the basis of the further discussion of this paper and will allow us to dispense with the clumsy terms, trithemimeres, penthemimeres, hephthemimeres, and bucolic diaeresis, it would be well to present the essential features of it here:

1. In the Greek hexameter the sense-division of the language and the rhythmic sequence of long and short syllables have a direct bearing upon each other.

The strongest sense-pauses are the ends of periods and clauses, and the weakest are the mere word-ends. For example, a verse such as Callimachus 6, 136, has fourfold division as a result of three clause-ends:


φέρει βόας, φέρε μᾶλα, φέρε στάχυν, οἷσε θερισμόν

The same division appears in Callimachus 1, 14, but is achieved here with mere word-ends:

ὠγύγιον καλέουσι λεχώϊον Ἀπιδανῆς

Between the two extremes, clause-end and word-end, there are pauses of every degree. There is no way of measuring the absolute strength of a pause, but the relative strength of a sense-pause in a word-sequence is often immediately apparent.

2. Our first question concerns the position of strong sense-pauses within the verse, i.e., such as we normally set off by punctuation. The answer is that they lie, almost always in Homer and exclusively in Callimachus, at those places which are marked in the following diagram:



There are then three portions of the verse where strong pauses may be placed, A, B and C, and within each portion of the

verse again there are variants open to choice, four for A (A 1 to A 4), and two each for B and C. The line, accordingly can consist at the most of four clauses, e.g., Callimachus 2, 10:

ὄσ-μιν-ἴδῃ, μέγας οὗτος, ὅς οὐκ-ἴδε, λιτὸς ἐκείνος

Every hexameter may be divided into four *cola*, and the colon-ends lie each at one A-, B-, and C- position as in the above diagram. We designate the colon-end positions successively as A 1, A 2, A 3, and A 4 (trithemimeres); B 1 (penthemimeres) and B 2; C 1 (hephthemimeres) and C 2 (bucolic caesura).

Every stronger sense-pause (clause-end and the like) lies at one of the designated positions, and weaker or very weak sense-pauses (word-ends) assume the function of division in cases where stronger ones are not found.

The sense-pauses employed for the internal division of the verse (3 in each hexameter) are called by us *caesurae*. We call the caesurae "strong" or "weak" according to the sharpness of the sense-pause. We assume that the caesurae were audibly distinguished in recitation and in fact distinguished more or less sharply according as they were stronger or weaker.¹¹

We may now see the significance of these caesurae and the formulae for which they serve as boundaries for the history of the patterns of separation that are our chief concern in this paper. *Adjectives and epithets are themselves essential parts of formulaic diction*. They have their fixed metrical positions in the line as determined by the regular caesurae. One of the most frequent epithet types is that which fills the fourth colon of the hexameter line in Homer. We may note the following examples:

Iliad 2, 753. οὐδ' ὄγε Πηνειῶ B₁ συμμίσγεται C₂ ἀργυροδίνῃ

4, 135. διὰ μὲν ἄρ ζωστῆρος B₂ ἐλήλατο C₂ δαιδαλέοιο

5, 737. τεύχεσιν ἐς πόλεμον B₁ θωρήσσετο C₂ δακρυόεντα

6, 343. τὸν δ' Ἑλένη μύθοισι B₂ προσηύδα C₂ μειλιχίοισι

These lines, it may be noted, display the same pattern of separation of noun and adjective observed in the lines of Propertius which we cited at the outset:

Cynthia prima *suis* miserum me cepit *ocellis*
 contactum *nullis* ante *cupidinibus*.
 tum mihi *constantis* deiecit lumina *fastus*
 et caput *impositis* pressit Amor *pedibus*

The Homeric pattern in the lines above is the ultimate parent of the pattern appearing in the lines of Propertius. But there are essential differences to be noted. In the Latin verses, the nouns are regularly last; in the Greek, they are first. In the Latin verses the adjectives tend to be emphatic as a result of the separation and the position prior to the caesura. In the Greek verses, the epithets are of an appositive nature. They are not attributes and emphatic, they add nothing essential to the narrative sequence, although, to be sure, they represent one of the more remarkable elements of grace and dignity of epic diction. In one sense, they are space-fillers, employed to complete the hexameter line when the essential meaning has already been given in the verb which fills the third colon. Yet the great number of examples of this pattern of separation (I have noted 52 examples of this order in the first nine books of the *Iliad*) offers striking evidence of the manner in which a poetic virtue may come about through metrical convenience.

The pattern has come into being, as Stifler¹² and Parry¹³ both realized, through the suitability of the third colon, with its two final short syllables, for finite verb forms.

Two other positions in the hexameter are also well suited to verb forms, and both of these figure in a pattern of separation of noun and epithet. One of these places is the second colon of the verse, and the pattern to which we refer may be observed in the following lines:

Iliad 2, 113. Ἰλιον | ἐκπέρσαντ' | εὐτείχεον | ἀπονέεσθαι
 A3 B1 C2

4, 346. οἶνου | πινέμεναι | μελιιδέος | ὄφρ' ἐθέλητον
A3 | B1 C2

8, 47. "Ιδην δ' | ἴκανεν | πολυπίδακα, | μητέρα θηρῶν
A3 B1 C2

9, 479. Φθίην δ' | ἐξικόμην | ἐριβόλακα, | μητέρα μηλῶν
A3 B1 C2

In each of these lines the adjective in the third colon is of the same sort as the adjectives in the fourth colon observed in the previously cited lines. These are traditional epithets of an appositional rather than attributive nature. In two of the lines yet another such epithet fills the fourth colon.

Short verb forms may follow the C 1 or C 2 caesura also and thus permit an adjective in the third colon to be separated from a noun at the end of the line. Such a pattern is observed in the following lines

Iliad 1, 530. κρατὸς ἀπ' ἀθανάτοιο· μέγαν δ' | ἐλέλιξεν "Ολυμπον

8, 443. ἔζετο, τῷ δ' ὑπὸ ποσσὶ μέγας | πελεμίζετ' "Ολυμπος

- Iliad* 2, 55. τοὺς ὃ γε συγκαλέσας πυκινὴν | ἀρτύνετο βουλήν
 4, 281. δῆϊον ἐς πόλεμον πυκινὰ | κίνυντο φάλαγγες
 2, 245. καί μιν ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν χαλεπῶ | ἡνίπαπε μύθῳ
 13, 624. Ζηνὸς ἐριβρεμέτew χαλεπὴν | ἐδείσατε μῆνιν

This pattern of separation is by far the most frequent in Homer. I have counted 90 examples of an adjective in the third colon separated by a verb from a noun at the end of the line in the first nine books of the *Iliad*. No special emphasis seems to be attached to these adjectives by virtue of their separation from their noun. Rather it appears that their metrical form has suited them for the third colon of the hexameter, and the metrical forms of verbs have suited them for the position following the C caesura. The pattern, then, is a regular feature of epic formulaic diction.

I do not wish to dwell at length upon the forms these patterns take in the Homeric poems. The subject is one that I hope to discuss more fully at another time. I think, however, that the examples cited are sufficient to show the origin of the role played by the caesura in the patterns of separation in later hexameter poetry. The caesura is the boundary between the metrical cola of the line, and the formulaic elements of noun, adjective and verb are conditioned by the metrical form of each of the four cola of the line.

We may say something about emphasis before we leave this discussion of Homer. We have already noted that the adjectives in the following lines,

- Iliad* 2, 753. οὐδ' ὃ γε Πηνεῖῳ | συμμίσγεται ἀργυροδίῳ
 2, 1113. "Ἴλιον ἐκπέσαντ' | εὐτείχεον ἀπονέεσθαι

are appositional modifiers, space-fillers which, while not emphatic, do add grace to epic diction. Seymour has shown that the essential sense of the Homeric narrative tends to be concentrated in the first half of the line and that the last half of the line is often filled by epithets which do not add anything essential to the narrative.¹⁴ This accords well with the character of these "traditional epithets" that appear in the third and fourth cola of the line, for such epithets are not emphatic. But when Homer *does* wish to emphasize an adjective, he may employ the same patterns we have seen above with a reversal of the order of noun and adjective. Thus emphasized is the adjective describing the laughter aroused among the gods at the sight of the hobbling Hephaestus:

- Iliad* 1, 599. ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο | γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν

Similarly the hatred of Hera for the Trojans gains great force not only from the use of the adjective *ὤμδν* in the following line, but even more from its initial position:

Iliad 4, 35. *ὤμδν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον Πριάμοιό τε παῖδας*

A similar emphasis rests upon the adjectives *ὄλοοῖο* and *δεινόν* which appear before the B caesura in the following lines:

Iliad 3, 133. *ἐν πεδίῳ, ὄλοοῖο || λιλαϊόμενοι πολέμοιο*

8, 133. *βροντήσας δ' ἄρα δεινόν | ἀφῆκ' ἀργῆτα κεραυνόν*

But such emphatic placement of adjectives at the beginning of the line is not very common in Homer. His adjectives are more commonly of the appositional, "traditional" type.

What is of interest in Homeric practice with regard to patterns of separation of substantive and attribute is not so much the establishment of regular patterns as the establishment of precedents for positions of separated elements. It is these positions for attributes and substantives that are exploited for purposes of emphasis and rhetorical elegance by later hexameter poets. We have seen also that there is some evidence in Homer for exploitation of the initial position in the line and of the position immediately preceding the B caesura for emphasis, and this practice is one that is pursued further and made regular by Hellenistic poets and by the poets of the Latin classical period.

We have lingered upon the Homeric patterns for some time in order to explain the origin of the first basic principle involved in the patterns of separation, that the caesura functions as a boundary before which (or after which) one element of the separated group appears. Let us now consider the second principle, that of *framing*. This is more a feature of rhetorical elegance than a means of emphasizing an adjective. It may take the form of the framing of a whole line, as in

Aen. 8, 704. *Actius haec cernens arcum intendebat Apollo*

or of the framing of a rhetorical colon as in

Aen. 8, 611. *talibus adfata est dictis seque obtulit ultro*
8, 25. *erigitur summi que ferit laquearia tecti,*

and even rhetorical cola in enjambement, as may be seen in this very elegant tricolon of Vergil:

Aen. 8, 95f. *et longos superant flexus, variisque teguntur*
arboribus, viridisque secant placido aequore silvas.

In the case of framing of rhetorical cola it can be seen that the caesura again plays a great role. One may wonder, in fact, whether we have here an example of rhetorical framing after all rather than merely another example of ordinary separation at the caesura. I believe that we must admit both factors are at play. In the first of these examples which I have cited,

Aen. 8, 611. *talibus adfata est dictis seque obtulit ultro*

we have the first element of a split phrase in the first metrical colon of the line while the second element appears in the third metrical colon, the portion between the B 1 and C 1 caesurae. This is, with a reversal of order, the Homeric pattern observed in

Iliad 9, 479. Φθίην δ' ἐξικόμην ἐριβώλακα, μητέρα μήλων

but it is also a framed colon in a dicolon hexameter line divided into unequal halves by the C 1 caesura, a common type as may be seen in these lines of Ennius:

Annales 424. Aestatem autumnus sequitur post acris hiemps it.
483. Dum clavum rectum teneam navemque gubernem
298. Summus ibi capitur meddix, occiditur alter.
309. Navibus explebant sese terrasque replebant.

Again, in the second of the Vergilian lines,

Aen. 8, 25. *erigitur summique ferit laquearia tecti*

we recognize that Homeric pattern with one element of the separated group in the second metrical colon, the other element at the end of the line:

Iliad 6, 343. τὸν δ' Ἑλένη μύθοισι || προσηύδα μειλιχίοισι

But the Vergilian line displays the colon framed by *summique* and *tecti* as one part of a common type of Vergilian two-line tricolon period, such as may be seen in the following examples:

Ecl. 4, 32f. quae temptare Thetim ratibus, quae cingere muris
oppida, quae iubeant tellure infindere sulcos
Aen. 8, 364f. aude, hospes, contemnere opes et te quoque dignum
finge deo rebusque veni non asper egenis.

It is no sheer coincidence that this combination of traditional patterns of separation with the motif of framing of rhetorical cola is best exemplified in Vergilian hexameters. Vergil stands at the end of the

development of Latin hexameter style. It is in his work that the possibilities of development in the Homeric patterns are most fully exploited; it is here that the whole development, as Aristotle might say, ἐσχε τὴν φύσιν.

Now that the two basic principles involved in the patterns of separation have been explained, I shall proceed with the exposition of the patterns in their historical development in the Latin hexameter from Ennius to Vergil. Examples illustrative of this development and statistical tables are drawn from the *Annales* of Ennius,¹⁵ the *Aratea* of Cicero,¹⁶ the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius,¹⁷ Catullus 64¹⁸ and the eighth book of Vergil's *Aeneid*.¹⁹ The analysis will follow the order of positions of the caesura serving as boundary in the pattern under consideration, beginning with the C caesura, proceeding to the B caesura, the A caesura, and then to the initial position in the line. I shall then discuss the disposition of two pairs of substantive and attribute in a single hexameter line: the very neat "golden line" of Dryden with its interlocked word-order and an equally common double framing which I call "concentric placement." The historical exposition will conclude with a discussion of patterns of separation in enjambement.

A. FIRST ELEMENT BEFORE THE C CAESURA

The first line²⁰ of Ennius listed by Vahlen,

Musae, quae pedibus *magnum* pulsatis *Olympum*

is reminiscent of Homer in more ways than one. The phrasing and the word-order are an echo of two passages in the *Iliad* describing the trembling of Olympus when Zeus speaks with authority or sits down on his throne:

Iliad 1, 528ff. ἦ καὶ κυανέησιν ἐπ' ὀφρύσι νεῦσε Κρονίων.
 ἀμβρόσιαι δ' ἄρα χαῖται ἐπερρώσαντο ἄνακτος
 κρατὸς ἀπ' ἀθανάτοιο· μέγαν δ' ἐλέλιξεν "Ολυμπον
 8, 443. ἔζετο, τῷ δ' ὑπὸ ποσσὶ μέγας πελεμίζετ' "Ολυμπος

In the line of Ennius and in the two lines of Homer the adjective (*magnum*, μέγαν, μέγας) appears before the C 1 caesura and is separated from its noun at the end of the line by a verb. In a discussion of this word-order in Homer,²¹ we have shown how its great frequency there is accounted for by the metrical convenience of the position following the C caesura for verb forms and by its full development as one of the

formulaic features of Homeric oral composition. In Homer, as we saw, this pattern of separation is by far the most frequent of all, and the pattern appears even more frequently in the *Argonautica* of Apollonius of Rhodes. I have noted 121 examples of this pattern in the first two books of the *Argonautica*. The pattern had in fact become such a standard feature of epic hexameter style that Theocritus employed it with a notably greater frequency in those Idylls and parts of Idylls where dialect and other factors indicate that he was writing in the epic tradition.²²

Ennius, like Homer and Apollonius, uses this pattern of separation most frequently. In all there are 27 examples in the fragments of the *Annales*. It is significant that all but five of these examples show the first of the separated elements before the C 1 caesura. Even in the Greek hexameter, examples of separation at the C 1 caesura exceed those at the C 2 caesura: there are, for example, 50 separations at the C 1 caesura in Book I of the *Argonautica* as against 31 separations at the C 2 caesura. But the overwhelming predominance of the C 1 pattern over the C 2 pattern in Ennius (and in the other Latin hexameter poets) is surely to be ascribed to the desire for clash of ictus and accent at the C 1 caesura.²³ That this is so is substantiated by the following line of Ennius in which the conjunction *cum* is inverted from its normal position at the beginning of the clause, even though its normal position at the beginning would not affect the metrical structure of the line:

443. Concurrunt veluti (*venti cum*) spiritus austri

Here Ennius could have written *cum venti*, though he would thereby have hurt the effectiveness of the assonance in *veluti venti*. The principle involved in this inversion is one discussed at length by Friedrich Marx,²⁴ who relates it to the desire of the Latin poets to have conflict of ictus and accent in the fourth foot of the hexameter. The principle, as he states it, is as follows:

In der Zeit des Cicero und Catullus hatte sich in der Verskunst des Hexameter die folgende Regel gebildet. Folgte auf die Semiquinaria ein Monosyllabon oder ein pyrrhisches Wort und ein spondeisches Wort und stand der Dichter unter keinerlei sprachlichem oder prosodischem Zwang, so musste das spondeische Wort gegen den Wortakzent an die erste, das Monosyllabon oder das pyrrhische Wort an die zweite Stelle gesetzt werden, oder, was dasselbe bedeutet, die Semiseptenaria war gefordert, die Bucolica war nicht zulässig.²⁵

Examples of such inversion are quite frequent in Vergil:

- Aen.* 1, 287. imperium Oceano, (*famam qui*) terminet astris
 1, 470. agnoscit lacrimans, (*primo quae*) prodita somno
 1, 602. gentis Dardaniae, (*magnum quae*) sparsa per orbem

There are more examples of this anastrophe in Ennius permitting the first separated element to fall before the C 1 caesura. In these the two elements could not be reversed, yet the arrangement is extraordinary and seems to have been chosen deliberately:

302. Europam Libyamque (*rapax ubi*) dividit unda
 374. Sicut fortis equus (*spatio qui*), saepe *supremo*.

In the first of these examples, *rapax* draws emphasis from the conflict of ictus and accent at the C 1 caesura. Cicero was evidently quite impressed by this characterization of the Straits of Gibraltar, for he refers to it twice.²⁶ In the second line it is the adjective which is particularly emphatic as a result of its final position, but the initial position of *spatio* in the colon enforces the alliteration of s and p sounds.

In two other examples there is also alliteration in the separated phrase:

138. Vulturus in spinis *miserum* mandebat *homonem*
 301. Livius inde redit *magno* mactatus *triumpho*.

Fourteen of the 22 examples of separation at the C 1 caesura in Ennius show the order adjective-noun. This is the normal order in Greek hexameters also²⁷ and it is the normal order for all patterns of separation in the Latin hexameter. The adjective so placed is a forceful one. In the following two lines the turn of fortune is dramatically announced by the placement of *laevum* and *dextra* in advance of their nouns and in the position where their ictus and accent conflict:

146. Olim de caelo *laevum* dedit inclytus *signum*
 414. Ingenio forti *dextra* latus pertudit *hasta*.

In line 158 *unum* draws from the separation the same emphasis we would give by vocal stress to the word *one* when we mean *one only*:

Inde sibi memorat *unum* super esse *laborem*.

Line 435 shows *rubra* in an extraordinarily effective position. The quick, dactylic motion of the line is slowed considerably by the successive combinations of stop and liquid in the last four words. The slower movement, the juxtaposition of *tractim* and *rubra*, and the separation

of *rubra* from *aethra* all aid the impression which the poet seeks to make: the lingering of the pink glow over the sea after setting of the sun (or moon: the body to which *fax* refers is uncertain):

interea fax
occidit, oceanumque *rubra* tractim obruit *aethra*.

The following lines all have a form of *magnus* or *summus*:

1. Musae quae pedibus *magnum* pulsatis *Olympum*
161. Romani scalis: *summa* nituntur opum *vi*
301. Livius inde redit *magno* mactatus *triumpho*
348. Regni versatum *summam* venere *columnam* ²⁸
412. Aedificant nomen; *summa* nituntur opum *vi*.
486. Cumque gubernator *magna* contorsit equos *vi*.

At play in these lines is the same interchanging of elements we have seen to be at play in the Homeric pattern.²⁹ In his study of Homer, Ennius must have observed the recurrence of these interchangeable elements even if he had no understanding of oral composition. In the Latin hexameter also the fifth foot is well-suited to verb forms with their common short final syllables. This feature of Homeric style which had become a distinguishing feature of epic style by the Alexandrian age, was carried over by Ennius into Roman epic, along with the hexameter itself. The pattern remained a standard feature of Latin epic style. It was still the most frequent of patterns in Lucretius (I have counted 82 examples in 1094 lines of Book 3 of *De Rerum Natura*), in Cicero (55 examples in 546 lines of the *Aratea*), in Catullus (71 examples in 408 lines of no. 64) and in Vergil (110 examples in 731 lines of Book 8 of the *Aeneid*).

We have said that in this pattern of separation (as well as in the others), the final position of the attribute is an inversion of the normal order. As a rule such inversion lays a very heavy stress upon the attribute. We have seen three examples of *summus* separated from its noun and placed before the C 1 caesura. In the repeated phrase, *summa nituntur opum vi*, *summa* is emphatic: "they strive with *all* the resources of their power"; yet in the following line, still greater force seems to reside in the adjective:

428. Non in sperando cupide *rem* prodere *summam*

Here the sense is "the thing that is most important of all." In the case of the adjective placed before the C 1 caesura, the adjective and noun are both stressed but a special stress rests upon the adjective. In the line

just cited the noun is not stressed at all, but the adjective is all-important. Emphasized in like fashion is *supremo* in line 374:

Sicut fortis equus *spatio* qui saepe *supremo*
vicit Olympia, nunc senio confectus quiescit.

The final position of *supremo* emphasizes that the horse has not only won races often at the Olympic games, but has often come from behind to win the race in the *very last* lap.

In line 530, the sharp quality of the sounds created by the high-pitched *lituus* is emphasized by the final position of *acutos*:

Inde loci *lituus* sonitus effudit *acutos*.

In line 157 the adjective *quadratae* does not seem especially emphatic. Rather the line seems to be an imitation of the Homeric type of phrase with proper noun and "traditional" epithet. Thus

Et qui sextus erat *Romae* regnare *quadratae*

is like *Iliad* 2, 77:

Νέστωρ, ὃς ῥά Πύλοιο || ἄναξ ἦν ἡμαθόεντος

Two other examples display the adjective *altus* in the final position. In line 189 the juxtaposition of *consternitur* and *alta* emphasizes the majestic height from which the fir tree is brought level with the ground:

Fraxinus frangitur atque *abies* consternitur *alta*.

The high spirits of the horse described in line 517 are doubly stressed by the placement of *celso* and *altam* at the points of greatest emphasis at opposite ends of the line:

Celso pectore saepe *iubam* quassat simul *altam*.

B. FIRST ELEMENT BEFORE THE B CAESURA

Table I gives figures for Latin poets showing the incidence of the patterns of separation in which the first element appears before the B caesura and the second element at the end of the line. The figures represent an analysis of the fragments of the *Annales* of Ennius and of the *Aratea* of Cicero, of Book 3 of Lucretius, of Catullus 64 and of Book 8 of the *Aeneid*. The tables show in separate columns the figures for separations at the B 1 caesura, at the B 2 caesura and for separations in which a word at the B caesura is elided with the following word. In the lines of each poet, separate horizontal columns give the figures

TABLE I. SEPARATION TYPE $\frac{x||}{B}$ X

		Total lines	Total examples	Separation at B ₁	Separation at B ₂	Separation with elision
Ennius, <i>Annales</i>	Total		9	7	2	0
	adj.-noun			5	0	0
	noun-adj.			2	1	0
Cicero, <i>Aratea</i>	Total	546	47	45	1	1
	adj.-noun		35	35	0	0
	noun-adj.			3	0	1
	gen.-noun			3	0	0
	ptc.-noun			0	1	0
Lucretius Book 3	Total	1094	30	29	0	1
	adj.-noun			23	0	0
	noun-adj.			4	0	0
	gen.-noun			1	0	0
	noun-gen.			0	0	0
	ptc.-noun			0	1	0
	noun-ptc.			0	0	0
Catullus 64	Total	408	76	76	0	0
	adj.-noun			68	0	0
	noun-adj.			1	0	0
	gen.-noun			1	0	0
	noun-gen.			0	0	0
	ptc.-noun			5	0	0
	noun-ptc.			0	0	0
Vergil, <i>Aeneid</i> 8	Total	731	92	72	11	9
	adj.-noun		63	50	8	5
	noun-adj.		13	9	2	2
	gen.-noun		8	7	0	1
	noun-gen.		0	0	0	0
	ptc.-noun		7	5	1	1
	noun-ptc.		1	1	0	0

for normal and inverted order of the divers elements and show distinctly the nature of the attribute.

From the table we see that this pattern, which is not so very frequent in Ennius, became common in the later hexameter poets; in Cicero, Catullus, and Vergil it appears more than once in every ten lines. Lucretius has not employed the pattern nearly so often as have the others, yet even so, more frequently than Ennius, if our evidence from Ennius is sufficiently indicative.

Secondly, it is clear from the table that separation at the B 1 caesura is much more common in all of the poets than separation at the B 2 caesura. Only in Vergil is there a notable number of separations at the B 2 caesura, and these figures are accounted for by Vergil's arrangement of rhetorical cola in enjambement.³⁰ Catullus, in whose poem 64 the pattern appears most frequently of all, has no examples of separation at the B 2 caesura. At play here, as in the pattern of separation at the C caesura, is conflict of ictus and accent. This conflict sets up a tension of expectation which is relieved by the noun's appearing at the end of the line; for in that word ictus and accent will coincide.

One more general statement may be made with reference to the table. In all of the poets, the order of adjective-noun is clearly normal. When this order is inverted, some explanation of the inversion ought to be sought.

In Homer, as we have seen, this pattern is frequent in the order of noun-adjective, and in such cases the adjective is of the nature of an appositive, most often a "traditional epithet." Such are:

Iliad 2, 753. οὐδ' ὃ γε Πηνειῷ || συμμίσγεται ἀργυροδίῃ
5, 737. τεύχεσιν ἐς πόλεμον || θωρήσσετο δακρυόεντα

When, however, an adjective appears before the B caesura in Homer and is separated from its noun at the end of the line, the adjective is emphatic:

Iliad 8, 133. βροντήσας δ' ἄρα δεινὸν || ἀφῆκ' ἀργῆτα κεραυνόν³¹

In the Alexandrian hexameter, the pattern appears much more frequently and the normal order is adjective-noun, as in the Latin hexameter.³² As was the case with the pattern of separation at the C caesura, so this pattern also was employed more frequently by Theocritus in those Idylls and parts of Idylls which reflect the epic tradition or bear a tone of dignity elevated above the speech of rustics.

Ennius carried over into the Latin hexameter this pattern from the Greek hexameter. In so doing, he made it Roman by binding it to the regular clash of ictus and accent at the B 1 caesura. In several lines he strengthened even more the Roman character of the pattern by marked alliteration. Thus in line 488,

Brundisium *pulcro* praecinctum praepete *portu*,

pulcro is set in the position of prominence before the B 1 caesura and is the first of a series of words beginning with p. Similar is *terribili* in line 310:

Africa *terribili* tremit horrida terra *tumultu*.

In the following lines describing the *auspicio* of Romulus and Remus, *magni* is set off by its position before the B 1 caesura:

87f. Sic expectabat populus atque ore timebat
rebus, utri *magni* victoria sit data *regni*.

In line 154 the change from fighting with spears to hand-to-hand combat is signaled by the prominent initial position in its colon of *ansatis*:

153f. Postquam defessi sunt stare et spargere sese
hastis, *ansatis* concurrunt undique *telis*.

In line 139 *crudeli* by sense and position expresses the horror of the reaction the poet seeks to arouse at the image of a body being devoured by a vulture:

138f. Vulturus in spinis miserum mandebat hominem:
heu, quam *crudeli* condebat membra *sepulcro*.

Two of the examples in Ennius that have the inverted order are alike inasmuch as the adjectives are quantitative. *Omne* at the end of line 38 is in the most emphatic position possible:

Vires vitaeque *corpus* meum nunc deserit *omne*.

The final *omne* has the effect of an exclamation point at the end of a factual statement: "Life and strength now abandon my body — entirely!" The fragmentary line 287 is somewhat similar:

multa *dies* in bello conficit *unus*.

Here the effectiveness of the final *unus* is enhanced by the antithetical *multa* which begins the colon: "Many things in war are brought to fulfillment in a *single* day."

We have seen many examples of sound-play in Ennius. This is the motive of the final placement of *alto* in line 378; for by it the two words containing the syllable *pont* are allowed to stand together.

Isque *Hellesponto* pontem contendit in *alto*

Later hexameter poets employed this pattern with greater skill and effectiveness. Although the mannerism could justify Cicero when he yielded to metrical necessity and separated the parts of a proper name:

Arat. fr. 5, 1. quas nostri *Septem* soliti vocitare *Triones*,³³

he often placed adjectives with strong emotional connotations before the B caesura:

Arat. fr. 18, 2. ausaque *funestum* primast fabricarier *ensem*
fr. 34, 13. et magis *horrisonis* Aquilonis tangitur *alis*
fr. 34, 200. ut res nulla *feras* possit mulcere *procellas*

Lucretius too, although he employed the pattern less frequently than Cicero and Catullus, liked to place words with strong emotional connotations before the B caesura:

3, 55. quo magis in *duris* hominem spectare *periclis*
3, 905. at nos *horrifico* cinefactum te prope *busto*

In some lines, this placement of the adjective achieved artful effects. In one of the opening lines of Book 3, Lucretius speaks reverently of the words of Epicurus as being

12. aurea, *perpetua* semper dignissima *vita*.

The punctuation after *aurea* sets that word off at the beginning of the line and also gives *perpetua* the additional stress of being the initial word in its colon. It is a long word and it begins, in its long final syllable, two heavy spondees in the third and fourth feet that have a retarding effect. The juxtaposition of *perpetua* and *semper* reinforces their common meaning. The separation of *perpetua* from *vita* under these circumstances produces a sense of time in its vast expanse of duration. A somewhat similar effect is achieved by the placement of *aeterno* in 3, 911:

3, 909ff. Illud ab hoc igitur quaerendum est, quid sit amari
tanto opere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem
cur quisquam *aeterno* possit tabescere *luctu*.

The question is pointed: sarcasm can be felt strongly in *cur quisquam possit tabescere*, and most of all in the word *aeterno*, the sense of which is aided by the laborious movement of the five spondees which weigh down the line.

The labor of Sisyphus is aptly depicted by Lucretius in a line in which *adverso* announces in advance the difficulty of the task:

3, 1000. Hoc est *adverso* nixantem trudere monte.

Perhaps no Latin poet has exploited the emphatic potentialities of separation at the B caesura more than Catullus. A few lines from *carmen* 64 will illustrate this assertion.

At the beginning of the poem Catullus looks back with longing, as he does again at the end, at the age of heroes, when the gods were not ashamed to commune with men. *Humanos* is a key word in this line in which *tum* and *non despexit* so firmly set the scene in the irrevocable and distant past. The word draws stress not only from its position but also by the antithesis implied in its juxtaposition with *Thetis*, the name of a divine being:

64, 20. Tum Thetis *humanos* non despexit *hymenaeos*.

In two successive lines describing the awakening of Ariadne on the lonely shore of Naxos, Catullus effectively employs our pattern:

64, 56f. Utpote *fallaci* quae tum primum excita *somno*
desertam in *sola* miseram se cernat *harena*.

In line 56 the adjective is not only placed before the B caesura; it is even given primacy before the relative pronoun which has been postponed to make room for it. The sense of *fallax* is central to the poem, the theme of which is human faithlessness.³⁴ Here sleep is the deluder, lulling the trusting girl to peaceful rest, from which an awakening must be a shattering experience. And so it is. In the next line *sola* is set before the B caesura. Its separation from *harena* is the more striking because the preposition here is placed with the adjective rather than with the noun. Thus the abrupt breaking-off of the prepositional phrase before it is complete emphasizes the very sense of separation which the line depicts Ariadne as suddenly coming to feel, and of course, since it is preceded by *desertam*, the word *sola* is all the stronger in eliciting emotional response.

Fidelity and human faithlessness make up the theme of *carmen* 64. One of the bitterest lines in Ariadne's lament lays its full weight of sarcasm upon the word *fido*, which is emphatically placed before the B caesura:

64, 182. Coniugis an *fido* consoler memet *amore*?

At the beginning of this paper, we stated that, from Ennius to Vergil, the patterns of separation rest upon the principle of framing and upon

the emphatic positions preceding the caesurae of the line. In Vergil's hexameter, the two principles appear to have merged. Vergil is fond of a pattern of enjambement with sense from a previous line ending at the A caesura and a new rhetorical colon beginning there and extending to the end of the line.³⁵ We have shown also how the traditional pattern of separation at the B caesura has been made to serve the purpose of framing a rhetorical colon.

The principle which has been exploited for this purpose is well illustrated by the following examples of anaphora from Lucretius and Catullus:

- Lucr. 3, 11-12. Omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta,
aurea, *perpetua* semper dignissima *vita*.
- Cat. 64, 61-62. Saxea ut effigies bacchantis, prospicit, eheu,
prospicit et *magnis* curarum fluctuat *undis*.
- Cat. 64, 69-70. Illa vicem curans toto ex te pectore, Theseu,
toto animo, *tota* pendebat perdita *mente*.

In the first two examples the repeated word (*aurea*, *prospicit*) at the beginning of the second line is followed by a pause, and the adjective that follows the pause has not only the emphasis of position before the B 1 caesura with consequent conflict of ictus and accent but also the emphasis of initial position in a new colon. In the third passage, the series *toto ex pectore*, *toto animo* reaches a climax in *tota pendebat perdita mente*. As if pauses before and after *tota* were not enough to set it off emphatically, Catullus has even linked the two words between *tota* and *mente* by alliteration with the result that the separated elements are isolated even by the sound pattern from their context.

In Vergil a great number of lines display a similar structure: A verb form fills the line to the A 3 caesura, a conjunction appears between the A 3 and A 4 caesurae, and a new colon begins at the A 4 caesura and is framed by an adjective ending in the B caesura and a noun at the end of the line:

- Aen.* 8, 87. leniit, et *tacita* refluens ita substitit *unda*
8, 2. extulit, et *rauco* strepuerunt cornua *cantu*
8, 70. sustinet, ac *talīs* effundit ad aethera *voces*
8, 387. dixerat, et *niveis* hinc atque hinc diva *lacertis*
8, 641. stabant, et *caesa* iungebant foedera *porca*

or the linking word may be postponed to allow the adjective the prominent initial position:

- Aen.* 8, 137. edidit, *aetherios* umero (qui) sustinet orbis
 8, 276. dixerat, *Herculea* bicolor (cum) populus *umbra*
 8, 517. adsuescat, *primis* (et) te miretur ab *annis*.

In the following lines the motive of framing the colon has taken precedence over the desire to place the adjective before the strong B 1 caesura. This accounts for the relatively large number of examples of this pattern in Vergil showing the adjective before the weak B 2 caesura³⁶:

- Aen.* 8, 13. edoceat, *multasque* viro se adiungere *gentes*
 8, 35. erigitur, *summi*que ferit laquearia *tecti*
 8, 30. procubuit, *seram*que dedit per membra *quietem*
 8, 96. arboribus, *viridis*que secant placido aequore *silvas*.

In the following lines the central caesura is partially effaced by the elision:

- Aen.* 8, 227. pendebat, *fultosque* emuniit obice *postis*
 8, 681. laeta vomunt, *patrium*que aperitur vertice *sidus*
 8, 375. debita, *casurasque* inimicis ignibus *arces*

We may cite in conclusion a line which does not involve separation at the B caesura at all. At play here is solely the motive of framing a colon beginning at the A caesura. The conjunction is postponed in favor of *his*:

- Aen.* 8, 323. maluit, *his* quoniam latuisset tutus in *oris*.

There is another pattern of separation at the B caesura that has a particularly high frequency in the hexameters of Cicero and Catullus. Since the pattern is clearly conditioned by metrical factors which must more tightly constrain the poet who restricts his sense-units to single lines, its greater frequency among these two poets is readily explained. The pattern is a variant of the one we have just discussed: the first element still appears before the B caesura, but in this variant the second element appears immediately following the C 2 caesura. The incidence of the pattern in Cicero's *Aratea*, Book 3 of Lucretius, Catullus 64, and Book 8 of the *Aeneid* is indicated in Table II, along with an analysis of the kinds of words that are found in the lines of the different poets. It is striking that without exception in examples of this pattern the attribute is the initial element, the substantive the final element,

TABLE II. SEPARATION TYPE

			x B 1	X C 2
	Cicero, <i>Aratea</i>	Lucretius Book 3	Catullus 64	Vergil <i>Aeneid</i> 8
Total lines	546	1094	408	731
Total examples	36 (6.5%)	25 (2.2%)	36 (8.8%)	17 (2.3%)
<i>Noun after C2</i>				
<i>corpore</i> — ∪ ∪ (3rd decl. abl. sg.)	27	14	24	6
<i>viribus</i> — ∪ ∪ (3rd decl. abl. pl.)	4	7	4	2
<i>parte</i> — ∪ ' (3rd decl. abl. sg.)	3	3	6	5
other	2	1	2	4
<i>Separating element</i>				
Verb between B1 and C2	24	14	26	6
Verb between B1 and C1	3	4	4	1
Other	9	7	6	6
Preposition between C1 and C2	8	3	5	4

There is only one example of the pattern in Ennius, a line from the passage narrating Ilia's dream:

35. *Excita cum tremulis anus attulit artubus lumen*

The line moves swiftly along with successive dactyls, portraying by its very rhythm the excitement of the scene. That it is not only excitement but also fear that sets the old serving woman in motion is indicated by the emphatic position of the adjective *tremulis*.

This line is a variant of the pattern previously discussed. The same emphatic character of the position before the B 1 caesura is exploited by the placement there of a significant adjective. The noun upon which the adjective depends in the line of Ennius cited above is a dactylic word which cannot fit at the end of the line. The table indicates that in Cicero, Lucretius, and Catullus more than three-fourths of the nouns in this pattern are dactylic third declension singular or plural ablative forms, such as *artubus* here, *viribus*, *finibus*, *corpore*, *lumine*, and the like. The overwhelming tendency of Latin poets is to seek conflict of ictus and accent in the second, third and fourth feet of the

hexameter and coincidence of ictus and accent in the last two feet. The consequence of this is the rarity of a word ending in the arsis of the fifth foot and the frequency of a word beginning in the arsis of the fifth foot. Since the fifth foot is regularly a dactyl, it is particularly well suited to third declension ablative forms, such as *parte*, *sorte*, *mole*, *arte*, *lumine*, *corpore*, *nomine*, and the like. Marouzeau, in commenting on the stylization of certain patterns of word-order as a result of metrical convenience, has called attention to an almost startling fact about Cicero's poetic technique:

De là, dans la versification épique, l'abondance des mots dactyliques au cinquième pied; ainsi dans les *Phaenomena* de Cicéron, un même mot *lumine* revient à cette place 47 fois sur 546 vers, soit à peu près une fois tous les dix vers.³⁷

The conformation of the hexameter poets to a standard technique for this pattern extends also to the nature of the word or words that appear between the B 1 and the C 2 caesura and that separate the adjective and noun. As may be seen from the table, the separating element in two-thirds of the examples of this pattern in Cicero, Lucretius and Catullus is a verb form. In our discussion of patterns of separation in Homer we called attention to the suitability of the third metrical colon for verb forms.³⁸ This is not any less the case in the Latin hexameter. The following lines of Cicero, Lucretius, and Catullus all conform to the description we have given:

- | | | |
|--------------|----------|--|
| <i>Arat.</i> | 34, 60. | quem cum <i>perpetuo</i> vestivit <i>lumine</i> Titan |
| | 34, 68. | tum fixum <i>tremulo</i> quatietur <i>frigore</i> corpus |
| | 34, 391. | et cum iam <i>toto</i> processit <i>corpore</i> Virgo |
| <i>Lucr.</i> | 3, 449. | inde ubi <i>robustis</i> adolevit <i>viribus</i> aetas |
| | 3, 595. | et quasi <i>supremo</i> languescere <i>tempore</i> vultus |
| | 3, 985. | nec quod sub <i>magno</i> scrutentur <i>pectore</i> quicquam |
| <i>Cat.</i> | 64, 86. | hunc simul ac <i>cupido</i> conspexit <i>lumine</i> virgo |
| | 64, 309. | at roseae <i>niveo</i> residebant <i>vertice</i> vittae |
| | 64, 321. | talia <i>divino</i> fuderunt <i>carmine</i> fata |

The separator in many of the examples of this pattern, when a verb does not fill the whole space between the B 1 and C 2 caesurae, is often a verb and a preposition. Since the fifth foot of the line is so favorable for third-declension ablative nouns, and since the position between the C 1 and C 2 caesurae is favorable for long monosyllables, it is understandable that monosyllabic prepositions and the nouns they govern should regularly fill these two places; indeed, a spondaic adjective

often precedes the group and appears between the B 1 and the C 1 caesurae. Marouzeau has an interesting note on this stylized pattern:

La présence fréquente d'un ablatif de substantif à la cinquième place appelle assez naturellement au deuxième demi-pied du spondée quatrième une préposition: Mlle. A. Guillemin (*La préposition 'de' dans la littérature latine*, Thèse Paris, p. 2 et suiv.) a fait cette remarque curieuse que la préposition *de*, sauf exceptions rarissimes (Aen. IX 2, III 277, VI 38) ne se trouve qu'à cette place dans le vers de Virgile: le groupe formé par cette préposition et son régime "retrouvera chez tous les poètes jusqu'à Ausone", et il constitue si bien un des procédés caractéristiques de la grande poésie qu'on le voit apparaître chez Horace, Juvénal, Martial, chaque fois que le ton s'élève et imite celui de l'épopée.³⁹

We may illustrate this pattern also with lines of Cicero, who first employed it frequently, and also with lines of Lucretius and Catullus:

- Arat.* 34, 110. nec vero *toto* spirans *de corpore* flammam
 34, 421. dicitur *excelsis* errans in *montibus* amens
Lucr. 3, 594. ire anima ac *toto* solvi *de corpore* velle
 3, 843. et si iam *nostro* sentit *de corpore* postquam
Cat. 64, 133. perfide, *deserto* liquisti in *litore*, Theseu
 64, 350. cum incultum *cano* solvent a *vertice* crinem

There is only one example of this placement in the fragments of the *Annales*. It is rare in Homer, but I have observed in Apollonius a somewhat greater incidence of this variant pattern of separation at the B caesura.⁴⁰ In the Latin hexameter this pattern seems to be founded not directly upon Greek precedent so much as on a desire to place adjectives before the B caesura with emphatic separation from nouns which by their metrical form cannot fall at the end of the line. The pattern is therefore conditioned by metrical factors. These factors weighed much more heavily upon those poets who eschewed the practice of enjambement and preferred to write in single-line sense units. This explains the much greater frequency of this pattern in Cicero and Catullus than in Lucretius and Vergil. Cicero employs the pattern with mechanical regularity in lines that are distinguished by technique rather than imagination. Lucretius employs the pattern in much the same way as Cicero, yet much less frequently. The adjectives of Catullus are much more vivid and picturesque, and they are much more effective when placed before the B caesura:

- 64, 52. namque *fluentisono* prospectans *litore* Diae
 64, 123. liquerit *immemori* discedens *pectore* coniunx

The examples in Vergil are fewer and conform with less regularity to the standard pattern of Cicero, Lucretius, and Catullus: third-declension ablative singulars and verb forms filling the third metrical colon do not make up nearly so great a proportion of the words in the respective positions in the pattern.

This variant of the pattern of separation at the B caesura makes use of the same interplay of ictus and accent as the more common form with the substantive at the end of the line.⁴¹ Again the adjective before the B 1 caesura has conflict of ictus and accent which arouses a tension that is resolved by the noun appearing in the fifth foot and having coincidence of ictus and accent.

C. FIRST ELEMENT BEFORE THE A CAESURA

There are three patterns of separation at the A caesura that appear with noticeable frequency in the Latin hexameter. In one of these the final element appears at the end of the line, in another after the C caesura, and in the third before the C caesura.

The A 4 caesura is the most favored position for an adjective near the beginning of the line, since here, as at the B 1 and C 2 caesurae a word-end must have as a consequence of its position the conflict of ictus and accent in the adjective. When in this pattern an adjective does not end in the A 4 caesura, it is because the word ends in a short syllable and is thus metrically unsuited to that position. Such, for instance, are the adjectives in the following lines:

Cic. <i>Arat.</i> 34, 366.	haec <i>obscura</i> tenens convestit <i>sidera</i> tellus
Cat. 64, 80.	quis <i>angusta</i> malis cum <i>moenia</i> vexarentur
<i>Aen.</i> 8, 458.	et <i>Tyrrhena</i> pedum circumdat <i>vincula</i> plantis
Cic. <i>Arat.</i> 34, 51.	sed <i>mediocre</i> iacit quatiens e corpore <i>lumen</i>
Lucr. 3, 1077.	quae <i>mala</i> nos subigit vitai tanta <i>cupido</i>
Cat. 64, 363.	cum <i>teres</i> excelso coacervatum aggere <i>bustum</i>

Table III shows the relative frequencies of the different patterns of separation at the A 4 caesura in Cicero, Lucretius and Vergil. The table shows again that the regular order of the elements is adjective-noun. It also shows that variants 1 and 2 are most frequent in Catullus and Cicero, while variant 3 is most frequent in Vergil. As we found was the case with the second variant pattern of separation at the B caesura,⁴² so here the distribution is explained by prevalent kinds of rhetorical disposition in Cicero, Catullus, and Vergil. Cicero and Catullus were fond of composing single-line sense units,⁴³ and it is in these that the separated elements are most likely to be found so distant from each

TABLE III. PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AT A CAESURA

	Second element at end of line	Second element after C caesura 3rd decl. abl.	Second element other	Second element before C ₁ caesura
Ennius, <i>Annales</i>				
adj.-noun	1	1	0	2
noun-ptc.	1	0	0	0
Total	2		1	2
Cicero, <i>Aratea</i>				
adj.-noun	7	9	4	2
noun-adj.	1	0	0	3
gen.-noun	1	0	0	0
noun-gen.	1	0	0	0
ptc.-noun	1	0	0	0
Total	11		13	5
Lucretius, Book 3				
adj.-noun	7	1	0	5
noun-adj.	1	0	0	1
Total	8		1	6
Catullus 64				
adj.-noun	7	2	4	0
noun-adj.	1	0	0	0
ptc.-noun	1	0	0	0
Total	9		6	0
Vergil, <i>Aeneid</i> 8				
adj.-noun	2	0	1	13
noun-adj.	0	0	0	3
gen.-noun	0	0	0	1
Total	2		1	17

other as the first and last metrical cola of the line. In Vergil, however, enjambement is more common, and we have seen how two favorite colon types extending respectively over the first three and the last three cola of the line recur frequently in his hexameters.⁴⁴ It is in one of these colon types that the pattern with the second element appearing before the C 1 caesura is regularly found.

Let us now look at some examples of each of these variants, beginning with that in which the second element appears at the end of the line. Ennius has one very striking example of this pattern.

221. Poeni suos soliti dis sacrificare puellōs

There is an elaborate interplay of sounds in this line: not only are the sibilants in close succession heaped together, but also the dental stops followed by long i's seem to emphasize the bestiality of the human sacrifice. The position of *suos* even further intensifies this Roman characterization of Carthaginian inhumanity. One may translate the line and carry over the effect of the placement of *suos* thus: "the Carthaginians who with their own flesh and blood made customary sacrifice of children to the gods."

The examples in Cicero are much more mechanical and much less interesting. The strongest adjective so placed is *valido* in line 431 of the fragment of the *Aratea*, which tells of the stinging of Orion by Scorpio:

hic *valido* cupide venantem perculit ictu

It is in the examples of Catullus that we see the most effective use of this pattern. The following two lines are similar to that of Ennius just cited in that the word so effectively placed is the reflexive pronominal adjective:

- 64, 27. ipse suos divum genitor concessit *amores*
64, 29. tene suam Tethys concessit ducere *neptem*

At play in these lines is not only the emphatic separation of the pronominal adjective from its noun but a principle very commonly observed in Latin comedy and first remarked by Friedrich Leo:

In Sätzen wie *iamdudum meum ille pectus pungit aculeus, placet ille meus mihi mendicus* sind es nicht die unbetonten Wörter die in den Anfang, sondern die Wörter gleicher Kategorie, die zueinander streben . . . In der alten Sprache sind es vor allem die Pronomina, die in dieser Weise sich aneinander reihen, wie denn in der Verbindung zweier Possessiv- und Personalpronomina bestimmte Gesetze der Wortstellung hervortreten.⁴⁵

Yet the juxtaposition of these pronominal forms is doubly effective in the lines of Catullus because of the separation and because of the conflict of ictus and accent in *suos* (*suam*). The initial placement of the pronominal groups is the chief factor in these lines effecting a sense of awe at the closeness that once was possible between gods and men.

In line 19 of the same poem the position of *Thetidis* is effective partly because of the separation. Yet the name of the goddess is thrown into bright light by its early position in this line and by its repetition with *polyptoton* in the two lines that follow in the very same position:

64, 19ff. Tum *Thetidis* Peleus incensus fertur amore,
tum *Thetis* humanos non despexit hymenaeos,
tum *Thetidi* pater ipse iugandum Pelea sensit.

There are but two examples of this pattern in Book 8 of the *Aeneid*, yet both are quite effective. In line 614, Aeneas is told by Venus that now with the armor of Vulcan he can face "the proud Laurentians" and "fierce Turnus." There is perhaps a pointed suggestion in the juxtaposition of *acrem* and *dubites*. That Turnus is "fierce" must rise foremost in the mind when thoughts turn to him; yet hesitation to seek him out in battle may be dismissed now that Aeneas is armed with the armor of Vulcan:

612ff. En perfecta mei promissi coniugis arte
munera: ne mox aut Laurentis, nate, superbos
aut *acrem* dubites in proelia poscere *Turnum*.

One of the focal points in the description of the shield of Aeneas is the scene at Actium with the gods marshaled for battle. *Discordia*, the goddess of civil war, is present and her state of mind is vividly presented in the juxtaposition of *scissa* and *gaudens* at the beginning of the line. In division she rejoices, and the division is a violent one (*scissa*) which the separation of *scissa* and *palla* serves to emphasize:

702. et *scissa* gaudens vadit *Discordia palla*.

The second variant of separation at the A caesura is that in which the second element appears after the C 2 caesura. This pattern is exemplified in line 418 of Ennius:

Tunc *timido* manat ex omni corpore sudor

The movement of this line is spondaic and slow after the initial dactyl. There is thus a contrast between the fear-stricken body and the slow oozing of sweat. Vergil, we may note, has reshaped this line and

even more ornately employed to advantage the emphatic possibilities of the Latin hexameter:

Aen. 3, 175. Tum gelidus toto manabat corpore sudor

The second element in the line of Ennius just cited was a third declension ablative form. We have noted the frequent placement of such forms in this position in the second variant of the pattern of separation at the B caesura.⁴⁶ It is not surprising, therefore, that nine out of thirteen examples of this pattern in Cicero show a dactylic ablative form as the second word. Such are:

Arat. fr. 14, 1. quem claro perhibent Ophiuchum nomine Grai
fr. 34, 67. at validis fugito devitans viribus Austrum
fr. 34, 322. quem rutilo sequitur conlucens corpore Virgo
fr. 34, 247. nec pleno stellas superavit lumine Luna

The mechanical character of the pattern of Cicero as well as his preoccupation with alliteration (*validis viribus, conlucens corpore, lumine Luna*) are again to be noted in the above lines. Once more it is in Catullus that we see the most effective use of this pattern. In the following line there is alliteration of *t*-sounds and also juxtaposition of words with nearly alike meanings (*tereti tenuis*):

64, 262. aut tereti tenuis tinnitus aere ciebant

In the lines of Catullus 64 in which Ariadne calls upon the Furies to avenge her on Theseus, the key phrase, *quali mente*, is separated in our pattern in line 200 and brought together as *tali mente* emphatically at the beginning of line 201. *Quali mente* and *tali mente* point to a key phrase of the poem which is expressed directly in the lines which later answer these. The phrase is *immemori mente*:

200f. sed quali solam Theseus me mente reliquit
tali mente, deae, funestet seque suosque
246ff. sic funesta domus ingressus tecta paterna
morte ferox Theseus, qualem Minoidi luctum
obtulerat mente immemori, talem ipse recepit.

The third variant pattern of separation at the A caesura has the second element before the C 1 caesura. Even before Vergil it is often found in the colon type which extends from the beginning of the line to the C caesura. Such is the case apparently in Ennius' fragmentary line 474:

It nigrum campis agmen

which Servius says was the model for *Aeneid* 4, 405:

It *nigrum* campis *agmen* praedamque per herbas
convectant calle angusto.

The pattern also appears in this kind of colon in these lines of Lucretius:

3, 52f. et *nigras* mactant *pecudes* et manibus divis
inferias mittunt.

3, 63. ad *summas* emergere *opes*, haec vulnera vitae . . .

In this pattern there is conflict of ictus and accent in both of the separated elements and the effect of this rhythm seems to be the awakening of expectancy or a sense of rapid motion. This is felt in Ennius' description of an eagle's flight, where rapid succession of wing-beats is emphasized by *densis* in its advance position:

147. et *densis* aquila *pennis* obnixa volabat.

The rapid motion of a bird is again described in this line of Cicero, where emphasis is laid upon the ruddy hue of the swan's plumage, where reference is presumably made to one of the stars of the constellation:

Arat. fr. 34, 412. quem *rutila* fulgens *pluma* praetervolat Ales.

Sudden rapid action is again expressed by the rhythm in Lucretius' description of a violent seizure's overtaking a person:

3, 487ff. quin etiam subito vi morbi saepe coactus
ante *oculos* aliquis *nostros*, ut fulminis ictu
concidit et spumas agit . . .

It is in Vergil, however, that the rhythm and emphatic possibilities of this variant are most fully exploited. The feverish activity of the aroused Turnus is depicted in a line in which *acris* has almost a predicative sense:

Aen. 8, 3. utque *acris* concussit *equos* utque impulit arma

Again the anxiety of Aeneas is aptly expressed by the very rhythm of

Aen. 8, 20. atque *animum* nunc huc *celerem* nunc dividit illuc

The position of *celerem* is emphatic and gives it a strong adverbial force, centrally placed as it is between the directional adverbs *huc* and *illuc*.

In line 95 of Book 8, the rhythm of *et longos superant flexus* suggests the motion of rowing which is described:

et longos superant flexus, variisque teguntur . . .

A sense of urgency lies in the rhythm of Venus' request for new arms for Aeneas:

Aen. 8, 441. *arma acri facienda viro! nunc viribus usus . . .*

Often other special effects are achieved by Vergil in the use of this pattern. In line 102 of Book 8 emphatic words *die illo* encircle *sollemnem*, which is grammatically construed with *honorem*, but which by position lends its significance to *illo die*. "And it chanced that on that very day the Arcadian king was offering the annual sacrifice to the son of Amphytrion."

Aen. 8, 102. *forte die sollemnem illo rex Arcas honorem
Amphitruoniadae*

In line 563 the emphatic words, "with this right hand" take the positions before the A 4 and C 1 caesurae with the result that the reader or listener can visualize the gesture of the Nestor-like king Evander as he glories in the heroic powers of his lost youth:

Aen. 8, 563. *et regem hac Erulum dextra sub Tartara misi.*

D. FIRST ELEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LINE

The initial position in the hexameter line is emphatic. Even in Homer the initial position in the line is employed not only for naturally emphatic words such as demonstratives:

Iliad 1, 419. *τοῦτο δέ τοι έρεουσα έπος Διὲ τερπικεραύνῳ*

but also for adjectives, when their sense is emphatic:

Iliad 1, 599. *ασβεστος δ' ἄρ' ενῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν*⁴⁷

The same emphatic character of the initial position in the line was exploited by the Latin hexameter poets—exploited, in fact, to a much greater extent than it was by the Greek poets. Ennius, too, could place a word that is by its nature emphatic in the initial position:

83. *omnibus cura viris uter esset induperator*

"Everyone without exception was eager to know which one would be their leader." A few lines later in the *auspicio* passage, the initial

TABLE IV. Patterns of Separation at the Beginning of the Line

	FRAMING		FRAMING VARIANT		FRAMING VARIANT		FRAMING VARIANT		COLON TYPE		COLON TYPE		COLON TYPE	
	x	X	x	C ² X	x	C ¹ X	x	C ² X	x	C ¹ X	x	C ¹ X	x	B X
Ennius, <i>Annales</i>	Total 4		Total 0		Total 0		Total 0		Total 1		Total 5		Total 0	
	adj.-noun 3								adj.-n. 1		adj.-n. 5			
	gen.-noun 1													
Cicero, <i>Aratea</i>	Total 24		Total 9		Total 4		Total 2		Total 2		Total 1		Total 7	
	adj.-noun 20		adj.-noun 8		adj.-noun 4		noun-a. 2		noun-a. 2		adj.-n. 1		adj.-n. 5	
	ptc.-noun 3		noun-adj. 1										noun-a. 1	
	verb-ptc. 1		— <i>nomine</i> 3		— <i>lumina</i> 3								gen.-n. 1	
Lucretius, Book 3	Total 12		Total 2		Total 1		Total 1		Total 1		Total 6		Total 8	
	adj.-noun 8		adj.-noun 2		adj.-noun 1		adj. noun 1		adj. noun 1		adj.-n. 6		adj.-n. 6	
	noun-adj. 1		— <i>carmina</i>		— <i>sensibus</i>						noun-a. 1		noun-a. 1	
	gen.-noun 1												gen.-n. 1	
	noun-gen. 2													
Catullus, 64	Total 24		Total 21		Total 6		Total 0		Total 1		Total 1		Total 5	
	adj.-noun 22		adj.-noun 19		adj.-noun 5				adj.-n. 1		adj.-n. 1		adj.-n. 5	
	gen.-noun 2		noun-adj. 1		noun-adj. 1								All but one interlocked	
			gen.-noun 1		— <i>nomine</i> 1									
			— <i>aequora</i> 10		— <i>navita</i> 2									
Vergil, <i>Aeneid</i> 8	Total 13		Total 7		Total 3		Total 4		Total 22		Total 2		Total 2	
	adj.-noun 12		adj.-noun 4		adj.-noun 2		adj.-n. 1		adj.-n. 16		adj.-n. 2		adj.-n. 2	
	noun-gen. 1		noun-adj. 3		noun-ptc. 1		noun-a. 1		gen.-n. 4		both interlocked		both interlocked	
					— <i>2</i>		noun-g. 2		noun-a. 2					

position of the word *laeva* heralds the happy outcome of Romulus' watching of the skies:

92. *Laeva volavit avis . . .*

Table IV indicates the relative frequencies of the patterns of separation with initial element at the beginning of the line. In Cicero, Lucretius, Catullus, and Vergil the figures show the same tendencies in rhetorical disposition that we have noted before. The framing of a line by adjective and noun is especially frequent in Cicero and Catullus, whose predilection for single-line sense-units we have noted many times.⁴⁸ In Vergil, however, although the framed lines are common enough, they appear about one half as often as in Cicero and Catullus. Most common in Vergil is the pattern with the second element before the C 1 caesura, and this pattern is most often found in the framed colon type extending from the beginning of the line to the C 1 caesura.⁴⁹

Now let us examine in Table IV the variants of this pattern, beginning with the framing of the line by adjective and noun.

In Homer one cannot actually speak of such "framing." In Books 1-9 of the *Iliad* I have found only two examples of initial adjectives construed with a noun at the end of the line. In one of these the adjective was emphatic but predicative:

Iliad 9, 629. ἄγριον ἐν στήθεσσι θέτο μεγαλήτορα θυμόν

In the other example, the adjective was emphatic but adverbial:

Iliad 7, 478. παννύχιος δέ σφιν κακὰ μήδετο μητίετα Ζεὺς

The reverse order, on the other hand, we found to be quite common in Homer. Yet in such lines the noun was emphatic and the adjective was an "appositional" epithet of a traditional character:

Iliad 7, 38. Ἐκτορος ὄρωμεν κρατερὸν μένος ἵπποδάμοιο

8, 2. Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν ἀγορὴν ποιήσατο τερπικέραυνος

In Apollonius, "framing" is genuine and more common.⁵⁰ Adjectives appear at the beginning of the line and often with emphatic force as

Arg. 1, 917. ἄρρητους ἀγανῆσι τελεσφορίησι θέμιστας

and in one line the pattern is an affectation in which the two parts of a proper name are so separated:

Arg. 1, 1186. Ἐκβασίῳ ρέξαντες ὑπὸ κνέφας Ἀπόλλωνι

Ennius has taken this pattern of the Hellenistic hexameter over into the Latin hexameter and has even carried the affectation to a greater extent in this forced separation of two parts of a single word:

610. *Massili-* portabant iuvenes ad litora *-tan*as

Not quite so objectionable but still very bold is Cicero's placement of the two parts of a compound verb at opposite ends of the line:

Arat. 34, 97. *sunt* inter partis gelidas Aquilonis *locatae*

or of a noun and the postpositive governing it:

Arat. 34, 31. *hanc* autem inlustri versatur corpore *propter*

The examples of framing in Ennius rely very strongly upon the emphatic character of the beginning of the line for their effect. Thus in line 550, the superlative *optima* stands in the initial position:

Optima cum pulchris animis Romana *iuventas*

In line 427 the separated adjective carries a strong stress: "Good commanders hold on to their command":

Navorum imperium servare est *induperantum*.

An extraordinary line, the sense of which is as yet not altogether clear,⁵¹ is 260 of the *Annales*:

Sulphureas posuit spiramina Naris ad *undas*.

Whatever the sense of *posuit spiramina*, the initial *sulphureas* calls attention to a prominent feature of the river Nar. There is also an alliterative effect in the repeated *s*- and *p*-sounds of the first three words, suggesting hissing and sputtering.

Throughout the epic tradition, numerals appear at the beginning of the line. Homer's line

Iliad 2, 134. ἐννέα δὴ βεβάασι Διὸς μεγάλου ἐνιαιτοί

is similar to Ennius' line

Ann. 501. *Septingenti* sunt paulo plus aut minus *anni*

and Cicero's lines

Arat. 34, 315. *sex* tantae poterunt sub eum succedere *partes*
34, 362. *quattuor* hic obiens secum deducere *signa*.

Somewhat similar are the framed lines in Cicero with initial placement of quantitative adjectives:

- Arat.* 34, 112. *totus* ab ore micans iacitur mortalibus *ardor*
 34, 286. *tantus*, quantus erat conluens Lacteus, *orbis*
 34, 396. *totaque* iam supera fulgens prolabitur *Argo*

Demonstratives also appear in initial position in framed lines of Cicero:

- Arat.* 34, 62. *Hoc* cave te in pontum studeas committere *mense*
 34, 223. *haec* sunt quae visens nocturno tempore *signa*
 34, 268. *hunc* octo in partis divisum noscere *circum*

The following lines of Cicero are framed by the name of a sign of the Zodiac and an epithet characterizing it:

- Arat. fr.* 27. *Corniger* est valido conixus corpore *Taurus*
 34, 320. *Aestifer* est pandens ferventia sidera *Cancer*

Anastrophe of the relative pronoun *quam* permits this line to be framed by adjective and noun:

- Arat.* 34, 423. *Bacchica* quam viridi convestit tegmine *vitis*

Lucretius, too, places emphatic quantitative adjectives at the beginning of framed lines:

- 3, 12. *omnia* nos itidem depascimur aurea *dicta*
 3, 948. *omnia* si pergas vivendo vincere *saecla*

In the following line of Lucretius *tenuis* is emphatic:

- 3, 232. *tenuis* enim quaedam moribundos deserit *aura*

The word-order of the following line is somewhat contorted to allow the line to be framed by adjective and noun:

- Lucr.* 3, 1085. *posteraque* in dubiis fortunam quam vehat *aetas*

As of the other patterns discussed, so it is true of this one that Catullus employed it most effectively in that he placed stronger or more picturesque adjectives in the emphatic initial position. Thus in line 72 of *carmen* 64, a powerful metaphor is set in motion by *spinosas* at the beginning:

spinosas Erycina serens in pectore *curas*

Venus had sown in the heart of Ariadne the seeds of love for Theseus, and the seeds had sprouted to produce thorns of pain.

Anastrophe of the particle *ut* allows *immune* to take the emphatic initial position in line 138 of the same poem. The sarcasm of the line is thus heightened; for *nostri miserescere* is excluded as a possible feeling in a heart the relentless (*immune*) character of which has been announced in advance.

immune ut nostri vellet miserescere pectus

Even naturally emphatic adjectives appear in a brighter light when placed by Catullus in the emphatic initial position. *Quantos* in line 99 of *carmen* 64, by its separation from *furores* and by its juxtaposition with *illa* and *tulit* intensifies one's sympathetic response to Ariadne's plight:

quantos illa tulit languenti corde furores;

and *quaenam* in line 153 seems to function as a subject itself until it is completed by *leaena* at the end:

quaenam te genuit sola sub rupe leaena?

The effect may be translated thus: "Who was she that gave you birth in some lonely grotto — a lioness?" How much stronger this is than Catullus' earlier expression of the same sense in *carmen* 60:

Num te leaena montibus Libystinis . . .
tam mente dura procreavit ac taetra?

The framed lines of Vergil are marked by adjectives which are less intense than those of Catullus, yet nonetheless effective. In four of the framed lines of Book 8 of the *Aeneid*, the initial word is a proper adjective establishing a significant association:

- 300. *Lernaeus* turba capitem circumstetit *anguis*
- 526. *Tyrrhenusque* tubae mugire per aethera *clangor*
- 654. *Romuleoque* recens horrebat regia *culmo*
- 704. *Actius* haec cernens arcum intendebat *Apollo*

In line 116 the meaning of the gesture of Aeneas as he answers the query of Pallas is heralded by the adjective *paciferae* in the initial position:

paciferaeque manu ramum praetendit olivae.

The table of separations with the first element at the beginning of the line indicates the great frequencies of the pattern with the second element after the C 2 caesura in Cicero and Catullus, the same poets in whose work framed lines also appear most frequently. This is in fact a variant of the full-line separation determined by the same metrical

factors that determined the variant of separation at the B caesura with the second element after the C caesura.⁵²

We have seen many times how dactylic nouns fall naturally into the fifth foot, and we have noted the regular appearance of third-declension ablative forms there in Cicero, Lucretius, and Catullus.⁵³ These forms recur again in the pattern now under discussion. We may cite, for example:

- | | | |
|--------------------|----------|--|
| Cic. <i>Arat.</i> | 34, 34. | <i>aeterno</i> cunctas sancto qui <i>nomine</i> dignant |
| | 34, 61. | <i>brumali</i> flectens contorquet <i>tempore</i> currum |
| | 34, 185. | <i>exiguo</i> superum quae lumina <i>tempore</i> tranat |
| Cat. <i>carmen</i> | 64, 1. | <i>Peliaco</i> quondam prognatae <i>vertice</i> pinus |
| Verg., <i>Aen.</i> | 8, 497. | <i>toto</i> namque ferunt condensae <i>litore</i> puppes |

The greater number of such forms, however, are neuter plural nominative and accusative forms:

- | | | |
|--------------------|----------|---|
| Cic. <i>Arat.</i> | 34, 103. | <i>inferiora</i> tenet truculenti <i>corpora</i> Tauri |
| | 34, 464. | <i>inferiora</i> cadunt Aurigae <i>lumina</i> lapsu |
| Lucretius | 3, 420. | <i>digna</i> tua pergam disponere <i>carmina</i> vita |
| Cat. <i>carmen</i> | 64, 129. | <i>molli</i> a nudatae tollentem <i>tegmina</i> surae |
| | 64, 7. | <i>caerula</i> verrentes abiegnis <i>aequora</i> palmis |
| | 64, 351. | <i>putrida</i> que infirmis variabunt <i>pectora</i> palmis |
| Verg., <i>Aen.</i> | 8, 485. | <i>mortua</i> quin etiam iungebat <i>corpora</i> vivis |

It may be noted that the majority of the lines just cited exemplify some kind of interlocked word order. We shall devote a special discussion to this particularly elegant pattern later. It is sufficient to note here that dactylic nouns regularly fill the fifth foot in this pattern and furthermore that trochaic nouns, which could by their metrical form appear in the sixth foot, do in fact fall in the fifth foot in interlocked lines of Catullus when the other noun has the metrical form $\cup - \cup$. This is shown by the following lines of Catullus:

- | | |
|----------|--|
| 64, 10. | <i>pine</i> a coniungens inflexae <i>texta</i> carinae |
| 64, 163. | <i>purpure</i> aue tuum consternens <i>veste</i> cubile |
| 64, 210. | <i>dulcia</i> nec maesto sustollens <i>signa</i> parenti |
| 64, 235. | <i>candida</i> que intorti sustollant <i>vela</i> rudentes |
| 64, 316. | <i>lanea</i> que aridulis haerebant <i>morsa</i> labellis |
| 64, 387. | <i>annua</i> cum festis venissent <i>sacra</i> diebus |

The favorite pattern of interlocked word-order in Latin hexameters is adjective a, adjective b, noun A, noun B.⁵⁴ Our current pattern with adjective at the beginning of the line and noun after the C 2 caesura is one of the patterns from which interlocked order is constructed.

We have stated that this pattern is a variant of the framed line. That is true insofar as the metrical form of dactylic words will not permit them to appear at the end of the line and they consequently fall into the nearest position adjacent to the end of the line. Yet in Catullus this pattern has become more than a variant of the framed line: it has become one strand of the doubly framed line we have called interlocked word order. The greater frequency of this pattern is thus perfectly consistent with the tendency of Cicero and Catullus to write single-line sense units.

The pattern with the second element after the C 1 caesura is but a variant of the one we have just discussed. Again metrical factors are responsible, since the nouns appearing in the position after the C 1 caesura are of the metrical forms — — ∪ and ∪ — ∪ ∪ which will not fit the line ending. Again the examples are predominantly in interlocked word-order:

- Cic. *Arat.* fr. 3, 1. *cetera* labuntur *celeri caelestia* motu
fr. 34, 65. *umida* non sese *vestris Aurora* querellis
Lucretius 3, 675. *omnis* ut *actarum* exciderit *retinentia* rerum
Cat. *carmen* 64, 59. *irrita* *ventosae* *linquens promissa* *procellae*
64, 162. *candida* *permulcens liquidis vestigia* *lymphis*
Verg., *Aen.* 8, 319. *primus* ab *aetherio* venit *Saturnus* *Olympo*

We shall discuss the special features of these interlocked lines more fully later. Let us turn our attention now to those patterns with initial element at the beginning of the line and second element after the B caesura.

We observed in our discussion of Homer that one of the more common patterns is the initial placement of an important noun in the first metrical colon of the line and an adjective in the third colon.⁵⁵ In Homer this adjective may be a strong word as

Iliad 1, 20. παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι

or it may be a "traditional epithet," as

Iliad 2, 113. "Ἴλιον ἐκπέρσαντ' εὐτείχεον ἀπονέεσθαι

In Homer the placement of the adjective first in this pattern is rare, but when the adjective is first, it is strongly emphatic as is the case

with *ὤμὸν* in Zeus' vivid description of the extent of Hera's hatred for the Trojans:

Iliad 4, 34-6. εἰ δὲ σύ γ' εἰσελθοῦσα πύλας καὶ τείχεα μακρὰ
ὤμὸν βεβρώθοις Πριάμον Πριάμοιό τε παῖδας
 ἄλλους τε Τρώας, τότε κεν χόλον ἐξακέσαιο

Apollonius, we noted, placed adjectives first in this pattern more often than did Homer.⁵⁶ There is another feature of this pattern, however, which may be observed in embryo in Homer and which is present in Apollonius. This is the framing of a colon by an adjective at the beginning of the line and a noun before the C caesura.

In Homer this "framing" of a colon may be seen in the following lines:

Iliad 1, 20. παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποιναδέχεσθαι
 5, 498. Ἀργεῖοι δ' ὑπέμειναν ἀολλέες οὐδὲ φόβηθεν.

Yet framing is not the real motive in these lines. Framing of the colon is better exemplified by these lines of Homer in which the adjective is the first element:

Iliad 1, 108. ἐσθλὸν δ' οὔτε τί πω εἶπας ἔπος οὔτ' ἐτέλεσσας
 2, 222. ὀξέα κεκλήγων λέγ' ὀνειδέα τῶ δ' ἄρ' Ἀχαιοὶ

Again in these lines, the framing of the colon was probably not the poet's motive so much as was the desire to place the adjective in the emphatic initial position.

The following lines of Apollonius better exemplify the framing of the colon:

Arg. 1, 796. πυροφόρους ἀρώσι γύας· κακότητα δὲ πᾶσαν
 2, 544. σφωιτέρους δ' ἐνόησε δόμους, ἄμυδις δὲ κέλευθος
 2, 663. ἐργατῖναι μογέουσι βόες, πέρι δ' ἄσπετος ἰδρῶς
 3, 831. αὐσταλέας δ' ἔψηχε παρηίδας, αὐτὰρ ἀλοιφῇ

This Greek epic pattern was carried over into the Latin hexameter by Ennius, yet the framing motif appears not to have been exploited consistently until Vergil. In Ennius, for example, only line 406 really has a strong break at the C caesura:

Totum sudor habet *corpus* multumque laborat

Somewhat similar is line 473:

Semianimesque micant *oculi* lucemque requirunt

The two lines have in common the fact that the common subject of the two clauses is centrally placed while grammatically construed with the first.

In the two other examples of Ennius the chief motive for placement appears to be the emphasis derived from the initial position in the line:

106. *Aeternum* seritote *diem* concorditer ambo

479. *Ingenti* vadit *cursu* qua redditus terminus est

In line 257 there is not only stress upon the adjective *fortibus* that is gained by initial position but also the strong assonance in its position close to *fortuna*:

Fortibus est fortuna *viris* data . . .

Most of the examples in Cicero show that the emphatic character of the initial position in the line is still the factor of chief importance in this pattern for him:

Arat. fr. 34, 316. *bina* pari spatio *caelestia* signa tenentes

fr. 34, 333. *annua* conficiens *vertentia* tempora cursu

The nicest example from Cicero is a line in a fragment dealing with the ages of man:

Arat. fr. 18, 1. *ferrea* tum vero *proles* exorta repentest

In this line the initial stress of *ferrea* is reinforced by *tum* and *vero* which follow. The sense is, "Then truly of iron was the generation that suddenly sprang up."

The examples in Lucretius are similar to those of Cicero. More interesting are those in Catullus. Four of the five examples with second element after the B caesura show interlocked word order:

64, 42. *squalida* desertis *rubigo* infertur aratris

64, 51. *heroum* mira *virtutes* indicat arte

64, 131. *frigidulos* udo *singultus* ore cientem

64, 15. *aequoreae* monstrum *Nereides* admirantes

The other line of Catullus again exploits the emphatic character of the initial position in the line:

64, 406. *iustificam* nobis *mentem* avertere deorum

There is one good example in Catullus of the framed colon in this pattern:

64, 178. *Idaeosne* petam *montes*? at gurgite lato

In Vergil the framed colon extending from the beginning of the line to the C caesura is a common thing, as we have already seen earlier.⁵⁷ Thus a traditional pattern of word-order has been combined with the motif of framing in this case also, as we have seen in the case of two other patterns earlier.⁵⁸

The framing of the colon in many of these examples in Vergil is found in a balanced dicolon line:

- Aen.* 8, 244. *infernas reseret sedes et regna recludat*
 8, 275. *communemque vocate deum et date vina volentes*
 8, 611. *talibus adfata est dictis seque obtulit ultro*
 8, 667. *Tartareas etiam sedes, alta ostia Ditis*

In many others the colon so framed is part of a larger group of lines with enjambement:

- Aen.* 8, 61. *supplicibus supera votis mihi victor honorem*
 8, 113. *ignotas temptare vias! quo tenditis inquit.*
 8, 257. *praecipiti iecit saltu, qua plurimus undam*
 8, 503. *externos optate duces, tum Etrusca resedit*
 8, 660. *virgatis lucent sagulis, tum lactea colla*

E. THE DISPOSITION OF TWO PAIRS OF NOUNS AND ADJECTIVES

A particularly elegant pattern of word-order in the Latin hexameter was referred to by John Dryden as "that verse which they call Golden, of two substantives and two adjectives with a verb betwixt to keep the peace."⁵⁹ The term, "Golden line," belongs strictly to what we shall call interlocked word-order, the most frequent pattern of which has two adjectives before the B caesura, a verb before the C caesura and two nouns at the end of the line. The order is aptly seen in the sequence of letters *abAB*, wherein lower-case letters signify adjectives and upper-case letters signify nouns. The pattern is exemplified by the following line of Vergil:

Georg. 1, 468. impiaque aeternam timuerunt saecula noctem

A pattern closely related to the above also has two adjectives before the B caesura, a verb between the B and C caesurae, and two nouns at the end of the line, but in this pattern the two pairs are not interlaced; they form a double frame around the verb, and for this reason we shall refer to this pattern as "concentric" word order. It is graphically described by the sequence of letters *abBA* and is exemplified by the following line of Vergil:

Aen. 8, 654. Romuleoque recens horrebat regia culmo

Neither of these two patterns is to be found in Ennius.⁶⁰ The forms of these patterns which we have cited are the ones most common in Catullus and Vergil. There are, to be sure, earlier examples in Cicero of interlocked word order in lines that are not so symmetrically constructed as the ones cited above. Such, for instance, is line 298 of fragment 34 of the *Aratea*:

ille autem claro quartus cum lumine circus

Here symmetry is not the object of Cicero's placement; rather his main intent seems to be making *claro* prominent, and this he has achieved by placing it before the B caesura. Similarly in line 358 of the *Aratea*:

Anguitenens validis magnum a cervicibus Anguem

the chief effect at which Cicero seems to have aimed is the placement at opposite ends of the line of *Anguitenens* and *Anguem*, the effect achieved by the juxtaposition of *validis* and *magnum* being secondary. Nevertheless *validis* and *magnum* do serve by their placement together to reinforce each other, and this stress effect of juxtaposition is one of the chief motives of interlocked word-order:

Idyll 16, 62. ἢ ῥδατι νίζειν θολερὰν διαειδέι πλίνθον

Here the confrontation of *θολερὰν* "muddy" with *διαειδέι*, "clear, transparent" underlines the incompatibility of the two notions and the impossibility of the task of washing clean the brick.

There are two patterns of interlocked word order that are frequently found in the Latin hexameter. In one of them the first attribute appears at the beginning of the line, the verb in the second metrical colon, and the second attribute and the two nouns in the second half of the line. This pattern is seen in the following two lines of Cicero:

Arat. 3, 1. cetera labuntur celeri caelestia motu

34, 103. inferiora tenet truculenti corpora Tauri

There is alliteration in these lines, but the chief effect of the word order is the stress on the first adjective resulting from its initial position in the line. Catullus, as we expect, has placed in this emphatic initial position adjectives of more picturesque or of more emotional content. Thus adjectives of color are thrown into relief in three of the examples from *carmen* 64:

7. caerula verrentes abiegnis aequora palmis

63. non flavo retinens subtilem vertice mitram

162. candida permulcens liquidis vestigia lymphis

In line 341 the speed of a hart is vividly expressed by the emphatic initial adjective *flammea* which is then followed by *praevertet*. The positions of the adjective and verb thus intensify the description of the speed of Achilles: "Though she run like fire, yet will he surpass the speed of a swift hart."

flammea praevertet celeris vestigia cervae.

The same relationship of initial adjective and verb is seen in line 113, where *errabunda* emphasizes the difficulties of escape from the Labyrinth and *regens* stresses the control over the passage outwards: "However apt to stray they may be, he guides his steps with slender thread."

errabunda regens tenui vestigia filo

In line 159 the last three words form a group bound together by alliteration as well as by dependence upon each other grammatically. The initial adjective *saeva* is strongly emphatic and displaces the conjunction *quod* to take the position of greatest emphasis:

saeva quod horrebas prisci praecepta parentis

There is an interesting example of the inverted order of this pattern in Vergil. It describes the gruesome scene of the monster Cacus, "reclining in his gore-smeared cave upon half-devoured bones." We have noted how the inverted order of patterns with the final element at the end of the line is especially emphatic.⁶¹ That is the case here with *cruento*, and this heavy stress is even further intensified by the juxtaposition of *semesa* and *cruento*. The effect is difficult to carry over into English: "reclining in his cave upon a bed of half-chewed bones amid streams of gore."

Aen. 8, 297. ossa super recubans antro semesa cruento

The genuine "Golden Line" of Dryden's comment is not to be found in Cicero. The third book of Lucretius offers three examples. The first is found in a discussion of the intimate bond between *corpus* and *anima*:

3, 344ff. ex ineunte aevo sic corporis atque animai
mutua vitalis discunt contagia motus
maternis etiam membris alvoque reposta
discidium ut nequeat fieri sine peste maloque.

Juxtaposition is the key element in interlocked word-order. Here the juxtaposition of *mutua* and *vitalis* underlines the point that Lucretius

is trying to make: *life* has as a necessary condition the conjunction of *corpus* and *anima*. Should the *mutua contagia* be dissolved, then the *vitalis motus* will cease.

In a preface to a discussion of the mortality of the soul, Lucretius addresses to Memmius an elegant line of praise:

3, 420. digna tua pergam disponere carmina vita.

The effect of the juxtaposition of *digna* and *tua* and of the wide separation of these adjectives from their nouns is to stress doubly their reciprocal relationship: "I shall proceed to unfold *noble* songs to match your *noble* way of life."

In line 675 of Book 3 one of the attributes is a participle, but the effects achieved by the interlocked word-order are nonetheless remarkable:

3, 674ff. nam si tanto opere est animi mutata potestas,
omnis ut actarum exciderit retinentia rerum,
non, ut opinor, id a leto iam longius errat.

One may, of course, note the repetition of *t*- and *r*-sounds in the last three words of the line; but more important is the sequence of the sense in *omnis ut actarum exciderit*, each word driving forcefully home the notion of total cleavage expressed by the verb. As a result of this sequence, the last two words are notions feebly contrasting with the finality of the perfect participle *actarum* and the perfect tense form *exciderit*.

Lucretius' use of this interlocked pattern of word-order, then, is sparing but highly effective in stressing an essential point in his argument. In Catullus the juxtaposition of adjectives is used not so much to drive home points of argumentation as to suggest moods and make vivid the scenes in his tableau. Thus in line 39 of no. 64, the adjectives vivify the picture of the fields left behind by the visitors to the wedding of Peleus and Thetis: "No curving blades along the ground prune back the vine."

non humilis curvis purgatur vinea rastris.

Painted with the same eye for detail is the picture of Ariadne standing in the shallow water by the shore of Naxos, "lifting up, so that her calves are bared, the soft-woven cloth."

mollia nudatae tollentem tegmina surae

and the picture of the Fates singing at their task of weaving while "woolen tufts clung to their withered lips:"

laneaque aridulis haerebant morsa labellis

No less vivid is the picture of the bacchants. Line 264 does not so much paint a detail as arouse a reaction with the juxtaposition of *barbara* and *horribili*:

barbaraque horribili stridebat tibia cantu

In line 242 the juxtaposition of *anxia* and *assiduos* intensifies the description of the anguish of Aegeus. In fact the adjectives make clear the internal significance of the overt action described in the line:

anxia in assiduos absumens lumina fletus

In line 59 the juxtaposed initial adjectives give vent to the bitter feelings of Catullus on human faithlessness. The force of the adjectives must be translated in some such manner as this: "they are of no avail: the wind has them — those promises which he delivers over to the storm to carry away!"

irrita ventosae linquens promissa procellae

In line 163 Ariadne expresses her powerful devotion to Theseus in terms of what might have been if she had been able to serve him at least as a slave. The juxtaposition of *purpurea* and *tuum* in this line has an effect similar to that of *digna* and *tua* in the line of Lucretius cited earlier: "Your bed I would gladly strew with the very best, a *purple* cloth."

purpureave tuum consternens veste cubile

An antithesis too may be made most forceful through juxtaposition of two strong adjectives. Thus the fatal moment in Ariadne's life is signaled by the two adjectives marking the impingement of the stranger from Athens on Ariadne's quiet life in Crete:

172. Gnosia Cecropiae tetigissent litora puppes

A powerful antithesis is expressed in the initial adjectives of line 210. It signals the nemesis that Theseus has brought upon his own household through his desertion of Ariadne. Through the same forgetfulness, he fails to keep his promise to his father, and the joy of homecoming gives way to grief. This change of mood at the homecoming is foreshadowed in the initial appearance of these two adjectives:

dulcia nec maesto sustollens signa parenti

The examples of interlocked word-order in this pattern in Book 8 of the *Aeneid* are not quite so striking as those of Catullus. In the dream of Aeneas in which the river god Tiber appears to him, the initial adjectives in the following line stress important features of the portent Aeneas is to see: "*On the banks of the river* you will find beneath the oaks a sow *of immense proportions*:"

43. litoreis ingens inventa sub ilicibus sus

In 319 Evander tells in a graceful line of the coming of the first ruler of Latium, Saturn:

primus ab aetherio venit Saturnus Olympo.

Juxtaposition of a noun and an adjective not belonging to it grammatically can also be effective. Thus in the line in which Evander describes the gift he received while a guest of Anchises, there is a play of *meus* upon *frena* and of *aurea* on *Pallas*. The effect is: "two harnesses that are mine, but now my son Pallas has them; they are of gold and even so much do I value my son Pallas."

frenaeque bina meus quae nunc habet aurea Pallas.

The two patterns of interlocked-word order which have been discussed are constructed on patterns of distribution of substantive and attribute that we have already seen in our earlier discussion. Thus the "Golden Line" combines the pattern with adjective before the B caesura and noun at the end of the line⁶² with the pattern having adjective at the beginning of the line and noun after the C caesura.⁶³ Similarly the pattern exemplified by the line

caerula verrentes abiegnis aequora palmis

combines the pattern having adjective before the C caesura and noun at the end of the line ("Homeric pattern")⁶⁴ with the pattern having adjective at the beginning of the line and noun after the C caesura.⁶⁵

"Concentric" lines are also doubly framed and are constructed upon patterns we have already discussed earlier: the framed line⁶⁶ and the pattern with the adjective before the B caesura and the noun after the C caesura.⁶⁷ This "concentric" line is frequent only in Cicero and Catullus, of whose technique of writing single-line sense units it is a part.

The examples of Cicero are interesting for little more than what they show us of his technique. The following line, for instance, can hardly

qualify as a good example of "framing," for *Graium* is a weakly appended partitive Genitive depending upon *nemo*:

Arat. 34, 212. quam nemo certo donavit nomine Graium

Yet the order is deliberate, for Cicero could as easily have written:

quam nemo Graium donavit nomine certo.⁶⁸

The word-order in the following lines seems to be determined by the desire for the symmetry of the doubly framed line rather than by any stress-factors:

Arat. 27, 1. Corniger est valido conixus corpore Taurus
34, 144. Fluminis inlustri tangentem pectore ripas

The following line does have stress on the two initial adjectives but there is no added emphasis in their juxtaposition:

Arat. 34, 64. non hiberna cito volvetur curriculo Nox

In the following line there may be an intentional juxtaposition of strong adjectives for intensity:

Arat. 34, 111. aestiferos validis erumpit flatibus ignes

Only once, however, does Cicero juxtapose in this pattern two adjectives that are of a like nature. In the following line *extremas* and *medio* both indicate relative position:

Arat. 34, 438. extremas medio contingens pectore terras

Again it is to Catullus that we must look for the most effective exploitation of the possibilities of this pattern. Line 133 of no. 64 is framed by two vocatives that belong together, *perfide Theseu*, and the central verb *liquisti* is further framed by *deserto litore*. The sense of the first two words of the line, however, are enough to portray Ariadne's situation, even though they are in themselves grammatically incomplete:

perfide, deserto liquisti in litore, Theseu

In line 309 the contrast of bright colors in the head dress of the Fates is made more effective by the juxtaposition of *roseae* and *niveo*:

at roseae niveo residebant vertice vittae

and there is also alliteration in the noun group at the end of the line.

Antithesis is again the motive of the juxtaposition of *Phrygii* and *Teucro* in line 344:

cum Phrygii Teucro manabunt sanguine campi

The indignity of the mothers mourning for sons slain at Troy is stressed by the juxtaposition of *incultum* and *cano* in line 350:

cum incultum cano solvent a vertice crinem

F. PATTERNS OF SEPARATION IN ENJAMBEMENT

The patterns of separation in enjambement in the Latin hexameter, like the patterns of separation within the single line, follow in the train of the Greek epic tradition. "Deferred" elements in enjambement in Homer are usually loosely appended adjectives of an appositional nature. This is thoroughly in accordance with what we find in the case of separated elements in the single line.⁶⁹ These "deferred" adjectives usually stand at the beginning of the second line, as in the following typical examples:

Iliad 2, 324f. ἡμῖν μὲν τόδ' ἔφηνε τέρας μέγα μητίετα Ζεὺς,
ὄψιμον, ὄψιτέλεστον, δοῦ κλέος οὐ ποτ' ὀλεῖται.

3, 337f. ὦ πόποι, ἦ δὴ πασὶν εἰκότες ἀγοράασθε
νηπιάχοις, οἷς οὐ τι μέλει πολεμῆϊα ἔργα

2, 402f. αὐτὰρ ὁ βοῦν ἱέρευσεν ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων
πίονα πενταέτηρον ὑπερμενεί Κρονίωνι

Many other examples could be cited and it may be added that a noun in the genitive case may serve just as well as an adjective in further characterizing the referent in the preceding line:

Iliad 3, 139f. ὦς εἰποῦσα θεὰ γλυκὺν ἥμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ
ἀνδρός τε προτέρου καὶ ἄστεος ἠδὲ τοκῆων

4, 354f. Τελεμάχοιο φίλον πατέρα προμάχοισι μιν γέντα
Τρώων ἵπποδάμων

5, 161f. ὦς δὲ λέων ἐν βοῦσι θορῶν ἐξ αὐχένα ἄξῃ
πόρτιος ἢ ἐβόος

We see that an adjective (or genitive modifier) following a noun referent in a previous line serves not as an attributive modifier, but

rather as an appositive, adding a further prediction which is not really necessary to the narrative. In this sense, the cases above do not really differ in kind from that of the noun in apposition following in a second line, e.g.:

Iliad 5, 59f. Μηριόνης δὲ Φέρεκλον ἐνήρατο, τέκτονος υἱὸν
Ἀρμονίδεω

1, 353f. τιμὴν πέρ μοι ὄφελλεν Ὀλύμπιος ἐγγυαλίζαι
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης

In the last example cited it may be objected that Ὀλύμπιος is an adjective and that its noun is Ζεὺς in the next line. Here however, Ὀλύμπιος stands as a traditional epithet of Zeus, "the Olympian," and the sequence of words should be understood as "the Olympian, high-thundering Zeus."

These phenomena are well summarized by Seymour:

In general, when an adjective (or its equivalent, a limiting genitive) or substantive at the beginning of a verse agrees with (or limits) a word in the preceding line, it is added as a kind of appositive in order to introduce the following clause, either directly, as in

κ 348 ἀμφιπολοι δ' ἄρα τέως μὲν ἐνὶ μεγάροισι πένοντο
τέσσαρες, αἳ οἱ δῶμα κάτα δρήσκειν ἔασιν

or by way of comment, as in

κ 354 ἡ δ' ἐτέρη προπάροιθε θρόνων ἐτίτανε τραπέζας
ἀργυρέας, ἐπὶ δέ σφι τίθει χρύσεια κάνεια⁷⁰

An adjective in one line modifying attributively a noun in the following line is an extremely rare phenomenon. LaRoche⁷¹ has found only four adjectives of this sort in Homer: πᾶς (and ἅπας), πολύς, ἄλλος and θαμναῖα. Where the last-mentioned appears it is always adverbial, and the first three are words of a demonstrative type with substantival uses, and the noun in the following line serves rather to delineate further the thing pointed out than to relieve the tension of anticipation aroused by an attributive adjective. Thus:

Iliad 1, 283f. λίσσομαι Ἀχιλλῆϊ μεθέμεν χόλον, ὃς μέγα πᾶσιν
ἔρκος Ἀχαιοῖσιν πέλεται πολέμοιο κακοῦ

4, 143f. κεῖται δ' ἐν θαλάμῳ, πολέες τέ μιν ἡρήσαντο
ἱππῆες φορέειν.

5, 485f. τύνη δ' ἔστηκας, ἀτὰρ οὐδ' ἄλλοισι κελεύεις
λαοῖσιν μενέμεν καὶ ἀμύνεμεναι ὥρεσσι

An example all the more striking, considering the rarity of the placement, is *Iliad* 18, 18f.:

ὦ μοι, Πηλέος νιὲ δαΐφρονος, ἥ μάλα λυγρῆς
πεύσεαι ἀγγελίης, ἥ μὴ ὥφελλε γενέσθαι.

Λυγρῆς is unquestionably emphatic here. The context is the dramatic announcement made by Antilochus to Achilles — that Patroclus is dead.

Homer's style is "appositional" and epithets are regularly appended *after* nouns they modify. In our discussion of the patterns of separation in the single line in the Greek hexameter we have already noted that in the Alexandrian poets adjectives normally appear first in the patterns carried down from Homer.⁷² Thus, what is exceedingly rare in Homer, an adjective in one line referring to a noun in the next, is quite ordinary in Apollonius.⁷³

There are two patterns of separation in enjambement in Apollonius that appear with great frequency. Most frequent of all is the pattern in which the first element (more frequently the adjective) appears in the latter half of the first line and the second element at the beginning of the second line. The pattern is illustrated by the following passages:

Arg. 1, 661f. κακῇ δ' ἐπὶ πολλὸν ἵκηται
βάξις, ἐπεὶ μέγα ἔργον ἐρέξαμεν· οὐδέ τι πάμπαν

Arg. 2, 383f. μήτι παντοίη μέγ' ἀναιδέας | ἐξέλασαντες
οἰωνούς οἱ δῆθεν ἀπειρέσιοι ἐφέπουσιν

The second pattern appearing frequently in Apollonius displays the first element at the end of the first line and the second element before the B caesura of the second line. This pattern is illustrated by the following passages:

Arg. 3, 982f. ἀμφαδίην ἀγόρευε καὶ εἶρεο, μηδέ με τερπνοῖς
φηλώσης ἐπέεσσιν

3, 148f. λίσσετο δ' αἶψα πορεῖν, αὐτοσχεδόν, ἥ δ' ἀγανοῖσιν
ἀντομένη μύθοισι . . .

The observation of these two patterns in the frequency indicated is in accord with the conclusions of Henry W. Prescott in a study of "deferred" nouns and adjectives published in 1912:

In general, as the result of the reconciliation of many different factors — metrical conditions, natural collocation, rhythmical and stylistic effects,

the historical development of classical verse — the deferred nouns and adjectives in the vast majority of cases stand first in the verse if they are metrically available. In a very small minority of cases these deferred words, though available for the initial position, escape to a position before the main caesura, and then usually under the metrical constraint of their environment.⁷⁴

These patterns do, in fact, account for the great majority of examples of separation in the Latin as well as in the Greek hexameter. Tables V and VI indicate their frequency in Ennius' *Annales*, Cicero's *Aratea*, Book 3 of Lucretius, no. 64 of Catullus, and Book 8 of the *Aeneid* of Vergil.

TABLE V. SEPARATION IN ENJAMBEMENT WITH SECOND ELEMENT
AT BEGINNING OF SECOND LINE

	First element after C caesura	First element before C caesura	First element before B caesura
Ennius, <i>Annales</i>	Total 3 adj.-noun 3	Total 0	Total 0
Cicero, <i>Aratea</i>	Total 4 adj.-noun 3 noun-gen. 1	Total 5 adj.-noun 1 noun-adj. 1 ptc.-noun 1 gen.-noun 1 noun-gen. 1	Total 2 adj.-noun 2
Lucretius, Book 3	Total 3 adj.-noun 3	Total 7 adj.-noun 3 noun-adj. 2 noun-gen. 1 ptc.-noun 1	Total 1 adj.-noun 1
Catullus, 64	Total 7 adj.-noun 7	Total 3 adj.-noun 3	Total 0
Vergil, <i>Aeneid</i> 8	Total 23 adj.-noun 17 ptc.-noun 3 noun-adj. 1 noun-ptc. 1 noun-gen. 1	Total 3 adj.-noun 1 noun-adj. 2	Total 2 adj.-noun 2

TABLE VI. SEPARATION IN ENJAMBEMENT WITH FIRST ELEMENT
AT END OF FIRST LINE

	Second element before A caesura	Second element before B caesura	Second element before C caesura
Ennius, <i>Annales</i>	Total 1 adj.-noun 1	Total 2 adj.-noun 2	Total 0
Cicero, <i>Aratea</i>	Total 0	Total 2 adj.-noun 2	Total 0
Lucretius, Book 3	Total 1 adj.-noun 1	Total 6 adj.-noun 4 noun-adj. 1 gen.-noun 1	Total 3 adj.-noun 2 gen.-noun 1
Catullus 64	Total 0	Total 1 adj.-noun 1	Total 0
Vergil, <i>Aeneid</i> 8	Total 0	Total 11 adj.-noun 5 noun-adj. 2 gen.-noun 0 noun-gen. 1 ptc.-noun 3	Total 3 adj.-noun 2 ptc.-noun 1

Let us now examine the examples of these two patterns in these authors, beginning with that pattern in which the second element appears at the beginning of the second line. We may begin with lines 65-6 of the *Annales* of Ennius:

Unus erit quem tu tolles in *caerula* caeli
Templa

Here perhaps one ought not to speak of separation, since *caeli* is as much dependent upon *templa* as is *caerula*. Ennius could have written *caerula templa*, but by so doing he would have lost the fine assonance of *caerula caeli*, and this, as we have seen before,⁷⁵ was a frequent motive in his placement of words. A better example of separation is found in lines 30-31:

Assaraco natus Capys optimus isque *pium* ex se
Anchisen generat.

By the separation here the adjective *pium* is thrown into relief with a resultant emphasis upon that most important of Roman moral qualities, *pietas*. There is another feature here to be noted: the pattern appears within a colon extending from the C caesura of line 30 to the B caesura of line 31. It is cola of this kind that account for a great number of the many examples of this pattern in Vergil. *Omne* in line 190 also introduces a new colon. I cite the whole context:

Incedunt arbusta per alta, securibus caedunt,
Percellunt magnas quercus, exciditur ilex,
Fraxinus frangitur atque abies consternitur alta,
Pinus proceras pervortunt; *omne* sonabat
arbustum fremitu silvai frondosai.

Omne is emphatic here. The phrase, *omne sonabat arbustum*, summarizes the sense of seven preceding clauses. The separation here heightens the strong sense that *omne* has as a result of its very nature and sense. *Πᾶς* and *πολύς* are two of the four adjectives that may appear first in this pattern in Homer.⁷⁶

The same word in the same pattern of separation with much the same effect is seen in Cicero's *Aratea*, fr. 34, 196f.:

quem si prospiciens vitaveris, *omnia* caute
armamenta locans, tuto labere per undas

Again the separation appears in a colon beginning after the C caesura and *omnia* has added stress through the separation.

In the following line of Cicero the motive for the placement is probably as much the desire to put *Perseus* at the line-ending as the desire to stress *infera*:

Arat. fr. 34, 565f. crus dextrumque pedem linquens obit *infera* Perseus
 in *loca*

More interesting in Cicero are those examples in which the adjective appears before the C or the B caesura. In line 375-6 of fragment 34 of the *Aratea*, *inlustrem* is stressed by its position:

sed laevum genus atque *inlustrem* linquit in alto
plantam

In lines 43-44 *infirmis* has an especially heavy stress by virtue of its initial position in the second line and the fact that it is the last element of the separated group: "with hands that were yet infirm":

Mercurius parvus *manibus* quam dicitur olim
infirmis fabricatus in alta sede locasse.

Alliteration is the motive for the separation of *curvus* in line 91 from *Delphinus* in 92. An additional effect is the prominent initial position of *Delphinus*:

tum magni *curvus* Capricorni corpora propter
Delphinus iacet

Supero is emphatic in its separation from *mense* in lines 72-3. This passage follows a discourse on the dangers of winter sailing when the sun is in Capricorn. The present lines assert emphatically that sailors should shun the sea even in the previous month when the sun is in Sagittarius:

Atque etiam *supero* navi pelagoque vacato
mense, Sagittipotens Solis cum sustinet orbem.

Several examples of this pattern in Lucretius have quantitative adjectives as the first element of a separated group:

- 3, 124-5. noscere ut hinc possis non aequas *omnia* partis
 corpora habere
- 3, 148-9. laeditur in nobis, non *omni* conruciamur
 corpore
- 3, 216-7. ergo animam totam *perparvis* esse necesse est
 seminibus
- 3, 229-30. scire licet perquam *paucillis* esse creatam
 seminibus

In the following line the separation not only allows the alliteration of *vera videtur*, but makes *vera* emphatic in its antithesis to *falsae rationi*:

- 3, 523-4. usque adeo falsae rationi *vera* videtur
 res occurrere

In line 447 *infirmo* and *tenero* are both prominent and emphatic in their separation from *corpore* in line 448:

- 3, 447-8. nam velut *infirmo* pueri *teneroque* vagantur
 corpore

The examples of Catullus show the pattern used most effectively to emphasize especially strong adjectives. Again the quantitative word is so placed:

- 64, 32-3. advenere, domum conventu *tota* frequentat
 Thessalia

Particularly suspenseful are the adjectives in the following lines, where the adjectives and the final verbs combine to create vivid pictures of rough sea and sprawling palace:

205-6. quo motu tellus atque *horrida* contremuerunt
aequora

43-4. ipsius at sedes, quacumque *opulenta* recessit
regia

Depth of passion is powerfully expressed in the following line, where the suspense of the separation of *flagrantia* from *lumina* is intensified by the slow spondaic movement of the verb *declinavit*:

91-2. non prius ex illo *flagrantia* declinavit
lumina

Blanda in the following line heightens the sarcasm of Ariadne's cry to Theseus:

139-40. at non haec quondam *blanda* promissa dedisti
voce mihi

In the following two passages the pattern in enjambement is combined with the "Homeric" pattern to form interlocked word order with its strong effects of juxtaposition.

In the first the antithesis between Theseus' concealed intentions and his assumed outward countenance is made poignant by the juxtaposition of *dulci* and *crudelia*:

175-6. nec malus hic celans dulci crudelia forma
consilia in nostris requiesset sedibus hospes

In the second passage the description of the wool lying at the feet of the Parcae is made vivid by the juxtaposition of the adjectives *candentis* and *mollia*:

318-9. ante pedes autem candentis mollia lanae
vellera virgati custodibant calathisci

The examples of this pattern in Vergil show that it is often used to bind together a colon in enjambement beginning with either the B or the C caesura and extending to the A caesura of the next line.⁷⁷ Thus in the following lines of Book 8 of the *Aeneid*, the quantitative adjective *plurimus* performs this function:

Aen. 8, 256-8. non tulit Alcides animis, seque ipse per ignem
praecipiti iecit saltu, qua *plurimus* undam
fumus agit nebulaque ingens specus aestuat atra.

In lines 283-4, the second colon of the tricolon period is held together by interlocked word order of the sort we saw in enjambement in Catullus:

instaurant epulas et mensae grata secundae
dona ferunt cumulantque oneratis lancibus aras

Similar is the tricolon describing the coming of Hercules to Latium:

Aen. 8, 203-4. Alcides aderat *taurosque* hac victor agebat
ingentis, vallemque boves amnemque tenebant

Here *ingentis* is especially emphatic as the final element of the separated group at the beginning of the second line.

In the following two tricola, the colon extending from the C caesura of one line to the A caesura of the next are framed by adjective and noun:

Aen. 8, 95-6. et longos superant flexus *variisque* teguntur
arboribus, viridisque secant placido aequore silvas

Aen. 8, 467-8. congressi iungunt dextras *mediisque* residunt
aedibus et licito tandem sermone fruuntur.

In concluding our discussion of this pattern, we may cite two elegant periods of Vergil in which this colon plays a part. The first describes the approach of Hercules to the cave of Cacus with its hidden entrance:

Aen. 8, 230-2. ter totum fervidus ira
lustrat Aventini montem, ter *saxea* temptat
limina nequiquam, ter fessus valle recedit.

The repeated *ter* at the beginning of each colon marks the rhythm of the frustrated search of the hero. The rhythm has a decreasing tempo and the word order helps to accentuate it: *totum* and *montem* frame the first colon, *nequiquam* at the end of the second brings the movement to a heavy halt, and the concluding words of the third mark the gradual relaxation after labor that is in vain. The second colon in enjambement marks a peak of effort: the enjambement is itself descriptive, yet the *nequiquam* with its three long syllables contrasts with both the sense and the movement of *ter saxea temptat limina*.

The second passage describes the Cyclopes at work on the armor of Aeneas:

Aen. 8, 449-51. alii ventosis follibus auras
accipiunt redduntque, alii *stridentia* tingunt
aera lacu.

The period paints a contrasting picture of some of the Cyclopes working the bellows while others temper the hot bronze in water. Each colon is marked by onomatopoeia, for the repeated *s*-sounds in *ventosis follibus auras* suggest the hissing of the bellows as they are inflated and deflated, and *stridentia tingunt* suggests the sound of steam erupting from water when hot metal is plunged into it. Here then it is onomatopoeia that is achieved through employment of our pattern of separation in enjambement.

The other pattern of separation of substantive and attribute that is common in Latin hexameters has the first element at the end of the first line and the second element before the B (less commonly before the A or C) caesura of the second line. The pattern is seen twice in three successive lines of Ennius' *Annales*:

78-80. Remus auspicio se devovet atque *secundam*
solus *avem* servat. At Romulus pulcher in *alto*
quaerit *Aventino*.

The adjective at the end of the line is especially prominent since it is a position of emphasis. In lines 183-4 of the *Annales* there is a play on words in *fero* and *ferro*, and *fero* is given great emphasis by its position:

Proletarius publicitus scutisque *feroque*
ornatur *ferro*.

In the following line of Cicero the final adjective *maestis* is further strengthened by juxtaposition with *grave*. *Maestis* is, in fact, proleptic, for it is the *grave signum* of the constellation Aquila that gives them their grim countenance:

Arat. 34, 89-90. non nimis ingenti cum corpore, sed grave *maestis*
ostendit *nautis* perturbans aequora signum

Lucretius achieves a nice symmetry in the following lines on the composition of the *animus*:

3, 186-7. at quod mobile tanto opere est, constare *rotundis*
perquam *seminibus* debet perquamque *minutis*.

He has placed the substantive *seminibus* centrally between the two attributes, *rotundis* and *minutis*, and both of these he has put at emphatic positions at the ends of their lines.

The weak demonstrative *is, ea, id*, rarely is emphatic, but in the following line it is very much so, for it refers to the blessings of home,

family, and material possessions — and *these* things, Lucretius asserts, one will feel no want of after death:

3, 900-1. illud in his rebus non addunt; nec tibi *earum*
iam desiderium *rerum* super insidet una.

Perhaps the most effective example in Lucretius of this pattern is in lines 907-8 of Book 3. Here the long words and the spondaic fifth foot aid the sense of *aeternum*, and the separation itself aids the sense of lingering grief:

insatiabiliter deflevimus, *aeternumque*
nulla dies nobis *maerorem* e pectore demet.

The following three examples from the *Aeneid* show the placement of strong adjectives in the final emphatic position of the line:

8, 198-9. huic monstro Vulcanus erat pater: illius *atros*
ore vomens *ignis* magna se mole ferebat

8, 237-8. dexter in adversum nitens concussit et *imis*
avulsam solvit *radicibus*, inde repente

8, 668-9. et te, Catilina, *minaci*
pendentem *scopulo*

An interesting effect is achieved by the framing of *ferrum acuant* in the following lines. The separation of the participle *clausis* and the noun *portis* graphically illustrates the action described by the lines: the sharpening of swords within the seclusion of closed gates:

Aen. 8, 385-6. aspice qui coeant populi, quae moenia *clausis*
ferrum acuant *portis*.

Another interesting effect is achieved by the final position of *cavi* in the separation in enjambement in the following lines. As a result of the placement, *cavi* goes closely with the verb in meaning: "shut in within their hollows":

Aen. 8, 598-9. undique *colles*
inclusere *cavi* et nigra nemus abiete cingunt.

In the previous pages we have discussed the two most common patterns of separation in enjambement. We may now call attention to some interesting examples of placement that do not fall into these patterns.

In lines 97–98 of Catullus 64 the initial words of the two lines correspond:

qualibus incensam iactastis mente puellam
fluctibus, in flavo saepe hospite suspirantem.

and in lines 16–17 of the same poem it is the final words of the two lines that so correspond:

Illa, atque haud alia, viderunt luce *marinas*
 mortales oculis nudato corpore *Nymphas*,

a pattern which I have observed in Apollonius:

Arg. 1, 685f.	<i>ἦε βαθείαις</i> <i>αὐτόματοι βόες ὕμνιν ἐνιζευχθέντες ἀρούραις</i>
2, 919f.	<i>ἄμφι δὲ καλή</i> <i>τετράφαλος φοίνικι λόφῳ ἐπελάμπετο πῆληξ</i>
3, 154f.	<i>καὶ δὲ φαεινῶ</i> <i>μητρὸς ἑῆς, εὖ πάντας ἀριθμήσας, βάλε κόλπῳ</i>

It is to be noted that each of these clauses begins after the bucolic caesura and that the adjective is set off in each as the first significant word. In addition, of course, each adjective is set off by its position before the pause at the end of the line. This pattern is to be found occasionally in Vergil:

Aen. 1, 190f.	tum vulgus et <i>omnem</i> miscet agens telis nemora inter frondea <i>turbam</i> .
1, 592–3.	aut ubi <i>flavo</i> argentum Pariusve lapis circumdatur <i>auro</i> .

In this last example the framing again graphically illustrates the sense: yellow gold surrounds silver or Parian marble.

The wide separations in Vergil are particularly noteworthy. The portent of the white sow is announced in two lines framed as a unit by adjective and noun:

Aen. 8, 82f. *candida* per silvam cum fetu concolor albo
 procubuit viridique in litore conspicitur *sus*.

Framing of large units is as common in Vergil as is that of smaller units. Thus the following colon is framed by *praecipuum Aenean*:

Aen. 8, 176f. *praecipuumque* toro et villosi pelle leonis
 accipit *Aenean*.

We cited above two lines of Catullus with corresponding initial words. The same order is seen in lines 324-5 of *Aeneid* 8:

aurea quae perhibent illo sub rege fuere
saecula . . .

Awe is expressed in the wide separation of *aurea* and *saecula*, as it is expressed in the wide separation of *nostri* and *oculi* in lines 222f. of *Aeneid* 8:

tum primum *nostri* Cacum videre timentem
turbatumque *oculi*.

We have already seen how framing of successive cola by adjectives and nouns helps to set off the parts of periods in Vergil.⁷⁸ In lines 405-6 of *Aeneid* 8, a shorter framed colon is followed by a longer one:

optatos dedit *amplexus placidumque* petivit
coniugis infusus gremio per membra *quietem*.

The analysis in this paper must necessarily contend with the objection of Horace:

Sermones I, 4, 60ff. non ut si solvas, "Postquam Discordia taetra
belli ferratos postes portasque refregit,"
invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae.

Poetry is discourse the meaning of which is far greater than the sum of its parts or its form. Yet form is one essential element of poetry and in this paper we have tried to show that there is in Latin hexameter poetry a tradition of word-order that has its origin in a tradition of word-order in the Greek hexameter going all the way back to Homer. We have tried, moreover, to show how each of the patterns of separation of substantive and attribute is formed and what effects it makes. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this study has been a close look at the Roman transformation of Greek traditional forms into strict and elaborate patterns. There was an instinctive Roman drive to develop new forms of order and to adhere to forms of order once created. At times this instinctive Roman drive seems to have led to excesses of mechanical technique, such as we have seen in Cicero's hexameters, and to what often seems excessive richness of effects in Catullus 64. Yet each poet we have discussed has felt, as Romans must by nature have felt, that the tradition was not something that confined or restrained their creativity but rather something that challenged them and offered a wide range of highly effective expression. The greatest artists among

them, Vergil and Horace, surely felt in some strange and paradoxical way that they were being most original and most Roman when they expressed what they had to say in traditional forms taken over from Greek poetry. Strangely, Vergil was most himself and most Roman in that he was the most loyal among the Roman poets to Homer; and Horace, too, can make no greater boast than that he was

princeps Aeolium carmen ad Italos
deduxisse modos.

Originality for these poets consisted not in the creation of never-before-seen forms or ideas but rather in the appropriation of a tradition. Appropriation of a tradition means more than just devotion and adherence to inherited forms; it means the mastery of inherited forms and the expression of one's own national and personal character *through* them.

NOTES

1. For a full discussion and description of these patterns in the Latin elegiac distich, see J. Heyken, *Über die Stellung der Epitheta bei den römischen Elegikern* (diss. Kiel), 1916.

2. Heyken's work, cited above in note 1, climaxed a half-century of study of these patterns by German scholars. See Kemper, *Quaestiones Tibullianae* (diss., Münster 1857), W. Gebhard, *De Tibulli, Propertii, Ovidii Distichis* (diss., Königsberg 1870), Eichner, *Bemerkungen über den rhythm. und metr. Bau wie über den Gebrauch der Homoioteleuta in Distichen des Catull, Tibull, Propertius, Ovid* (Programm Gnesen, 1875), J. Hilberg, *Gesetze der Wortstellung im Pentameter des Ovid* (Leipzig 1894), Eymer, *De adpositorum apud poetas Romanos usu* (diss., Marburg 1905). August Meineke made reference in his edition of Callimachus (Berlin, 1861, p. 265) to a "nota lex compositionis elegiacae" that half-lines in the pentameter were so constructed that one would end in an adjective and the other in a noun, and on the basis of this "lex" emended the word-order of some of the pentameters of Hymn 5 of Callimachus to conform to it.

3. Harald Patzer ("Zum Sprachstil des neoterischen Hexameters," *Museum Helveticum* 12 [1955] 77ff) has attempted to prove that these patterns are essentially elegiac, that they effectively exploit the descriptive nature of adjectives, and that it was the neoteric poets who carried over the use of these patterns from elegiac poetry to the "epyllion" which Heyken insists is essentially different from the "erzählender Vers des Ennius," in that it is a "lyrischer Hexameter." This distinction is in itself highly questionable. The patterns are older than the neoteric epyllion and they are in origin epic.

4. It is my intention to demonstrate this at greater length in another article. A brief discussion of the Homeric patterns and their formulaic character is to be found below.

5. An attempt to encompass the entire history of patterns of word-order in Greek and Latin literature was undertaken by Heinrich Boldt in a Göttingen

dissertation (*De liberiore linguae graecae et latinae collocatione*) of 1884. A more systematic discussion of some of the patterns forms Anhang III of Eduard Norden's commentary on Book VI of the *Aeneid* (3rd ed., Leipzig: Teubner 1934). I may mention also an analysis of patterns of word-order in Pindar published in 1961 by Miss Asta-Irene Sulzer (*Κλυταῖσι δαίδαλωσέμεν ὕμνων πτυχαῖς, oder Zur Wortstellung und Satzbildung bei Pindar*, Zürich: Aschmann u. Scheller AG, 1961) who in her concluding chapter made the interesting but not very convincing assertion that the source of all the patterns is Pindar.

6. See Heyken (above, n.1) 8-12.

7. See Hans Drexler, "Caesur und Diaerese," *Aevum*, 24 (1950) 353. The controversy over the existence of the caesura as a feature of classical metrics may safely be considered closed. E. H. Sturtevant, who opened up this discussion in 1924 with his article, "The Doctrine of Caesura, a Philological Ghost" (*AJP* 45 [1924] 329-50), himself provided sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the caesura in the following articles: "The Coincidence of Accent and Ictus in Roman Dactylic Poets," *CP* 14 (1919) 373-385; "Word-ends and Pauses in the Hexameter," *AJP* 42 (1921) 289-308; "The Character of the Latin Accent," *TAPA* 52 (1921), 5-15; "Syllabification and Syllabic Quantity in Greek and Latin," *TAPA* 53 (1922) 35-51; "The Ictus of Classical Verse," *AJP* 44 (1923) 319-338; "Harmony and Clash of Accent and Ictus in the Latin Hexameter," *TAPA* 54 (1923) 51-73. On the subject of the caesura the material of greatest importance is represented, in my opinion, by the following: A. W. DeGroot, "Wesen und Gesetze der Caesur," *Mnemosyne* 2 (1935) 81-154; H. N. Porter, "The Early Greek Hexameter," *YCS* 12 (1951) 3-63; H. Fraenkel, "Der Homerische und der Kallimacheische Hexameter," *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, Munich: Beck 1955. From the viewpoint of comparative Indo-European metrics, the work of A. Meillet, *Les Origines indo-européennes des mètres grecs*, Paris 1923, is important, though Meillet does not see the hexameter as having any direct relationship with other Indo-European meters.

8. Milman Parry, *L'Épithète traditionnelle dans Homère* (Paris 1928); "Studies in the epic technique of oral verse making," *HSCP* 41 (1930) 73-147 and 43 (1932) 1-50. For a complete bibliography of Parry's work, see *AJA* 52 (1948) 43f.

9. Parry, *L'Épithète traditionnelle*, p. 11: "Les plus communes d'entre ces formules remplissent le vers entre le diérèse bucolique et la fin du vers, entre les césures penthémimère, κατὰ τρίτον τροχαῖον, hephthémimère et la fin du vers, entre le commencement du vers et les césures indiquées, et enfin le vers entier."

10. H. Fraenkel, "Der Homerische und der Kallimacheische Hexameter," *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, Munich: Beck, 1955, 100-156. See also H. N. Porter, "The Early Greek Hexameter," *YCS* 12 (1951) 3-63.

11. Fraenkel (above, n.10) 103-4, 111. This is my own version of the German original of Fraenkel's article.

12. Th. Stiffler, "Das Wernickesche Gesetz und die Bukolische Dihärese," *Philologus* 79 (1923) 350. See also K. Witte, "Der Einfluss des Verses auf die Bildung von Komposita," *Glotta* 3 (1912) 12ff.

13. Parry, *L'Épithète traditionnelle*, p. 49.

14. Thomas D. Seymour, "On the Homeric Caesura and the Close of the Verse as Related to the Expression of Thought," *HSCP* 3 (1892) 91-129.

15. Fragments of Ennius are cited from J. Vahlen, ed., *Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae*. 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Teubner 1928).

16. Fragments of Cicero's Poetry are cited from A. Traglia, ed. *Ciceronis Poetica Fragmenta*. 2 vols. (Rome: Gismondi 1950-1952).

17. Lucretius is cited from the Oxford Classical Text edited by C. Bailey, 1922.

18. Catullus is cited from the Oxford Classical Text edited by R. A. B. Mynors, 1958.

19. Vergil is cited from the Oxford Classical Text edited by Fr. A. Hirtzel, 1900.

20. Skutsch in *The Annals of Quintus Ennius* (Inaugural Lecture, University College, London, publ. 1953) p. 5, argues that this should *not* be considered the first line of the *Annales*.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

22. The highest percentages of incidence of this pattern in the different Idylls appear in numbers 13 (5.3), 15 (4.1), 16 (4.5) 17 (8), 22 (6.7) and 14 (9.2). Of these only 15 is in the Doric dialect; the others are epic in dialect and content: each of these poems treats a subject matter dealt with traditionally in the language of Homer and the *Homeric Hymns*. The high incidence in Idyll 15 is accounted for by the appearance of four examples of the pattern in the 44 lines of the song chanted at the Festival of Adonis, and Idyll 15 thus confirms the rule.

23. I do not intend to enter into the controversy over the question of ictus and accent here. I proceed on the traditional assumption that ictus and accent both had a phonetic stress, that conflict between ictus and accent within a line of verse was noticeable, intended, and exploited by Latin poets. I find quite convincing the evidence compiled by Sturtevant in the articles referred to above in note 7.

24. Friedrich Marx, "Molossische und Bakcheische Wortformen in der Verskunst der Griechen und Römer," *Abh. der sächs. Akad. der Wiss.*, 37, 1 (1922).

25. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

26. *Tusc. disp.* 1, 20, 45; *De natura deorum* 3, 10, 24.

27. In the first nine books of the *Iliad* this pattern appears in the order, adj.-noun 90 times, in the order noun-adj. 17 times. In the first two books of Apollonius it appears 105 times in the order adj.-noun, 3 times in the order noun-adj.

28. The MS reading is *regni versatum summam vero columnam. Venere*, the emendation suggested by Ilberg, is accepted by Vahlen, but Warmington prefers Scaliger's suggestion: *regni versatam iam summovere columnam*, and has printed this in his Loeb text of Ennius (*Remains of Old Latin*, 4 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. Vol. 1. Ennius and Caecilius).

29. See above, p. 199.

30. See above, pp. 201-204.

31. See above, p. 201.

32. In the first nine books of the *Iliad* this pattern appears 16 times in the order adj.-noun, 52 times in the order noun-adj. In the first two books of Apollonius, it appears 100 times in the order adj.-noun, only 4 times in the order noun-adj.

33. Perhaps he was following the lead of Apollonius, *Argonautica* 1, 1186: *Ἐκβασιὶ ρέξαντες ὑπὸ κνέφας Ἀπόλλωνι*

34. Cf. Michael Putnam, "The Art of Catullus 64," *HSCP* 65 (1961) 165-205.

35. Cf. above, n.30.

36. See Table I.

37. J. Marouzeau, *Traité de stylistique Latine*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1946) 316.

38. Cf. above p. 199 with references there to the work of Stiffler and Parry cited in nn. 12 and 13.

39. Above, n.37, p. 318.

40. This pattern is not very common in Homer. It may be looked upon as a variation of the pattern with the first element before the B caesura and second element at the end of the line. The following examples may be noted:

1, 57. ἤλυθε δ' ἀφνειὴν προλιπὼν Γυρτῶνα Κόρωνος

3, 280. ἐκ δ' ὄγε καρπαλίμοισι λαθὼν ποσὶν οὐδὸν ἄμειψεν

3, 992. οὔνομα, καὶ καλὸν τεύχων, κλέος' ὥς δὲ καὶ ὄλλοι

3, 1052. αὐτικ' ἐπὴν κρατεροῦς ζεύξης βόας, ὦκα δὲ πᾶσαν

3, 1335. λαῖον ἐπὶ στιβαρῶ πιέσας πόδι' τῆλε δ' ἑοῶ

In the last four examples it may be noted that the noun is pyrrhic and fills the space between the C 1 and the C 2 caesura. Metrical convenience accounts for the position of these nouns: they cannot stand in the final position in the line, but they are well-suited to this position. The essential feature of the patterns seems to be placement of the adjective in an emphatic position.

41. Cf. above, p. 210.

42. Cf. above, p. 217.

43. One may examine the opening lines of Catullus 64 and lines 320-35 of fragment 34 of Cicero's *Aratea* as examples of their technique of writing single-line sense-units.

44. See above, pp. 201-202.

45. Friedrich Leo, "Bemerkungen über plautinische Wortstellung und Wort-Gruppen," *Gött. Nachrichten* (1895), p. 432.

46. See above, pp. 215-218.

47. See above, p. 200.

48. See above, pp. 214, 217, 218 and n.43.

49. See above, pp. 201-202 and n.30.

50. I have noted ten examples in the first two books of the *Argonautica* in the order, adj.-noun.

51. *Spiramina* means normally "breathing-holes." Bergk attempted to find a double meaning therefore in *Naris*, which he conceded must be a proper name of the river. Hug explained *spiramina ponere* as "breathe one's last, expire," and Valmaggi defends this interpretation with a reference to *spiritum ponere* in Val. Max. 7, 8, 8.

52. See above, pp. 214-218.

53. See above, pp. 215-218.

54. See below, pp. 234.

55. See above, p. 199.

56. See above, n.32.

57. See above, pp. 201-202.

58. See above, pp. 212-214, 222-224.

59. John Dryden, Preface to *Sylvae*.
60. In line 35, *Excita cum tremulis anus attulit artubus lumen* should be read rather than *et cita* . . .
61. Above, pp. 206-207.
62. See above, pp. 207-214.
63. See above, pp. 229-231.
64. See above, pp. 203-207.
65. See above, pp. 229-231.
66. See above, pp. 226-229.
67. See above, pp. 214-218.
68. Cf. *Aratea*, fr. 34, 318. *Orbem Signiferum perhibebunt nomine vero*.
69. See above, p. 199.
70. Thomas D. Seymour, "On the Homeric Caesura and the Close of the Verse as Related to the Expression of Thought," *HSCP* 3 (1892) 98.
71. J. La Roche, "Die Stellung des attributivischen und appositivischen Adjektivs bei Homer," *Wiener Studien*, 19 (1897) 161ff.
72. See above, p. 209 and n.32.
73. See Henry W. Prescott, "The Position of 'Deferred' Nouns and Adjectives in Epic and Dramatic Verse," *CP* 7 (1912) 35-58.
74. *Ibid.*, 58.
75. See above, p. 209.
76. See above, n.71.
77. See above, p. 201.
78. See above, pp. 201-202.

AN ATTIC GRAVE STELE IN THE FOGG ART MUSEUM¹

BY JOHN GRIFFITHS PEDLEY

*Τιμαρέτα πρὸ γάμοιο τὰ τύμπανα τὴν τ' ἐρατεινὴν
σφαῖραν, τὸν τε κόμας ῥύτορα κεκρύφαλον,
τάς τε κόρας, Λιμνᾶτι, κόρα κόρα, ὡς ἐπιεικές,
ἄνθετο, καὶ τὰ κορᾶν ἐνδύματ', Ἀρτέμιδι.*

"Timareta, before her wedding,
hath dedicated to thee, Artemis of the Lake,
her tambourine and her pretty ball, and the caul
that kept up her hair, and her dolls, too, and their dresses;
a virgin's gift, as is fit, to Virgin Dian."²

THE Greek marble grave stele at present in the Fogg Art Museum of Harvard University³ was purchased by contribution at the auction of *Ars Antiqua* in Luzern on April 29, 1961, and was presented to the museum by the friends of the late Katherine Brewster Taylor.

The stele, shaped in high wide relief, is in a good state of preservation, with only slight surface chipping, and few surface cracks. A chip is broken away from the inner side of the left anta, smaller fragments from the outer side of both antae, from the lowest horizontal member of the pediment, from the nose of the dog, and from the background to the left of the girl's head. Surface cracks are apparent on the left anta opposite the doll, and very slightly on the right knee of the girl, and scratches occur on the girl's right hand and wrist: there is some deterioration of the stone from which the dog was sculpted, and this is evident at spots on his shoulder, tail, and thigh. The Conservation Department of the Fogg Museum used carefully toned color to mask some of the damage on the pediment, on the dog's thigh, and on the background on the aedicula. There is a vein of bluishness in the stone which reaches, almost imperceptibly, diagonally from the girl's right ear through her chin and chiton to the outer edge of the falling folds of the shawl beneath the doll. At its widest (across the chiton) this vein of impurity measures 0.05 m., at its narrowest (by the girl's ear) 0.01 m.

The architectural form is not uncommon for stelai of this type (Plate I). On either side the aedicula stand antae-pilasters, of which that at the right maintains a regular width, while that at the left is

irregular. Above the antae capitals (that at the left is wider than that at the right) an inscription is written on a narrow architrave, somewhat recessed from the plane of the antae-capitals and the pediment. It reads: *Μελιστῶ Κτησικράτους Ποταμίου*; "Melisto, daughter of Ktesikrates, from the Deme of Potamos." Immediately above, on an even narrower cyma which forms the transition from architrave to pediment, there are traces of a somewhat carelessly painted egg and dart motif (Plate IIa). The pediment is plain within but decorated above with three akroteria, of which the central one is not exactly aligned, being somewhat displaced to the right; the outer two do not balance perfectly. The frame remains, the sculptor having made no attempt to let the akroteria stand free: they are merely adumbrated, their architectural identity articulated by the slight recession of the background plane. At the foot of the monument the amount of unworked stone indicates to what depth the stele was set in the ground.

Within the aedícula, displaced a little to the right from the center, stands a girl, her weight resting on the left foot, with the right leg relaxed and slightly bent at the knee. The right foot protruding a little from beneath the chiton is depicted frontally, while the left, equally sketchily worked, is seen in a diagonal, almost profile, view. She is wearing a chiton, highly girt, with shoulder strap and buttoned sleeve. A shawl or cloak, thrown presumably over her left shoulder, is carried broadly around her hips and upwards across the body over her extended left forearm, whence it falls in loose folds. In the left hand she holds tightly to a female doll, drawn frontally, while the right hand, lowered diagonally across her body and over the shawl, holds a bird. A rough-haired lively dog with curling tail leaps at the bird's beak. The right arm of the girl is bare from the edge of the sleeve at the mid-point of the upper arm. The transition from the body to the head is very awkward, and such that a considerable ledge is left at the top of the chiton below the chin (Plate II b).

The head is drawn almost in three-quarter view so that when the stele is viewed frontally, the far eye is visible (Plate III a): conversely the figure must be viewed diagonally for a frontal view of the head. The forehead is high, the eyebrows delicately curving, and the eyes themselves soft and heavy-lidded; the profile curve of forehead and nose is so sweeping that it gives the nose itself a perky, almost retroussé, quality. The far (left) eye and nostril, for obvious reasons, received less care than the right eye and nostril, and they are, in comparison, flat and lacking plasticity. The cheek is somewhat fat and heavy, the chin angular and dimpled, and though the mouth is closed, the lips pucker



PLATE I. Stele of Melisto, Fogg Art Museum.




PLATE IIa. Stele of Melisto, Fogg Art Museum. Detail.



PLATE IIb. Stele of Melisto, Fogg Art Museum. Diagonal View.



a. Detail.




b. Lower part.

PLATE III. Stela of Melisto, Fogg Art Museum.



a. Frontal view.



b. Profile.

PLATE IV. Head of "Blind *Arktos*."

Courtesy, National Museum, Athens



a. Profile view of entire statue.



b. Profile view of head.

PLATE V. "Smiling Arktos."

Courtesy, National Museum, Athens

into a rather sardonic, adult smile. The hair, with central parting, is swept back from the forehead straightly and combed down in curling locks at the back and the side, partially covering the right ear. Either side the head, beside the lowest lock at the back, and at the front immediately below the space between the A and the T of the inscription, are small holes let into the stone which must have served as fixture points for a *stephane*. There is, however, no trace on the hair itself of any such band.

The proportions of the figure seem confused by the exaggerated height of the body and the heaviness of the head, as if the artist had first blocked out the architectural framework and in his allocation of space for the various forms had not left enough room for a head proportionate to the body. Hence he was obliged to squeeze the head in immediately below the architrave and leave the unnatural and awkward ledge between the chin and chiton. His uneasiness is further reflected by the confusion of contour of the head; the profile is far from exact. And while the body is that of a child, the head, in spite of the girlish hair style, has an oddly adult look.

The blending of the composition to a unity, then, is not achieved by the relation of the major forms to one another (though the proportions of the body itself are adequate), but by the proximity of the background and architectural structure. There is none of the spaciousness of fifth-century stelai here, and it seems possible that, were Melisto stripped of architectural and background support, she might topple over. She appears somewhat top-heavy: and though the broad, flat, sweeping line created by the shawl is drawn back into the standing figure by the angle at which the doll is held and the glance of the eyes, and though this line itself is carefully balanced by the diagonal of the right arm and the dog, yet the sense of overbalance would be pervasive. Unity, then, stems from the discipline of the architectural elements and the background.

The figure does not break free at all, but is firmly attached to the background, and all movement is anchored there; there is no overlap of either anta, as is customary in some stelai of this type, and the right foot barely touches at one point. This lack of motion is also shown by the static attitude of the limbs, emphasized by the heavy straightness of the folds of the chiton and especially by the accentuated verticality of the folds of the weight-leg. Yet any sense of volume is fugitive in spite of the enfolding in heavy drapery; only motionlessness is communicated. A counterweight is neither necessary nor possible.

The surface treatment is both in broad large surfaces (of the shawl)

and small plentiful folds (of the chiton) which, with their sharp edges and irregular grooving, are almost fussy (Plate III b). And lack of ability in modeling rounded forms is compensated for by uneven deepening of the background. Thus an attempt is made to achieve greater plasticity by pushing back the background around the face.

The attitudes and mood of the whole composition are relaxed and carefree: though the smile is faintly wry, the expression is confident and serene. Accompanied by her playthings, Melisto appears at once aloof from the world and involved in it.

The architectural forms of the stele, antae, architrave, frieze course, cornice, and akroteria are paralleled as early as the end of the fifth century,⁴ and seem to have continued in use till the sumptuary laws of Demetrios of Phaleron.⁵ As examples at the end of the series may be cited the stelai of Aristonautes⁶ and Hagnostrate⁷ and that of Lykourgos and Hierophon.⁸ Distinctive in the Fogg stele is the fact that the akroteria have only been worked in relief and not sculpted, so to speak, in the round. Even this treatment, however, appears early,⁹ and there is no reason to suppose that it fell out of favor in the course of the fourth century, though full modeling of the akroteria was preferred.¹⁰ These forms, then, are typical of Attic grave stelai of the classical period.

The treatment of the hair and head seems to me closely related to that of some of the heads of *arktoi*, "the bears," young girls who served Artemis in her sanctuary at Brauron. The central parting of the hair, the straight combing of the locks to the bunching of the curls over the ear, and the use of the *stephane*, presumably fixed across the head by the holes let into the background at either side, are all characteristics of the *arktos* thought to be blind. (Plate IV a-b).¹¹ The treatment of the face of the blind *arktos* also has marked similarities: the same high forehead and slightly upturned nose, the same puffy cheeks and closed yet smiling mouth, the same dimpled and angular jaw. Yet there is not in the Fogg stele any of the psychological individuality of the *typhle arktos*, an effect produced by the way in which the eyes have been sculpted, and a quality which marks that head as transitional between the categorization of the classical style and the Hellenistic diversification of the psyche. The blind *arktos* has been dated, rightly I believe, to the years around 300 B.C.:¹² stylistically, as well as historically, the Fogg stele must be somewhat earlier.

Even more pronounced similarities may be seen in the head of the completely preserved *arktos* from Brauron (Plate V a-b).¹³ The same high forehead, retroussé nose, chubby cheeks, and dimpled jaw are

repeated, and here, too, the smile flickers on the closed mouth in the same somewhat sardonic way. The hair, centrally parted, is drawn back rather more irregularly than that of Melisto, and instead of falling over the ear is pulled back above it and roughly arranged in a chinon at the back. The eyes are not so heavy-lidded as those of the stele figure. Yet the psychological portrait is typical, like that of Melisto, and the trend toward fragmentation of the *persona* has not yet begun; the expression remains canonical and predictable, not personal and individual. The comparison goes yet further. The stance of the *arktos* exactly parallels that of Melisto; her high-girt chiton with buttoned sleeve is the same, and she wears the same kind of shawl. S. Karouzou suggests a date for this *arktos* in the years immediately preceding the Demetrian laws.¹⁴ This does not seem improbable. And it is perhaps not without significance that a deme of Potamos lay close to Brauron to the south.¹⁵ Could the same workshop that produced the smiling *arktos* have also produced the Fogg stele?¹⁶

The stance of Melisto is further paralleled by two other grave stelai,¹⁷ though in both cases the right leg and knee are more pronouncedly in a different plane from that of the weight-leg. I have been able to find no analogy for the positioning of the shawl so high on the body:¹⁸ in every other instance it is far larger and sweeps across the body from a point considerably below the right knee. The treatment of the folds of the chiton is at first reminiscent, in its stressed verticality, of works of the early fourth century: yet the drapery lacks any of the plasticity of works of that period,¹⁹ or even of the middle of the century.²⁰ It has become flat, and though starkly vertical, fussy in its jagged edges and striated channels. Similar characteristics may be seen in the chiton of a standing female figure from a grave stele,²¹ which Buschor,²² following Conze, places right at the end of the series of Attic grave stelai. Even more striking is the similarity to the treatment of the back of the chiton of the smiling *arktos*: this has been dated, as noted earlier, to the years immediately prior to the sumptuary laws of Demetrios.

Of the attributes which accompany Melisto, the bird and dog are common enough. In *Conze* alone I count 49 birds and 52 dogs, clearly perceptible. The doll is less common. Of the six that I have seen,²³ two are seated,²⁴ while the other four are upright, as is Melisto's. Those that are upright are clearly naked and female, and of these, three are provided neither with forearms nor legs below the knee. Only one is complete. All the stelai, naturally, are of girls. Evidence derived from preserved terracotta dolls suggests that they were made in various ways in antiquity—some complete, some seated, others with limbs to be

attached subsequently.²⁵ Most frequently the clothing was to be put on separately, and this clearly accounts for the carelessness of the modeling of dolls. It comes as no surprise, then, to find that Melisto's doll has neither clothing, nor forearms, nor legs below the knee. And thus there is small reason for attaching symbolic meaning to these attributes; to see, as some have done, the bird as an expiatory offering or the doll as the soul of the dead. They are simply the playthings among which Melisto passed her life, the characteristic attributes of the unmarried girl; the animals were the *Lieblingstiere* of her existence.

Melisto is the daughter of Ktesikrates. Neither name is uncommon,²⁶ and from a deme Potamos we have the name Ktesikles on a columella of the third century.²⁷ It is possible that the same family preserved the prefix *Ktesi-* over several generations; that there is a link between the Ktesikrates of the stele and the Ktesikles of the columella.²⁸ The prefix *Ktesi-*, however, is so common that this seems improbable.²⁹ The name Melisto, whatever its rhapsodic or other implications,³⁰ appears to have enjoyed some popularity in the fourth century,³¹ and to have continued in use thereafter.³² The name Ktesikrates was also current both in the first half of the fourth century,³³ about the middle,³⁴ and perhaps towards the end.³⁵ It continued in use in the third century;³⁶ a Kresikrates was councillor of Erechtheis in 256/5,³⁷ and the name appears in the first century.³⁸ No definite connection emerges between any known Melisto or Ktesikrates and the persons of our inscription: we are dealing with people hitherto unknown.

Distinctive characteristics of the lettering style of the inscription are a strikingly small *omicron*, usually thought to be a latish trait, *epsilon* with short central horizontal stroke, and *pi* with second vertical stroke not yet reaching very far down. Finials are beginning to be used, as may be seen in the horizontal stroke of the second *tau*: but, throughout, carelessness is more apparent than precision. The characteristics of the forms of these letters are very similar to those inscribed on the statue base dedicated to Demeter and Kore found in the Athenian Agora and dated to the middle of the fourth century.³⁹ Yet the *epsilon* with short stroke makes its appearance earlier, in the second quarter of the fourth century,⁴⁰ and if this characteristic might seem to argue for an earlier date, it only in effect gives a *terminus post*, since it continued in use; the *omicron*, which does not seem to become canonically smaller till the third quarter, suggests more strongly a later date.⁴¹ The *pi* with short second vertical stroke, had always been in use,⁴² and does not seem to lengthen perceptibly till the last quarter of the century.⁴³ Yet these inscriptions are perhaps too formal to provide fair analogies.

The small *omicron*, *epsilon* with short central stroke and similar sprawling *sigma* may be seen in an Athenian bronze dikastic pinakion,⁴⁴ which may be dated before ca. 330 B.C., but not earlier than 403/2 B.C.⁴⁵ But other pinakia display other characteristics, and this resemblance merely shows that the style of writing typified by the stele inscription was current in the fourth century in informal writing. More closely, a *horos*, dated to 301/300 B.C.,⁴⁶ shows similar *pi*, *epsilon*, and *omicron*. There is nothing definitive here, but a good chance that the lettering should place the stele in the second half of the fourth century.

The stele must have been erected before the Demetrian anti-luxury laws became effective—that is to say, broadly speaking, before the last quarter of the fourth century. The hair style, modeling, expression of the face, drapery, and stance place it after the middle of the century and close to works immediately preceding the Demetrian laws and at the end of the series of Attic grave stelai. Süsserott's analysis of stylistic development might seem to put the stele in the decade 340/330 B.C.⁴⁷ The style of the lettering suggests the second half of the century. Melisto's grave stele may then fairly be dated in the third quarter of the fourth century B.C.

This sepulchral stele is the work of a competent craftsman, comparing very favorably with many of the banal and careless stelai of similar type and date.⁴⁸ Little attempt has been made to show spiritual experience; there is no reaching toward the expression of a higher reality. There is simply a motionless expression of a deep inner mood, a representation of the girl and her environment, material and earthly. And if the paradox between her involvement in life and possession by death persists, and the sculptor permitted the ironic recognition of her premature death to express itself on her face and in her smile, yet the stele remains more an affirmation of life than a recognition of death.

NOTES

1. I should like to express my thanks first and foremost to Professor G. M. A. Hanfmann both for permission to publish the stele and for constant encouragement and advice: my thanks are also due to Professors S. Dow, L. B. Urdahl, and E. Vanderpool who I have also consulted in matters concerning this paper.

2. *Anth. Pal.* VI, 280, trans. W. R. Paton: quoted by Ad. Michaelis, "Griechische Grabreliefs," *Arch. Zeit.* 29 (1872) 142.

3. Accession No. 1961.86. Measurements: Height from top of central akroterion to bottom of monument, 0.95 m.; height from top of central akroterion to lower side architrave, 0.157 m.; height of unworked stone from left foot of figure to bottom of monument, 0.085 m.; height of girl (from crown of

head to hem of chiton), 0.70 m.; height of dog (from snout perpendicularly to line of stance), 0.305 m.; height of doll, 0.135 m.; width at base of akroteria, 0.49 m.; width below antae capitals, 0.475 m.; width of antae capitals (right); 0.075 m.; (left): 0.08 m.; width of girl, (at shoulders): 0.155 m.; (at hips): 0.19 m.; (at feet): 0.205 m.; thickness of stone, 0.07 m.—0.085 m.; height of letters, 0.007 m.—0.012 m. Ear, shoulder, arm, and right leg protrude beyond the plane of the antae. Maximum prominence at the knee because of double clothing. Right and left are always proper right and left. *Fogg Art Museum, Acquisitions 1959–1962* (1963) 35.

4. Cf., e.g., the stele of Phainarete, A. Conze, *Die attischen Grabreliefs* (Berlin and Leipzig 1893–1922) No. 104, Taf. 39; H. Diepolder, *Die attischen Grabreliefs des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Berlin 1931) Taf. 17; that of Phrasikleia, Conze, *ibid.*, No. 289, Taf. 67; Diepolder, *ibid.*, Taf. 19; and the far-famed one of Hegeso, Conze, *ibid.*, No. 68, Taf. 30; Diepolder, *ibid.*, Taf. 20.

5. For the date of these laws, see H. K. Süsserott, *Griechische Plastik des 4. Jahrhunderts vor Christus* (Frankfurt am Main, 1938) 120, n.136; also G. M. A. Richter, "Two Greek Statues," *AJA* 48 (1944) 239, n.16, quoting Ferguson's careful view.

6. Conze (above, n.4) No. 1151, Taf. 245; Diepolder (above, n.4), Taf. 50; Süsserott (above, n.5) Taf. 24.2.

7. Diepolder (above, n.4) Taf. 52.1.

8. Conze (above, n.4) No. 1060, Taf. 215 B; Süsserott (above, n.5) 122.

9. Cf., e.g., the stele of Erasippos and Meixias, Diepolder (above, n.4) Taf. 2.2; Louvre, *Cat. Somm.* 3063; and that of Xanthippos, Conze (above, n.4) No. 696, Taf. 119; Diepolder, *ibid.*, Taf. 4, though in both these instances the relief is deeper and neither stele has antae. Nearer, perhaps, to our stele is that of the Woman with Mirror in Boston, Diepolder, *ibid.*, Taf. 10.

10. Cf., e.g. (without antae) Conze (above, n.4) No. 821, Taf. 158, and No. 893, Taf. 174; (with antae) Conze, *ibid.*, No. 826, Taf. 160, No. 855, Taf. 166, and No. 756, Taf. 147.

11. A. Orlandos, *To Ergon tes, Arkhaiologikes Etaireias* (1958) 36, fig. 39, lower left; G. Daux, "Chronique des Fouilles," *BCH* 83 (1959) 589ff, fig. 25; S. Papaspyride-Karouzou, "Typhle Arktos," *AE* (1957) 68ff, pls. 18–19; for the *stephane*, see also *inter alia*, Conze (above, n.4) No. 815, Taf. 156.

12. S. Papaspyride-Karouzou (above, n.11) 77.

13. A. Orlandos (above, n.11) 36, fig. 38; G. Daux (above, n.11) fig. 27; S. Papaspyride-Karouzou (above, n.11) 75ff, fig. 7.

14. S. Papaspyride-Karouzou (above, n.11) 75.

15. Strabo, 9,1,22; cf. Ernst Meyer, *RE*, s.v. "Potamos"; also C. W. J. Eliot, "Coastal Demes of Attica," *Phoenix*, suppl. vol. 5 (Toronto 1962) 91, n. 58.

16. I am told by Professor Vanderpool that a stele, possibly related, was found in the fourth-century cemetery of Merenda which belonged in antiquity to the deme of Myrrhinous; cf. E. Vanderpool, "Newsletter from Greece," *AJA* 57 (1953) 282; also J. M. Cook, "Archaeology in Greece, 1952," *JHS* 73 (1953) 113. Myrrhinous, like Potamos, was geographically close to Brauron; cf., Strabo, 9,1,22.

17. Conze (above, n.4) No. 805, Taf. 152; No. 1087, Taf. 222.

18. Unless Conze (above, n.4) No. 831, be similar.

19. Cf., e.g., the "Ince Blundell Hall' Athena," in Süsserott (above, n.5) 132, n.13.

20. Cf., e.g., the mourning women of the Sidon sarcophagus, the muses of the Mantinea base.
21. Conze (above, n.4) No. 807, Taf. 153.
22. E. Buschor, *Die Plastik der Griechen* (Berlin 1936) 85.
23. Conze (above, n. 4) No. 814, Taf. 154: No. 815, Taf. 156: No. 817, Taf. 154: No. 818, Taf. 157: No. 880, Taf. 170: No. 882, Taf. 171.
24. Conze (above, n.4) Nos. 817 and 818 *supra*.
25. Cf. F. Winter, *Die Typen der Figürlichen Terrakotten* (Berlin and Stuttgart 1903) 165-173.
26. B. Hansen, *Rückläufiges Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* (Berlin 1957) 170, 320.
27. J. Kirchner, *IG II²*, No. 7267.
28. For this practice among demesmen of Potamos in the fourth century see *IG II²* Nos. 7257 and 7263, with Bion and Eubios, Arkhias and Arkhikles.
29. Cf. J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica* (Berlin 1901 and 1903) 597ff.
30. For these, see F. Bechtel, *Frauennamen* (Göttingen 1902) 25, n. 4.
31. J. Kirchner, *IG II²*, No. 6999 = J. Sundwall, *Nachträge zur Prosopographie attische* (Helsingfors 1910) 124; cf. E. Strong, "Three Sculptured Stelai in the Possession of Lord Newton at Lyme Park," *JHS* 23 (1903) 356ff, pl. XI. Also, *IG II²*, No. 12065.
32. J. Kirchner *IG II²*, No. 7126 = J. Kirchner (above, n. 29) No. 9833 = W. Pape, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* (1875) 891.
33. J. Kirchner, *IG II²*, No. 5232 = J. Kirchner (above, n.29) No. 8876; also *IG II²*, No. 7612 = J. Kirchner (above, n.29) No. 8880 = W. Pape (above, n.32) 728.
34. J. Kirchner, *IG II²*, No. 7504.
35. *Ibid.*, No. 6182 = J. Kirchner (above, n. 29) No. 8877.
36. J. Kirchner (above, n. 29) Nos. 8875, 8878.
37. S. Dow, "Prytaneis," *Hesperia*, suppl. vol. 1 (1937) 44,9:22.
38. J. Kirchner (above, n.29) No. 8879.
39. T. L. Shear, "The Campaign of 1936" *Hesperia* 6 (1937) 339ff, figs. 4, 5, 6; B. D. Meritt, "Greek Inscriptions," *Hesperia* 26 (1957) 200ff, fig. 1, pl. 50, no. 50.
40. Cf., e.g., J. Kirchner, *Imagines Inscriptionum Atticarum* (Berlin 1935) No. 53, Taf. 25; No. 52, Taf. 26.
41. Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, No. 61, Taf. 29.
42. Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, No. 47, Taf. 22.
43. Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, No. 65, Taf. 30.
44. L. Robert, *Collection Froehner I* (Paris 1936) 91, pl. VI. = S. Dow, "Dikasts' Bronze Pinakia," *BCH* 87 (1963) 671, fig. 9.
45. S. Dow (above, n.44) 657.
46. J. V. A. Fine, "Horoï," *Hesperia*, suppl. vol. 9,3, no. 6, pl. 1.
47. Süsserott (above, n.5) 127.
48. Cf., e.g., Conze (above, n.4) No. 827, Taf. 161: No. 828, Taf. 162.

SOPHOCLES: SOME BEARINGS

BY ROBERT M. TORRANCE

HOW are we to read Sophocles? The question is anything but rhetorical, as the sweeping diversity of current interpretations makes clear.¹ This most "classic" of all Greek poets is also the hardest for us to know how to approach. His characters, indeed, are drawn with such clarity and power as to leave no doubt of their compelling magnificence and grandeur. Yet the implications of their actions and the meaning of the great forces at work within and upon them — these are problems which thrust themselves forward with an impact almost equal to that of the characters themselves. Sophocles writes not of ideas but of people; yet in few poets is one aware of so vast and cogent an intellect shaping and molding the diverse materials of his drama into a unity as complex as it is comprehensive. His very simplicity, because so much has gone into its making, is the special source of his difficulty: his works contain so highly concentrated a distillation of experience that, for all their clarity, they seem inexhaustible of possibilities, interpretations, ambiguities. His harmony dizzies.

Sophocles' seven extant plays were written, in all probability,² over a period which nearly spanned the latter half of the fifth century B.C. These were the years of Pericles and the Parthenon, the invasions of Attica and the Plague, Cleon and his victories, the Peace of Nicias, the Sophists and Socrates, the disastrous Sicilian expedition, and the approaching final defeat of Athens. They were years of almost unparalleled turbulence and activity. Yet so great an artist was Sophocles, and so successful in fusing the elements of his experience into myth and drama, that the order of his plays (insofar as it can be determined) has more often than not been ignored in discussing his works: their qualities of permanence and universality have greatly obscured the possibility of significant change and development in his thought and outlook.³ This fusion is no small part of the poet's triumph, but may well be hazardous to the reader's and critic's understanding of the complex issues of the plays. Certainly we may determine, and must not underestimate, the presence in Sophocles' work of certain unchanging values of paramount importance: his heroes, from first to last, possess a

kinship in grandeur and tragic dignity, and all that he wrote bears the stamp of a powerful integrating personality. But we shall be ill-advised, and most probably led astray, if we attempt to define "Sophoclean thought" or to understand the forces at work in the plays without taking into account whatever development may have occurred in so active an intellect during those many long years of excitement and change.

Moreover, the artistic integrity of Sophocles' plays is likely to obscure for the reader not only the changes in his ideas, but even their very nature. Few can doubt, on beholding or reading the *Antigone* or the Oedipus plays, for example, that the poet is deeply concerned with the fundamental issues of human life as he sees it: but what are these issues, and in what terms are we to discuss them? For all his unquestionable intellect, Sophocles is the least abstract, the least conceptual, of authors. So inseparably are his ideas bound up with his characters, the language they speak, and the situations they speak it in, that it is meaningless to discuss them in any other context. Aeschylus, with the more or less consistent religious symbolism of his choruses, and Euripides, with his sophistic language and passionately polemic spirit, are much easier to talk about. With Sophocles we scarcely know where to begin.

Yet perhaps if we admit at the outset the possibility that development in Sophocles' vision of life may have occurred in the forty-year span between the first and the last of his extant plays, the *Ajax* and the *Oedipus at Colonus*, we shall have, at least, a point of departure. An examination of these two dramas and a comparison of any significant similarities and differences in their thematic structures may enable us, tentatively, to measure and appraise whatever change may have taken place; may provide us, further, with some bearings for the interpretation of the intervening plays and of Sophoclean drama as a whole. Just because of that characteristically unifying compression by which Sophocles, simplifying outline without simplifying content, conveys so much in the course of each brief, clear drama, it is perhaps possible for his critic, by dealing in the poet's own terms, to suggest much of value in brief compass. I would emphasize "the poet's own terms." There is no greater pitfall for the reader or critic who would endeavor to understand, than to impose on an author terms which are alien to him. Sophocles has most conventionally been presented in religious terminology, Greek or Christian, as one who taught in his plays the gods' punishment of those who sinned against them. This view has been developed at great length in C. M. Bowra's *Sophoclean Tragedy*.

Bowra writes:

The central idea of Sophoclean tragedy is that through suffering a man learns to be modest before the gods . . . Each learns his real state and accepts it by abandoning his illusions . . . When they are finally forced to see the truth, we know that the gods have prevailed and that men must accept their own insignificance . . . Despite all the suffering and horror we feel not indignation but relief, because in spite of everything the human characters have made their peace with the gods.⁴

According to this view the hero is punished, as in Aeschylus, by the *atê* of the gods for some *hybris* resulting from a "tragic flaw," a *hamartia*, and is thus brought either to wisdom in submission, or to death. It is a marvelously consistent explanation, but we may, perhaps, judiciously question its applicability, in large part, to the text of Sophocles.

In opposition to this rather complacent theological viewpoint has arisen the "humanistic" interpretation, according to which the concerns of Sophocles were radically different from those of Aeschylus. In his provocative book *Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism*, Cedric Whitman, the most cogent and original exponent of this view, writes:

The trilogy was the perfect vehicle for divine justice. Why then did Sophocles abandon it? It is customary to say that he was more interested in individual fates; but it is clearer to observe that he was not concerned with divine justice but with divine injustice. The single play offered Sophocles that form of moral problem which for him was most pertinent: the morality of individual man in the face of irrational evil . . . The emphasis consequently shifts, not merely from god to man, but from the structure of cosmic justice to the structure of human morality.⁵

Now, if "humanism" is understood to mean simply a greater emphasis and sharper focus on man than is apparent in Aeschylus, Sophocles is clearly a humanist. But if we must further understand this humanism to imply an "agnostic attitude" and "indifference" on the poet's part toward gods who "no longer stand in the moral picture,"⁶ then we must again question the relevance of the interpretation to the terms of the drama on which it is imposed.

My point is that, at least to begin with, the opposition between a "theological" and "humanistic" view of Sophocles is not pertinent to the plays themselves, and sets up a distorting prism between them and the reader. Bowra speaks throughout his book of the cardinal Greek virtue of *sophrosynê*, which he characteristically translates "modesty." Yet the noun itself appears nowhere in Sophocles; and though its verbal and adjectival forms are frequent, it is noteworthy that in the

last, longest, and most ostensibly "religious" of the plays, the *Oedipus at Colonus*, no form of the word is found at all. It would seem that Sophocles, in the grand tradition of the Oxford master, was somewhat absent-minded about the "lesson" he meant to teach. Similar, on the other side of the fence, is Whitman's use of the word *areté*. Ever since Werner Jaeger's now classic discussion of this term (roughly, "courage" for Homer and "virtue" for Plato and Aristotle) in his *Paideia*, it has become customary to apply it rather loosely to a wide range of excellences, so that Whitman speaks even of Deianeira's "supremacy of gentleness" in the *Trachiniae* as "a kind of arete."⁷ Unfortunately Sophocles, lacking the fruits of Jaeger's erudition, uses the word but six times in his seven plays,⁸ and then only of warriors. An interpretation of Sophocles centered around *areté* seems no more justified than one based on *sophrosynê*.

Another, more radical, solution to the problem of Sophocles' thought has been advanced by A. J. A. Waldock in *Sophocles the Dramatist*. Waldock contends, with disarming candor, that Sophocles, as a practical playwright preoccupied with his theatrical effects, simply "eschews thinking."⁹ This is a book whose pages are interspersed with occasional insights of great solidity: it should serve, at the very least, as a road-block in the path of doctrinaire theories. But, in the end, the eschewal of thinking which its pages manifest is not to be laid at Sophocles' door.

Sophoclean criticism in English has more recently been graced by the keen observations of H. D. F. Kitto and Bernard Knox. Kitto has evolved a conception in which *Dikê*, "a universal rhythm, ruling in the physical world and in human affairs alike,"¹⁰ plays a central role in Sophocles' vision of life. This conception has led him to discover a close interplay between the human and the divine throughout the tragedies. Knox, meanwhile, has given us some of the most balanced and penetrating analyses of Sophocles' plays in English. His grasp of their historical context, his close adherence to their text, and above all his appreciation of their heroic qualities, are unexcelled. Yet both Kitto and Knox have concerned themselves almost exclusively with the unchanging, the constant elements in Sophocles' vision, thus leaving unexplained the disparity of mood and structure between the earlier and the later plays — between, for instance, the *Trachiniae* and the *Electra*.¹¹

What is needed is to abandon the presuppositions of strictly theological or strictly humanistic viewpoints and to examine the plays, first in themselves and then in comparison one with another. In doing so we

must be prepared to follow up the implications of differences as well as of similarities. Let us begin at the beginning, with *Ajax*.

1. *AX*

No quality of the *Ajax*¹² is more immediately striking than its violent contrasts. Contrast pervades the language, with its sweeping oppositions of images culminating in the juxtapositions of winter and summer, night and day, friend and enemy, in Ajax's great central speech (646-92), and dominates the dramaturgy, with its sudden, unexpected shifts of mood and its harshly discordant groupings of characters. Ajax himself, who is part of this world, stands in uncompromising opposition to it, a monolithic colossus in a milieu of conflict and change. Such is his defiant posture, and such his hostile surroundings, that he virtually cries out for judgment. Yet how are we to judge him, this heroic criminal of terrible grandeur who fights stubbornly against a world he cannot change, and would rather die than change himself to adapt to its ways? We must attempt, by examining the position in which Ajax is placed, and places himself, *vis-à-vis* the gods and his fellow men, to orient ourselves in such terms as the drama requires.

The question of men's relationship to the gods is abruptly brought to the fore in the prologue, and is commented on by nearly every principal character in the play. No doubt whatsoever exists in anyone's mind that human actions are directly subject to divine supervision and control. Odysseus says to Athena, "In all things, as in the past, so in the future, I am guided by your hand" (34-5); for "anything may happen when a god contrives" (86). Tecmessa tells the Chorus that Ajax's words in his madness were such as "a god, and no man, had taught" (243-4). The Chorus, in turn, fears some blow from a god has befallen him (278-9); and later, after Ajax's death, Tecmessa cries in lamentation, "These things would not have been thus without the gods" (950). Teucer is outspoken in his belief: "I should say that these things and all things always are contrived for men by the gods; and whoever is not pleased with this, let him cherish his ideas as I mine" (1036-9). Menelaus too is prepared to credit the gods with saving his life and taking Ajax's (1057-61). But it is Ajax himself who, on recovering from his madness and realizing he has slain sheep instead of the Greek leaders, is most emphatic of all: "The gorgon-eyed invincible goddess, daughter of Zeus, when I was preparing my hand against *them*, foiled me by casting on me a raving disease, so that I bloodied my hands on these flocks" (450-3). This unanimity of the characters concerning the

control exercised by the gods over men is a striking feature of the play, emphatic and questioned by no one. The element of conflict, however, asserts itself forcefully in the strain between what we may call the divine framework of the tragedy and its human content.

The viewpoint of human activity taken by these controlling divinities is so unequivocally expounded in the prologue as to cast its shadow over the entire play. Athena's words are so simple, direct, and incapable of misconstruction as to seem almost crude. "Is it not the sweetest of laughter to laugh at one's enemies?" she asks (79). "Do you see, Odysseus, how great is the strength of the gods?" (118). And, lest there should be any ambiguity, she concludes:

Therefore, beholding such things, never speak presumptuously against the gods, or act arrogantly, if ever you prevail over someone by strength of hand or by abundance of great wealth. For a day turns all human things aside and restores them again; and the gods love the wise (τοὺς σώφρονας) and hate the evil. (127-33)

Whatever, we may think of this edict,¹³ it is stated with power and conviction, and is confirmed overwhelmingly throughout the play. Ajax commits unmistakable *hybris* in his attempt to kill the Greek commanders, and *atē* comes upon him for it in the form of divine madness. These traditional religious terms are consistently used of him.¹⁴ As for Athena, her speech and actions are wholly appropriate to the avenging deity. No one in the entire play complains that she is unjust, however harsh and cruel her actions may seem to us. She simply gives Ajax his deserts, and this is recognized by all. Nor is her motivation personal or spiteful. Ajax has given her sufficient cause to bear a grudge, as we learn at length from the Messenger (756-77). But this insolent behavior, this self-willed flouting of divine assistance, was not the direct cause of his punishment, nor must it be taken as merely a personal insult to Athena, who is, after all, the goddess of wisdom. Instead, it illustrates Ajax's lifelong habit of thinking, as the Messenger twice says (761, 777), not κατ' ἀνθρώπον, not as a man, realizing his limitations, should. His presumptuous words were indeed the origin of Athena's anger (776-7); but the direct cause of Ajax's punishment, which all this serves to clarify, was his attempt to kill his commanders in anger at the judgment of the arms. It was after, not before, that attempt that Athena sent divine madness on Ajax. His violent punishment came in requital for a violent deed; he got what he was asking for. He cries that Athena "is torturing me to death" (403) — precisely as he himself had thought he was torturing Odysseus (110-113). Thus Athena is

neither a "spirit of the hour" nor a malignant and jealous woman. She is the arbiter of destiny, the dispenser of an impeccable — but inhuman — justice.¹⁵ Her very inhumanity, indeed, is understandable only as being her immortality viewed from another perspective.

But this other perspective is our own; and thus we are brought face to face with the drama's contrasting human content. The contrast is a strong one, so strong that we must beware lest it throw our interpretation off center. Ajax's punishment and death, seen from the viewpoint of the gods, *sub specie aeternitatis*, is perfectly right, perfectly just: he has reaped what he sowed, no more. The wheel has come full circle, and *atê* has followed *hybris*. And yet, there *is* more. Such a view is one thing for the unembroiled gods, but we are men; and Ajax is no mere symbol of punished crime, but a fellow being who, however heinous his deeds may have been, commands our fullest respect by the inflexible rigidity with which he persists in refusing to learn the wisdom of yielding to life. He will break, but not bend. He is too big for his frame. He is wrong, but he is great. Everything in the play — the devotion of Tecmessa and the Chorus, the loyalty of Teucer, the envious hatred of the Atreidae, and the tribute paid by Odysseus at the end — underscores this central fact. In contrast Athena is cold and remote. To laugh at one's enemies is an Olympian prerogative, but as Odysseus immediately recognizes, and as the Atreidae will later graphically demonstrate, it is not a form of behavior suited to mortal men. The gap between the impersonal divine justice embodied in Athena and the very personal human grandeur of Ajax is thus complete. Odysseus seeks to bridge this chasm by combining an awareness of the supreme power of the gods with the maintenance of his essential humanity. Because of his eminent *sophrosynê* he is not only loved by the gods but, by the end of the play, universally respected among men. The Chorus, which had from the beginning (148-150) accused him of slandering and plotting against Ajax, now says, "Odysseus, whoever says that you were not born wise in judgment, being such as you are, is a foolish man" (1374-5). Yet the very fact that he is necessary in the scheme of the drama serves also to *emphasize* the underlying polarity of its universe. The qualities which set Ajax apart from Odysseus, which make him grander and more heroic, are those which, inevitably it seems, pit him against justice and the gods. "I see," says Odysseus, "that all of us who live are nothing else but phantoms or a flitting shadow" (125-26). In contrasting human with divine power, he is unquestionably right: the wise man must know that men are as nothing when opposed to that "strength of the gods" (118) which becomes so amply apparent to the

characters in the course of the play. Yet Ajax's refusal to believe that men are merely shadows, which blinds him and pits him against the gods, is also the essence of his heroism. The two qualities seem inextricably united: such heroism contains an inherent *hybris*, and *hybris* an inherent *atê*. The resolution offered in the final scene is tenuous at best. Odysseus, who had shrunk back in the prologue from the encounter between Ajax and Athena, here negotiates a truce between Teucer and the Atreidae, and shows that there is a place in this universe for a man of capacious understanding and generosity, of *sophrosynê*. But such a one, even to live on in a world of shadows, must be cautious, watchful, unheroic. Ajax, who was heroic, is dead. And though his heroism, his *aretê* (1357), has won him a degree of vindication, that vindication is valid, and could exist, only in the eternal changelessness of death, for the terms on which it rests are incompatible with the flux which is life. With this tension the play ends. Ajax will be buried, and as the Chorus carries his body out Teucer proclaims him "the best of men" (1416). But the final effect is not one of "pomp and orchestral sonority," of "apotheosis" and "moral triumph."¹⁶ The contrasts have been too great. Odysseus has achieved a humane solution, and Ajax's reputation, which had so concerned the Chorus throughout, has been firmly upheld. But what has happened to Ajax, his crime and his fall, has not been undone, and could not have happened otherwise. The disparity between divine justice and power, on the one hand, and human heroism and greatness of soul, on the other, is left, in the terms of this play, unresolved and unresolvable.

I shall return later to what I believe some of the implications of this latently irreconcilable split to be. Now it is sufficient to note that it exists, and pervades the play. Much the same kind of duality and strain manifests itself in Ajax's relations with his fellow men. Just as the very qualities which endowed him with heroism placed Ajax in conflict with the divinely established order of life, and led to his downfall, so do these same qualities isolate him from common humanity. Again, the elements of the play seem to contain an inherent dissonance, evidenced in its sharp structural divisions, which endows the whole with a certain supreme tension.

In Ajax's dealings with those around him this quality is evinced in a mutual lack of communication and understanding, as if the characters, being what they are, were moving inevitably in different dimensions. This is particularly clear with Tecmessa. She is a wholly sympathetic character, completely loyal and devoted to Ajax, and fully capable of sharing his sorrows. In an emphatic, if rather awkward exchange with

the Chorus (265-77), she stresses that they, by their consciousness of Ajax's suffering, must bear its burden as much as he: "It is we, who are not afflicted, who suffer now" (269). The Chorus say that they "share in his grief" (283), but carry less conviction; only shortly before, on first hearing that Ajax had in fact performed the deed which rumor had attributed to him, they had been prepared to flee so as *not* to "share in his grief" (255). Tecmessa's compassion, shown in such touches as her concern to save her child Eurysaces from his raving father (531), is genuine and unrestrained. She poignantly tells the Chorus, in her grief for Ajax's death, "It is for you to conjecture about these things, but for me to understand them only too much" (942). Yet in Ajax her love and sympathy meet a brick wall. He is totally impregnable to her. They speak at odds, by their very natures. Two speeches (430-80, 485-524) which stand at the center of the first episode underline this cleavage. Ajax, disgraced and humiliated by his ignominious failure to kill his leaders, blames Athena and determines neither to shame his father by returning home, nor to gladden the Atreidae by throwing himself into battle. He concludes that "the well-born man must either live well or die well; you have heard all":

ἀλλ' ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι
τόν εὐγενῆ χρὴ πάντ' ἀκήκοας λόγον. (479-80)

Tecmessa, on the other hand, urges the necessity of yielding to the stream of life and of considering others. She herself was free-born but is now a slave; she implores Ajax not to abandon her and his parents and child. A man should requite good with good. Thus she, in turn, concludes that "kindness is always the begetter of kindness, and whoever forgets the time when he has received a benefit, he will not become a 'well-born' man":

χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστίν ἢ τίκτους' αἶε'
οὔτου δ' ἀπορρεῖ μνήστις εὖ πεπονθότος,
οὐκ ἂν γένοιτ' ἔθ' οὗτος εὐγενὴς ἀνὴρ. (522-4)

This antithesis is more than a rhetorical device. These views of life are mutually exclusive. Ajax's code, which has made him great, has made him immobile as well.

The ideal of the *εὐγενής*, the "well-born" man, which both Ajax and Tecmessa here stress in their different ways, is a very important one in this play. A pride in family, a strong sense of kinship and duty, is a basic component of Ajax's heroic character. In the speech to Tecmessa quoted from above he compares his own disgraceful deeds to the fame his father Telamon had won at Troy (434-40), asks how he can

face his father if he returns dishonored (462-5), and says, "I must seek some means by which to show my father that, born from him, I am not spineless by nature" (470-2). Tecmessa, who knows him well, argues in return that by ending his life he will expose her to the taunts of his enemies, and "these words will be shameful to you and to your race" (505). "Respect your father" (506), she pleads; "respect your mother" (507); "pity your child" (510). Ajax is not moved by her appeal, but has his son brought out, and says of him: "He must soon be broken into his father's rough ways and become like him in nature. O child, may you be more fortunate than your father but like him in other respects, and you will not be bad" (548-51). Ajax, having committed his shameful mistake, sees no choice for himself but to die. If this means sorrow not only for Tecmessa and Eurysaces, but, as the Chorus too perceives, for his mother (622-34) and father (641-5) as well, that is but one more of the conflicts inherent in the structure of the play: only by grieving them can he prove himself worthy of them. Before he throws himself on his sword Ajax calls on the sun to "announce my destruction and my fate to my old father and the poor woman who bore me. She will indeed be wretched when she hears this report, and will raise a great wail through all the city. But I need not thus lament in vain, but must begin the deed with haste" (848-53). This is his only way to be true to the nature he was born with.

A similar sense of the importance of race is seen in Ajax's half-brother Teucer. This is especially worthy of note since Teucer is illegitimate and a bowman — therefore of lower social standing. He too imagines the harsh greeting he will receive from his father Telamon if he returns home in dishonor (1008-20). He accuses Menelaus of merely *seeming* to be εὐγενής (1095), and takes great pride in his own birth. Agamemnon insults him by calling him low-born and a slave (1229-31, 1235, 1259-61), and Teucer, far from claiming that birth is unimportant, replies at length by contrasting his own lineage with Agamemnon's, entirely to his own favor (1288-1305). A man's birth, in this play, is closely bound up with his honor and self-esteem and, like the power of the gods, is of undisputed importance.

These scenes between Teucer and the Atreidae bring into focus still another central conflict of the drama, that between authority and the individual. In the parodos the Chorus had said: "The small without the great are a tottering bastion for the walls, for the little man would prosper best with the great, and the great served by the lesser. But it is not possible to teach foolish minds these things" (158-63). The final part of the play, before Odysseus enters, is the perfect illustration

of this futility. The situation is one where the little man attempts brazenly to rule the fallen great.¹⁷ Menelaus gloats over Ajax's body, and says, "If we were not able to control him when alive, at least we will wholly rule him when dead" (1067-8). He goes on, in his Spartan way, to defend the paramount importance of law, fear, and submission. Without them, he says, an army cannot be ruled wisely, *σωφρόνως* (1075). Therefore he will refuse the criminal Ajax burial. What he does not see, the Chorus points out: "Menelaus, do not, when you have set down wise counsels, yourself become insolent (*ὕβριστής*) toward the dead" (1091-2). Menelaus, in his supreme pettiness, is the living refutation of his bold words. Authority is not wrong in itself; but he is simply too slight a man to invest it with any real human meaning. He stresses the form and neglects the content. Agamemnon too makes no allowance for human greatness outside the mold he conceptualizes. Yet Teucer, though our sympathies lie with him, is not a character to command deep admiration. He is too small, too rigid, too vitriolic; he lacks vision and stature. He trades stinging taunts on equal terms with those Atreidae whom Ajax had shunned. To him, as to Menelaus, the Chorus's words are pointed: "I do not approve of such a tongue in the midst of hardships, for harsh words, even if completely just, sting" (1118-9). Indeed, the emphasis of this last part of the play falls heavily on *words*. "What dread courage your tongue breeds" (1124), Menelaus sarcastically tells Teucer; and goes on to compare him with a man "bold in tongue" (1142). Agamemnon enters on hearing of Teucer's "dread words" (1226), and Teucer returns his compliment by accusing him of "speaking many mindless words" (1272) — just as he dismissed Menelaus as "a foolish man speaking slight words" (1162). In the midst of such wrangling, such *logomachia*, the Chorus's plea (1264) — "Would that you both might have the sense to show wisdom (*σωφρονεῖν*)" — falls stillborn. Such wisdom Odysseus alone, in his play, possesses.

Thus these scenes of contention and invective serve several functions in the play. They heighten our sense of Ajax's grandeur by simple contrast with these little men, these men of words. But they also constitute a commentary, in the form of a serious parody, on Ajax's relations with the gods. There is the same kind of unresolvable conflict between the proud and upright Teucer and the state-minded Atreidae as, on a totally higher plane, existed between great Ajax and the impersonal justice embodied in Athena. The Atreidae show the concept of justice in its most debased and impoverished form because, as Odysseus says, they "would destroy the laws of the gods" (1343) by refusing

Ajax the honor which is his due in death. When impersonal justice becomes personal and vindictive, it is starkly revealed as hatred and tyranny. Odysseus, who stood so helplessly by in that first confrontation, restores a tenuous balance by his humanity, vision, and awareness that he himself, like his old enemy Ajax, is mortal (1365). But Agamemnon leaves vowing eternal enmity (1372-3), and Teucer prays that the gods may bring destruction on those who had insulted Ajax (1389-92). The opposites come no closer to union; the centrifugal forces are in no way diminished. Odysseus, though honored by all, is very nearly as isolated as Ajax had been.

Such is the milieu in which Ajax's tragedy occurs: a world of absolute contrasts held together only by Odysseus' moderation and wisdom, and by Ajax's own unyielding personality. In such a world what does the hero learn? He learns nothing, because he will take it on no terms but his own. A universe where "a day turns all human things aside and restores them again" (131-2) renders all certainty impossible. Odysseus says at the beginning, "We know nothing clearly, but wander" (23), and the Chorus concludes the play with the lines: "Men can know many things by seeing, but until he sees, no man is a prophet of how he will fare in the future" (1418-20). It is just this uncertainty which Ajax cannot accept: he must shape the course of his life even if he must die to do so. He stands against all that his universe is, and knowledge of it is painful to him. To his child Eurysaces he says, "I envy you this, that you do not perceive these hardships. For the sweetest life lies in understanding nothing, until you learn of joy and grief" (552-5). Rightly he tells Tecmessa, "You seem to me to be thinking foolishly if you intend to educate my temper now" (594-5). He would not be Ajax if he were other than he is, and to stay Ajax the world will be well lost.

It is this which gives the immense irony to his great speech on time and change.¹⁸ The world in which this play takes place is, I have tried to show, such that Ajax is left with only two alternatives: to reject it outright or to adapt himself to its uncertain ways. There is no compromise; he cannot remain a hero and stay alive. For a moment, in this speech, it seems that he has taken the course which is clearly impossible for him. Time, he says, brings to birth and obscures all things. Now he pities Tecmessa and will bury his sword, softened by her pleas. He will learn "to submit to the gods and reverence the Atreidae" (666-7), for they are his rulers. As winter gives way to summer, night to day, wind to calm, sleep to wakefulness, so will he learn to be wise, *σωφρονεῖν* (677). For he knows that friends may in time become enemies and enemies friends.

The peculiar irony of all this is that Ajax, whom consciousness pains, is fully conscious of the wisdom — for others — of what he is saying, but no less aware of its utter impossibility for him. He knows he will reject this course because, life being what it is, he cannot follow it and retain his integrity. Time changes all things, yes; but Ajax's greatness has its identity only in immutability. It is an absolute; if he cannot nobly live, now that he is disgraced, then he *must* nobly die. Wisdom, *sophrosynê*, is a wise course for those who would live on in this world. Ajax had recommended it to Tecmessa (586), and if the Atreidae misunderstand it as badly as they misunderstand the nature of justice, that does not invalidate it for those who, like Odysseus, can live life in accord with a broad, sympathetic comprehension of its meaning. But Ajax's nature is rooted in values which do not partake of *sophrosynê*, and if self-imposed death is the outcome of such a nature, whose excesses lead to crime and to downfall, then, by his code as an *εὐγενής*, he must accept that outcome. Learning is impossible for him: he must act in accord with the consequences of what he is and what he has done.

Therefore any judgment of Ajax based on the paramount value of either submission or defiance must be false. This is a play about a hero in a world where heroism, on his terms, can no longer exist. We learn respect and awe for Ajax's greatness, for his adherence to permanent values in a world where little else is permanent, but we see also the insane futility of his effort to be a god, and know that his fall is inevitable, and therefore just, by the nature of things as they are. Teucer's anapests at the close of the play are no song of moral triumph. They are, quite simply, an elegy. Ajax was great and is dead.

2. OEDIPUS AT COLONUS

We must return later to some of the problems raised by this reading of the *Ajax* — some of the implications of the divisive forces at work in this study of a great man in a universe where such greatness is ultimately destructive of others and of self, and where only the man of cautious *sophrosynê* can maintain his values and live on in a world of change, a world whose final justice, however sure, is remote and hard to perceive. But first, to gain some sort of perspective through contrast, let us examine the play which Sophocles wrote near the end of his life, a long generation later — the *Oedipus at Colonus*.¹⁹

The contrasts within this drama are no less marked than those of the *Ajax*, but they are of a different order entirely, and the total

impression is vastly dissimilar. Oedipus, for all his heroic energy, for all the many sufferings he has so irrationally endured, dies at one with himself, the gods, and those around him whom he has chosen for his own. This is a play where titanically kinetic forces coexist and intermingle with acceptance, understanding, and love. What has made this change, this reorientation of outlook, possible?

We have seen that Ajax, in his heroic solitude, was thrown out of contact even with those who, like Tecmessa and the Chorus, consistently took his part: for all practical purposes he talked only to himself and cared for nothing but his own integrity and honor. In this play, however, Oedipus reacts strongly — whether for good or bad — to those who compose his world, and eventually realizes his own identity through his relations with them. This is apparent from the first in the interplay between Oedipus and the old men of Colonus who are the Chorus. Throughout the play we are reminded that he is, as the Chorus says, “a stranger in a strange land”: *ξένος ἐπὶ ξένης* (184). His status as a *ξένος* is referred to by every character, except his own daughters, who enters to him: by the citizen of Colonus (75), the Chorus (162), Theseus (562-3), Creon (745), and Polyneices (1335). In Athens Oedipus has found the city, he says, which alone is famed for protecting and helping strangers (261-2). Yet when the Chorus discovers him violating their sanctuary, blind and in rags, and learns that he is that Oedipus who is famed throughout Hellas for his dreadful deeds and misfortunes, their fear and distrust are without restraint. They claim, on learning his identity, the right to revoke the promise they had earlier made, to protect him (228-36). But slowly they change. Antigone appeals to their natural sense of reverence and humanity (237-53), and they answer: “Be certain, child of Oedipus, that we pity you and him alike for your misfortune” (254-5). Only fear of the gods, they say, has caused their concern (256-7). On hearing Oedipus’ impassioned plea of innocence (258-91) they agree to let Theseus decide the matter (294-5). Later, when the scene with Ismene confirms Oedipus’ good intentions, the Chorus is anxious “to advise what will benefit you” (464). And after the scene with Theseus the rapport is complete. The Chorus has learned the true value of this blind old man who has come to bestow his blessing on their land, and begins its great ode by singing, “Stranger, you have found in this land of fine horses the best home on earth, white Colonus” (668-70). Hereafter they will be his staunchest supporter and ally, and he, in turn, will benefit the city which has befriended him with all the limitless power that resides in his suffering, polluted body.

But this responsiveness on the Chorus’s part is equaled by Oedipus

himself. He, unlike Ajax, has a choice, and is able to exercise it. He need not accept or reject his experience in its entirety to retain his integrity as an individual. At all times he shows the utmost respect for the customs and traditions of Athens. He ends his first speech to Antigone by saying, "We have come as strangers to learn from the citizens, and to perform what we hear of" (12-13). Almost his first words to the Chorus are, "Do not, I beseech you, consider me lawless" (142). When Oedipus asks Antigone's advice on whether she should leave the grove of the Eumenides as the Chorus demands, in accord with law (168), she replies, "O father, we must have the same concerns as the citizens, yielding and listening as befits us" (171-2). His readiness, as the Chorus requests, to "hate what the city holds in dislike and reverence what is dear to it" (185-7) contributes greatly to winning their regard. When they bid him perform the rites of propitiation to the Eumenides, whose sanctuary he has violated, he assures them he will "fulfill all" (465); he is indeed eager to learn from them: "Teach me," he says (468); "teach me this too" (480). Because he is willing to comply with the laws of their city and their gods, he wins their trust and confidence; and when Creon enters Oedipus is able to speak "on their behalf" (811). There is a give-and-take here which would have been wholly impossible in Ajax's world.

Yet any suspicion that Oedipus is crushed and humbled by disaster is shattered once for all in the scene with Creon. Creon, in this play, is perhaps the least attractive character in Sophoclean drama;²⁰ but we must bear in mind that he enters with a most polite, almost obsequious speech, and is, after all, Oedipus' brother-in-law and uncle. Oedipus had been king of Thebes, and Creon's appeal to patriotism should be a strong one. Athens, he says, is indeed a worthy city; "but your own home would be revered with greater justice, since she was your nurse of old" (759-60). Yet Oedipus, in answer, flares up to the heights of indignation, puncturing at a stroke Creon's elaborate hypocrisy. Kinship and patriotism, he says, meant nothing to Creon before, when he banished Oedipus from Thebes; yet now he pretends to offer Oedipus asylum "when the favor confers no benefit" — *ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἡ χάρις χάριν φέροι* (779). Oedipus will have no truck with this brand of patriotism. Any ties he might have had with a city which has so wronged him he severs here with unmistakable finality.

In complete contrast to his forthright rejection of Creon and Thebes is the relationship which Oedipus establishes with Theseus. Here are two men who have no ties of city or family, yet come to be indissolubly united by their common vision and humanity. When Theseus first

enters he recognizes Oedipus and "pities" him (556). But his pity is not condescending. He has the deepest respect for Oedipus as a fellow human being:

I know that I myself was brought up as a stranger like you, and, in a strange land, contended, more than any other, with dangers to my life. And so I would not turn aside or refuse to help anyone who is a stranger, as you are now; for I well know that I am a man, and that tomorrow holds no greater portion for me than for you. (562-8)

In tone this resembles the speech of Odysseus. But the difference is more important. Oedipus, unlike Ajax, unlike Agamemnon or even Teucer, can *respond*; and between him and Theseus is established a kinship, a *ξενία*, transcending the ties of city or of blood. For Oedipus has found in himself the strength to reject offers which, like Creon's, are "good in word but bad in deeds" —

λόγω μὲν ἐσθλά, τοῖσι δ' ἔργοισιν κακά, (782)

and to enter into a spiritual communion with the men of Athens who, as Theseus says, "are not zealous to make our lives brighter in words than in what we do" (1143-4). Creon, Oedipus immediately knows, is "dreadful in tongue" alone (806), for time has made him "empty of mind" (931); but Theseus speaks "with my mind as well as from my tongue" —

τῷ νῶ θ' ὁμοίως καὶ πὸ τῆς γλώσσης λέγω. (936)

Thus Oedipus has made his choice on grounds not of word but of deed, and has been rewarded by the protection which Theseus and his Athens have given him.

The same exercise of a choice based on the perception of the reality beneath appearances is evident in Oedipus' attitude toward his sons and daughters. In the *Ajax*, we have seen, the ties of family were of great importance: Ajax strove mightily to be worthy of his father and live up to his code as well-born man. In this play it is far otherwise. Oedipus, famed through all Greece for his dreadful birth, his *αἰνὰ φύσις* (212), is scarcely *εὐγενής*. If he is to achieve any sort of greatness he must erect it on some foundation other than that of birth. Indeed, the word *εὐγενής* appears only once in the play, when Creon, in his first line, flatteringly addresses the "well-born inhabitants of this land" (728). Oedipus must, and does, transcend family just as he has transcended city. When Antigone, near the beginning, pleads for mercy from the Chorus, she asks them to consider her "as one sprung from

your own blood" (245-6). This is a highly unusual argument for a pre-Stoic, or pre-Christian Greek to make; but again the bond of sympathy and understanding is the one which holds. Now, the love which old Oedipus shows for the daughters who have stood by him in all his hardships is unbounded. They, like Tecmessa, are wholly unselfish; as Ismene says, "One should not remember her labor when she labors for her parents" (508-9). And again unlike Ajax, Oedipus *responds*. He realizes, he tells the Chorus, that "from these virgins, insofar as their nature allows, I have the maintenance of my life, and safety on land, and the succor of kinship" (445-7). His reunion with them (1099ff) is a scene of almost unbearable tenderness. Then, just as he had yielded to the Chorus in leaving the grove of the Eumenides, so does he submit to Antigone's reiterated plea to "yield" (1184, 1201) to her and hear, however unwillingly, the supplication of her brother. Oedipus' words to his daughters before his final passing are, as the Messenger reports them, one of the great moments in Greek poetry:

Folding his arms around them, he said: "O my children, this day your father is no longer with you. For everything about me has died, and no longer will you have the toilsome lot of caring for me. I know it was hard, my children; but one word dissolves all these sufferings. For such love as you have had from me you can have from no other; but now you will pass the rest of your life without me." (1611-9)

Oedipus, in defying Creon, had earlier said, "Even faring as I am, I would not live badly if I found joy therein" (798-9). Joy, *τέρψις*, so intense that he can tell it only to Theseus (1121-2), is what this blind old man, known for his sufferings through all Greece, finds in his daughters. "I have what is dearest," he says (1110): *ἔχω τὰ φίλτατα*. And Antigone, at the end, understands this presence of joy in the sharing of sorrow. "There was," she sings, "a certain longing even for hardships. What was in no way dear *was* dear, when I held him in my arms" (1697-9). At the close of the *Ajax* Agamemnon had sworn that his hatred would follow Ajax even in the world below — "he will be equally hateful to me there as here" (1372) — and Teucer had declined Odysseus' offer to assist in the funeral "lest in doing so I offend the dead man" (1395). But here Antigone cries out, "O father, O my loved one, clad forever in darkness under the earth, not even there below will you be unloved by me and her" (1700-4). From first to last this play is permeated by the power of undying love.

But this is a love no longer dependent on the ties of blood. Throughout the play Oedipus had drawn a sharp distinction between the

daughters who shared his sufferings and the sons who exiled him and sat on his throne (337ff, 445ff). More than once he had cursed those sons for the wrongs they had done him, and even prayed that he might have the power to determine the issue between them (422-3). Now, immediately after the reunion with his daughters and immediately before the thunder which will call him to his mysterious end, Oedipus is actually brought face to face with his son Polyneices.²¹ The dramatic power of this scene in this place, with Oedipus' long silence of almost a hundred lines (1254-1347), is immense. It is the answer to the Chorus's darkly pessimistic ode on old age, with its picture of Oedipus beaten by winds from all the corners of the earth (1239-48). Antigone had barely convinced her father even to hear Polyneices, by appealing to the natural bond of kinship: "You begot him, and so it is not right for you, even if he is doing the most unholy of wicked deeds, to requite him with evil" (1189-91). Yet Polyneices' long and moving appeal has no effect on Oedipus, who sees through him with remorseless clarity. He answers: "If I had not begotten these daughters to care for me, I would not exist, for all your doing. Now they preserve me and care for me; they are men, not women, in working to help me. But you were born from another, not from me" (1365-9). Oedipus here finally and irrevocably places the ties of humanity above those of kinship and race, just as he had placed them above those of city.²² Polyneices, "spat upon and fatherless" (1383), must reap what he has sown. His refusal to Antigone to turn back from his expedition against Thebes — "it is impossible" (1418) — makes clear that Oedipus' curse is not an old man's act of petulant resentment, but an insight, such as is given to the gods alone, into those qualities in Polyneices which reveal him not as a son but as a man whose own nature is bringing his doom inevitably upon him.

Oedipus, then, moves in a world where men may, with sufficient good will, respond to one another on the basis of what, within them, they most essentially are. In this world Oedipus towers high over even the most sympathetic of his fellow men. He has wandered long and suffered much in the many years since that day when he first discovered the terrible secret of his birth and gouged out his eyes with the brooch of his wife and mother. What, we may ask, has time taught him?

Time pervades the play, and Oedipus, above all others, feels its power. To Theseus he says:

Dear son of Ageus, only the gods do not grow old or die; but omnipotent time confounds all other things. The strength of the earth and the strength of the body waste away; trust dies and distrust is born; and

the same spirit does not stand fast among friends or between cities. For some now, and for some in the time to come, what is pleasant becomes bitter, and sweet again. And if all is well now between you and Thebes, yet myriad time gives birth in her going to myriad nights and days. (607-18)

Clearly time has taught Oedipus a sense of change, of mutability. His words themselves are remarkably like those which Ajax spoke before him — save only that what was for Ajax impossible and ironic is for Oedipus fraught with a lifetime's meaning. Long time, χρόνος μακρός, and the learning that comes with time, have been his constant companion. After he had blinded himself at Thebes, he recalls to Ismene, then "in time, when my suffering was assuaged, I learned that my wrath had run too far in punishing my previous errors" (437-9). Time has humbled Oedipus when first we see him, and taught him, as it taught Odysseus in the *Ajax*, the vastness of the unseen forces of the universe — forces which before he had so imperfectly perceived. It has taught him also the value of learning itself; "for in learning," as he tells Antigone in the closing lines of the prologue, "is a safeguard for our actions" (115-6). The words "teach" and "learn", διδάσκω, μανθάνω, and their compounds, occur time and again in this play; and Oedipus is as ready to learn from Theseus and the Chorus as they from him. The sense of the changes wrought by time and the flexibility with which the wandering Oedipus has learned to meet them, thus make themselves felt from the first. The Chorus, after the Polyneices scene and only a moment before the thunderclap which will summon Oedipus to a timeless existence, sings: "Time sees, always sees these things, overturning some, and on the next day restoring others again" (1453-5).

Time, then, has taught Oedipus the breadth of vision and the flexibility of character which allow him to look for good in the ways of others and to bear his misfortunes with resignation and even humility. This is the dominant impression at the beginning of the play:

Child of the blind old man, Antigone, what land have we come to — the city of what men? Who will welcome the wandering Oedipus today with paltry gifts? I ask for little and bring still less, but this suffices for me; for my sufferings and long time, my companion, and, third, my integrity (τὸ γενναῖον) teach me to be content. (1-8)

He has learned the wisdom to say, "Let us not fight necessity" (191).

Yet if time has taught him an awareness of change, an endurance of suffering, and the ability to meet the exigencies of circumstance, it has also served, more importantly still, to validate and ratify that

third component of his contentment, his essential integrity or nobility: τὸ γενναῖον. The word recurs repeatedly in the play. It is this quality which the citizen of Colonus perceives from the first in the blind beggar who has violated the precinct of the Eumenides (75-6). It is this quality, too, which Oedipus immediately recognizes in Theseus (569-70), and which unites them from the outset in a kinship stronger than that of blood. For this he blesses Theseus when his daughters are restored to him (1042), and when at last he must part from them, Theseus consents "like a noble man" — ὡς ἀνὴρ γενναῖος (1636) — to their charge. In his last words to them it is with τὸ γενναῖον that Oedipus says they must depart (1640).

Now, in this awareness of strength and integrity which the suffering Oedipus has gained, the principal ingredient is his passionate conviction of his own innocence. This conviction is closely involved with his transcendence of the ties of blood. As he faces and overcomes each new and painful attack upon him, we see him become increasingly certain of himself. In the prologue he is so humble and submissive as to seem abject. To the Eumenides he prays for death, "unless I seem unworthy, who am always a slave to the most extreme sufferings of mankind" (104-5). "Pity," he beseeches, "this wretched image of the man Oedipus; for my body is no longer as it was of old" (109-10). "Though great," he tells the Chorus, "I am anchored on the small": κατὰ μικροῖς μέγας ὄρμουν (148). And when the Chorus inquires after his birth he is too deeply ashamed to admit it. Finally, when he does, it is because "I have no way to hide it" (218). Yet as the drama moves on, Oedipus' stature grows in his own eyes and in ours. He is moved to this first protestation of innocence (258-91) by a sense of despair: these men of Athens, most devout of cities, are about to expel him. Yet it is only his name they fear, not himself or his deeds; "for my deeds lie more in suffering than in performance" (266-7). The disparity between Oedipus' defiled, rag-clad body and his inner worth is as wide as that between Creon's persuasive speech and base acts. How, asks Oedipus, was he bad by nature — πῶς ἐγὼ κακὸς φύσιν; (269). Even if he had known he was killing his father, none could blame him for hitting back when he was struck at. But as it was, he acted in total ignorance. When the Chorus next asks about his misfortunes in the commos after the scene with Ismene, Oedipus shrinks back and again tries to conceal his sufferings: "Do not, by our friendship (πρὸς ξενίας), lay open the shameful things I have suffered" (515-6). But again he adamantly proclaims his innocence: "I have borne misfortunes, strangers, I have borne them unwillingly, god knows; and none of

these things are self-chosen" (521-3). He repeats that he has suffered rather than done evil. He killed one who would have killed him; he was "pure by law, and unknowing" (548) when he did the deed.

These declarations, however, are merely prefatory to the great and indignant defence which Oedipus delivers before Creon. Here there is no reluctance or shame. On the contrary, it is Creon who had said to him, "Alas, have I not cast a wretched reproach on you and me and all our race? It is not possible to hide what is in the open; so now, by your father's gods, Oedipus, obey me: *you* must hide it by consenting to return to the home and city of your fathers" (753-8). But by now, fortified by his new friends and by his own sense of right, Oedipus needs to conceal nothing. When Creon tells Theseus that he thought no one would want this incestuous parricide, Oedipus breaks into his longest, most passionate defence. "I will not," he says, "be silent" (980). Perhaps the gods were angry at his race of old; but *in himself* there had been no previous *hamartia* to which his own dreadful errors could be ascribed:

ἐπεὶ καθ' αὐτόν γ' οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροις ἐμοὶ
ἀμαρτίας ὄνειδος οὐδέν, ἀνθ' ὅτου
τάδ' εἰς ἑμαυτὸν τοὺς ἐμούς θ' ἡμάρτανον. (966-8)

This flat denial that his punishment came on him for any personal fault is his first affirmation of his innocence in the eyes of heaven: before he had appealed only to his ignorance and to the principle of requital which Creon has here just invoked against him ("I deemed it best to requite what I had suffered," 953). Now he comes to the heart of the question: "If by oracles some divine doom was coming on my father to die at the hands of his children, how could you rightly blame me, who as yet had birth from neither father nor mother, but was unborn?" (969-73). For the first time Oedipus asserts the total irrationality, for himself, of what he has suffered. "I entered upon these evils led by the gods," he says (997-8). He asserts this irrationality, but the very consciousness of it gives him strength; and, far from complaining of it, he calls upon the Eumenides to stand by him and be his allies (1010-3). He has found his own greatness; he is ready now to meet Polyneices and speak to him not as a father but as a god. Then, with the thunder-clap, our sense of time suddenly alters; the moment toward which all these years had been leading, the "resting-point in long time," *παύλαν ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ* (88), which the oracle had foretold, is upon us. It is, Oedipus tells Theseus, "the turn of the scale for my life" — *ῥοπή βίου μοι* (1508). Three times in his long speech the Messenger stresses

the swiftness of the marvelous events he has witnessed: *ταχέϊ σὺν χρόνῳ* (1602), *χρόνῳ βραχέϊ* (1648), *βαιὸν οὐδὲ σὺν χρόνῳ* (1653) — that is how these things came to pass. "Suddenly" (1610) Oedipus hears a rumble from the earth²³; "suddenly" (1623) a voice cries out so that "suddenly" (1625) the hair of those present stands on end. "Go with all speed," Oedipus tells his daughters — *ἀλλ' ἔρπεθ' ὥς τάχιστα* (1643); and when they look back he has vanished. It has all been the work of a moment.

Time had taught Oedipus, after his fall, the necessity of yielding to a world of change which he must accept without fully understanding; it had taught him, with this and beyond it, the permanent, unchanging value of the greatness which lay within him. Now in a moment which, as Oedipus had foreseen (585), would include all the others, that long process of myriad time passes, suddenly, into the timeless.

Throughout this play we have seen a remarkable fusion of diverse elements into a complexly but consistently interrelated whole. The dimension which gives all these elements their final validity is that of the gods. In the *Oedipus at Colonus*, unlike the *Ajax*, we find no hint of a consistent theology whereby the good are rewarded and the evil punished. On the contrary, as we have seen, Oedipus only fully discovers his worth with the realization that man may suffer without cause, and yet retain his integrity and nobility of character. But the absence of the old theology does not mean the absence of the gods. Their presence is pervasive from first to last in this drama marked throughout by the extraordinarily intimate correlation between the human and the divine. Thus the faith in the gods and the reverence toward them which Oedipus exhibits in this play are another expression, in different terms, of the self-knowledge and inner faith which he has achieved. Not that the gods are *symbols* of internal character traits: the gods, quite clearly, are *gods*²⁴; they are the forces which rule in the universe, outside and above man, not from within him. But the measure of the harmony which characterizes the universe in which this drama moves is that man, as he comes to discover what is true and lasting within him, and to fulfill his own potentialities for greatness, learns also to reverence the gods and even to become identified with them.

Just as Oedipus found a kinship with Athens, Theseus, and his loyal daughters which transcended patriotism and family ties and was based on what was best in himself and them, even so does he discover a kinship with nature and the gods. His tutelary deities are the "ladies dreadful to behold," *πότνιαι δεινῶπες* (84), known in Athens as the Eumenides, or Kindly Ones. It is their grove which Oedipus enters at

the beginning, and which Antigone describes: "This is a sacred place, it is clear, teeming with laurel, olive, and the vine; and within it thick-feathered nightingales sweetly sing" (16-18). It is they whom the citizen of Colonus describes as "the daughters of Earth and Darkness" (40). "The people hereabouts," he says, "would call them the all-seeing Eumenides; but other names are pleasing elsewhere" (42-3). It is to them that Oedipus suddenly prays (84-110), saying that Apollo had prophesied that he would find rest and an end to his life in their precinct. The intimate relationship between man, nature, and the gods which is so soon apparent here in the prologue continues and is developed throughout the play.

Appropriately, Oedipus' attitude is one of faith and reverence: of *eusebeia*. The acceptance of suffering and the sense of his own value and integrity which time has taught him have their correspondence in his humility before the gods, and his worship of them. He steps forth with Antigone from the grove of the Eumenides, as he says, "entering on reverence": *εὐσεβίας ἐπιβαλόντες* (189). And the words he speaks embody a faith which seems strange indeed from a man who has suffered so long with no apparent cause. The gods, he says, "look on the reverent man, and look on the irreverent, and there is no escape for the impious mortal" (279-81). He himself, he says, is "sacred and reverent" (287). The oracles concerning him, he tells Theseus, will be fulfilled "if Zeus is still Zeus and Zeus's son Phoebus is sure" (623). To Creon he says that his source of knowledge is "Phoebus and Zeus himself, his father" (792-3). Moreover, this reverence for the gods is another quality which acts as a bond uniting Oedipus with Theseus and Athens. It is Athens, Oedipus knows, which is famed throughout Greece as "most reverent toward the gods" (260). As he says to Creon, "If any land knows how to worship the gods with honor, this one is pre-eminent" (1006-7). In thanking Theseus for returning his daughters, Oedipus declares, "I have found reverence among you alone of men" (1125-6). Indeed, it was from a sense of reverence that Theseus originally accepted the wandering suppliant and made him a citizen of his land (636-7). The matchless ode on Colonus, with its praise of the green glens and thick foliage where the nightingale sings and Dionysus treads, of the sleepless streams among the narcissus and crocus where Aphrodite and the Muses dance, of the olive and the horse, the gifts of Athena and Poseidon — this is but the most lovely expression of the reverential awe which fills this play. Even ritual is significant. The libations to the Eumenides are described in small detail (465-92). Theseus was sacrificing to Poseidon when interrupted by Creon's outrages (888). And

Oedipus, before his end, has his daughters cleanse him according to ritual custom (1598-1603). There is no question as to the importance of reverence and worship of the gods in this play. It is as much a religious as it is a human drama.

But the two, we must understand, are one. Reverence here does not imply surrender to the will of alien gods, but rather the discovery and fulfillment of self: of that within man which is, like the gods, universal. Man in this play is seen against the background of the infinitely greater forces embodied in the never-dying gods; but man, too, partakes of these forces and has that within him which is lasting and divine. What Oedipus discovers in himself are the qualities, not which separate, but which unite him with other men of good will, and with the gods.

For with the gods he is, finally, united. As the play progresses, Oedipus steadily grows. The faith in the gods which he expresses all along seems, paradoxically perhaps, not to carry the fullest conviction until he is correspondingly certain of his own complete freedom from personal guilt. When Ismene says early in the play that the gods will raise him, he replies, "It is a poor thing to raise an old man who fell when young" (395). He fails, in these lines, to understand that the gods will not raise him until he has raised himself; that he can become like a god only by being godlike. It is not until his passionate plea of innocence before Creon, and the demonstration of strength in his oracular denunciation of Polyneices, that the thunder comes. His voice had early seemed divine, an *δμφή*, to the Chorus (550); now (1351) it seems so to Oedipus himself. After much suffering and long time he has found and embraced the permanent within him; he has transcended human mutability; he sees with the vision and speaks with the voice of the gods. His curses "will prevail if *Dikē*, spoken of old, sits by Zeus in accord with the ancient laws" (1381-2). When the thunder comes he knows immediately that "the winged lightning of Zeus will lead me forthwith to Hades" (1460-1). "The gods themselves," he tells Theseus, "are the heralds who announce this to me, belying none of the signs laid down before" (1511-2). "You convince me," Theseus replies, "for I see you speaking oracularly (*θεσπιζοντα*) of many things" (1516). The blind man who had said, "My body would not have the strength to walk if left alone or without a guide" (501-2), departs with no other guides than Hermes and Persephone (1548). In his death he is joined somehow with the elements. The Messenger says:

In what way he perished no mortal but Theseus could say. For no god's lightning bolt destroyed him, and no storm stirred from the sea in that time; but either some god was his guide, or the nether world,

earth's painless foundation, cleaving in good will (εὖνον διαστάν). For the man was not summoned with wailing, or pained by disease, but wondrous if ever man was. (1656-65)

"I think," Oedipus had told his daughters, "that one soul may suffice to pay this debt for ten thousands if it come with good will — ἤν εὖνους παρῇ" (498-9). Even so had Oedipus come to Athens, and found "this city, and all its people, united with me in good will" —

πόλιν τέ μοι
ξυνοῦσαν εὖνον τήνδε καὶ γένος τὸ πᾶν. (772-3)

And now, perhaps, the very earth of Attica has cleaved in good will to receive the old man who brought as his only gift "my wretched body, not comely to look upon, yet with profits beyond fair appearance" (576-8). That body remains defiled to the end — Oedipus shrinks back from allowing Theseus to take his hand (1132-6) — but the man within has gone beyond. In what way he perished no mortal but Theseus could tell; for us it must remain a mystery and, like all mysteries, ineffable. Oedipus, in his dreadful birth, was punished for no fault of his own, nor is there any cause to be found for his divinely guided descent to the world below. But, though inexplicable, Oedipus' ending is not arbitrary. He himself, before leaving, reaffirms for one last time his unshaken faith that "the gods look well, though late, when a man abandons the divine and turns to madness" (1536-7); and the Chorus, when he departs, sings, "Many sorrows were coming upon him without cause; but a just *daimon* will uplift him again" (1565-7). In transcending the mortal ties of blood and city, Oedipus has purged himself of all but what is lasting, and that is divine. His curse on Polyneices was the curse not of a father but of a god; and his last words on stage, not a curse but a blessing, have authority no less divine: "May you be of good destiny, and, faring well in good fortune forever, remember me when I am dead" —

εὐδαίμονες γένοισθε, καὶ εὐπραξία
μέμνησθέ μου θανόντος εὐτυχέϊς αἰεί. (1554-5)

By the time these words were spoken in the Theater of Dionysus in 401 B.C., the long war against Sparta had ended in defeat, and the city of the tragic poets, wondrous if ever city was, had, like Oedipus and the poet of ninety years both buried in her soil, died, and bequeathed her blessing to all who would come in good will.

3. SOME BEARINGS

Points of comparison and contrast between these two plays will be apparent from the readings I have given. Before examining the intervening dramas, however, I should like to make a few general observations and suggest some possible lines of development.

It is scarcely too much to say that the *Oedipus at Colonus* embodies a resolution of those conflicts which presented themselves so irreconcilably in the *Ajax*. In the earlier play human greatness and the divine will were at odds; the hero was isolated from humanity by his own code of nobility; the learning which comes with time was impossible for him; and he was left only with the choice of living in accord with his principles or, when they became untenable in life, dying for them. In the *Oedipus at Colonus*, as I have tried to show, all these disparate elements are fused in a spiritual synthesis of the highest order, and viewed as variant but consistent aspects of an experience fundamentally one. So complex is this fusion that we must examine some of the elements which have gone into its making.

Sophocles, we know, was one of the great innovators of Western dramatic literature. He not only abandoned the trilogy for the single play, introduced the third actor, and reduced the lyrical role of the Chorus; he also was the first dramatist ever consistently to center his plays on the sufferings of individuals. This is well known and often said. But, again because of the near perfection of balance and harmony which the plays achieve, the implications of these theatrical changes may easily be overlooked. Yet Sophocles lived and wrote in an age when, of all ages, intellect and spirit were most intimately and vitally fused with literary form, and his way of writing plays will not be found devoid of implications for his way of viewing life.

Now, the influence of Aeschylus on Sophocles' *Ajax* has been discussed mainly in matters of technique and style.²⁵ This, of all his plays, is closest, in the sweep of its language and the boldness of its imagery and theatrical effects, to the weighty grandeur of Aeschylean tragedy. The structure of the play, moreover, with its sharp division in two, seems still to reflect the structural division inherent in the form of the trilogy.²⁶ In such matters the presence of Aeschylus is very much in evidence. But the influence of the older dramatist is not a technical one alone. The theodicy so splendidly set forth in the plays of Aeschylus represents the high point of a long and consistent development of Greek thought. Poets from Hesiod to Solon and after had concerned themselves with the vexed relationship between human insolence

and divine punishment — between *hybris* and *atê*. That *Dikê* which Hesiod invoked in the *Works and Days* became, in Solon, more closely identified with the whole fabric of the social order.²⁷ The concept, in one form or another, is central to early fifth-century religious thought. It pervades Herodotus. But Aeschylus, more than any other, justifies the gods to men by seeing divine justice as a cosmic process in time.²⁸ If we think in terms, not *primarily* of the individual at a given moment, but of society in its development, then the gods may be seen, in the end, as unimpeachably just. To show how *Dikê* works through time is the central burden of Aeschylus' great tragic poems.

The concept of divine justice, with *atê* requiting *hybris*, is, we have seen, important to the *Ajax* also. But Sophocles, unlike Aeschylus, is writing primarily about an individual; he is writing not a trilogy but a single play. And here, indeed, is a principal cause of the conflict between what I have called the divine framework and the human content of that drama. The crime-and-punishment formula is basic to the play; but no less basic is the greatness of Ajax in his suffering; and the two are simply not, in human terms, fully compatible. The form of the single play thrusts the protagonist to the fore; and for *him*, that individual being seen now in sharp focus, the laws of *hybris* and *atê* seem almost crude. The perspective has changed, but the old conception of deity has not changed with it. The contrast with the *Oedipus at Colonus* is complete. Here the irrationality, or at least the inscrutability, of the individual's suffering is an accepted and central fact. The gods are seen now not as arbiters of human destiny, dispensing punishment for crime in lofty but chilling justice, but rather as components and co-ordinates of that destiny itself. And man is more at one with the universe and its gods only insofar as he is more at one with himself and with other men of good will. Divine justice has become more complex, indeed, and less apparent, less comprehensible, but also more real and meaningful for the man himself who suffers. The stress and disparity between the human and the divine are gone. Oedipus views the gods not with the defiance of Ajax or the cautious *sophrosynê* of Odysseus, but with *eusebeia*: an attitude of reverence and worship arising from the awareness that, in the essential greatness which he has discovered within himself in the midst of all his uncomprehended suffering, he is one with the gods, who are just.

In the *Ajax* we have noted also the importance of the bonds of kinship and blood. Here again we feel the presence of older ideas. Aeschylus in his trilogies had dealt powerfully and subtly with the close ties between succeeding generations. He had reformulated and reinterpreted in the

terms of his own poetry the old Greek idea of the family curse. In the *Ajax* Sophocles is writing, of course, about an individual, not a family. But behind this individual, whom we see only in a single crisis, lies the accumulated bulk of his own deeds and those of his house, which influence, indirectly at least, his actions and his fate. Ajax must die in order not to disgrace his family honor, which is his own honor as well. The contrast with the later play is clear in the terms used of their heroes. Ajax is *εὐγενής*, Oedipus *γενναῖος*. Both words may be roughly translated "noble." But, though by no means exclusive, their meanings are significantly different. Aristotle, discussing good birth in the *Rhetoric*, writes:

Good birth is an honor from one's ancestors. It is contemptuous even of those who are its ancestors' equals, for what is far off is more honored and easier to boast of than what is near. Being well-born is being in accord with the excellence of one's race (*ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν γένους ἀρετήν*), but integrity is that which does not depart from one's nature (*γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως*) — a quality which for the most part is not found in the well-born, most of whom are of little value.

(*Rhetoric* II.xv.2-3)

Again in the *Natural History* (I.i.32) he makes a similar distinction: *εὐγενὲς μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ γένους, γενναῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως*. The relevance of this distinction to our two plays is clearly apparent. Ajax is a man who is much concerned with living up to the old heroic code: he must be true to his father's ideal even to the point of dying for it. Only by being uncompromisingly *εὐγενής* can he also be, as Odysseus recognizes (1355), *γενναῖος*. Only by living and dying in accord with the *aretê* of his race is he able to be true to his nature — and become of great value indeed. With Oedipus it is different. Far from being *εὐγενής*, he was, as he knows, "born ill-starred" (974). Yet he is able nonetheless, by transcending the bonds of city and family and discovering the ties of love and reverence which unite him with his daughters, with the men of Athens, and with the gods, to fulfill the potentialities of his nature and become, in a fuller, more universal sense, *γενναῖος*. He is true not only to his own nature, but to the nature of man.

Furthermore, as we have seen, time plays no organic part in the *Ajax*. For all its peerless grandeur there is something stiff, something static, about it. Aeschylean tragedy had been conceived in terms of a family or society of men working out their destiny in the long and complex process of time. But in the *Ajax* the individual hero is divorced from time and placed before us in his moment of greatness and disaster.

This accounts not only for the dual structure, with the second half of the drama commenting on the first and placing it in a new perspective. It explains also, in part, the ambivalence we feel toward this man whose actions we must judge as his alone, unextenuated, or extenuated but little, by the actions of others and the corrective of time. Aeschylus' lost play on Ajax's death was preceded by a *Judgment of the Arms* and succeeded by a *Salaminians*. That of Sophocles stands alone. It is as if we were to judge Orestes only from the *Choephoroe*, with no *Agamemnon* before and no *Eumenides* to follow. But in the *Oedipus at Colonus*, though the action centers no less upon an individual, time has become an operative force, serving both to purge Oedipus' nature through the learning that comes from suffering and experience, and to confirm and validate its essential greatness through perseverance, courage, and magnanimity. Time is the medium through which Oedipus *becomes* what, most essentially, he *is*.

4. THE INTERVENING PLAYS

Antigone

In the *Antigone*²⁹ the internal conflicts which we have seen in the *Ajax* are even more sharply delineated: the play gains its peculiar dynamism, in large part, through the juxtaposition and confrontation of opposites. This quality characterizes the language of the play, with its charged antitheses — Antigone's *σὺ μὲν γὰρ εἴλου ζῆν, ἐγὼ δὲ κατθανεῖν* (555) is one typical instance — and the character portrayal, with its forcefully contrasted and balanced debates. The prologue establishes the pattern which the central scenes — those between Creon and Antigone, Creon and Haemon, Creon and Teiresias — simply repeat, of collision between sharply crystallized and hopelessly opposed views of life. This divisiveness is basic to the play's structure as well. The *Antigone* presents us with a conflict similar to that between Teucer and the Atreidae at the end of the *Ajax*: both Teucer and Antigone are determined to bury their brother's body in defiance of political authority. But because this conflict lies at the center of the *Antigone*, the issues involved in the first half of the *Ajax* enter into it also; and here there is no Odysseus to plaster over the widening breach. Antigone is Ajax's spiritual sister: just as he would train his son "in the rough ways of his father" (548), so does the Chorus describe Antigone's nature as "rough and from a rough father" (471). Ajax had said, "It is shameful for a man who finds no

alteration of hardships to desire long life" (473-4); and Antigone's words seem an echo: "Whoever lives, like me, amid many hardships — how should he not find profit in death?" (463-4). They alone of Sophocles' heroes are thus resolute on death as the alternative to a life whose mold they cannot be made to fit,³⁰ and their suicides, unlike Eurydice's or the wretched Deianeira's in the *Trachiniae*, are acts of proud defiance — gauntlets thrown at the feet of the world. Antigone is contrasted with Ismene much as Ajax was contrasted with Tecmessa: both protagonists reveal magnificent heroic energy dependent, for good or bad, on the inflexibility of their values. It is with pain that Antigone mocks her sister (551), yet mock she must. Like Ajax again in her deepest values, she tells Ismene in the prologue (38) that her behavior will demonstrate whether or not she was born *εὐγενής*. For Antigone feels no sense at all of personal defilement from *her* dreadful birth. The sense of family which we have noted in Ajax is her ruling passion: born from an ill-starred, incestuous union, she will nonetheless unhesitatingly lay down her life for the brother who has waged war against her native city.

But similar in character as Ajax and Antigone are, the difference in the positions they adopt is of no less importance; for Ajax pitted himself against the gods, but Antigone bases her stand on adherence to their laws. Her opponent, Creon, is a man at least as inflexible as she, but who, in his arrogance and pride, has blinded himself to those very laws which Antigone invokes, the laws of Zeus and of "*Dikē*, who resides with the gods below" (451-2). Antigone has Ajax's greatness; Creon has only his *hybris*. It was in his power to do otherwise than he did, but he was blind; and he has no trace of Ajax's greatness of soul to redeem him. No other character in Sophoclean drama so perfectly exemplifies Aristotle's man "among those of great reputation and prosperity, but not distinguished for virtue and justness, who is brought to misfortune not by wickedness or perversity, but by some error (*ἀμαρτίαν τινά*)" (*Poetics* xiii.3). Indeed, the verb *ἀμαρτάνω*, to err, is central to an understanding of Creon's position in the play.³¹ "Do I err in revering my powers?" Creon indignantly asks; and Haemon replies, "You are not reverent when you trample on the honors due to the gods" —

Creon: ἀμαρτάνω γὰρ τὰς ἐμὰς ἀρχὰς σέβων;
Haemon: οὐ γὰρ σέβεις, τιμὰς γε τὰς θεῶν πατῶν. (744-5)

Antigone ends her last doubt-tormented speech by saying, "If these things are well in the gods' sight, I will come to know my error when I have suffered; but if it is these men who err, may they not suffer more evils than they do to me" (925-9). By the end of the play, certainly, it is

starkly clear that the error, the *hamartia*, is Creon's alone: *αὐτὸς ἁμαρτῶν* (1260). And the nature of his error is no less clear. "It is common to all men to err," Teiresias tells him; "but when one does err, that man is no longer ill-counseled (*ἄβουλος*) or unblessed who, when he has fallen on an evil, heals it and is not unmoveable" (1023-7). But Creon *is* unmoveable; he cannot see "how much the best of possessions is good counsel (*εὐβουλία*)" (1050). By the end of the play this lesson has borne down upon him with crushing weight; he has demonstrated, the Messenger says, "how much the greatest evil that attaches to a man is ill counsel (*τὴν ἄβουλίαν*)" (1242-3). Creon himself laments that Haemon has died by his ill counsels (*δυσβουλίας*, 1269); and the Chorus ends by singing, "By far the foremost part of happiness is understanding" (1347-8). Clearly then Creon's tragedy lies in not understanding and following the advice that was available to him; in not grasping the truth of Haemon's plea: "It is no shame for a man, if he is wise, to learn many things and not to stretch too far" (710-1). In placing the claims of the city as he conceives them above the laws of the gods Creon is making a mistake *which he could have avoided*, and which he will learn to his sorrow. When Teiresias tells him that "for these deeds the late-destroying avengers, the Furies of Hades and the gods, lie in wait to take you in the midst of these evils" (1074-6), it is clear that divine justice is taking its course and Creon is reaping the fruits of his error. This, however grim, is right and well; for we can scarcely fail to see that *atē* is coming upon him for a clearly demarcated *hybris*.

Yet it is a striking characteristic of this tragedy that, although Creon stands structurally at its center, it is not he but Antigone who gives it not only its name but its lasting interest. As the plot is structured Antigone is, very nearly, a peripheral casualty, along with Haemon and Eurydice, of Creon's tragic error; but it is she whom we remember. This conflict of interest, embedded in the very structure of the play, is similar to that which we felt between the divine frame and the human content of the *Ajax*. And the implications range far. If on the one hand Creon is the clearest exemplar of justly punished *hybris* in Sophocles, yet what, on the other hand, are we to say of the catastrophes which befall Antigone? If her alliance with the gods, through her adherence to their laws, makes her more *right* than Ajax, whom she so resembles in character, yet it thereby also makes her death seem more irrational. Creon's reverence, we have seen in the passage quoted above, is for his own powers, his *ἀρχαί*. But Antigone, by defending the bonds of kinship and burying her brother at the price of death, is, as

she says in her last words, "revering reverence": τὴν εὐσεβίαν σεβίσασα (943). Even the Chorus, while disapproving her harsh rigidity, has conceded this: σέβειν μὲν εὐσέβειά τις (872). Why then, if the gods are just, did she who defended their laws fall? Teiresias, their prophet, says nothing about her. The Chorus, in the second stasimon, advances, for the only time with such emphasis in Sophocles, the Aeschylean idea that Antigone is being brought low by a blood curse on the house of Oedipus: "Those whose house the gods have shaken escape no *atê*" (583-5). Perhaps, as with Ajax,³² greatness itself leads to ruin: "Nothing vast," they sing, "enters the life of mortals without *atê*" (613-4). Antigone herself, when the Chorus tells her, "You are paying for some ordeal of your father's," replies, "You have touched on my most grievous care" (856-7), and proceeds to lament the curse on her house. There is no other reason, in the scheme of things set forth in this play, that this fate should come on *her*; for the "self-willed temper" (875) with which the Chorus reproaches her has alone given her the strength to follow the resolute and lonely path which she has chosen. Considering her splendid greatness of spirit and her reverence for her brother and the gods, and considering the fate of the innocent Haemon and Eurydice, we must surely find divine justice severely taxed in this play. All the elements which in the trilogies of Aeschylus had vindicated god to man are present, except the restorative of time. And without this element justice, in the terms of the Aeschylean theodicy, seems scarcely just. When the focus has shifted from the house to the individual, the inherited curse is no longer comprehensible. Seen as the tragedy of Creon the play is a perfectly rational dramatization of the familiar *hybris-atê* formula; its universe is one where wise counsel and understanding may avert disaster. But seen as Antigone's tragedy it is the story of a brave and uncompromisingly heroic girl who defends the laws of family and of the gods — and is destroyed for her pains. The agonized doubt of her unanswered question as she is about to be led to living burial foreshadows the dominant mood of the following plays: "Why should I, in my misery, look to the gods? What ally should I call upon when, for my reverence, I have acquired irreverence in return?" —

τί χρὴ μὲ τὴν δύστηνον ἐς θεοὺς ἔτι
βλέπειν; τίν' αὐδ' ἄν ξυμμάχων; ἐπεὶ γε δὴ
τὴν δυσσέβειαν εὐσεβοῦσ' ἐκτησάμην. (922-4)

It is a question not easily to be dismissed. The *Antigone*, beneath its balanced antitheses, tight dramatic structure, and seemingly traditional patterns of ideas, conceals vast potentialities of unreason and chaos.

Trachiniae

I have emphasized the disparities and conflicts inherent in the *Antigone*, as well as the *Ajax*, because I think they account for much of the gripping tension of those dramas, and also make more comprehensible the dark terror of the middle tragedies, the *Trachiniae* and the *Oedipus Tyrannus*. If I am right in seeing a severe and increasing strain between the traditional theodicy and the new emphasis on the individual suffering human being, then we might well expect something to give. And that is just what seems to happen. The *Trachiniae*³³ is a tragedy from which any meaningful form of divine justice has utterly vanished. The beauty of its poetry, the power of its characterization, are unexcelled, but only heighten thereby the horror of the relentless destruction which overwhelms these people who are blind, not through some particular *hybris*, but because they are human.³⁴ The deep-running stresses and conflicts of the earlier plays here have burst the floodgates. The imagery, founded on the opposition of light and darkness — of the searing sun and the blazing sacrificial fire; the dark waters of Achelous, the sunless casket containing the robe, and the black blood of shaggy Nessus — this is no more violent in its contrasts than is the play's structure, half dominated by the gentle Deianeira, half by the savage Heracles, its scenes see-sawing from the frantic exultation of the choral "Io io Paean!" (222) to final unmitigated catastrophe.

And there is no attempt in the play to rationalize the irrational. The only echo of the old theodicy is Lichas' solemn explanation of the vengeance wrought by Zeus on Heracles for the guileful killing of Iphitus: "for the gods too do not love *hybris*" (280). But the story Lichas is telling when he makes this statement is, as we soon discover, wholly false. The Chorus sings in its parodos, "The all-ruling king, son of Cronus, has assigned to mortals no lot without pain; but suffering and joy come round to all, like the revolving paths of the Bear" (126-30). In such a universe what can the *sophrosynê* Athena enjoins upon Odysseus, the *euboulia* Teiresias recommends to Creon, avail? The Chorus ends this parodos by asking:

τίς ὦδε
τέκνοισι Ζῆν' ἄβουλον εἶδεν;

"Who has known Zeus to be so ill-counseled with his children?" (139-40). And in a world where the god is ἄβουλος, human counsel is to no purpose. "It seems to us," the Chorus tells Deianeira as she hesitates before sending the fatal robe of Nessus to Heracles, "that you have not counseled badly" (589). Indeed the attempt to *learn*

which Haemon urged his father to make in the *Antigone* is a central theme of this play; and the issue is futility and disaster. Hyllus leaves at the end of the prologue with the words: "I will cease at nothing to learn the whole truth in these matters" (90-1). "The whole truth" — it is what Deianeira beseeches Lichas to tell her (453), for, she adds, "Not to learn — that is what would pain me. What harm is there in knowing?" (458-9). But Deianeira soon discovers, to her horror, that hers is a world engulfed by the unknowable — a world in which the best intentions reap bitter fruit. Coming back from the house in terror — verbs of fear, *δέδοικα*, *φοβοῦμαι*, *ταρβῶ*, recur again and again in this play — she tells the Chorus of the wool dipped in Nessus' blood which had crumbled to dust when the light fell upon it, and describes this as a sight "unintelligible for a man to learn" — *ἀξύμβλητον ἀνθρώπῳ μαθεῖν* (694). "I gain a knowledge (*μάθησιν*) of these things," she says, "too late, when it avails no longer" (710-1). So too, after Deianeira's suicide, the Nurse tells us that Hyllus was taught of her innocence too late — *ὄψ' ἐκδιδαχθείς* (934) — and adds that no man can know the morrow. Clearly good counsel is futile, and Deianeira's innocence is absolute. The pattern of *hybris* followed by *atē* which we have seen at work with Ajax and Creon has no place here. The concept of *hamartia* as an avoidable error, so pertinent to Creon's fall, has no bearing on Deianeira's, for she, as Hyllus insistently tells his unheeding father, *ἤμαρτεν οὐκ ἐκουσία* (1123), *ἤμαρτε χρηστὰ μωμένῃ* (1136) — "she erred unwillingly, she erred with good intention." Those who would find fault with Deianeira's character miss the mark altogether. It is true enough that with more prudence she might have avoided her dreadful error — true enough, in the abstract, and easy enough to say, but not, in this play, what matters. "Such things a man would not say who had a share of sorrow, but only one whose home had known no grief" (729-30). As we see this woman before us — this woman who pities even her rival Iole and who believes that "anger is not right for women of understanding" (552-3), this gentle spirit more in the line of Tecmessa and Ismene than of Ajax and Antigone — we do not think of faults. Obsessed by fear and deeply in love, she tries only to learn what is true and do what is good — and she fails. That alone is her *hamartia*. Heracles too might have avoided calamity by being other than he is, but as we hear him in the throes of his unbearable and incurable agony cry, "Let me, let me for the last time, ill-fated that I am, let me for the last time sleep" (1005-6), we can think not of his mistakes but only of his anguish. There is no rationale behind such suffering as this. Ajax and Antigone met their deaths with heroic

confidence that each was living up to his standards as an εὐγενής. If Antigone wavered, she did not repent. Now, Deianeira's determination, it is true, has a ring of Ajax about it still: "To live with a bad reputation is not to be endured by one who holds it in honor that she was not basely born" (721-2). But she dies knowing only that she is wretched and, for all her love and good intentions, has brought wretchedness on others. Ajax and Antigone shaped their own destinies; Deianeira's is thrust upon her. As she herself said of Iole, "Her beauty destroyed her life" (465). And when Heracles is borne off to his pyre he knows only that, in the height of his glory, he has been struck down. There is no consolation for either.

Hyllus too is sucked into the vortex of this play without a hero — the only extant Sophoclean drama named for its Chorus. His position shows to what an extent the bonds of kinship, so important in the *Ajax* and *Antigone*, are strained in his play. Believing that Deianeira has plotted his father's death he wishes, to her face, either that she were dead, or were called some other man's mother, or would change the heart she has for a better (734-7). He asks the Chorus, "Why should she vainly foster the dignity of a mother's name when she does nothing like a mother?" (817-8). Yet when he learns the truth he is left weeping over her body, kissing her lips, lying by her side (936-9). And Heracles, in imposing his will upon him, reminds him over and over of his obligations as a son. "O son, prove yourself my true-born son" (1064). "Beware lest you show yourself basely born" (1129). "You have reached the point where you will show what sort of man is called mine" (1157-8). The best of laws is "to obey your father" (1178); and if Hyllus disobeys, he is told to "find some other father and no longer call yourself mine" (1204-5). "The curse of the gods will await you if you disobey my words" (1239-40). He is charged to obey "if you wish to be reverent (εὐσεβεῖν)" (1222-3), for "there is no irreverence (δυσσεβεία) if you please my heart" (1246). Thus Hyllus, most notably εὐγενής as the son of Greece's greatest hero, receives as his patrimony only the wretchedness of leading his father to his death and marrying a woman whom he would rather die than live with. He finds no reason for performing these repugnant deeds, except that "you command and compel me, father" (1258). His noble birth has brought him only misery, as, in the end, has the even nobler birth of his father. For Heracles, as we are repeatedly reminded in the play, is the son of Zeus. The bitter arraignment of the gods with which the drama ends is also a personal indictment — by Hyllus, though not by Heracles — of Zeus as a father. And the arraignment is absolute. The power of the gods is as

evident here as in the earlier plays. But for the individual sufferer, who learns too late and acts at cross-purposes, there is no justice in heaven. Sophocles has fully expressed, for the first time in his tragedies, the irrationality of human misery; and the result is a play of the darkest imaginable colors. The question which Antigone asked in a very different play — “Why should I, in my misery, look to the gods?” — has ramified until its implications cannot be contained; and the very possibility of *euboulia*, good counsel, has been swallowed up in the maw of a cosmos which, whatever inscrutable order may lie behind it, is for man a chaos. The gods are not cruel, not vindictive, but impersonal, insensitive, remote — ἄβουλοι. “Lift him, comrades, granting me great indulgence for these things,” Hyllus says at the end:

and knowing the great insensitivity (ἀγνωμοσύνην) of the gods who have done these deeds — who bring forth children and call themselves fathers, yet look on such sufferings as these. No one may foresee the future; but the present is pitiful for us, shameful for *them*, and hardest for him, of all men, who bears this destruction (ἄτην). Maidens, you must not be left by the house where you have seen great deaths and many sufferings unknown before — and none of these things which is not Zeus.³⁵

(1264-78)

So the play ends. The old world-order which held together with such strain in the *Ajax* and *Antigone* — an order where the gods dispensed justice, where learning and wisdom were possible for men, and where birth was a guide to conduct — has flown apart from the center with the full impact of personal suffering and incomprehensible evil, and will never again be reconstructed as it was before. At this juncture, when mere anarchy threatened to be loosed upon the world, Sophocles had need, if he was to escape wandering in the labyrinthine paths Euripides thenceforth followed, to discover some principle of order different in kind from that grand theodicy which, in its long development, had served the centuries between Hesiod and Aeschylus with a coherent and ample vision of life and the gods.

Oedipus Tyrannus

The *Oedipus Tyrannus*³⁶ stands in every way at the center of Sophocles' achievement — at once the climax of all that had gone before and the matrix for all that would follow. The dark mystery of irrational suffering first felt in the *Trachiniae* pervades the *Tyrannus* with no less force; yet here the disjointed components of the old theodicy are forged together, as by a massive effort of intellect and spirit, into a new and more complex consistency. Two themes of the earlier plays, that of

learning and that of birth, are here fused. Ajax and Antigone had taken their own lives on the strength of a creed — the creed of living up to their birth, of loyalty to the sacred ties of family honor. Ajax could not be false to Telamon, nor Antigone to Polyneices. Deianeira, less heroic in temper and circumstances, had sought, in her uncertainty, to discover what was best, to learn what she must do; but in the face of an unfathomable universe her efforts brought not enlightenment but ruin, and for her, too, suicide was the one alternative. Like Deianeira, Oedipus strives to learn, but the object of his inquiry is, by the end, his own birth. As tyrant of Thebes, he bears many resemblances to the Creon of the *Antigone*: both are devoted to their city, but hot-tempered and quick to suspect a plot without cause, as their similar accusations of Teiresias show. Indeed, Creon in the later play accuses Oedipus of the same self-will, ἀνθαδία (549-50), against which Teiresias had warned the Creon of the *Antigone* (1028). But whereas Creon there had resisted the pleas of Haemon and the warnings of Teiresias that he should learn good counsel, here Oedipus throws all his being into the search to learn, first the murderer of Laius, then his own origin; he stints at nothing in his quest. And whereas Creon was struck down for a clearly defined fault, an ill-counseled act in opposition to divine law, all his life is involved in Oedipus' fall. If Deianeira erred unwillingly in her gift to Heracles, Oedipus erred unwillingly in being born; and thereby his fate becomes an archetype, a *paradeigma*, as the Chorus says (1193), of all men's.

And his fate is inseparably enmeshed with the oracles of the gods. The prophecies of Calchas in the *Ajax* and of Teiresias in the *Antigone* served principally as reminders of the gods' power, but were peripheral to the plays' action; indeed, neither Ajax nor Antigone knew of them. In the *Trachiniae* the oracle reflected the play's central theme of human blindness: no one had understood the true meaning of the prophecy that Heracles would bring his toils to an end, for its meaning was that he would die. The oracles revealed an order which silently mocked men's endeavors to understand. But in the *Tyrannus* the truth of the oracle is intertwined with the destiny of Oedipus himself; we can no longer speak of a divine framework and a human action as we did in the *Ajax*, for the workings of the divinity are inseparable from the hero's actions. Conflicting attitudes toward prophecy run throughout the play. Oedipus, who strives to fulfill the oracle that Laius's murderer must be found and banished, had striven no less to frustrate the oracle that he must kill his father and marry his mother. Iocasta scorns the authority of prophecy and proclaims, "It is best to live at random, as

one can" (979); yet we see her come forth from the palace to sacrifice to Apollo, and we learn from the Shepherd, at the very culminating point when Oedipus is discovering his fate, that she had given him her child to be destroyed "from fear of evil oracles" (1175). Between the poles of Teiresias' godlike overview of the patterns working themselves out in human life and Iocasta's doctrine of the supremacy of Chance, *Tύχη* — the poles of the Chorus's wavering faith and Creon's non-committal caution ("In what I do not understand I am accustomed to be silent," 569, 1520) — Oedipus moves toward his discovery. It is only when Iocasta has realized the truth and rushed in to kill herself that Oedipus embraces her doctrine and calls himself the "son of Chance" (1080); it is only when he has coerced the unwilling Shepherd to tell him of his parentage that he at last knows the truth of Teiresias and the oracle — the truth of the gods which is also the truth of his own birth, of his destiny. He who had taunted Teiresias with blindness of eye, ear, and mind (371), and had so determinedly investigated the murder of Laius — he who was famed among all men for his vision and intellect — comes, only after he has blinded himself, to understand that, for all his vain efforts to annul the oracles, he had married Iocasta "neither seeing nor inquiring" (1484). He who had first thought himself son of the king of Corinth and then, at the height of his folly, the child of Chance and brother of the months, says at the last, "Now I am found to be base, and of base parents" (1397).

Yet, though basely born, though wishing he had been left to die on the mountainside, Oedipus is a paradigm of something more than human blindness and misery. For, while the Chorus falters, Creon maintains prudent silence, and Iocasta lives at random, Oedipus, and he alone, dares, by the force of his intelligence and his will, to strive to mold order from this seeming chaos, and his very fall brings his vindication. It is this above all which sets the play apart. If we are as fully aware as in the *Trachiniae* of the irrationality of the individual's suffering from his own point of view, we are also aware both of a new stature and greatness which he achieves through the very process of suffering itself, and of a new sense of universal order which, without motivating, validates this suffering and places it in a larger perspective. If at the climax of the play Oedipus finds catastrophe, yet he also finds therein the object for which he has searched with intrepid courage, and proves the truth of the oracles he had himself come to doubt. In his very ruin he achieves a sort of triumph, not, like Ajax and Antigone, by heroic adherence to a rigid code of traditional ethics, but by the brutal discovery of what he is. The concept of "divine justice," in the

terms of the old theodicy, has no pertinence to this play. For in great part Oedipus' discovery is that the oracles concerning him were not the dictates of a controlling fate, but statements from a larger and more comprehensive vantage point of the nature of his own destiny, which the gods and Teiresias knew before, but which he himself has only now come to learn. In this merging of human destiny and divine will the play's reorientation is most clearly to be seen. The gods in the *Ajax* and *Antigone* were, in effect, conceived as being outside of a circle within which men moved; from their sphere outside that circle they dispensed justice to mortals. The god might, like Athena in the *Ajax*, make his will known to the world of men, but the circle remained. In the *Trachiniae* the figure has not changed, but the sense of separation has become acute: the gods look passively now on suffering and pain "shameful to them." But in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* divine providence and human destiny are conceived more nearly in the figure of that self-involving circle, the Moebius strip, whose outside, when traversed, becomes its interior. Here no separation is possible. The gods do not control and dispose, nor merely watch with unconcern; they are intricately involved in human destiny, and it in them. The terrifying irony of the play is that Oedipus can discover this only at the price of his downfall. But the elements of the later tragedies are here. Sophocles has composed for the first time a wholly unified drama with protagonist at center from beginning to end; and for the first time his hero achieves his greatness by the discovery of himself and of the eternally inscrutable order of those mysterious powers which, though beyond him, are inextricably entwined with his destiny.

Electra

Thus when we come to the *Electra*³⁷ we are in a different world from that of the early plays. Much more than a gripping piece of theatrical art, the *Electra* is, in terms of Sophocles' total work, a redefining of the individual's role in relation to his destiny. It is the play of triumph through endurance in time. Aeschylus has been called with penetration "the inventor of the ideas of meaningful time";³⁸ the trilogy itself, as we have seen, was the expression of a teleological pattern of human destiny, obscure at any one moment, but moving toward a significant goal through the long and intricate process of time. But Sophocles must struggle through his plays to discover how time can become meaningful, not for mankind, but for a man. Ajax rejected time, for time meant change. Antigone was outside of time; her action was of

the moment, as it would have been of any moment; it was innate in her character, and no process went into its making. It is in the *Trachiniae* that time first makes itself felt on a central Sophoclean character; for Deianeira, in her long and futile vigil, is ever aware of its corrosive passage. Heracles, she says in her opening monologue, "has stayed away unannounced for no small time, but already ten months on another five" (44-5). She greets Lichas as one "appearing after much time" (227-8), and when he tells her of Heracles' sack of Oechalia, she asks: "Then was it for this city he was gone for a time beyond reckoning of the number of days?" —

ἡ καὶ πὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τὸν ἄσκοπον
χρόνον βεβῶς ἦν ἡμερῶν ἀνῆριθμον; (246-7)

Later she sadly tells the Chorus that Iole is the reward Heracles has given her "for keeping his house this long time" (542). But, like the revolving paths of the Bear which the Chorus sings of in its parodos, time in this play has no human meaning; all that it accomplishes is to raise and dash hopes and to prolong a woman's suffering. Again the *Oedipus Tyrannus* is central: time, like the oracles, reveals its meaning in Oedipus' fall. In that one day all Oedipus' life is laid bare and finds its meaning: "This day," as Teiresias told him, "will give you birth and destroy you" (438). Time as process and time as climactic moment, χρόνος and καιρός,³⁹ coincide in Oedipus' discovery. Since Laius's death, Cræon tells Oedipus, "Long and ancient times would be measured" (561); and yet, "In time you will know these things for sure, since time alone points out the just man; but the base man you may know in one day" —

ἀλλ' ἐν χρόνῳ γνώσει τάδ' ἀσφαλῶς, ἐπεὶ
χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος,
κακὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ γνοίης μὲν. (613-5)

All Oedipus' life has gone into showing him as a great and just king, yet all his life has led to the moment of his discovery — "the moment," he tells the Corinthian Messenger, "for these things to be found out": ὁ καιρὸς ἡρῆσθαι τάδε (1050) — and the revelation of his base birth which follows. "All-seeing time has found you out against your will" (1213), the Chorus sings; and at the very last Oedipus asks his daughters to pray that he may live "where καιρός allows" (1513).

Thus in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* time is conceived as a process working toward fulfillment in a moment of discovery and revelation; it is this process which gives the play its form. Electra, however, is the first Sophoclean hero who, like Philoctetes and old Oedipus after her,

works *with* time by purposeful endurance, so that her climactic moment is one not of ruin but of triumph. Again, the *Tyrannus* was the watershed: there time was first, in the extant plays, seen as humanly meaningful, yet worked to the hero's destruction. In the unified tension of its action the *Electra* resembles the *Tyrannus*, and might, more truly even than its predecessor, be called the drama of suspended *καιρός*. The prologue establishes a mood of intense expectancy which finds issue only in the bloody conclusion. Three time in the opening seventy-five lines of the play the word *καιρός* is emphatically spoken. The Paedagogus ends his rapidly paced first speech by saying, "We are at the point where it is no longer the moment (*καιρός*) to hold back, but the occasion for deeds (*ἔργων ἀκμή*)" (21-2). Orestes bids the Paedagogus enter the palace "when *καιρός* leads you" (39), and ends his own speech by saying they must go, "for *καιρός* (ordains it), which is the greatest master of every action for men" —

*καιρός γάρ, ὅσπερ ἀνδράσιν
μέγιστος ἔργου παντός ἐστ' ἐπιστάτης.* (75-6)

Nothing could be more heavily underlined. After his reunion with Electra, Orestes tells her she must cut short her story because "it would obstruct the due limit of time (*χρόνου καιρόν*)" (1292); and when the Paedagogus summons him to kill Clytemnestra he says simply, *νῦν καιρός ἔρδειν* — "now is the moment to act" (1368). But this *καιρός* can be understood only as the issue of "long time" — *χρόνος μακρός* — a phrase which Orestes speaks in the prologue and which recurs in this play as it had in the *Trachiniae*. The entire central section of the play, from the parodos to the recognition scene, presents, intensifies, and reintensifies the impression of Electra's unbending endurance of almost unendurable sufferings through long time. "Are you not willing to be taught in long time," Chrysothemis begins by asking her, "not vainly to indulge your idle wrath?" (330-1). But Electra will not learn such submission to what she conceives as evil; she has suffered terribly and long, but she will die before she yields. That her endurance ends not in death but in the appearance of Orestes and the accomplishment of the vengeance she has longed for is the expression of a new sense of the human spirit's capacity to triumph by heroic perseverance in the face of adversity. The endurance becomes itself a trying and a proof of the individual's worth, so that when Orestes comes at last, "thinking it worthy to appear to me," as Electra sings in her commos, "after long time on this most welcome journey" (1273-3), she too has shown herself worthy of the event. Thus the prologue, by

anticipating the *καιρός* which is to terminate this trying process of time and vindicate Electra, makes bearable for the audience the prolonged laying bare of the heroine's soul which constitutes the greater part of the drama.

The prologue anticipates also another major theme of the later plays: the sharp awareness of contrast between appearance and reality — or, in the sophistic terms of fifth-century Athens, word and deed, *λόγος* and *ἔργον*. There was little sense of this disparity in the early plays, where the strain was rather, as we have seen, between the great man's intrinsic worth and his place in the cosmic order. Teucer, in the *Ajax*, had indeed said of the Atreidae, "They who seem well-born err thus in the words they speak" (1095-6); but their words, if in error, were wholly in accord with — and almost constituted — their deeds. Nothing could be more bluntly straightforward than Menelaus's "He hated me, I hated him; and you knew it" (1134). So too Creon's mistaken views in the *Antigone* were held with stubborn conviction; and to doubt, as some have doubted, Deianeira's innocence — to doubt that she "had no foreboding of these things" (841) — is to misconceive her tragedy *toto caelo*. Yet the disjuncture in the *Trachiniae* between intention and result — "I have wrought a great evil," Deianeira says in despair, "from a good hope" (667) — foreshadows the new disparity of the later plays, as does Oedipus' horrified sense of the "fairness festering with ills beneath" (*κάλλος κακῶν ὑπουλον*, 1396) which he, unwittingly, has proved to be. In those plays the disparity was one, not between word and deed, but between what men could know and what they were; in these last plays it is rather one within the characters themselves, dividing them into those like Clytemnestra, Odysseus, and Creon, who try to conceal their real motives with specious protestations, and the heroes themselves, Electra, Philoctetes, Oedipus, who, whether through vengeful hatred or through the indignity of rags and physical mutilation, may seem base in the eyes of the world, but are true to themselves, and are justified in time. "Ills pregnant with fairness beneath," we might say, again reversing the coin of the *Tyrannus*. Orestes plots in the *Electra* to die in word but be saved in deed (59-60); and the prevalence of deception in this play, culminating in the agonizing speech of the Paedagogus on Orestes' supposed death, mirrors from still another angle the absoluteness of Electra's single-mindedly sincere devotion to right as she sees it. The contrast between word and deed is not, however, one only of contrivance. "You," Electra tells her sister, "who hate while I am by, hate only in word, but in deed you consort with our father's murderers" (357-8). Chrysothemis herself —

it is this which differentiates her so distinctly from the Ismene of an earlier play — admits that justice lies not with her but with Electra; and yet, she says, she must obey her rulers (338-40). But the timid sister's disparity of word and deed is as nothing beside that of the audacious mother, "the woman noble in words" — ἡ λόγοισι γενναία γυνή (287). Electra's own words mercilessly penetrate Clytemnestra's façade of fair speech because, as she tells her, "You do the deed, and your deeds find words for me" (624-5). The stark contrast of the hypocritical mother and the burningly genuine daughter should make the play's central meaning unmistakably clear. Sophocles has taken the extreme instance of enmity toward a mother, treated in so different a spirit in Aeschylus' already classic version of the myth, and is showing that *even* here, even where all traditional sanction is violated, justice is with Electra. The matricide itself is played down and the murder of Aegisthus stressed to make the climax bearable, but there can be no doubt of the justice of both acts. Clytemnestra, in her sleepless life of fear (780-2), has been living a lie, a false pretence, as Electra says — σκῆψιν οὐκ οὔσαν (584) — and has become for her daughter not so much a mother as a mistress (597-8). Electra's repudiation of such a mother — "if indeed I must call her a mother who lies with such a man" (274) — is as final as Oedipus' rejection of Polyneices in the later play.

Thus a new attitude toward the inviolability of family ties seems also to have emerged from the experience of the *Tyrannus*. Electra, as much as any Sophoclean hero, upholds the code of the εὐγενής (257) as she sees it. "It is shameful," she says, "for those who are well-born to live shamefully" (989). She bases her resolution on loyalty to her dead father, and the Chorus pointedly calls her "wise and the best of children" (1089). But all this, important as it is, is counterweight to the central fact of the drama: that this girl is determined, if she must, to kill Aegisthus with her own hand, and will cry out, "Strike her twice if you have the strength" (1415) when her mother is slain. Only the extreme indignity and suffering we have seen her endure could succeed — if it does quite succeed — in making this seem not only forgivable but right. Electra's character, more perhaps than that of any other Sophoclean hero, is liable to misunderstanding. She is, as her reunion with Orestes shows beyond doubt, a girl of deep and tender passions. Thrice in the play she is compared to a nightingale (107-9, 147-9, 1076-7). This is her essential nature; she is hostile and harsh to her mother and sister because only thus, by actions she knows are in themselves wrong, can she be true to what she no less surely knows is fundamentally right. "Force compels me to do these things,"

she tells the Chorus at the outset: "pardon them" (256-7). To Clytemnestra she says:

Know well that I am ashamed of these deeds, even if I do not seem so to you; for I have learned that what I do is unseasonable and not suited to me. But my enmity for you, and your deeds, compel me by force to do these things; for shameful acts are taught by shameful circumstances. (616-21)

Thus we must not judge her more simply than she judges herself. Her deeds are necessary evils toward the fulfillment of a greater good. Both her character and her situation are more complex than Antigone's. The earlier heroine aligned herself with the gods by taking the course which she knew to be right in burying her brother; her reverence to him was the only reverence she claimed, and therein she was true to the unwritten laws of the gods. But Electra has been forced by events and time to find her integrity through her very opposition to conventional ethical and religious codes. Her seemingly cold-blooded determination to resist the mother who she feels is evil increases in the face of increased adversities throughout the play, and will not be shaken. She has chosen, rather than be untrue to her loved ones and herself, to "be badly minded (*φροεῖν κακῶς*)" (345) in the eyes of the world; and she will not listen to Chrysothemis' appeal to "be well-minded (*εὖ φροεῖν*)" (394), nor to her accusations of ill counsel — *aboulia* (398, 429). The vice of the *Antigone's* Creon has become her virtue.

But Electra is not, by her stubbornness, as Ajax and Creon were, opposing herself to the will of the gods. On the contrary, by adherence to the truth which, with time, she has found in herself, she is, despite appearance, and almost without her own knowledge, identifying herself with that will. This again is clarified in the prologue by Orestes, who is fully conscious of his divine mission: "I come as a cleanser in justice, urged on by the gods" (69-70), he says. The Chorus is confident that *Dikê* will come (475-9); and those dread Erinyes who in Aeschylus' trilogy had hounded Orestes are here invoked by both Electra (112, 1386-8) and the Chorus (489-90) against the murderers of Agamemnon. And, above all, the intimate correlation between divine providence and human destiny which we first saw in the *Tyrannus* is vital to the *Electra*. If the play is a redefining of individual responsibility to self, it is also, thereby, a redefining of reverence. This is a central and fully explicit theme; it is basic to the reconstitution of a vision of life which emerges from the white heat of the play. Any form of reverence for the gods of the *Trachiniae* would have been futile at best. In the *Tyrannus* the faith in

the gods which even the Chorus had been hard put to maintain in their great central stasimon (863-910) was confirmed only in Oedipus' fall. But in this play both Electra and the gods are vindicated in the victorious, if blood-curdling, finale. The very horror with which this assertion comes should warn against taking it for granted. Early in the drama Electra had concluded the parodos — the emphatic position should be noted — by singing that, unless her father's murderers paid for their crime, "respect and reverence — *eusebeia* — would be swept away from all mortals" (248-50). She ends her long description of her hardships by saying, "Under such circumstances, my friends, there is no room to be either moderate or reverent; but in evil circumstances there is strong compulsion to practice evils" (307-9). Yet as the play progresses, this word *eusebeia* is used consistently of Electra herself. It is she, not Chrysothemis, whom the Chorus praises for speaking "in accord with reverence" (464). Again, Electra proudly tells Clytemnestra that she and her brother and sisters, unlike the children born of the marriage with Aegisthus, were "reverent and from reverent parents" (589-90). She says to Chrysothemis that in killing Aegisthus they will "win reverence" from their dead father and brother. Once more in the most emphatic of positions, the Chorus concludes the stasimon which immediately precedes Orestes' entry by praising Electra for "winning the best repute of the greatest laws in being by your reverence for Zeus" (1095-7). And Electra, just before entering the palace, prays that Orestes will "show men how great a penalty for irreverence the gods award" (1382-3). These passages are vital to an understanding of the play. Electra, in being true to her own nature even at the price of defying the dictates of traditional piety, has labored with, not against, the gods. She has, in her unremitting hatred of her mother, placed her concept of right above the ties of blood; and in the end not only is she vindicated and the divine purpose achieved through her and Orestes, but also, as the Chorus says, the curse on her race and city is ended (1413-4). "O seed of Atreus," ends the play, "having suffered many things you have come forth, with difficulty, in freedom, consummated by this present effort" —

ὦ σπέρμ' Ἀτρέως, ὡς πολλὰ παθὼν
 δι' ἐλευθερίας μόλις ἐξῆλθες
 τῇ νῦν ὀρμῇ τελεωθέν.

(1508-10)

The word *μόλις*, "with difficulty," is of great weight in these last lines. Electra's triumph has not been an easy one either for her or for her poet. Rather, it has been a baptism of fire whose intense experience

we must not dismiss or underestimate if we are to understand the resolution of the final plays. As *Electra* said (945), "Without suffering nothing prospers."

Philoctetes

The *Philoctetes*,⁴⁰ to judge from its production date of 409 B.C., must have been very nearly Sophocles' last play before the *Oedipus at Colonus*; and in both these dramas of the poet's old age there is a quality of resolution and finality found nowhere else in his work. Yet the play has affinities with the *Electra* as well; and if we conceive the *Oedipus at Colonus* as Sophocles' final statement, complete in itself, then this penultimate drama may be seen as a working toward that vision. The play pivots on Neoptolemus, the young son of Achilles, and his rejection of Odysseus for Philoctetes — of intrigue and deception for the heroic integrity which his own father, whom he had never known, had so uncompromisingly adhered to. In order to understand the consummate deception which Odysseus embodies, certain passages from the earlier plays are of relevance. There was deception of a sort from the beginning, in Ajax's speech on time and change which misled Tecmessa and the Chorus into thinking that he meant to yield to the Atreidae. But his speech, as we have seen, was comprehensible only as Ajax's ironical reckoning with forces which he understood all too well, but knew that he could not submit to. The deception, however great its dramatic effect, was for him almost incidental: he might as well have been speaking — perhaps was — to himself. Again, Lichas, the herald in the *Trachiniae*, had delivered a false speech to conceal Heracles' passion for Iole. But his motive, far from being deceitful, was of the best: "I myself, O queen," he had told Deianeira in confessing his previous falsehood, "fearing that by these words I might grieve your heart, erred, if you count this an error" (481-3). Like her, like everyone in that hopeless play, he erred with good intention. Another speech of importance, though not involving deception, is Creon's defence of himself in the *Tyrannus* (583-615), for it closely follows the pattern of the new sophistic disputation. No man who understands wisdom (*σωφρονεῖν ἐπίσταται*, 589), he says, arguing impeccably from probability, would desire the dangers of the ruler's name when he already enjoys the ruler's powers; "I do not happen to be so deceived," he contends, "as to desire other honors than those with profit" (*τὰ σὺν κέρδει καλά*, 594-5). This argument is only a more calculating restatement of Odysseus' position in the *Ajax*: "Do not rejoice, son of

Atreus, in profits which are not honorable" (κέρδουσιν τοῖς μὴ καλοῖς, 1350). But the terms are significantly reversed, and κέρδος, rather than τὸ καλόν, becomes for Creon the standard of the man of *sophrosynê*. And Creon, like the more sympathetic Odysseus in the earlier play, does, with his cautious self-interest, emerge from the play's catastrophes unscathed; his policy, by his own standards, is a success. In the *Electra* prologue, Orestes, explaining his intention to feign death, justifies himself by saying, "I think no word is bad which brings profit" (61). His dissimulation, through the Paedagogus's speech, does indeed accomplish his purpose with brilliant success. Yet as we watch its effect on the shattered Electra, it is hard to condone this cruel speech, whatever profit it may bring. Profit, however good its end, can be too dearly bought; for the end may not always justify the means.

In the central situation of the *Philoctetes* Sophocles, it would seem, has again faced up to the full implications of his ideas. The deceit which Orestes had employed to accomplish a given end we now see, in Odysseus, as a way of life. "When what you do brings profit, you should not shrink from it" (111) — that is his watchword. The cautious utilitarianism of Creon becomes, in this Odysseus, a subtle form of hypocrisy. And it is clearly as a sophist that he is presented. He will, he says at the beginning, capture Philoctetes by a sophism (σόφισμα, 14); thus the deed must be shrewdly contrived (σοφισθῆναι, 77). Neoptolemus reluctantly permits himself to be won over by Odysseus' appeal to profit, and acts as his instrument in the deception of Philoctetes. In one of his many unconscious ironies, reflecting his discomfort at the role he plays so well, he tells Philoctetes, "Even shrewd opinions (σοφαὶ γνώμαι) often trip themselves up" (431-2). Odysseus appeals also to the young warrior's sense of duty and desire for fame; and though Neoptolemus realizes that men "may become bad through the words of their teachers" (388), yet later, when Philoctetes learns he has been tricked and begs him to return his bow, Neoptolemus says, "It is not possible; obligation (τὸ ἐνδικόν) and expediency (τὸ συμφέρον) make me obey those in power" (925-6). The appeal to submit to authority from obligation is one we have met before in Sophocles' plays, most baldly in Menelaus's speech to Teucer; the appeal to expediency and self-interest is particularly a sophistic one. In advancing it Neoptolemus is clearly, as Philoctetes bitterly charges, "a hateful contrivance of dreadful villainy" (927-8). Odysseus, by his deliberate choice of deceit and guile over action as instruments to his end, has placed himself squarely on the side of word at the expense of deed. "Now when I have undergone the proof (of experience)," he tells Neoptolemus, "I see that the

tongue, not deeds, rules men in all things" (98-9). Thus Neoptolemus, in submitting to him, has put himself under the sway of one for whom the motive of profit and the method of deception are the rules of life. And when finally he repudiates his error it is Odysseus' sophistry, his shrewdness, that Neoptolemus explicitly renounces. "Though born shrewd (σοφός), you speak nothing shrewd," he says. And when Odysseus answers, "Neither what you say nor what you intend to do is shrewd," the young man replies, "But if they are just, they are better than shrewd" (1244-6). There is a direct descent of sorts from the Odysseus of the *Ajax* through the Creon of the *Tyrannus* to this Odysseus and to the Creon of the last play. But whereas the generous moderation of the early Odysseus and the cautious prudence of the middle Creon had their place in a world where heroic greatness seemed to run counter to the order of things, here in these last plays, where the heroes can and do commit themselves, finally, to that order and find fulfillment through it in the end, the Odysseuses and Creons must be, and are, cast aside and left behind. When Odysseus backs down before the un-intimidated Neoptolemus and leaves with a threat to tell the army on him, the son of Achilles replies, with unsurpassable contempt, "You have shown *sophrosynē*" (1259). The gods of the *Philoctetes* do not, discernibly, love τοὺς σώφρονας.

It is not in the arts of the sophist but in truth to his own nature that Neoptolemus finds himself; and his discovery is made by the respect which he gains for the heroic endurance of Philoctetes. As the son of the greatest warrior of Greece Neoptolemus is, as Philoctetes reminds him, "well-born and from well-born parents" — εὐγενὴς καὶ εὐγενῶν (874). Yet at the beginning of the play he has no real comprehension of the potentialities of his own nature, and is a pawn in the hands of the opportunistic Odysseus. Odysseus artfully anticipates the young man's reaction to the scheme he is advancing — "I know, my son, you were not born to speak or contrive such things by nature" (79-80) — but stresses the honor he will win by complying. Neoptolemus does indeed recoil: "I was not born," he says "to do anything by evil contrivance — neither I myself nor, so they say, was he who begot me" (88-9). "I wish, prince, rather to err by doing well than to be victorious by evil" (94-5). Thus, though he is easily won over by Odysseus' cunning appeal to profit, Neoptolemus is instinctively aware from the first what his nature, his φύσις, is. He senses it, but cannot yet act upon it; he is torn from his natural ways by those other compelling values, obligation and expediency. The conflict between these ways of life preys on him. "All things," he tells Philoctetes in

anguish at his own deceitfulness, "are offensive when one deserts his own nature and does what is not suited to him" —

ἄπαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν
ὅταν λιπὼν τις δρῶ τὰ μὴ προσεικότα — (902-3)

and Philoctetes' appeal to him is eloquent in its simplicity: "Be yourself!" — ἐν σαυτῷ γενοῦ (950). As Neoptolemus wavers Odysseus enters and forestalls him; and, while Neoptolemus stands silently with the bow in his hands, Philoctetes, his own hands bound by two of the sailors, excoriates his old enemy and accuses him of teaching his companion "against his nature (ἀφυσᾶ) and against his will to be shrewd in evil things" (1014-5). In rejecting Odysseus Neoptolemus, as Philoctetes tells him, is showing "the nature you were born from" (1310-1). And thus, like the old Oedipus, he is true to himself at the end: he is *γενναῖος*. The word recurs emphatically here as in the subsequent final play. Ironically, it is Odysseus who first tells Neoptolemus he must prove himself *γενναῖος* (51) by assisting in the plot to take Philoctetes' bow. For this accomplishment, he assures him, he will be called "most reverent (εὐσεβέστατος) of all men" (85). The master plotter's words will be fulfilled indeed, but precisely contrary to his intention. For it is Philoctetes who understands that "for those who are *γενναῖος* the shameful deed is hateful and the good one glorious" (475-6). Twice in the unspeakable anguish of physical pain he calls on Neoptolemus as *γενναῖος* (799, 801); and it is because Odysseus recognizes this quality in him that he bids Neoptolemus not look back on Philoctetes, "lest, being *γενναῖος*, you should ruin our fortune" (1068-9). Finally, when Neoptolemus, just before the epiphany of Heracles, at last consents to take Philoctetes to his home, his comrade calls his promise *γενναῖος* (1402). In repudiating Odysseus for Philoctetes, and in fulfilling, even at the cost of abandoning his hopes at Troy, the pledge of honor he had made, Neoptolemus has indeed proved true to his essential nature.

But there is change in Philoctetes, too, during the course of the play — change which manifests itself in his attitude toward the gods and toward his island. Neoptolemus had indeed, at the beginning of the play immediately before Philoctetes' scream, stated the cause of divine justice with a complacency unmerited by the situation he would soon see before his eyes (191-200). But Philoctetes, afflicted, like the old Oedipus, with a suffering wholly irrational in its origin (he had stepped on the sacred snake of the goddess Chryse), looks on his ulcerous foot and his ten-year exile on Lemnos with easily comprehensible bitterness,

and rages vindictively against the order of life. The good are punished and the evil rewarded: "How am I to consider these things, how praise them, since, in praising their deeds, I find the gods evil?" (451-2). He has not come yet to accept the irrationality of irrational suffering, nor has he yet learned the transcendent value of his own endurance. Further, just as Neoptolemus at first subordinated his nobler aims to the desire to win the bow, so is Philoctetes anxious for nothing so much as to leave his island at any price. "Take me and throw me where you will," he pleads, "in the hold, in the prow, in the stern, wherever I will least disturb your companions" (481-3). What he longs for here is escape, oblivion: "Let us go, for timely speed brings sleep and rest when suffering is over" (637-8). It is only when Neoptolemus reveals his ruse that Philoctetes is thrown back on himself and his island, and calls for support on the harbors, promontories, and mountain beasts (936ff). It is only when Odysseus tempts him with glory at Troy that he expresses his determination to stay on his island, and proclaims a faith in the gods transcending his own despair. Odysseus, he says, by hiding behind the gods makes them false; yet, though the gods "allot nothing sweet to me" (1020), he is certain Odysseus is hated by them (1031), and certain that they care for justice, that "some divine spur" has brought these men to his island (1036-9). And he ends by calling on those gods, whom he had previously accused of rewarding the evil, for vengeance, however late, on his enemies (1040-2). Thus, in his realization of some meaning in things beyond his personal suffering, and in his refusal to yield to his deceitful enemy, Philoctetes, too, even at the price of facing annihilation by the beasts of his own island, has proved true to himself.

The movement of the drama, then, is toward the discovery by both Neoptolemus and Philoctetes of what is essential in them. But though the point they reach is ultimately the same, the processes by which they reach that point are wholly diverse; and the diversity is closely bound up with the two aspects of time. If the *Electra* was the drama of "suspended *καῖρός*," its tension steadily mounting toward the final climax, the *Philoctetes* might be called the drama of the displaced *καῖρός*. Its action ascends continually to the point when the Chorus, while Philoctetes sleeps after his agonizing pain, urges Neoptolemus to steal away: "*καῖρός*, which holds the key to all understanding, will often seize much power at a single stroke" (837-8). Yet at this climactic moment Neoptolemus, instead of accomplishing the goal to which all his efforts thus far have led him, proclaims in the meter of the oracle that Philoctetes himself, and not his bow, must be their prize: "His is the

crown, it is he whom the god said to bring; to boast of futility and lies is a shameful reproach" (841-2). This seems a moment of revelation, a *καίρως* of another sort: yet not decisively so, for, as the event shows, Neoptolemus is still not ready to reject the demands of obligation and expediency; he still submits to Odysseus' control. Yet the power of development in him, the ability to learn from what he has seen, the capacity for change — a change which is in reality a return to his true self — these forces are at work in him as in no Sophoclean character before; and when he suddenly returns it is, he tells the incredulous Odysseus, "to undo the errors I made (*ὅσ' ἐξήμαρτον*) in the past" (1224). "I shall attempt," he says, "to retrieve the shameful error I made" (*τὴν ἀμαρτίαν αἰσχρὰν ἀμαρτῶν*, 1248-9). Thus the process of time telescoped into this play for Neoptolemus has allowed him not only to learn from his experience, to develop, to discover himself, but also to correct his *hamartia*: time not only teaches but reconstructs him. For Philoctetes, on the other hand, as for Electra before him, "long time" (235, 306) has been rather a process of unremitting endurance. His long narration of his hardships in ten years of subsisting in hunger and pain on Lemnos (254-316) sets unforgettably before us — as before Neoptolemus — the extent of the nearly incredible sufferings this lonely, disease-wracked man has been through. Under these circumstances Philoctetes can scarcely be expected to listen to advice that he should return to fight at Troy; long endurance has developed in him, again as in Electra, a stubborn persistence which will not lightly be taught by others. Both he and Neoptolemus, indeed, have discovered their essential selves. But between the openness and responsiveness which Neoptolemus has learned and the bedrock of unalterable perseverance which Philoctetes has laid bare, there is still a chasm. Neoptolemus rightly tells his companion he is too harsh and unyielding in not listening to the good advice of a proved friend (1316-25). But Philoctetes, who has won his own integrity only at the end of long years of suffering such as the young man will never know, cannot now be true to himself by yielding even to the best advice. The impasse is total; there is nothing for Neoptolemus to do but agree to take Philoctetes home, even though this means the sacrifice of the glory of taking Troy.

It is the visitation of the god Heracles which fuses these two natures into one. The young Neoptolemus, under the shadow throughout the play of the mighty father he had never seen, had first submitted to the paternal tutelage of Odysseus — "I was young once myself," Odysseus had told him (96) — and then found not only a friend but a father in

Philoctetes, who had consistently called him "child" and "son." Yet now Philoctetes himself, in desiring only to return to his own father Poeas, whom in his despair he had assumed to be dead (1211-2), is failing to live up to the full potentialities of his own rediscovered nature. Heracles is the expression of the hero and god in Philoctetes himself; he summons Philoctetes to nothing less than the achievement of his own destiny. "Be certain," he says, "that for you too it is ordained to make from these sufferings a glorious life" —

καὶ σοί, σάφ' ἴσθι, τοῦτ' ὀφείλεται παθεῖν,
ἐκ τῶν πόνων τῶνδ' εὐκλεᾶ θέσθαι βίον. (1421-2)

Heracles, who had passed his unerring bow on to Philoctetes at his own funeral pyre, summons him back, now proved by long endurance, to the heroic life he had led before Chryse's noxious snake had bitten his foot: he recalls him finally to himself, as Philoctetes had recalled Neoptolemus. Thus again the paths of men and gods are seen, in the end, to be at one; and Heracles may command with the full authority of the man-god that *eusebeia* which looms so large in the vision of these last plays: "Remember this, when you ravage the land (of Troy), to reverence the gods; for father Zeus counts all else of less importance; reverence does not die along with men; among the living and the dead it does not perish" (1440-4). With this revelation the gap which divided Neoptolemus and Philoctetes has vanished, and they are seen as complementary and inseparable: "Like lions roaming together he guards you and you him" (1436-7). Both have progressed in the play to the discovery of their true natures, which are revealed at the end to be fundamentally one. This is the fulfillment toward which time has moved; now, Heracles says, "καίρός and the wind for sailing at your stern urge you on" (1450-1). Philoctetes calls on the now beloved island where he has suffered so long to grant him a fair voyage, and the play comes to its end. The vision is now complete. The blind, aged Oedipus of Sophocles' last play will combine in his one being the responsiveness of Neoptolemus and the endurance of Philoctetes to realize through their union an even fuller expression of that in man which is, in deed and not in word only, divine.

Thus between the *Ajax* and the *Oedipus at Colonus* has occurred a complex reorientation of Sophocles' vision of life. In the early plays, *Ajax* and *Antigone*, the heroic protagonists loom too large for the frame which would contain them. The pattern of *atê* requiting *hybris* motivates the fall of both Ajax and Creon; but for Ajax, as well as for the innocent

Antigone, this scheme of divine justice seems inadequate: the change of perspective which the new emphasis on the individual involves has taxed with too heavy a burden the theodicy which served Aeschylus so well. The hero, isolated from his fellow men — and set against or outside of the workings of time — by the stern code of the *εὐγενής*, the “well-born” man, here pits himself, when need arises, against the laws of the city or against the gods themselves, and achieves his greatness in the timeless finality of death. In the *Trachiniae* the disparity between human greatness and divine justice, latent in the early plays, has become an abyss: the gods watch now with unconcern as men are swept helplessly up in the current of time and led blindly to error by their efforts at good. In the *Oedipus Tyrannus* human destiny and divine purpose are somehow fused, and the process of time finds meaning in the terrible moment when Oedipus discovers the truth of his birth. This fusion becomes in the *Electra* the basis for the triumph of the determined human will, proved by suffering and endurance in long time, and working through and with the inexorable purpose of the gods. The final plays, *Philoctetes* and *Oedipus at Colonus*, are the dramas of *eusebeia* and τὸ γενναῖον: of the discovery through that very process of time and suffering of the ties which bind men together in a union stronger than that of city or blood, and unite them finally with the gods.

It is easy to underestimate the complexity and diversity of experience distilled into these seven plays; indeed, even so discerning a critic as the late Werner Jaeger has spoken of Sophocles’ “unshakable but placid piety.”⁴¹ But Sophocles’ faith was not a given, and his development will be best conceived as a religious experience central to Western man. There is something of the Old Testament Jehovah in the Athena of the *Ajax*, before whom men are as shadows, and who chastens the wicked and watches over the righteous — even though righteousness be, for the Greek, *sophrosynê* — while the mysterious passing of the tainted Oedipus is more nearly analogous to the redemption of original sin through inner faith and the inscrutable grace of God preached by St. Paul. As in the Jerusalem of a later age men were beginning to turn, in the Athens of Socrates, away from the old Law, the old sanctions and codes, in their time of crisis, to a new probing of inner spiritual values. None explored these regions more profoundly than Sophocles in his last plays, yet — it is his unique achievement — he was able to see in the innermost man qualities at one with the divine powers holding sway in the universe beyond him. Thus man’s deepest self links him with the gods; thus may man achieve greatness through the

fulfillment of his truest being. Not only inner worth but, finally, outward greatness, asserting itself in the teeth of contrary appearance, remains a prime article of Sophocles' fully evolved belief. In the time of Socrates and Euripides his heroes find still the stature of Homer's.

During the half century of peace and war, of triumph and calamity, in which Sophocles wrote, he faced with the utmost clear-sightedness and courage the issues and conflicts which presented themselves to him. His subject was no less than the place of individual man in his universe, and he explored the full implications of that staggering subject with a depth of insight given to the greatest poets alone. When we consider the immensity of his theme and the diversity of experience brought to bear on it, we must marvel most at the force of mind and spirit which enabled him to mold all this into drama of such vigorous clarity and intense power. His final glory — as it was his first — is the towering grandeur of his heroic men and women, the gripping interest of the dramatic action which informs his plots, and the balanced cadences of his dense and richly woven verse. It is small wonder that the developing pattern of his vision has been so easily obscured; for never has any poet conceived more harmoniously the multiform complexity of man's state on earth, and possessed it of a form so intricately one.

NOTES

1. See in particular C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944); Cedric H. Whitman, *Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1951); A. J. A. Waldo, *Sophocles the Dramatist* (Cambridge 1951); H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*, 2nd ed. (New York 1954), *Sophocles: Dramatist and Philosopher* (London 1958), and *Form and Meaning in Drama* (New York 1960); and Bernard Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (New Haven 1957), and *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley 1964).

Albin Lesky's *Die Tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* (Heft 2 of the *Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft*, Göttingen 1956) is useful both in its own right and as a compendium of German Sophoclean scholarship.

Other works of interest on Sophocles include S. M. Adams, *Sophocles the Playwright* (Toronto 1957); G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama* (Ithaca 1958); F. J. H. Letters, *The Life and Work of Sophocles* (London and New York 1953); Georges Méautis, *Sophocle* (Paris 1957); J. C. Opstelten, *Sophocles and Greek Pessimism* (Amsterdam 1952); and Gennaro Perrotta, *Sofocle* (Messina and Milan 1935).

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2. In dating I follow the chapter on "Chronology" in Whitman, pp. 42-55. In the order which he assigns to the plays — the order followed also by Bowra and Lesky; namely *Ajax*, *Ant.*, *Trach.*, *O. T.*, *El.*, *Phil.*, *O. C.* — he seems to me almost certainly correct.

3. Whitman is almost the only writer on Sophocles in English in whose book the poet's development plays an important part. His threefold grouping into plays of "Tragic Arete," "Tragic Knowledge," and "Tragic Endurance" anticipates the central thesis of this paper. Bowra too (pp. 377-8) speaks of the "three stages" of Sophocles' "theology," but leaves this argument largely unexplored. Perrotta, earlier, saw a development of sorts: "Between the first two dramas and the other five there is a profound division. The poet has a more mature intuition of life and men. He knows now that not only the guilty are unhappy, but also the innocent" (p. 631); his further exploration of this theme was perhaps hampered by placing the *Trach.* among the last plays. Opstelten, whose early chapters in particular are of great interest, notes also (pp. 50-2) the greater weight given to the motif of guilt in the first two plays. See also Lesky, p. 144.

4. Bowra, pp. 365-6.

5. Whitman, p. 39.

6. Whitman, p. 40.

7. Whitman, p. 113. See also John A. Moore, *Sophocles and Areté* (Cambridge, Mass. 1938).

8. *Ajax* 617, 1357; *Trach.* 645; *Phil.* 669, 1420, 1425. At *Phil.* 669, where Philoctetes promises to let Neoptolemus handle his bow because of his *areté*, there are possible moral overtones; elsewhere a clearly martial virtue is called for.

9. Waldock, p. 158. He is here discussing the *O. T.*, but the statement sums up a central attitude of his book. His principal assumptions resemble those of Tycho v. Wilamowitz's influential *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles* (Berlin 1917), but the flavor is distinctly Waldock's own.

10. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*, p. 151. This idea is presented with particular conviction in Kitto's *Sophocles*; see especially chap. III.

11. These two tragedies, separated among the extant dramas only by the *O. T.*, are a particular challenge to those who would deny significant change in Sophocles' outlook. Knox has written on neither. Kitto is excellent on the *Electra*, but rather at a loss with the *Trach.*, which he dates late.

12. Of major importance on the *Ajax* is Bernard Knox's article "The *Ajax* of Sophocles," *HSCP* 65 (1961) 1-37. Knox is particularly fine on the incompatibility of Ajax's heroic code with the values of a later time. See also Ivan Linforth, "Three Scenes in Sophocles' 'Ajax'," Univ. of Cal. Pub. Class. Phil., 15 (1954) 1-28; and Kitto's article in *Form and Meaning*, pp. 174-98.

13. Whitman is particularly offended by Athena's dictum. He contends (p. 68) that Sophocles "put a moral of sorts in the prologue, but then in his apotheosis of the hero denied its meaning." Athena, he argues (p. 70), "is a kind of spirit of the hour" who "tells no great truth and exhibits no great power." Bowra, on the other hand, maintains of this speech (p. 38) that "we cannot but accept it as given *ex cathedra* by the poet," and Lesky (p. 109) considers its force valid "for all Sophocles."

14. See lines 123, 195, 304, 307, 363, 367, 643, 848, 976, 1061, 1088.

15. See Knox's article (p. 7): "Athena in the prologue is a minister of justice." Knox is excellent on Athena's relation to Ajax. Lesky (p. 112) sees

Athena "not only as punishing and teaching through punishment, but also as incalculable power, not answerable to, and not sparing, the human."

16. Whitman, pp. 63, 68, 72. Yet Kitto's conclusion in *Greek Tragedy* (p. 129) that "the end is rather the triumph of Odysseus than the rehabilitation of Ajax," is at least equally exaggerated.

17. As Knox notes (p. 2), "The last half of the play shows us a world emptied of greatness."

18. The irony of the speech is apparent, whatever precise interpretation is given. Bowra's notion (pp. 39-46) that Ajax really has changed his mind and decided to yield, and then, afflicted by divine madness, forgets his lesson and kills himself, is untenable to the point of silliness. Whitman's interpretation, on the other hand (p. 75), that "Ajax had to deceive his friends in order to get away unhindered," assigns too simply utilitarian a motive to this complex speech. For other interpretations see Lesky's discussion, pp. 112-113. More recently, Bernard Knox, in his *Ajax* article (pp. 12-14), has suggested that Ajax's speech, up to line 684, is a soliloquy: "He is not trying to deceive but to understand" (p. 14). Knox's cogent arguments are worth close attention, and his interpretation does far more honor to Ajax than either Bowra's or Whitman's. And yet, there is nothing of that balancing of alternatives in the speech which we might expect in a meditation on so important a matter; moreover, this reading does not fully account for Tecmessa's later feeling that she has been "deceived" (807), or the Chorus's sense that they were "deaf and unhearing in all" (911). Starting from Knox's insights I would offer the following as a possible interpretation.

Ajax, in the previous scene, had turned a deaf ear to Tecmessa's pleas and left no doubt in anyone's mind of his intention to take his life. Yet now he emerges from his tent — that in itself is unexpected — and, as Knox stresses, begins abruptly and without addressing anyone present. Here indeed he is speaking to himself. "In all things long and unnumbered time brings forth what is obscure and hides what is apparent," he begins. Likewise, Ajax will bring forth the obscure and hide the apparent, not because his resolve has changed, nor simply to provide a subterfuge to sneak away and take his life, but because his speech has been softened in consideration of Tecmessa. This is clearly the meaning of the words ἐθελύνθην στόμα / πρὸς τῇσδε τῆς γυναικὸς (651-2). In the context of the preceding metaphor, βαφῇ σίδηρος ὤς, the word στόμα, as Jebb points out in his note, "necessarily suggests the sense of a sharp, hard edge." But this in no way alters the basic meaning of the word, which is "mouth": Ajax, in one of the speech's many ambiguities, is at once suggesting that "the keen edge of my temper" has been softened, and stating that in reality it is his mouth, his words, that have been made womanly. (A similar play on στόμα occurs in *O. C.* 794-5: ὑπόβλητον στόμα / πολλὴν ἔχον στόμῳσιν). To all appearances Ajax's temperament has changed; in fact it is only his speech which has softened because of his expressed pity (652-3) for Tecmessa and Eurysaces.

Then with the phrase ἀλλ' εἰμι (654) he addresses the others directly. By Knox's interpretation these words can only mean, "I pity her but (nonetheless) I will go (to kill myself)." In this case, however, we should expect a construction such as: οἰκτίρω μὲν . . . νῦν δ' εἰμι (compare *Phil.* 453-61: ἐγὼ μὲν . . . νῦν δ' εἰμι). Otherwise the pity for Tecmessa would contradict the immediately subsequent determination to take his life. The phrase ἀλλ' εἰμι, however, is

too abrupt to act simply as an adversative to the previous clause. In the three other places where I find the phrase in Sophocles (*Trach.* 86, 389; *O. C.* 503) it stands at the beginning of a section of dialogue; therefore is not adversative. Compare Aesch. *Pers.* 845-9, where Atossa, after hearing the ghost of Darius speak, first calls ὦ δαῖμον, then turns to the Chorus with ἀλλ' εἰμι. So here Ajax's opening lines are meant for himself; then with ἀλλ' εἰμι he begins the speech to Tecmessa and the Chorus which fulfills his intention to soften his words, but not his resolution. Thus the double meanings with which the speech abounds. Ajax knows the impossibility that he should learn wisdom and reverence the Atreidae, but he had just said to Tecmessa, σωφρονεῖν καλόν (586). Now, in ambiguous words which couch his real intention to take his life, he suggests that he too has learned *sophrosynê*. Tecmessa's pleas have not educated his temper, but they have softened his speech. This the Chorus later realizes when Tecmessa tells them Ajax has buried his sword only to kill himself; their κατημέλησα (912) means that they had overlooked the real intention of Ajax's statement (658-9) that he would bury his sword in the earth. Now, too late, they understand.

Ajax, softened in speech by Tecmessa's pleas, has veiled his intention to die in language as misleading as that of the oracle in the *Trach.* which said Heracles would bring his toils to an end and live the rest of his life free from pain. The Chorus and Tecmessa, naturally, are deceived. But in Ajax's mind no doubt has entered. He is not "trying to understand"; rather, he understands all too clearly.

19. According to Waldock (p. 218), "problems of any kind are singularly absent from this work." Bernard Knox's discussion in *The Heroic Temper* is customarily exceptional. See also Ivan Linforth, "Religion and Drama in 'Oedipus at Colonus'," *Univ. Cal. Pub. Class. Phil.*, 14 (1951) 75-192 — an article vitiated by its central assumption that the gods "have no more religious quality than the humming wires of Thomas Hardy" (p. 183).

20. In Lesky's phrase (p. 131), expressing a commonly shared reaction, "einer der widerwärtigsten Gestalten, die Sophokles gezeichnet hat."

21. This scene is absolutely crucial to an understanding of the play, yet the elder Wilamowitz would have excluded it entirely (see Lesky, p. 132), and Waldock (p. 225) can still call it "a gripping *interlude*, or not very much more than that."

22. See Lesky (p. 132): "Wohl löst sich der Mensch Oidipus in diesem Stücke ebenso von seiner Polis wie, mit dem Flucke über Polyneikes, aus der schuldhaft zerstörten Familie."

23. The signs which Oedipus had been promised were ἡ σεισμόν, ἡ βροντήν τιν', ἡ Διὸς σέλας (95). The thunder comes at 1456; at 1606 Ζεὺς χθόνιος rumbles; and at 1650-2 Theseus is seen "holding his hand before his face to shade his eyes, as if some strange terror had appeared, not endurable for a man to see."

24. For a valuable discussion of the gods in Sophocles see Kitto's *Sophocles*, p. 46.

25. See Whitman, pp. 42-6, and John H. Finley, Jr, "The Origins of Thucydides' Style," *HSCP*, 50 (1939) 35-84. Finley's discussion of the style of the *Ajax* and *Antigone* (pp. 53-9) is worth close attention. Although, he maintains (p. 56), "the elaborate symmetry" of the *Ajax* debates is "remote . . . from anything in Aeschylus," yet (p. 58) the *Ajax*, because of "its numerous figures and generally grandiose utterance," must be placed in the earliest, or

"Aeschylean," period designated by Plutarch. For a penetrating discussion of Aeschylus and Sophocles see Opstelten's second and third chapters, pp. 24-72.

26. See Whitman (p. 63): "Sophocles was struggling here with the problem of evolving a single play out of the trilogic form used by Aeschylus."

27. See the chapters on Hesiod, Solon, and Aeschylus in vol. I of Werner Jaeger's *Paideia* (New York 1945), particularly pp. 140-1.

28. On Aeschylus and time consult John H. Finley, Jr, *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1955), especially pp. 179-194.

29. On the *Antigone* Knox (in *The Heroic Temper*) is at his very best. See also Kitto's article in *Form and Meaning*, and, on the style, Finley's article, cited in note 25 above. Finley maintains (p. 58) that the *Antigone* is "in style the most antithetical not merely of Sophocles' but probably of all ancient Greek tragedies."

30. For Philoctetes threatens to kill himself only in desperate defiance of Odysseus (1001-2); thereafter, in his commos, he imagines the birds and beasts feeding on his flesh since he will be powerless to live without his bow (1155-62); and only in the frenzy of utter despair does he ask the Chorus for a weapon with which to take his life (1204-5). See my discussion of the play below.

31. It is Sophocles' use of *hamartia*, however, and not Aristotle's, which must concern us here. For consistency I have translated it "error" throughout, though clearly the "errors" of Creon and Deianeira are of wholly different orders. As will be seen, the error of Creon is an avoidable, but fatal, error of judgment; Deianeira's error is one made with good intention, in spite of her effort to find the best course of action; Oedipus' error in the *O. T.* is involved with the very fact of his birth; while in the *Phil.* and the *O. C.* the errors of Neoptolemus and Oedipus are subject, within the plays themselves, to redemption. Thus the concept of *hamartia* as it appears in Sophocles is an evolving one.

32. Compare *Ajax* 758-760: τὰ γὰρ περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα / πίπτειν βαρείαις πρὸς θεῶν δυσπραξίαις / ἔφασχ' ὁ μάντις.

33. Whitman, always provocative, is perhaps closest to the mark on this play which has puzzled so many Sophoclean critics. His discussion of "late learning" is especially valuable.

34. With Lichas' σε μανθάνω / θνητὴν φρονοῦσαν θνητὰ (472-3) contrast Calchas on Ajax (761, 777).

35. Jebb is surely right in assigning these final four lines to Hyllus. Other explanations, that the Chorus Leader addresses the *other* Chorus members as παρθένε, or that Iole has suddenly reappeared on stage to be so addressed, are too far-fetched to carry conviction. These are efforts to make the play end as a Sophoclean drama "ought to end" according to preconception: too many writers have tried to make the last lines, in the mouth of the Chorus, somehow refute Hyllus's accusations. The *reductio ad absurdum* of such arguments is found in Méautis (p. 290): "La fin des *Trachiniennes* s'illumine donc de la lumière de l'apothéose d'Héraclès; après les ténèbres du jardin des Oliviers, de Golgotha, de la «nuit obscure» de l'âme, vient la claire lumière de la résurrection. Tout cela Sophocle ne le dit pas, mais chacun de ses auditeurs le savait."

36. Knox's *Oedipus at Thebes* is the nearest thing to a definitive discussion of this great and inexhaustible play.

37. Kitto is exceptionally good on the *Electra*, both in his chapter in *Greek*

Tragedy and in his *Sophocles* throughout. Whitman's discussion of *tleмосyne* in this and the last two plays is also to be recommended.

38. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus*, p. 181.

39. *καίρός* is a difficult word. From a basis meaning of "due measure" it came, during the course of the fifth century, to take on a temporal meaning of "occasion" or "opportunity" as well: the "moment" of accomplishment. In *Odysseus'* *πρὸς καιρὸν πονῶ*; (*Ajax* 38: "Do I toil to purpose?" in Jebb's translation) the earlier meaning clearly predominates. In the *Electra* and *Philoctetes*, however, the word has obvious temporal significance, though the phrase *χρόνου καιρὸν* of *Electra* 1292 shows that the temporal meaning was not the only one involved. "Opportune moment" is perhaps an adequate translation for most of the usages in these later plays. I am indebted for most of these observations to Professor Elroy Bundy of the University of California.

40. Edmund Wilson's essay in *The Wound and the Bow* (Boston, 1941) remains an intriguing comment on one aspect of this play. See also Knox's essay in *The Heroic Temper*; and Whitman's chapter, particularly his discussion of *Heracles* (pp. 187-8).

41. *Paideia*, I, 270.

MONISM: PLOTINUS AND SOME PREDECESSORS

BY JOHN M. RIST

IT is a commonplace that the Milesian philosophers were seeking for a single cause of the universe, some substance or *ἀρχή*, as they called it, from which all things were derived and of which they are all in some sense composed. This *ἀρχή* was viewed in different ways, but yet was always seen as some *one* thing. The thinkers of those days had realized the plurality of things and assumed that in some way plurality must derive from unity. All such speculations, however, were shaken with the appearance of the One of Parmenides. As Burnet put it: "Philosophy must now cease to be monistic or cease to be corporealist. It could not cease to be corporealist, for the incorporeal was still unknown."¹ Parmenides' pseudo-logic appeared to his contemporaries to make a derivation of plurality from unity impossible. Since plurality could not, for the Eleatics, be so derived, it must be delusory; it must be one of the beliefs of mortal men who listen to the deceitful ordering of words. Proclus reports² that Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides, lashed the supporters of plurality with forty arguments. One result of the Eleatic polemic was, as Burnet remarks, the abandonment of monism. The next thinkers, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists, made no claim to the discovery of a single first principle.

It is another commonplace that Socrates replaced natural philosophy by ethics as the chief concern of thinking men. Since, however, he does not seem to have concerned himself with the origin of things, the question of the possible truth of the theory of a single *ἀρχή* was outside the scope of his major interests. Yet in the *Republic* he was brought face to face with the same problem again, but now in an ethical form. *Republic* 379C tells us that since God is good, he is not the cause of all, indeed that there are many things in the universe for which he is not responsible. We must seek another cause, not God, to account for the evil in the world.³ *Republic* 617E with its doctrine that man is responsible for choosing his own *daimon* would seem to imply that the origin of *moral* evil is in the human soul; but Plato sees the existence in the universe of *cosmic* evil as well as evil in man. Such at least seems to be the assumption behind the famous passage of the tenth book of

the *Laws* (896E) where the Athenian explains that in the cosmos as a whole there must be at least two souls, one that is good and another that is capable of producing what is other than good. According to this passage, responsibility for *all* evil must rest, at least in part, upon a soul.

The view of the *Theaetetus* is like that of the *Republic*. At 176A Socrates tells Theodorus that evils can never pass away from the earth because it is necessary (*ἀνάγκη*) that there should always be something opposed to the good. And at 176E he says that there are two patterns set up in the world, one which is most blessed, and one which is godless and most wretched. Those who live in accordance with the latter are evil men who associate with evil. There is evil in the nature of the external world, and man, when he becomes morally evil, makes a misguided choice in favor of that evil.

Yet we are told in the *Republic*, and assume in the *Laws*, that the evil in the world is not the result of God's work; it must have some other cause. Hence in the *Timaeus* when Plato describes the formation and ordering of the cosmos, he distinguishes between the works of reason and the works of necessity (*ἀνάγκη*). The works of necessity are those effects of the Receptacle and its quasi-material (31B) contents which the Demiurge cannot wholly eliminate. It is important to remember that neither the Receptacle nor its contents — which are a kind of substrate for the world — are themselves produced by the Demiurge; on the contrary it is with them that, *faute de mieux*, the Demiurge is compelled to work. No answer is given by Plato to the question of their origin. We must therefore assume that their ill-effects are a permanent aspect of the physical world, and that they themselves are *ἀρχαί*. Plato probably regards their negativity as a seductive attraction to souls, and thus, albeit unwittingly, as an evil counsellor.

Matter, then, in the physical world has an existence apart from the Gods and the Good; and this brings us to the question of the quasi-material element which Plato seems eventually to have introduced into the world of Ideas. Aristotle tells us repeatedly that the elements of the Platonic Forms are the One and the Indefinite Dyad. In *Metaphysics* 988A14 he explains that ultimately the One is the cause of what is good, the Dyad of what is bad. This idea seems to be already present in the *Philebus* (25E–26A) where Limit is reckoned the cause of what is good. Now Plato does not specify the nature of his Dyad, and Aristotle has hardly succeeded in illumining the minds of his readers at this point. We may remark, however, that Aristotle describes it as matter at *Metaphysics* 987B21, and that it is not

itself evil, even though it is the cause of evil. Nevertheless Aristotle does not believe that it is in any way derived from the One.⁴ It is another quasi-ἀρχή alongside the One which acts as a cause of existence for the Forms. Aristotle implies at *Metaphysics* 987B 19–20 that ultimately the Dyad, or Great-and-Small in the world of Forms, is identical with the quasi-material substrate of the world of particulars, but this is a hard question which need not be resolved here.

If we enquire into the precise reason for the positing of the Dyad, we are faced with at least apparent difficulties. Merlan points out that in Apuleius and Plutarch⁵ passages can be found which suggest that some Platonists were asking themselves, What is the principle of differentiation within the Ideal World? and, under Aristotelian influence, were giving the answer, Matter. But this was not apparently Plato's reason for introducing the Dyad in the first place. The problem of the distinction between Ideas seems to have caused him little inconvenience, although as early as the *Protagoras* he was concerned about the relation of various virtues with one another (329D–333B). The difficulty which Plato seems rather to have wished to solve is the old Parmenidean one about the origin of plurality itself. The first hypothesis of the second part of the *Parmenides* shows that if Unity be understood in the strict Parmenidean sense and be considered entirely in isolation, then nothing whatever can be said of it.⁶ Presumably, therefore, in the world of reality as well as the world of λόγοι, if the Platonic Good, or One, be considered by itself, then for all that it is the source of Being in some sense (*Republic* 509), yet no other Beings (Forms) can exist unless there is some kind of substrate or ἐκμαγεῖον (*Met.* 988A1), or what you will, in the intelligible world, in which or on which the One can impose itself as Limit upon the Unlimited. Aristotle's whole account of the Idea-Numbers depends on the assumption that Plato expects that by positing the One and the Dyad he can account for the existence of more than one Form. He does not deal with the question: What is the difference between Forms? He contents himself with explaining that there is a difference between Forms, that there are, say, two Forms, the Ideal Two and the Ideal Three, and that these are not merely two different names referring to the same thing.

The problem of plurality in the intelligible world, and the problem of the possibility of a choice of evil in the realm of sensibles, keep Plato from formulating a monistic position of the pre-Parmenidean type. Considerations both metaphysical and ethical seem to rule monism out of court. Plato, as the successor of both Parmenides and Socrates,

finds that the interests aroused by both these masters weigh against the possibility of a single ἀρχή for the universe. In this it seems that he also tended toward the Pythagorean tradition of his day, for it is most likely that Pythagoreanism originally differed from the Milesian philosophy in that it was a dualism.⁷ And, to judge by the evidence of Theophrastus, the dualist tradition in both Plato and the Pythagoreans was continuing to attract notice, for he writes: "Plato and the Pythagoreans make the distance between the real and the things of nature a great one, but hold that all things wish to imitate the real; yet since they make a kind of opposition (ἀντίθεσιν τινα ποιοῦσιν) between the One and the Indefinite Dyad . . . it is absolutely impossible that for them the nature of the whole should exist without the Indefinite Dyad; they say it has an equal share in things with, or even predominates over, the other principle. Whereby they make the first principles contrary to one another. Hence those who ascribe causation to God hold that even God cannot guide everything to what is best."⁸ It is certain that the doctrines of the *Timaeus* are among those alluded to here; there is certainly also a reference in the last sentence to views such as that discussed earlier in connection with the *Republic* that God is not the cause of evil. It is likely too that if, as Theophrastus implies, the Pythagoreans used the term "Indefinite Dyad" they had taken it over from Plato. In brief, it seems that if Theophrastus is at all reliable as a witness, the appearance of Plato on the Greek philosophical scene had a great effect on the Pythagoreans. In his discussion of the philosophy of Plato in the first book of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle introduces that philosophy as a development of Pythagoreanism and as closely related to Pythagoreanism: "After the philosophies described came the system of Plato which in most cases agreed with them, but also contained peculiar features which marked it off from the philosophy of the Italians (987A29ff)."

It is well known, too, how stories spread rapidly in the ancient world that Plato plagiarized Pythagorean writings⁹ and how Professor Taylor held that the *Timaeus* expresses the views of a Pythagorean. Behind all this lies the certainty that Platonists and Pythagoreans had a good deal in common at this time. There must have been a good deal of give and take between the two groups, perhaps especially in matters of terminology. We see how Theophrastus attributes to the Pythagoreans the term "Indefinite Dyad" which certainly arose in the Academy and probably with Plato himself.¹⁰

We may assume therefore that in a sense both Plato and the Pythagoreans were dualists. Parmenides' rejection of monism had not itself

been rejected. In the centuries which followed, our evidence about a struggle between monism and dualism is scanty. When light shines again through the gloom we have reached the time of Alexander Polyhistor (first century B.C.), whose evidence on Pythagoreanism is recorded by Diogenes Laertius (8.25).¹¹ At this period of the Pythagorean school, a period of great activity in which a mass of pseudepigraphy was produced, the earlier dualism has disappeared. The new mood is typified by Alexander Polyhistor's blunt opening statement *Ἀρχὴν μὲν πάντων μονάδα*. Alexander goes on to show that the Indefinite Dyad derives from the One and then serves as its substrate. Thus the One has two cosmogonical functions, first as supreme cause, then as the principle of Form which informs the indefinite material principle which has sprung from it. At least one fundamental difference exists therefore between Alexander's conception of Pythagoreanism and that of the Pythagoreans of Theophrastus: monism has returned. The reasons for this change and the men responsible are impossible to determine. As far as we can see, no attempt was made to answer the objections of Parmenides to the monism of his predecessors. It is possible, certainly, that the return of monism was forwarded by the doctrines of the Stoics. The Stoic pantheistic notion that the One is present in the All and the All in the One is perhaps a half-way stage in the journey of philosophers from the separation of the One and the Many in early post-Parmenidean writings to the return of monism in Neopythagoreanism. But even with the appearance of the pantheistic monism of the Stoa, the old problem of the origin of evil returns. Plato, we recall, need attribute evil neither to his first Principle nor to God, since neither the Good nor God is the cause of all. There is always the "Errant Cause" and the effects of this cause on individual souls. With the return of monism in the Stoa, however, the problem of ethical dualism returns.¹² At this stage therefore we must be certain that Neopythagoreanism itself was monistic. We shall find a virtually complete agreement among the limited sources at our disposal.

In the passage of Alexander Polyhistor we read that the One is the cause of all and that it is from the One that the Dyad takes its origin. From the One and the Dyad come the numbers, and eventually the whole of the cosmos. Such a monistic scheme implies that the One is the cause of matter both in the material world and in the intelligible. We can be certain from Moderatus, who will be considered later, and from Theon of Smyrna, who is influenced by Moderatus (*cf. Exp. Rer. Math.* 19.12ff Hiller), that this intelligible matter was a regular part of the Neopythagorean system.¹³

Another source of knowledge about Neopythagoreanism is Eudorus. Eudorus, who is quoted *verbatim* by Simplicius,¹⁴ offers a somewhat garbled account of Pythagoreanism which I have shown elsewhere to be based on doctrines identical with those of Alexander.¹⁵ Eudorus' Pythagoreans are also monists; their first Principle is the One, but it is from the One and its opposite, the Dyad, that the remaining parts of the cosmos are generated. Eudorus does not fully understand the Pythagoreans; he supposes that they posit two Ones. In reality they teach the doctrine expounded by Alexander Polyhistor.

We find a further interesting piece of information about the monism of Eudorus in Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Quoting Aspasius, Alexander tells us that whereas the normal text of *Met.* 988A 10–11 reads τὰ γὰρ εἶδη τοῦ τί ἐστὶν αἴτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἶδεσι τὸ ἐν, Eudorus and Euarmostus read for the second clause τοῖς δ' εἶδεσι τὸ ἐν καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ.¹⁶ Evidently Eudorus wished to interpret Plato, who is under discussion in this section of the *Metaphysics*, as a monist. It appears therefore that according to Eudorus, who probably reflects the views of most of the Platonists and Pythagoreans of his day, Plato derived both the Indefinite Dyad and the substrate of the sensible world from the One.¹⁷ How this derivation was supposed to occur we have little idea. We recall that Alexander Polyhistor also fails to give an account of the manner of the appearance of what is to be the material substrate of the intelligible world.

There is an interesting passage from Proclus' commentary on the *Timaeus* (I.176.9 Diehl), in which the same monistic doctrine occurs and in which the same lack of explanation of the appearance of the Dyad is evident. "The One is prior to all opposition, as the Pythagoreans also say. But when after the first cause ἡ δυὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀνεφάνη, also among these (καὶ ἐν ταύταις) the Monad is superior to the Dyad." We do not know the date of the Pythagoreans in question here, but we can at least discern something of their doctrine. Originally there is a First Cause (presumably the One); later the duality of causes appears. This duality is presumably the One and the Dyad. As in the passages of Alexander Polyhistor and Eudorus, there is no explanation of how the Dyad appears; all we know is that it appears later than the First Cause. In other words the system under discussion is monistic.

A similar doctrine is credited to the Pythagoreans (obviously the Neopythagoreans) by Numenius, as we learn from Chalcidius.¹⁸ "*Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos vim sententiae non recte adsecutos putasse dici etiam indeterminatam et immensam duitatem ab unica singularitate institutam, recedente a natura sua singularitate et in duitatis habitum*

migrante." Numenius, who himself held strongly dualist views, objects to this derivation of the Dyad, but the doctrine he describes should be quite familiar to us.

It is interesting to compare the language in which the appearance of the Dyad is described. Alexander Polyhistor says nothing; Eudorus talks of the First Cause *κατὰ τὸν ἀνωτάτως λόγον*, and of the One and its opposite as *κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον*; Proclus says that the *δυὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀνεφάνη* (appeared); Numenius says that the *unica singularitas* of the One retired from its own nature and took on the guise of duality. It is certain that Parmenides would have supported Numenius in finding such weakly argued monism contemptible. Nor would he have found the introduction by Moderatus¹⁹ of the doctrine of the three Ones, derived from an interpretation of the *Parmenides*, any more to his taste.

There is a further source for Neopythagoreanism to which we must turn, but it is a source over which scholarly warfare has long been fierce and keen. This is a passage of Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 10.248–284) which discusses in great detail various doctrines attributed to Plato and to the Pythagoreans. There seems to be no need here to discuss the sources of all the details of the passage.²⁰ It will be sufficient for our purposes if we establish the general nature of the doctrine and indicate the provenance of the themes relevant to our present enquiry. The first requirement therefore will be to give a broad outline of the passage as a whole.

In 248ff we learn that numbers are the *ἀρχαί* and *στοιχεῖα* of all, according to the followers of Pythagoras of Samos. At 258 Plato is said to have held similar theories and thus to have regarded the numbers as prior to the Forms. It is the numbers which are *ἀρχαί*. Then follows the most important section 261 which tells us that Pythagoras, moved by similar notions, declared that the Monad is the *ἀρχή*. When this Monad is conceived by itself (or perhaps "in its sameness"), it is conceived as One, but when in its otherness it is added to itself it produces (*ἀποτελεῖν*) the Indefinite Dyad.²¹ We can at once see that this aspect of the scheme is not Platonic. Plato's One does not produce the Indefinite Dyad. We cannot dogmatize about the origin of the Pythagoreanism here, but there is a remarkable similarity to the doctrines of Alexander Polyhistor, of the Pythagoreans of Eudorus and Numenius and of the Pythagoreans discussed by Proclus. All these sources share with Sextus the doctrine of monism; all imply more or less clearly that the Dyad derives from the One; all are less than clear about how this derivation occurs. Eudorus was baffled to find the

Pythagoreans stating that on the one hand the One is the cause of all and on the other that there are two causes, the One and its opposite. Yet the passage of Pythagoreanism in Sextus indicates clearly how his puzzlement might have arisen, for we find Sextus saying on the one hand: *Πυθαγόρας ἀρχὴν ἔφησιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν μονάδα* (261), and on the other (262) *δύο οὖν τῶν ὄντων αἱ ἀρχαί, ἥ τε πρώτη μονάς . . . καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς*. Whatever the sources of the rest of Sextus 10, 248–284, sections 261–262 seem to be Neopythagorean.

This conclusion should not be rejected as the result of a consideration of the following sections 263–276, which, as has frequently been pointed out, most clearly perhaps by Miss de Vogel,²² are of Academic origin, and can be compared both with sections of the *Categories* and with a passage of Plato's disciple Hermodorus recorded by Simplicius.²³ It is quite possible that the whole passage of Sextus is a hotch-potch of material from different sources, though it must be remembered that the Academic material may have filtered through Neopythagoreanism. We recall that at 261 Sextus tells us that the Dyad derives from the One. The same ambiguous account of Neopythagorean causes appears here as we are familiar with from other authors. At 276, however, the derivation of the Dyad from the One is not mentioned. What Sextus says is simply: *ἀνέκυψαν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ πάντων καὶ τὸ ἀνωτάτω ἥ τε πρώτη μονάς καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς*. What one would like to know is whether these are the ultimate *ἀρχαί*, or whether, as in 261–262, we are to rest assured that the Dyad itself derives in some sense from the One. If Sextus' whole passage 248–284 is taken from a single source, then we must say that in 276 he simply feels it unnecessary to mention that the Dyad is in fact itself a product of the One. If however we deduce from the Academic nature of 263–276 that we must be dealing with a dualistic doctrine quite similar to that of Plato himself, we can only conclude that Sextus has failed to perceive that the doctrine of 261–262 is different from that of 276 and derives from a different source. It seems impossible to find a final solution to this problem, but perhaps the word *ἀνέκυψαν* is some slight evidence in favor of the view that in 276 Sextus has not felt it necessary to refer again to the ultimate derivation of the Dyad from the One. He is talking here of an upward path of investigation leading toward first principles (*cf. Phaedo* 109D, *Phaedrus* 249C and *Ennead* 6.7.9.45 for *ἀνακύψαι*), and, once he had reached the stage of the two *ἀρχαί*, he may have thought that he was now back to the position he had described in 261 and that there was therefore no need for further elaboration on the theme of the ultimate derivation of the Dyad from Unity.²⁴

We see then that Neopythagoreanism is a kind of monism. It is a monism with which Parmenides would have been profoundly dissatisfied. Yet these thinkers, urged on in part perhaps by the need to justify their interest in mathematics, made some kind of an attempt to show, rather than merely to assume, how plurality — and in particular duality — arose. If these attempts must be condemned as failures, yet they at least indicate that those who were interested in them were aware of the problem to a limited extent. One solution offered was to see the Monad itself as Twoness-in-Unity and thus to call it ἀρσενόθηλυς.²⁵ This idea, though natural to thinkers for whom even numbers are female, odd numbers male, and the unit odd and even, may have become prominent in the context of an attempt to fall back on the pre-Platonic and dualistic form of Pythagoreanism, and to combine this with the desired monism. Naturally such a combination is not happy. Its propounders run the risk of compromising their monism too greatly. This doctrine seems to introduce duality into the Monad itself, and is perhaps more suited to Stoic pantheism, from which it may have come, than to the monistic aspirations of the Neopythagoreans. It appears at its most clumsy in the version of Nicomachus,²⁶ where we find the Monad described as νοῦς, εἴτα καὶ ἀρσενόθηλυς καὶ θεὸς καὶ ὕλη δέ πως.

No more adequate, as we have seen, is the account of the appearance of the Dyad given by Alexander Polyhistor. Alexander merely states that the Dyad arises from the One. He seems quite oblivious to the fact that such a statement begs one of the major questions raised by ancient philosophers. The account of Sextus Empiricus (10, 261) is a little more subtle, but not much. He seems to envisage the One being added to itself (whatever that may mean) and thus in its otherness (καθ' ἑτερότητα) creating the Indefinite Dyad. A similar impression is given by Numenius²⁷ who objects to the illogicality of the Pythagorean procedures when the One is said to "retire from its own nature and put on the guise of duality." Numenius himself, of course, is not a monist. He finds none of the attempts to account for the origin of the material principle adequate. In this he follows not only the Gnostics who created an evil soul out of the elements,² but the other dualist Platonists, Atticus, and Plutarch. We must remember that the dualism these men ascribed to Plato is far stronger than that which Plato himself professed.

We can now begin to understand one of the problems which Plotinus faced when he reviewed the doctrines of his Platonist and Pythagorean predecessors. Was he to eschew monism, with Numenius, or was he to offer a logically feeble account of the derivation of the Dyad from the

One with the Pythagoreans? The problem arose in the most acute form both for Plotinus and for the Pythagoreans in the moral sphere. It was difficult enough for the Pythagoreans to show how plurality arose; they had also to face the question of the origin of evil, the question which provided Plato with the strongest incentive to adopt a limited variety of dualism. There is no doubt of the Pythagorean line on this question, though there may be considerable doubt of the meaningfulness of what they proposed. It is quite certain that the Dyad, the material cause, which so mysteriously arose from the One, was called *τόλμα*. Such terminology, as Henry and Schwyzer's *Testimonia* to *Enn.* 5, 1, 1 indicates, is expressly said to be Pythagorean by Plutarch (*de Iside* 381F) and by the author of the *Theologoumena Arithmeticae* (p. 7, 19 and p. 9, 5-6 de Falco); Proclus (*in Alc.* 104E, p. 60 Westerink) tells us that the Pythagoreans actually called procession *τόλμα*; a similar doctrine is attributed by Johannes Lydus to the followers of Pherecydes (*de mens.* 2,7. p. 24, 12-13). Other evidence pointing in the same direction is given by the *Etymologicum Magnum* (s.v. *δυάς*), by Olympiodorus' commentary on the *Alcibiades* (140E. p. 33 Westerink), and by Alexander of Aphrodisias (*in Met.* 74. 13 Hayduck).

The implication of the word *τόλμα* is that it is in some way a sin that the Dyad arose. The origin of evil is thus "accounted for." But what sort of an account is it? And can it possibly be intelligible within a monistic context? Does it not involve not only the presence of a material principle in the One, but the presence of evil also? Is one to assume that the *μονὰς ἀρσενόθελυς* is a compound of good and evil, yet a compound whose parts are wholly indistinguishable? Or would it be better to assume that the One is beyond good and evil, and thus that neither good nor evil is prior in the cosmos? Yet this was not the Pythagorean view, though something like it seems to have been the opinion of Speusippus. In brief, then, the Neopythagorean account of the origin of evil is as difficult as is the related account of the origin of matter.

In an article published in *Phronesis*²⁹ I elaborated upon Dean Inge's distinction between "existential judgments" and judgments of value in Plotinus' philosophy. My intention there was to show how Plotinus held that matter was the last level of the process of emanation and that its existence was not in any way inconsistent with his metaphysical monism. I then attempted to show both that Plotinus tried to preserve ethical dualism alongside this metaphysical monism and that he was consistent in his teachings on these points. There is no need to repeat this discussion here. We can take it that Plotinus believed and consist-

ently taught that the existence of evil was not necessarily an objection to monism. What we are concerned with here, however, is the further and more fundamental question of whether, in maintaining both the existence of plurality and the derivation of all things from the One, he was able to make his One, together with the emanation-process, intelligible. We assume that Plotinus derived the many from the One; must we add that his logic is as bad as that of the Neopythagoreans?

Plotinus' One is different in many ways from the Monad of Neopythagoreanism, but the key to our particular problem is the realization that Plotinus envisaged it as infinite. Dodds³⁰ and Armstrong³¹ have suggested that this description is applied hesitatingly. Armstrong says that "Plotinus (as also Proclus) appears to shrink from applying ἄπειρος, ἀπειρία, terms traditionally used to express the negative indefiniteness of matter, to the primary and absolute infinity of the One. When he does use the term 'unbounded' of the One it is in one of the restricted senses." Though, as I hope to show elsewhere, this tentativeness of the commentators is somewhat excessive,³² all that concerns us here is the infinity of δύναμις which is clearly attributed to the One at *Ennead* 6.9.6.10-12. The One is not infinite in magnitude or in any numerical sense, but in power. According to the stricter principles of negative theology, the One is not so much infinite in power as rather the source of whatever kinds of infinity are predicable of the lower hypostases (2.4.15.19-20). The One is here said not itself to be ἀπειρία but to create it.

Now if we wish to understand the effect of Plotinus' new emphasis on the One's infinity on his theory of emanation, we can perhaps be instructed by the innovations and improvements of Melissus on the Sphere of Parmenides. As Raven puts it³³: "Whereas the One of Parmenides was finite and spherical, the One of Melissus is unequivocally declared, to the irritation of Aristotle, to be infinite in extent as well as in time." Melissus' reasons for doing this seem to have been firstly a fear lest the Parmenidean sphere should seem to be limited and thus to admit of something outside its limits, and secondly an anxiety that it should seem to have a beginning, middle and end. The latter problem is the one which concerns us. In order to obviate the criticism that the One is not properly a unity, Melissus replaced a finite One by a One that is infinite. Admittedly his notion of infinity was primitive, but that is not of immediate concern.

Although Melissus was a supporter of Parmenides' rejection of the Many, while Plotinus was trying to account for the derivation of the Many from the One, their procedures have something in common.

Plotinus was trying to face the objection that if the Pythagorean Monad is the cause of the Indefinite Dyad, then it itself seems to be dual; Melissus was trying to rid Parmenides' One of the appearance of having parts. Both, then, are aiming at making the First Principle pre-eminently simple. Both follow the same course, though at different levels of sophistication. Melissus makes the One infinite in extent; Plotinus makes it infinite in power. Plotinus certainly believed that the One should not be limited by any predication: hence the negative theology. The obverse of this must be that its potentiality is infinite, as we see him assert. It is this way of thinking which helps to lead Neo-Plotinians such as the men concerned with the transmission of the eighth book of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*³⁴ to write that "we say that actuality is superior to potentiality in this world, whereas in the upper world potentiality is superior to actuality."

What is the advantage which Plotinus sees in positing a First Principle whose power is infinite? Clearly, that its effects will be infinite. As Merlan says,³⁵ Plotinus continually alludes to the fact that plurality arises because of the overflowing of the One. This overflowing is the effect of infinite power and exists eternally. The range of products is infinite and embraces all that is. It obviously includes what is not the One itself, for Plotinus has no time for simple pantheism of the Stoic type. The first product of the One is the matter of the intelligible world or the Indefinite Dyad. This matter is not produced of its own free will, but because of the nature of the One itself. It has not committed any sin in coming into existence. It is not *τόλμα* in any pejorative Neopythagorean sense. As we know, it is by the return of this Dyad to the One that the clear-cut Forms of the Intelligible World take their order. Thus we can say that it is not due to *τόλμα* that the Many arise in Plotinus' system; it is due to the nature of the One which generates.

The separation of *τόλμα* from the Dyad is an important innovation, for it means that in Plotinus' view sin is not necessarily present with plurality. Where then, if anywhere, does *τόλμα* appear? If we look at *Ennead* 5.1.1, we read that *for souls* *τόλμα* and *γένεσις*, *ἡ πρώτη ἐτερότης* and *τὸ βουλ' ἠθῆναι ἑαυτῶν εἶναι* are the source of evil (cf. 4.8.5). The latter phrase implies that the origin of evil is not the existence of the soul but its desire to be apart from the One and *Νοῦς*. The soul has the power of choice. It can choose to return to its source in the mystical union or it can forget its origin and develop a taste for its own products, and at the worst for nonproductive matter. It is this misplaced desire which is *Τόλμα*. The Dyad itself (Intelligible Matter) is not *Τόλμα* as it was for the Neopythagoreans.

Yet just a trace of Neopythagoreanism remains. Clearly if the soul did not exist it could not make a wrong choice. This is why the very existence of things other than the One can be said to be in a sense responsible for the appearance of evil. Hence Plotinus can maintain ἡ πρώτη ἑτερότης alongside "wishing to belong to themselves" and γένεσις as a source of evil. We should however recall and contrast this with the notion we found in Sextus (*Adv. Math.* 10.261) that the One in its otherness (καθ' ἑτερότητα) creates the Dyad. Emanation in Plotinus is supported by the concept of the One's infinite power. In contrast to the passage of Sextus, Plotinus sees the One not "in its otherness" but as the cause of otherness, since its products are finite, whereas it itself is infinite. And we should remember too that for Plotinus all "otherness" is in the others, none in the One. The One is quite unaffected by and unlike its products (including "otherness"). As he says at 6.8.19.18, when the One had created Being, he left it outside himself for he had no need of it.

Although the τόλμα of 5.1.1 is not to be equated with the Neopythagorean Dyad, we may wonder if there is not a further echo of the Pythagorean conception in 6.9.5.29, where Νοῦς is said to have "dared (τολμήσας) in some way to stand apart (ἀποστήναι) from the One." We should be a little hesitant, however, before putting much significance on ἀποστήναι, as Merlan does,³⁶ for in 1.8.7.19 ἀπόστασις seems to be merely another way of saying ἑκβασις or ὑπόβασις. Voluntarism is not necessarily manifest here in the form of a deliberate urge to be apart from the One. Rather separation from the One can be called either "going away" if the movement is emphasized, or "standing apart" if we wish to stress the separated state. It is of course true that "revolution" is a common meaning of ἀπόστασις, but there seems to be no meaning of this kind in 1.8.7.19, and even if there was, it would not affect the major issue. The question with which we are concerned at 6.9.5.29 is whether the first generated thing — intelligible matter — came into being *because* of τόλμα. In other words, how do we interpret the word τολμήσας in view of the fact that ἀποστήναι means "to stand apart"?

We should notice at once that the passage does not in fact concern the generation of Νοῦς (its "coming to stand apart") but rather its attitude after it has been generated (its actual "standing apart"). Thus the fact that "dared" ἀποστήναι τοῦ ενός does not mean that it recklessly broke away, but that it has "faced up" to living apart after its generation — indeed it had no option. This lack of option and the consequent τόλμα of Νοῦς is not a guilty act on Νοῦς' part, which brought about its own fall, but is rather the inevitable result of

the One's generosity. The producer must for Plotinus be greater than the product. Hence the Second Hypostasis must be inferior to the First and in that sense a falling away from the First. But its generation is not the deliberate generation of something bad; rather it is the generous production of the best possible product. *Noûs* must stand apart from the One, but it does not *will* to be separate. Its *τόλμα* is thus not a guilty will for separation but a "facing up" to necessity. Hence Merlan's comment on this passage (p. 124) that "even *νοûς comes into being* (my italics) as the result of its *τόλμα* is quite misleading, for once the One has generated Intelligible Matter, this Matter cannot be permanently restored to its origins. It must remain separate. Plotinus' phraseology may sound dualistic; his thought, however, is not.

At *Ennead* 3.8.8.34-36 Plotinus says that *νοûς* desires to possess all though it would have been better for it not to will this. Does this imply, as Merlan suggests, a voluntary choice of the less good?³⁷ It seems not, for although it would have been better for the *νοûς* not to exist but to remain a potentiality in the One, it is good on the other hand for the One to produce it — and once produced, it has no option but to will to possess all. As generated Being, that is the best it can will. Hence there is no deliberate choice of falling away.

Finally the use of words like *πρᾶν* and *πτῶμα* (1.8.14. 21-25) does not (*pace* Merlan) imply voluntarism, even of the soul. Intelligible Matter has no will. It is because of the One that the less perfect Second Hypostasis comes into being. In the case of soul, there is *τόλμα*, it is true, and this *τόλμα* can be bad, for the soul can be perverted, but it is significant that even in 1.8.14 Plotinus speaks of this fall as weakness. Soul, like the One, longs to create. Its products, however, are not perfect. Its urge for creation must inevitably produce inferior products. Hence we can see that with the best will in the world, so to speak, emanation leads to the appearance of products which must be regarded as a falling away at all levels.

Τόλμα — when used in a bad sense — means wishing to be by oneself; emanation occurs through contemplation and a self-gathering and return to one's source. Thus the emanation from the One must be perfect, while the emanation from *νοûς* is less perfect, since the emanating power is less able to achieve perfect unity. And when we reach Soul we find that the urge to return to one's origins is insufficiently strong to prevent a kind of self-centeredness arising. This self-centeredness and forgetfulness is the cause of evil for all souls, and may be called *τόλμα* in the Neopythagorean sense of that term.

In brief, then, Plotinus' version of Pythagorean ideas about monism and emanation is as follows:

1. The One is infinite in power and can therefore produce "otherness."
2. This "otherness" must be less good and therefore in a (nonmoral) sense worse than its cause.
3. The Indefinite Dyad is not Neopythagorean *τόλμα*.
4. *Τόλμα* — in a bad sense — is therefore not equivalent to plurality *per se*, but to plurality only in proportion as it loses sight of unity (as in 6.6.1).

NOTES

1. J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*⁴, London (1930) 180.
2. *In Parm.* 694, 23.
3. For Plato on the origin of evil see F. P. Hagen, "Die Materie und das Böse in Antiken Platonismus," *Mus. Helv.* 19 (1962) 73-83.
4. Cf. C. J. de Vogel, "La Théorie de l'ἄπειρον chez Platon et dans la tradition platonicienne," *Rev. Phil.* 84 (1959) 21-39.
5. P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*² (The Hague 1960) 125-126. *Apul. de dogm. Plat.* 1.5, 190; p. 86, 9-11 Thomas; Plutarch, *Quaest. Plat.* 3, 1001F-1002A.
6. For my tentative views on the *Parmenides*, see "The *Parmenides* Again," *Phoenix* 16 (1962) 1-14. The acceptance of the idea expressed here, that the One of the first hypothesis of the second part is discussed in isolation from everything else, need not involve the acceptance of any general interpretation of the dialogue.
7. Cf. J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (Cambridge 1948) 3-4, against Cornford who in his *Plato and Parmenides* (London 1939) attempts, on the basis of passages of Eudorus and Alexander Polyhistor to be discussed later in this paper, to support the position that the early Pythagoreans were monists.
8. *Met.* 33, 11A27ff Ross-Fobes.
9. For Plato as plagiarist see A. H. Chroust, "Plato's Detractors in Antiquity," *Rev. Met.* 16 (1962) 98-118 and "Charges of Philosophical Plagiarism in Antiquity," *Modern Schoolman* 38 (1961) 225-227; G. C. Field, *Plato and His Contemporaries*² (London 1948) 176.
10. Cf. W. D. Ross, *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics I* (Oxford 1924) lvii-lviii; L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote* (Paris 1908) 649-654.
11. On the Neopythagoreanism of Alexander Polyhistor see A. J. Festugière, "Les Mémoires pythagoriques cités par Alexandre Polyhistor," *Rev. Et. Gr.* 58 (1945) 1-65.
12. See P. Merlan (above, n.5) 123, note.
13. Cf. E. R. Dodds, "The *Parmenides* of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One," *CQ* 22 (1928) 138.
14. Simplicius, *In Phys.* A5. 181. 10-30 Diels. Cf. A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste 4, Le Dieu Inconnu et la Gnose* (Paris 1954) 36.

15. See my article "The Neoplatonic One and Plato's *Parmenides*," *TAPA* 93 (1963) 389-401.
16. Alex. in *Met.* 58.31-59.8 Hayduck.
17. For general information on Eudorus, see H. Dörrie, "Der Platoniker Eudorus von Alexandria," *Hermes* 79 (1944) 25-39.
18. In *Timaeus* p. 324. 11 Wrobel.
19. Cf. Dodds (above, n.13) and Rist (above, n.15).
20. The thesis of P. Wilpert in *Zwei aristotelischen Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre* (Regensburg 1949) will not be formally discussed here. But Wilpert's view that Sextus' account derives (via Aristotle's *De Bono*) from Plato's Lecture on the Good, will appear incompatible with my interpretation of the Sextus passage. For criticism of Wilpert, see J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* 61 (1952) 110-113, W. Jaeger, *Gnomon* 23 (1951) 250-251; and Merlan (above, n.5) 203-204.
21. Cf. *Hyp. Pyr.* 3. 153.
22. C. J. de Vogel, "Problems Concerning Later Platonism," *Mnemosyne* ser. 4.2 (1949) 205-216; Cf. W. D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford 1953) 185-187, and P. Merlan, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus I, Zur Erklärung der dem Aristoteles zugeschriebenen Kategorienschrift," *Philologus* 89 (1934) 35-53.
23. In *Phys.* 247.30-248. 15 Diels.
24. Cf. Syrianus, in *Met.* 925B27ff, where an ultimate unity is attributed to Archænetus and Philolaus.
25. For a detailed discussion of the First Principle as ἀρσενόθης see A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation* 4, 43-51.
26. *Ap. Phot. Bibl.* 187, 143A.
27. *Ap. Chalcidius*, in *Tim.* p. 324, 11 Wr.
28. Cf. *Enneads* 2.9.5. for the world soul. The doctrine of Basilides and Isidore seems to be that under discussion in this passage. Cf. E. R. Dodds, "Numenius and Ammonius," *Entretiens Hardt* 5, *Les Sources de Plotin* (Geneva 1960) 7-9. To the reference given by Dodds could be added Philo, *Quaest. in Exod.* 1.23 and the Gnostic *Apocryphon of John*. For a text of the latter with a German translation by W. Till, see *Die gnostischen Schriften des Koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis* 8502 (Berlin 1955).
29. J. M. Rist, "Plotinus on Matter and Evil," *Phronesis* 6 (1961) 154-166.
30. E. R. Dodds, *Proclus' Elements of Theology* (Oxford 1933) 245.
31. A. H. Armstrong, "Plotinus' Doctrine of the Infinite and its Significance for Christian Thought," *Downside Review* 73 (1955) 50-51.
32. Cf. the excellent discussion of W. N. Clarke, "Infinity in Plotinus: A Reply," *Gregorianum* 40 (1959) 75-98.
33. G. S. Kirk and J. S. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1957) 300.
34. See P. Henry and H. R. Schwyzer's *Enneads* 2 (Paris 1959) 73.
35. P. Merlan (above, n.5) 124.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS
FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D.

MIRIAM S. BALMUTH — *Forerunners of Coinage: Observations on the Monetary Forerunners of Coinage in the Aegean and the Near East with Special Reference to the Origins of Coinage*

THE origins of money, and more specifically coinage, have been a source of interest from an economic, historical, political and even sociological point of view from as early as the second century A.D. when they were already so obscured by myths and traditions that Pollux in his *Onomasticon* had to propose several candidates as possible inventors of coinage. The apparent conflicts between the ancient epigraphical sources and the archaeological evidence have prompted the present study in early money, pre-monetary currency, and weight systems of the Late Bronze Age and the Iron Age. Currency, money and coinage are here respectively defined, after Aristotle, as metal used to facilitate the exchange of goods; pre-weighed but unmarked metal; and metal that is stamped with a guarantee and conforms to a standard of weight.

Inscriptions from eighteenth- and fifteenth-century Alalakh, fourteenth-century Ugarit, Ramesside Egypt, and early seventh-century Assyria have been interpreted as referring to pre-weighed, recognizable money; yet, archaeological evidence favors assigning the first consecutive coinage to Lydia toward the end of the seventh century B.C. Although this early Lydian coinage is electrum, Herodotus calls the Lydians innovators only in their institution of two separate issues, one of gold and one of silver, in a statement so heavily qualified that it warrants intensive examination for possible implications. Aristotle's description of the transitional stages between barter and coinage states that the earliest coins had a mark of value, a statement which does not correspond to the material at hand. Such are the paradoxes found in the documentary material from which it is necessary to begin an investigation of the forerunners and origins of coinage.

Three catalogues have been employed to present archaeological material that has hitherto not been collected in one place. The first catalogue lists hoards of metal ingots from the Near East. The earliest

of these is from the fourteenth century B.C. and although there is a discernible chronological development from masses of random metal bits to more monetiform pieces in the latest hoards from the seventh or sixth century B.C., such hoards not only continue well into the period of actual coinage in Greece, but are often found with Greek coins as bullion. In Palestine and Babylonia, coinage was of Persian introduction, and in Egypt and Mesopotamia, there was no native coinage until Hellenistic times. The observation of the use of metal currency rather than coinage for such a long period in the Near East is all the more significant by virtue of the findings of the second catalogue, a list of unmarked but pre-weighed pieces of metal, known as dumps.

The catalogue of dumps not only demonstrates that the great preponderance before the Ephesus hoard are of Aegean provenience, but that they were probably cut from larger, notched bars which are also known only from Aegean sites.

The third catalogue represents an initial investigation of the weight systems of selected areas and periods as indicated by the results of the previous two catalogues. A selection of inscribed scale weights from Crete, Cyprus, Egypt and Palestine, extends from the Middle Bronze Age to the seventh-century period of the Ephesus hoard. The metrological analyses necessary to make conclusive determinations have been unfortunately hampered by the lack of any coherent and comprehensive work on this subject. Only spot work in this field has been possible here within the limits of this thesis.

In addition to the metrological matters, there are philological problems bearing on the names of scale weights or their divisions, and upon further examination, these reinforce the conclusions of predominantly weighed currency in the Near East and pre-weighed cuttings in the Aegean.

The coincidence in the animal forms of scale weights and the types of the early coins is interpreted only as an indication that the metal has been weighed. An attempt to correlate these types with denomination and thereby vindicate Aristotle does not succeed. The probability is that the cattle shaped scale weights originated as the equivalent in metal currency to the cattle represented, and explains the persistent tradition of cattle as an early coin type.

The advantage of the use of metal for currency, namely, its re-use value, is precisely the disadvantage in trying to prove the early existence of money, if not coinage. This advantage added to perishability, and its small size unless found in hoards: all these contribute to negative

archaeological results in an attempt to interpret texts that seem clearly to refer to money. Nevertheless, the texts cannot be ignored or disbelieved, and the conclusion must be clearly stated that although the Ephesus hoard represents the first consecutive coinage, pre-weighed money existed for at least seven centuries before and the almost certain tentative coinages that may have begun at one place or another, but never took hold permanently, await only the right spade in the right mound.

CARL W. CONRAD — *From Epic to Lyric: A Study in the History of Traditional Word-Order in Greek and Latin Poetry*

This study is an attempt to trace the history of several patterns of "Sperrung" in Greek and Latin hexameter poetry and in Latin lyric poetry. By "Sperrung" is meant the separation of grammatical elements that must be construed with each other and that are not separated in common prose. The simplest form of "Sperrung" is the separation of adjectives and nouns, and it is with this kind of separation that this inquiry is concerned.

Two basic factors influence the nature of these patterns: first, the placement of the separated elements at positions of emphasis before caesurae; and second, the framing either of whole lines or of rhetorical cola by the separated adjective and noun.

The observation of recurrent patterns of separation in the *Odes* of Horace has led to the question: how are these patterns in Horace's lyric poetry related to similar patterns in the hexameter tradition? Horace himself claims Sappho and Alcaeus as his primary inspiration: can we accept them as a source for his practice in the placement of words? In the first major portion of the work, I have analyzed samples of Horace's lyric poetry and shown what the patterns of word-order are that form the subject of this study. From this exposition I have moved on to demonstrate that, despite Horace's insistence on inspiration from the Aeolic poets, Sappho and Alcaeus can scarcely be pointed out as his models in the matter of word-order.

At this point I have offered an analysis of the word-order of Vergil's Fourth Eclogue. Here, beyond doubt, are found the same patterns that appear in the *Odes* of Horace. It is a known fact, moreover, that the poetic technique of Vergil is the culmination of a long development within a tradition extending backward to Homer. The tradition itself, it appeared, must be studied and its history traced.

The tradition begins with Homer. In an examination of the first nine books of the *Iliad*, forms of several of the patterns seen in Horace and Vergil were observed and shown to be a regular feature of the formulaic diction of Homer. Especially characteristic of the Homeric patterns was that emphasized nouns appear either at the beginning of the line or immediately before the central caesura of the line, while loosely appended epithets, often "traditional," appear separated from them after the central caesura and at the end of the line respectively. Only in one pattern of separation in Homer is the adjective regularly the first element, and this is the most frequent of the patterns appearing in Homer. In this pattern an adjective fills the portion of the line between the caesura of the third foot and the hephthemimeral or less often the bucolic caesura. A verb form follows this adjective and the noun appears at the end of the line.

Important additional developments in the technique of word-order are noted in the Alexandrian hexameter. Apollonius reversed the regular order of Homer's patterns and exploited the emphatic possibilities of the placement of an adjective at the beginning of the line or before the caesura of the third foot. In such cases the noun is separated from the adjective and appears either after the central caesura or at the end of the line. Apollonius carried through the same change in patterns of separation in enjambement: where Homer had preserved the unity of the single line by scarcely ever allowing an adjective to wait for its complement until the following line, Apollonius regularly exploited the element of suspense achieved through the suggestion of connotations of an adjective detached from a noun not immediately evident. Also new in Apollonius was the effective juxtaposition of two adjectives with a resultant sharing of connotations. Such juxtaposition is the regular feature of interlocked word-order, wherein two pairs of adjectives and nouns are interlaced in a pattern that may be noted by the sequence of letters *abAB*.

In Theocritus an interesting distinction was observed between the "realistic" Doric Idylls and those poems in either Doric or Epic dialect wherein intentional artificiality or a deliberate aim at a higher tone may be recognized. In the "realistic" Idylls, the epic patterns appear much less frequently than in those poems treating legendary material. A striking example of this is the appearance of the pattern of separation at the hephthemimeral caesura four times within the 44 lines of Idyll 15 which comprise the song of the *γυνή ἀοιδός*. This pattern is one of the marks of a higher tone of speech than that of the Syracusan women in Alexandria.

Ennius, in founding the Latin hexameter tradition, carried over the patterns developed in the Greek hexameter, and their further development has been traced in the poetry of Cicero, Catullus, Lucretius and Vergil.

The hendecasyllabic verses of Catullus provide the first extensive evidence of the transfer of the epic patterns to lyric poetry. In Horace, however, the techniques of word-order are firmly established in all of the lyric meters. In order to show this, a careful analysis has been offered of the patterns in Sapphic, Asclepiadean and Alcaic meters.

In the concluding chapter a suggestion has been made concerning the origin of the patterns of separation linking the third and fourth lines of clausulae of four-line strophes. These patterns are seen in the couplets of Horace's *Epodes* and appear to have been developed there first and then to have been transferred to the clausulae of Alcaic, Asclepiadean and Sapphic strophes.

Throughout the work I have tried to show through examples not only how the tradition of poetic word-order is reflected in each poet's work, but also how each poet exploited traditional patterns in his own creative achievement.

STANLEY SHECHTER — *The Hellenistic Aition in Virgil's Georgics*

This thesis discusses in detail the *aition* (or account explaining the origin of a word, thing, or practice) in Classical and Hellenistic Greek poetry and in Virgil's *Georgics*.

An introductory chapter shows that the *aition* in the *Georgics* has certain features not deriving from either Lucretius or Hesiod. The *aition* in Greek poetry is then defined in Chapters II and III. Chapter II deals with the "single *aition*," or passage in which only one *aition* is presented (e.g., for a word only). Chapter III examines the "composite *aition*," or passage in which two or more *aitia* occur (e.g., for a word *and* a practice; or for several practices; or for a thing *and* a practice, etc.). These chapters isolate the characteristic features of the *aition* in both the Classical and Hellenistic periods, and show that during the Hellenistic period the *aition* became a highly stylized device of poetry, containing certain distinctive features of form and content. Where possible, the stylistic innovations in any given type of *aition* are assigned to their originators, and the types of *aitia* peculiar to only one poet determined.

Chapter IV discusses the single *aition* in the *Georgics* (I 12-14; 147-149; III 146-153; 266-283), and Chapter V, the composite *aition* in the same poem (I 7-9; 18-19; 60-63; 121-123; 136-145; II 336-345; 380-396; 536-540; III 113-117; IV 149-152; 271-314; 538-558). It was found that all of the *aitia* in the *Georgics* are Hellenistic, rather than Classical, in style; that most of these *aitia* are not rubber-stamp copies of the Hellenistic *aition*: Virgil tends to create new types of *aitia* even where he has made use of a Hellenistic *aition* as a literary model; that the stylistic influence of the Callimachean *aition* (as a *form*) upon several of the *aitia* in the *Georgics* is unmistakable.

In the course of considering the *aitia* introducing and concluding the Aristaeus Episode (IV 315-558), a history of the "Epyllion" is presented, proving with a number of examples that the Epyllion properly speaking contains an *aition*. Two types of Epyllia are distinguished: (1) "narrative" — those in which the digression is presented in the form of a prophecy and in which the *aition* ends the Epyllion (e.g., the *Hecale*), and (2) "pastoral" — those wherein the digression is depicted upon an inanimate object and ends with an *aition* (e.g., the *Europa*). Examples of the narrative and the pastoral Epyllion taken from Ovid's *Metamorphoses* are offered as corroborating evidence for this definition of the Epyllion, and a few other instances of the Epyllion are discussed. A Hellenistic precedent for the (narrative) Epyllion occurring within the framework of a larger poem (and introduced by a composite *aition*) is adduced, and the direct influence of this Epyllion upon the composition of the Aristaeus Episode is demonstrated. Other features of the Epyllion (both Hellenistic and Roman) are also discussed.

Chapter VI assesses the prominence given to the *aition* in the *Georgics* by considering the program passages in that poem (II 39-46; 173-176; 475-494; 541-542; III 1-48; 289-293; IV 116-117; 147-148) in the light of their relation to *Eclogue* VI and to several Callimachean and Lucretian programs.

PETER M. D. SWAN — *A Study of the Conspiracies against Emperors of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty*

Conspiracy was an important form of opposition to emperors of the Julio-Claudian line (30 B.C.-A.D. 68). Augustus was the object of at least seven plots; Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius, and Nero of three or more each. Gaius' assassination was the work of one; another set in motion

the events which led to the fall of Nero. Still, although many of these conspiracies have been studied individually, they have not been treated as a group. This thesis makes available in a single volume a full discussion of them all and considers each plot in the context of the others.

Conspiracies during this period were on the whole formed of and led by senators, particularly *nobiles*. They were symptomatic of the disaffection created within the senatorial class by political and social changes occurring under the early principate. These infringed on its traditional position, jeopardizing the dignity, fortunes, and lives of its members. The powers of the senate were reduced — in the government of provinces, in the control of financial and military affairs, and in foreign policy. At one time or another the senators were harassed by informers, humiliated by the ascendancy of women or freedmen in the imperial house, or persecuted by the princeps himself. The result was that the class as a whole felt insecure, resentful, and frustrated, and this temper was prone to manifest itself in the form of an overt attack by conspiracy on the emperor.

When deterioration of the senate's position was very pronounced, the unrest expressed itself in a wave of conspiracies by factions which usually had many members and whose aim was to abolish or at least to reform the principate. Octavian's establishment of a virtual autocracy, which radically curtailed the powers and prerogatives of the senatorial order, particularly the right it valued most — to aspire freely to the highest political honors — was the fundamental cause of the conspiracies of M. Aemilius Lepidus (30 B.C.), L. Terentius Varro Murena (22 B.C.), and M. Egnatius Rufus (19 B.C.). The degeneration of Gaius' person and his despotic treatment of the senate were responsible for a second wave of conspiracies — by Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus (A.D. 39), Anicius Cerialis and Sex. Papinius (A.D. 40), and Cassius Chaerea (A.D. 41). Although the plot by which Gaius was slain succeeded largely through the efforts of a tribune of the praetorian guard, Cassius Chaerea, it was supported by a movement of senators which sought to end the dynasty and restore the republic. Their program, advertised by the slogan "libertas," was "government of the nobility exactly as had formerly existed" (Joseph. *Bj* 2.205). The unexpected elevation of Claudius against their will intensified their dissatisfaction with the principate, and in the next year the republican movement found expression again in the civil war of L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus, who sought to depose Claudius and reestablish τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἐλευθερίαν (Dio 60.15.3). Nero provoked a third wave of

conspiracies — by C. Calpurnius Piso (A.D. 65), Annius Vinicianus (A.D. 66), and C. Iulius Vindex and Ser. Sulpicius Galba (A.D. 68). He had degraded Roman honor by ignominious personal conduct, had reduced all but the staunchest part of the senate to unprecedented subserviency, and had caused the deaths of its most distinguished members, among others Rubellius Plautus, Seneca the Younger, Thrasea Paetus, Barea Soranus, and Cn. Domitius Corbulo.

In the intervals between these waves conspiracies were less frequent and usually less dangerous. They were generally formed by individuals rather than by parties. Some of these conspirators were probably psychotics, for example, the ignoble would-be assassins of Augustus, Tiberius, and Claudius. Others, such as Iullus Antonius, the paramour of Augustus' daughter Julia, L. Aemilius Paullus, the husband of Julia *neptis*, and L. Aelius Seianus, were sane and competent persons who were motivated primarily by ambition. They did not seek to subvert the existing constitution but to exploit a connection with the imperial house in order to assassinate the princeps and usurp his office.

In examining each conspiracy the method adopted has been always to ascertain carefully what happened before offering an interpretation of the event. For this reason much of the dissertation is taken up with basic research into questions of fact. Some of the more interesting findings are appended:

1. *The date of the conspiracy of Varro Murena.* — Dio locates this plot in 22 B.C. and names the conspirator Licinius Murena. His testimony has usually been rejected on grounds that the consular *fasti* for 23, except the *Fasti Capitolini*, omit the name of A. Terentius Varro Murena and must be imposing on him *damnatio memoriae* for a conspiracy in that year. But examination of the *fasti* and the late consular lists (Chronographer of 354, *Fasti Hydatiani*, etc.) shows that the omission of Murena's name in the manner noted indicates merely that though elected consul in 24 for 23 he never entered office (perhaps because he died in 24 of natural causes). There is accordingly no evidence that A. Terentius Varro Murena was a conspirator, and one should follow Dio both in dating the conspiracy and in identifying its leader, L. Terentius (Licinius) Varro Murena.

2. *The reality of the conspiracy of Sejanus.* — The tendency of recent scholarly investigations to reduce Sejanus from arch-conspirator to a victim of Tiberius probably needs revision. There is admittedly little evidence for or against a conspiracy of Sejanus that cannot be disqualified because of possible bias or untruth. Still, what little there is

suggests that he conspired. It is confirmed by the extent of the investigations and punishments consequent on his fall. Tacitus' account alone, despite a lacuna that includes Sejanus' fall and the following weeks, reveals approximately fifty persons involved in these, more than were implicated in the great Pisonian conspiracy against Nero in 65, for which his narrative, covering one third of the fifteenth book of the *Annals*, is fully preserved.

3. *L. Annius Vinicianus in Joseph. AJ 19.251-252*. — It is the accepted view that at the senate's meeting of January 25, A.D. 41, the morrow of Gaius' murder, L. Annius Vinicianus, who had led the republican element in the conspiracy of Cassius Chaerea, promoted the attempt of M. Vinicius, the brother-in-law of Gaius, to be named emperor. This view lays Vinicianus open to the charge of betraying the cause of *libertas* and calls into question the sincerity of the republican movement in the conspiracies of Chaerea and Scribonianus. But Niese's text of Joseph. AJ 19.251-252, on which it depends, is unsound, and an obvious emendation shows that Vinicianus, far from attempting to create an emperor, played the opposite role, consistent with his republican associations, of frustrating those like Vinicius and Valerius Asiaticus who aspired to the throne.

CHRISTIAN WOLFF — *Aspects of the Later Plays of Euripides*

Given the extent and diversity of Euripides' plays, one should like to be able to find some classification for them and some underlying features which could characterize at least a group of plays. In this thesis the plays produced from about the time of the Sicilian expedition down to 406-5 are taken as a group — *IT*, *Ion*, *Phoenissae*, *Helen*, *Orestes*, *Bacchae* and *IA* (*Electra* is considered earlier than 415). Three of these, *Ion*, *Orestes* and *IT*, are discussed in individual chapters. A fourth chapter, then, using what has emerged from the first three, surveys themes and characteristics of all seven of the later plays.

In *Ion* two points are outstanding: the role of Athens, out of whose earliest mythology the play is made and which yet is so harshly rejected in a speech by Ion, and the way the myths are presented and used. Ion's speech is shown to be fitting in its dramatic context, to mark his reaction to an abrupt change in his life which would take him from a peaceful, simple and withdrawn existence in the service of a god at Delphi to the uncertain and violent circumstances of public life in

Athens. And in the speech one can also see the motifs which in fact move the whole action of the play, misunderstanding, hatred, violence, plots. These, however, are finally rendered harmless by the miraculous intervention of the gods; and with them the myths are before us. The play is found to turn on the isolation or distancing of its mythical elements and then their qualified reintegration. Its plot and protagonists are ranged by their relation to a mythical world. Thus the continually recalled fabulous past is juxtaposed to the human immediacy of what we witness in the present; Creusa is closest to that past and mythical or divine figures; Xuthus, prosaic and simple, is farthest from them; and Ion, devoted to Apollo and yet articulating rational doubts about the propriety of the god's actions, stands in between at a point of transition. But Ion's doubts, though fairly stated, are continually undercut. Circumstances and his own deeper ignorance cancel his reasonable objections. The myths and the gods illustrate an incommensurability in things just beyond comprehension. As a tragedy the play shows that the human need to reason and the irresistible nature of human feelings are both insufficient and hazardous in the extreme. To qualify that tragedy the play makes divine providence, though sometimes devious and doubtful, gracious.

It could be inferred that a condition of divine help in *Ion* is the fundamentally decent nature of its protagonists. In *Orestes* every figure is seriously flawed. Showing human nature as degenerate, the play represents a world disintegrated in both the private and public spheres. The plot is new (Orestes after killing Clytemnestra but before his trial at Athens), but cramped within the confines of one of tragedy's most traditional myths. Thus mythical features clash with new and realistic ones, and a totally obscured relation of present to past is suggested. The latter represents only an oppressive weight which makes any new action ineffectual. And as there are disjunctions between past and present, myth and contemporary reality, so Orestes himself veers between sanity and madness, and between a resolution to die nobly and a desperate desire to survive at any cost. As a result the play proceeds by a series of abrupt shifts and surprises — reflected in alternations of stylistic levels which run a gamut from flat, prosaic statement to an extravagant, operatic lyricism. It recreates theatrically the hallucinatory world of its protagonist. And where Orestes is sometimes mad, the public world around him is corrupt. Part of the action is moved by the impulse to revenge (shared by almost everyone) and so it raises the issue of justice. But there are no grounds on which to argue it and no objective administration of it. Orestes' trial at Argos (one of the plot's

novelties) is in fact a mockery in contemporary terms of his traditional trial in *Eumenides*. The disorder of this plot, then, is finally stemmed by Apollo. Yet the reconciliation which the god effects — and which brings Euripides' new plot in line with the traditional story — is an affront to all reason and feeling. It is only one more in a sequence of irrational reversals. The break between past and present is bridged only by an arbitrary gesture. That is all survival hangs on; and it takes away from the play any sense of necessity which could have made it a tragedy. The "tragedy" of *Orestes*, underlined by its extreme experimentalism with one of tragedy's most used myths, is that, where heroism is degenerate and public life corrupt, true tragedy is no longer possible.

Iphigenia in *IT*, lost to her own and in another land, recalls Ion. The plot of the play again, it seems, new with Euripides, like *Orestes*, is an insertion within the traditional story. Here Orestes' acquittal at Athens is not decisive and he is not yet free from his madness. But where in *Orestes* there is an almost complete discontinuity between the old and new stories, in *IT* the older story is not so much denied as supplemented. Orestes' regeneration is not sought in a public context (and not in Greece), but in a more remote and essentially private one, to be achieved by reunion with his other sister and by their concerted plot to escape with a cult statue. The play's fortunate conclusion seems in part possible because the context of a political community is absent. Instead, the play centers first on the conditions of recognition — principally a capacity for hope, and then on the scheme for escape, depending on persistent shrewdness and the exploitation of credulity. This scheme suggests a kind of paradox: the escape is carried out under the guise of a fictitious ritual of purification; but the escape is in fact Orestes' way to a real purification, the final release from his madness. The play is a sequence of similar paradoxical situations and as such has a more speculative, detached quality than the two discussed before it. At the same time *doxa* simply, the limited, illusory sphere of human imagining, is the principal element in which its actors move. This it shares with *Ion* and *Orestes*; underlying all three plays is the utterly hazardous limitation of human knowledge — Orestes' madness is only an extreme form of it. The final appearance of a god (once again) in *IT* is then a reminder of human dependence even in success. Yet Athena also gives the play a link to the Greek community through two aetiologies. The one suggests a meaning for ritual in general (the play is run through with various religious observances), namely, that the imitation of a past deed by some token action can at once preserve the past

while rendering it harmless. The other, recalling the suffering that preceded success in this play, recounts a rite for those who died in childbirth.

Features common to Euripides' later plays as a whole are taken up under four headings: myth; exile, death and recognition; comic elements; and survival. Three aspects of the use of myth are discussed and illustrated (principally from *Phoenissae* and *IT*): as standing for what is irreducible to human intelligence (and as such associated especially with chance and with the past as an incomprehensible or unviable legacy); as isolating, because of its remoteness, what is specifically human (and so the myths no longer serve as traditional examples); and as decorative, elaborated as though for its own sake to furnish the distractions and sometimes the consolations of poetry. Exile, always a preoccupation in Euripides, is shown extended from the earlier plays, which usually represent an outsider exiled in the Greek community (e.g., *Medea*), to include Greeks outcast in hostile, foreign lands (*IT*, *Helen*). *IT*, *Ion* and *Helen*, however, show the displaced finding the way home, having seemed dead and coming again to life as they are recognized by those closest to them — brother, mother, husband. *Phoenissae*, *Orestes* and *Bacchae*, on the other hand, all end with exiles (for the survivors; and death is at the hands of one's own — brother, son, mother). They include no recognitions (or one, Agave's, which is too late). And they are located in a political context. Private happiness and political life seem irreconcilable. In the discussion of comic elements a shift in the character of Euripides' tragedy is indicated by surveying his use of incongruity, gratuitous actions and continuity, a kind of paradoxical wit (particularly in *Helen*), and the grotesque (especially in *Orestes* and *Bacchae*). The last section of this chapter then traces in the later plays the increasing value put on life simply. Heroic death (with the qualified exception of self-sacrifice, discussed in connection with the use of myth) is shown to be increasingly questionable; human beings are not up to it and circumstances too obscure to allow it meaning (already in *Heracles* true heroism is to sustain hope and life). Tenacity to life appears to be men's only hope, joined with all possible ingenuity in the plotting of survival. And thus life is sought on altered terms, not for glory or the community's good, but simply for happiness or release from suffering. Not isolated heroism nor a political community but the joining of friends makes it possible. *Bacchae*, however, seemingly celebrating an ecstatic release, finally uncovers an abyss of ruin at the edge of it.

CARL A. P. RUCK — *IG II² 2323: The List of the Victors in Comedies at the Dionysia*

The agonotheses at Athens for the year 279/8 B.C. commemorated his service in supervising the dramatic festivals by erecting a monument which recorded his city's theatrical history up to that date; the dedicatory inscription survives in *IG II² 1193*. The record comprised four distinct lists (*IG II² 2319–2322, 2323a*), inscribed in uniform lettering: (1) tragedies at the Dionysia, (2) comedies at the Dionysia, (3) comedies at the Lenaea, and (4) tragedies at the Lenaea. The records up to the time of Aristotle were no doubt based on his research on the didascaliae. The entire record was inscribed on the inner walls of a hexagonal building, on the Ionic epistyle or architrave of which was inscribed a compilation of the names of the victorious actors and poets, arranged without dates but in chronological order (*IG II² 2325*).

The nine didascalic fragments, most recently edited as *IG II² 2323*, represent what remains of a fifth list, recording comedies at the Dionysia and inscribed from time to time in several hands as a continuation of the original didascaliae. It probably began with 278/7 B.C. and stretched across two orthostates. From the first orthostate nothing survives; the earliest of the fragments is from the edge of the second orthostate and is for some year *ca.* 206 B.C.; the latest records the year 144/3, but was apparently not the end of the inscription.

During this period the festival for comedies was not held every year; on the average, five performances of the festival were staged every ten years, although there was apparently no regular biennial sequence. For a year in which no performance occurred, the inscription recorded the archon with a notice that the festival was not held. When the festival did occur, the inscription, after the archon dating, recorded first the actor who presented a revived performance of an earlier play, together with the name of the play and its author. Next followed, in the order in which they placed in the contest, the playwrights of the new comedies, together with the titles of their plays and their actor. Whereas only five new comedies had been the normal number in the earlier period, six were regularly presented. An additional notice recorded the victorious actor; the actor who presented the revived comedy was included in this competition. The titles of the plays for the most part indicate a heavy dependence on the work of the earlier playwrights of the Middle and New Comedy; the period documented by the inscription is, however, very scantily represented by fragments from actual contemporary plays.

The present study begins with an attempt to place the nine fragments. To this end, there is offered a detailed description of the hands of the four masons who inscribed the record and a discussion of the nature of the stones themselves and the character of the breaks. Cognizance is taken of the lines scratched by the masons as a guide in their lettering; these lines were drawn by eye and not by actual measuring. On the basis of this evidence the stones are placed in exact relation to one another and the extent of the lacuna is in each instance estimated. Some of the nine fragments had formerly been united to make up six; these had been reduced to five by a join (discovered earlier by Sterling Dow) between Fragment I and the united group Fragments B-C-D.

A new text of the inscription is presented, together with a line-by-line commentary. A disruption in the regular performance of the comic festival on Fragment A is dated to the year 200 B.C. and the cause of the disturbance is seen in the invasion of Attica by Philip in that year; some new evidence for the archon sequence for the years around this period may also be indicated. Indexes and a scale drawing of the entire inscription conclude the study.



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